feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation by wpfleger96 · Pull Request #6994 · block/buzz

wpfleger96 · 2026-08-28T17:17:55Z

PR 2 of the NIP-FI plan: the schema foundation. Establishes the durable server-side identity ledger and final-admission surface that the runtime phases build on. All of Phase A's migrations live here; later phases own their own deltas.

Depends on nothing — PR 1 (#6776, merged) owned zero migration files. This PR's relations are shaped to store exactly what PR 1's verifier produces: issuer-qualified identity and the four denial classes. They meet in a later PR that writes a verified assertion into these tables in one transaction.

Two internally-ordered migrations

0041_nip_fi_identity_foundation.sql (migration A) — core identity + base-lifecycle relations (5 tables): issuer-qualified (iss, sub) bindings, lifecycle history/selectors, enrollment policies, and operation receipts. Applies cleanly to current main.
0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql (migration B) — the final-admission surface (10 tables): authorization events + capacity, admission results, replay/receipt guards, audit, invalidation domains/floors, protected-object authority, authority epochs, and restore version deltas. Applies to A's resulting state.

Fifteen NIP-FI relations total, zero dangling foreign keys. Identity is issuer-qualified throughout — no single-global-issuer assumption in any relation, no Block-hardcoding. A single deployment may run one issuer; that is config, not schema.

Durable, immutable ledger posture

All 15 relations are append-only (immutable no_delete/no_truncate triggers) and carry community_id as provenance, not ownership. Both migrations widen the single SQL source of truth community_write_fence_excluded_table so the relations are never fence-attached, never purged on community deletion, and never counted as tenant-scoped drift by the deletion control plane's exact-set catalog check — the same posture main already applies to product_feedback and rate_limit_violations. schema/schema.sql keeps one consolidated definition of that function whose exclusion array byte-matches 0042, guarded by a parity assertion so a future consolidation cannot silently drop NIP-FI relations from the ledger.

This makes a tenant's identity/authorization ledger survive community deletion, per the spec's FI-INV-02 (durable binding) and FI-INV-03 (tombstone monotonicity) and NIP-FI.md's "durable server state" ruling. communities(id) FK never dangles: community rows become permanent tombstones, never hard-deleted.

Authorization shape and cardinality contracts

Authenticated OperatorDenied events (actor_kind 1–3, non-null request_fingerprint) carry a null semantic_fingerprint and commit without a denial-attempt row. The denial-attempt cardinality and shape guards are scoped to unresolved pre-auth kind-9 events (actor_kind = 4). Applied and no-op lifecycle receipts (outcome_code IN (1, 3)) require exactly one mapped success-transition event; denied lifecycle receipts (outcome_code = 2) require zero events from the complete core lifecycle success-transition class (kinds 1, 2, 3, 6: enrolled, revoked, rotated, retired) — any such event paired with a denied receipt would record a transition that never occurred.

Mined vs. new

Re-cut from Franco's #1476 (0029/0030) and Cea's #4772 committer schema, re-cut along FK topology and renumbered above the live main tip. The buzz-auth core of #1476 is Cea-authored; Co-authored-by reflects verified per-commit authorship of the mined schema.

Zero Rust/deletion.rs edits — the migration-only exclusion widening keeps EXPECTED_SCOPED_TABLES untouched.

wesbillman

Carl, an automated reviewer, commenting via Wes’s GitHub account.

Requesting changes for one contract-breaking schema constraint:

identity_bindings uses a composite FK from (community_id, policy_revision, binding_provenance) to (community_id, policy_revision, enrollment_mode). That forces immutable binding provenance to equal the policy mode. NIP-FI requires TOFU policy to record attested-key provenance when the assertion supplies the matching key (docs/nips/NIP-FI.md, Direct preparation), and rotation independently chooses attested-key or provisioned from replacement evidence (Base lifecycle). Those valid rows cannot satisfy the FK when their provenance differs from the policy mode, so final admission or rotation will fail at commit or persist false provenance.

Keep the policy reference on (community_id, policy_revision) only; binding_provenance already has a closed-value check and should be validated from operation evidence rather than equated to enrollment mode. Please add a behavioral migration regression covering TOFU policy + attested-key provenance (and preferably rotation under a differently named policy mode), since the current tests exercise catalog shape and invalidation but not this valid binding path.

The migration ordering, ledger immutability/deletion exclusions, lifecycle/history/selector coupling, invalidation guards, capacity accounting, authority replacement, restore delta cardinality, and consolidated-schema parity had no additional blocking findings in the reviewed exact-head diff. Broad CI was green; the separate automated Codex security job timed out/cancelled and is process metadata, not this verdict’s basis.

wesbillman

Carl, an automated reviewer, commenting via Wes’s GitHub account.

Changes requested at exact head 81d5992bb188301629d920eb38d2af0d4beee63a. The previous provenance/policy-mode FK defect is fixed and now has both positive and negative coverage. Three blocking schema-contract gaps remain:

[High] Make enrollment-policy revision ordering authoritative. The migration describes these as “immutable monotonic local policy revisions,” but identity_enrollment_policies only requires a positive revision and uniqueness (0041_nip_fi_identity_foundation.sql lines 50–65); its triggers only prevent update/delete/truncate (lines 836–841). A writer can commit revision 100 and later insert revision 1 or 99, then create a binding against that stale backfilled policy. Add a serialized per-community head/allocator or equivalent insert guard, define the effective-time ordering contract, and test forward, replay, and backfill transitions.
[High] Require exactly one closed admission result for each protected-operation receipt. authorization_admission_results has only a child-to-receipt FK (0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql lines 573–638). The existing receipt companion guards cover lifecycle operations and return for protected operation kind 11 (0041 lines 596–620, 0042 lines 647–717). A kind-11 receipt can therefore commit without the result needed to reconstruct exact replay, while a result can attach to an unrelated receipt kind. Add a bidirectional deferred cardinality/semantic guard tying the result and fingerprint to the protected receipt.
[High] Bind every pre-auth denial event to exactly one semantically matching attempt. The denial row’s FK includes only community, event ID/kind, and operation ID (0042 lines 229–259); it does not bind correlation, reason, or attempt identity, and there is no event-to-attempt cardinality guard. A kind-9 event can commit alone, or an event for correlation A/reason X can be attached to a denial row for correlation B/reason Y. Add sufficient shared keys plus a bidirectional deferred semantic/cardinality guard.

The same gaps exist in schema/schema.sql. The migration tests currently prove catalog existence, FK validity, exclusion/deletion behavior, and one immutability path, but do not exercise these relationships (migration.rs lines 2744–2840). Current exact-head CI is otherwise green; the Codex security job was cancelled, not failed. Review used GitHub metadata, diff, and exact-head source only; no PR code was executed.

…e duplicate-prefix absorb collision Upstream consumed migration numbers 0035 through 0040 (0035_relay_operators .. 0040_push_message_kinds) while the fork held 0035_task_system.sql, so the prospective merged tree carried two files claiming the 0035 prefix -- a schema-ordering hazard, not a cosmetic one. Renumber to 0041, the next free number measured against the merged tree with git ls-tree on both refs immediately before committing (the three open 0041 claimants block#6981/block#6994/block#6960 re-verified unmerged at commit time). The deliberate 0035-0040 gap is the design: it reserves the range upstream already owns so the next absorb drops those six files into empty slots with no second collision. This supersedes the earlier 0040 target recorded in the prior attempt: block#6269 merged 0040_push_message_kinds.sql 23 minutes after that branch was cut, which would have recreated the collision one number up. Zero SQL bytes change (md5 ce760c56f87fb31ae02096a07a96eb04 before and after). The migration count stays 35 -- this is a renumber, not an addition -- so only the highest version moves, 35 -> 41, in the task-system assertion. Signed-off-by: Michael Feth <[email protected]>

kalvinnchau · 2026-08-31T17:28:59Z

Blocking findings

[P2] Scope denial-attempt coupling to unresolved actors

migrations/0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql:233-239,551-624

The schema supports two kind-9 OperatorDenied shapes: unresolved pre-authentication events (actor_kind = 4, null receipt fingerprint) and authenticated operator denials (actor_kind 1–3, canonical receipt fingerprint). The semantic-fingerprint check and deferred cardinality guard classify every kind-9 event as pre-authentication and require an authorization_authentication_denial_attempts row.

A valid authenticated denial therefore aborts at commit with authorization_denial_attempt_event_cardinality. Creating a denial-attempt row instead would violate that table's credential-free pre-authentication contract and closed Missing/Invalid/Unauthenticated reasons.

Scope semantic fingerprint and denial-attempt cardinality to actor_kind = 4. Require attempt rows to reference an unresolved kind-9 event with a null receipt fingerprint. Mirror the change in schema/schema.sql, and add positive authenticated-kind-9 and negative cross-shape regressions.

[P2] Do not require success events for denied lifecycle receipts

migrations/0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql:916-941

authorization_operation_receipts permits outcome_code = 2 (denied), while migration 0041 correctly requires lifecycle history only for applied/no-op outcomes. The authorization-event guard ignores outcome and requires an enrolled/retired/revoked/rotated event for every lifecycle receipt.

A denied lifecycle receipt therefore cannot commit alone. Adding the required event would falsely record that the lifecycle transition occurred.

Apply lifecycle-event cardinality only when outcome_code IN (1, 3), matching the guard's stated successful/no-op contract and the history guard. Mirror the change in schema/schema.sql and add a denied-receipt regression.

Non-blocking findings

[P3] Correct stale migration-number references

migrations/0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql:15,171,964

Three comments still refer to migration 0040 after the identity migration was renumbered to 0041. Replace those stale references so the migration and schema/schema.sql mirror describe the same ordering.

[P3] Run the new PostgreSQL migration regressions in CI

crates/buzz-db/src/runtime/migration.rs:2659+

The new PostgreSQL-backed NIP-FI tests are ignored and are not selected by a --run-ignored CI lane. They pass when run manually, but CI currently proves only that the migrations apply, not that the new monotonicity, cardinality, provenance, intermediate-state, and deletion-ledger invariants hold. Add these tests to the PostgreSQL-backed CI lane.

[P3] Remove the trailing blank line

schema/schema.sql:3735

git diff --check reports a new blank line at EOF. Remove it to keep the diff clean.

Introduce the Phase-A NIP-FI schema as two internally-ordered migrations: 0040 lays down the core identity and base-lifecycle relations, and 0041 applies to 0040's resulting state to add the final-admission surface (replay/receipt, audit events, invalidation, capacity, protected-object authority, restore version deltas, and the closed admission result). Identity is issuer-qualified (iss, sub) with no hardcoded issuer. All 15 NIP-FI relations are a durable, immutable, append-only security ledger: both migrations widen the single SQL source of truth community_write_fence_excluded_table so the relations are never fence-attached, purged on community deletion, nor counted as tenant-scoped drift by the deletion control plane's exact-set catalog check — the same posture as product_feedback and rate_limit_violations. schema.sql keeps one consolidated definition of that function whose body byte-matches 0041. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <[email protected]>

…n guard The authorization_invalidation_floor_guard_v1 trigger compared NEW/OLD.relationship_revision_floor, but authorization_invalidation_floors has no such column — a later FI-DELEG field correctly trimmed from the Phase-A table when mining, yet left in the guard body. PL/pgSQL defers record-field resolution, so the function CREATEs and all catalog/parity tests pass, but the first real monotonic floor advancement aborts with 'record NEW has no field relationship_revision_floor', making the floor update path unusable. Remove both comparisons from the migration and its byte-matched schema.sql mirror, and add a behavioral regression test that advances a floor through the live trigger (forward generation and binding_version_floor commit; equal/regressive updates reject) — coverage a deferred PL/pgSQL failure structurally evades in catalog tests. Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

…egression The FK on identity_bindings previously equated binding_provenance with the enrollment policy's enrollment_mode via a composite reference: (community_id, policy_revision, binding_provenance) → identity_enrollment_policies (community_id, policy_revision, enrollment_mode) This contract-breaks NIP-FI §352 and §424: provenance is determined from operation evidence, not the policy mode. A TOFU-mode policy (mode=3) with an attested-key binding (provenance=1) — a valid and specified admission path — would fail at commit with a FK violation. Narrow the FK to (community_id, policy_revision) → (community_id, policy_revision), which is already the PK of identity_enrollment_policies. The redundant UNIQUE (community_id, policy_revision, enrollment_mode) on identity_enrollment_policies is removed; it existed only to satisfy the old composite FK and has no other consumer. Both changes applied in lockstep to the migration and the schema.sql mirror. The parity assertion in admin_schema_parity_between_desired_state_and_migrations continues to hold. Add behavioral regression identity_binding_provenance_is_independent_of_enrollment_mode: seeds a TOFU-mode policy, inserts an attested-key binding in a single deferred transaction, and asserts the commit succeeds with provenance=1 and mode=3 persisted independently. Mutation-verified: restoring the composite FK causes the test to fail with the exact FK violation (code 23503) the fix removes. Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

Extends identity_binding_provenance_is_independent_of_enrollment_mode with the negative half required for two-sided mutation sensitivity. A second deferred transaction inserts an otherwise-valid identity_bindings row referencing policy_revision 999 (nonexistent in identity_enrollment_policies) and asserts the INSERT fails with SQLSTATE 23503 from the narrowed FK identity_bindings(community_id, policy_revision) → identity_enrollment_policies(community_id, policy_revision). Non-vacuity verified: removing the FK from the migration causes the absent-policy INSERT to succeed (rows_affected: 1) and the expect_err assertion to fire, confirming the negative half detects a dropped or neutered FK. The existing positive half catches the old composite FK; together they give full two-sided coverage. Zero production changes: migrations 0040/0041 and schema.sql are byte-untouched. Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

main landed 0040_push_message_kinds.sql (#6269) which collides with the previous NIP-FI numbering. Renumber: 0040_nip_fi_identity_foundation.sql → 0041 0041_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql → 0042 Update all test references, run_to() calls, and schema.sql comments to match. The push_match_trigger test (migrations[39].version == 40) is unchanged — it covers the push-notification migration at 0040, not NIP-FI. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

…ion result cardinality, denial attempt binding Finding 1 (policy revision monotonicity): add identity_enrollment_policy_revision_guard_v1() BEFORE INSERT on identity_enrollment_policies. Uses a per-community advisory lock via hashtextextended so concurrent writers serialize the max-revision read, then asserts both policy_revision and effective_at strictly exceed the current community maximum (FI-INV-06 — stable assertion policy). Finding 2 (admission result ↔ kind-11 receipt cardinality): add authorization_admission_result_guard_v1(), bidirectional deferred constraint trigger on both authorization_operation_receipts (kind-11 receipt must have exactly one result) and authorization_admission_results (result must attach to a kind-11 receipt). Mirrors the pattern of the existing authorization_operation_receipt_event_guard_v1. Finding 3 (denial event ↔ attempt binding): add authorization_denial_attempt_guard_v1(), bidirectional deferred constraint trigger on both authorization_events (kind-9 event must have exactly one denial attempt) and authorization_authentication_denial_attempts (attempt must reference an existing kind-9 event). The existing FK binds (audit_event_kind=9) but does not require a kind-9 event to have a matching attempt row; this guard closes that gap. All three fixes applied identically in migrations/0041, migrations/0042, and schema/schema.sql; the parity assertion continues to pass. Tests added (all three mutation-sensitive, two-sided): - identity_enrollment_policy_revision_is_monotonic - authorization_admission_result_requires_kind_11_receipt_bidirectional - authorization_denial_attempt_requires_kind_9_event_bidirectional No new tables; fence exclusion list unchanged; #[ignore] deletion suite need not rerun. Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

Three IMPORTANT findings fixed: 1. Drop effective_at monotonicity from policy revision guard identity_enrollment_policy_revision_guard_v1() now enforces only strict-greater policy_revision per community. The effective_at check had no NIP-FI basis (FI-INV-06 defines assertion_policy_id stability, not revision chronology) and would reject legitimately-sequenced revisions — the downstream constructor stamps every immediately- effective revision with Unix epoch, so revision 2 would fail after revision 1 under the old guard. 2. Bind semantic coordinates in denial attempt guard authorization_authentication_denial_attempts gains attempt_id UUID NOT NULL with a deferred FK to authorization_events on (community_id, operation_id, event_kind, attempt_id). The guard authorization_denial_attempt_guard_v1() now additionally compares correlation_id and reason_code between the event and its denial attempt row, raising check_violation (23514) with named constraint authorization_denial_attempt_semantic_binding on mismatch. This closes the Carl finding 3 gap: a kind-9 event for correlation A / reason X can no longer be paired with a denial row carrying correlation B / reason Y. 3. Rewrite regression tests to prove the contracts - Policy test: seeds a gap (100->101) then inserts unused revision 99 and asserts 23514 from the named guard (not 23505, which would fire on a PK duplicate and not prove the monotonic comparison). Adds a two-transaction concurrency regression: two distinct forward revisions (102, 103) race through separate connections; both commit because the advisory lock serializes them and each is valid. - Denial test: replaces the ambiguous negative-B (23503 OR 23514) with three single-coordinate-mismatch cases attributed to the named guard: B1 correlation_id mismatch (23514), B2 reason_code mismatch (23514), B3 attempt_id mismatch (23503 via deferred FK). - Admission test: adds negative C -- mismatched request_fingerprint rejected by the immediate composite FK (23503) at INSERT, proving the coordinate binding half of Carl finding 2. All four changed files byte-identical between migration files and schema/schema.sql (verified by extraction+cmp). All 5 NIP-FI tests, admin_schema_parity, and 2 unit tests pass. Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

Three IMPORTANT findings addressed: IMPORTANT 1 (denial semantic binding, partial): Bind the remaining two unbound denial identity coordinates. - Add semantic_fingerprint BYTEA to authorization_events: required non-zero for kind-9 events, NULL for all other event kinds (enforced by CHECK on the table). This is the redaction-safe intent_digest coordinate. - Add authorization_denial_reason_reason_code_binding CHECK to authorization_authentication_denial_attempts: encodes the canonical OperatorAuthenticationDenialReason <-> AuthorizationReasonCode mapping from operator_lifecycle.rs:700-706 and authorization_events.rs:215-226: MissingCredential(1)<->Missing(2), InvalidCredential(2)<->Invalid(3), Unauthenticated(3)<->Unauthenticated(4). Fires at INSERT, not COMMIT. - Extend authorization_denial_attempt_guard_v1() to compare semantic_fingerprint between event and denial attempt in both firing directions, raising 23514 'authorization_denial_attempt_semantic_binding' on mismatch. Carl's mismatched-reason and mismatched-fingerprint cross-attachments are now fully closed. IMPORTANT 2 (concurrency regression): Replace the 10ms-sleep approach with a tokio::sync::Barrier(2) that holds both connections after BEGIN and before INSERT. Both race to pg_advisory_xact_lock; one blocks, the winner commits, the loser sees MAX=102 and fails with 23514 (not 23505). XOR assertion proves exactly one INSERT succeeds, and the loser's 23514 (not PK 23505) proves the advisory lock — not just PK uniqueness — is the serialization mechanism. Contradictory comments fixed. MINORs (folded in): - Fix stale test doc comment claiming effective_at must advance (it does not; the downstream constructor stamps Unix epoch for immediate policy). - Fix equal-revision comment incorrectly claiming different policy_digest avoids the PK; the PK is (community_id, policy_revision). CI fmt failure: cargo fmt --all run; whitespace-only reformatting of some query blocks in migration.rs. Regressions added/updated: - B4: denial_reason/reason_code mapping violation rejected at INSERT by the immediate CHECK (23514 from authorization_denial_reason_reason_code_binding). - B5: semantic_fingerprint mismatch between event and denial attempt rejected at COMMIT by the deferred guard (23514 from authorization_denial_attempt_semantic_binding). Byte-parity (extraction+cmp): - authorization_events table: 3394 bytes, migration == schema.sql - authorization_authentication_denial_attempts table: 2062 bytes, migration == schema.sql - authorization_denial_attempt_guard_v1(): 5579 bytes, migration == schema.sql - identity_enrollment_policy_revision_guard_v1(): 1113 bytes, migration == schema.sql - authorization_admission_result_guard_v1(): 2164 bytes, migration == schema.sql All five NIP-FI tests green locally (run in isolation to avoid pre-existing pool-state flakiness in the full suite). Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

…tion schedule The previous concurrency regression used a tokio::sync::Barrier to synchronize two connections before racing to INSERT the same revision. That construction synchronizes client-side INSERT dispatch, not trigger execution; a lock-free schedule where one INSERT completes and commits before the other reads MAX still satisfies the XOR + 23514 assertions, so the test offered no deterministic proof that pg_advisory_xact_lock is required. Replace with a controlled two-connection schedule: 1. tx1 opens a transaction and inserts revision 102. The BEFORE INSERT trigger acquires pg_advisory_xact_lock and completes; tx1 holds the advisory lock until commit. 2. tx2 opens a transaction on a second backend, reports its pg_backend_pid over a oneshot channel, then issues INSERT for revision 103. The trigger fires and blocks on the advisory lock held by tx1. 3. The main task polls pg_stat_activity WHERE pid = tx2_pid AND wait_event_type = 'Lock' AND wait_event = 'advisory' with a 10 s bounded timeout. Without pg_advisory_xact_lock in the guard the trigger returns immediately, tx2 never enters the advisory wait, and the poll times out — making the regression deterministically red. 4. tx1 commits, releasing the lock. tx2 unblocks, its trigger reads the fresh MAX=102, and INSERT 103 succeeds. tx2 commits. 5. Final count asserts six revisions (1, 2, 100, 101, 102, 103). Zero production changes: migrations/0041, migrations/0042, and schema/schema.sql are byte-untouched (single-file diff confirmed). Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

… and add regressions Addresses all five Kalvin-agent findings against PR 2 head 0534277: **Authenticated kind-9 shape (IMPORTANT):** The semantic_fingerprint CHECK and denial-attempt cardinality guard incorrectly classified every kind-9 event as unresolved pre-auth, requiring a denial-attempt row and a non-null fingerprint for authenticated OperatorDenied events (actor_kind 1–3). Scope the non-zero semantic_fingerprint constraint to actor_kind = 4 (require NULL for actor_kind 1–3). On the event side, skip the denial-attempt guard when actor_kind ≠ 4. On the attempt side, add a shape guard that rejects binding to any event with actor_kind ≠ 4 or non-null request_fingerprint, named authorization_denial_attempt_event_kind so the attribution is distinguishable from the pre-existing semantic-binding check. **Lifecycle receipt outcome cardinality (IMPORTANT):** The lifecycle-event guard fired for denied lifecycle receipts (outcome_code = 2), requiring a fabricated transition event. Apply event cardinality only for outcome_code IN (1, 3), matching the stated successful/no-op contract. A denied receipt now commits without a paired audit event. **Stale migration-number comments (MINOR):** Three comments in 0042 still referenced migration 0040 after the identity migration was renumbered to 0041. Updated to 0041. **Trailing EOF blank (MINOR):** Removed extra blank line at end of schema/schema.sql; git diff --check is now clean. **CI wiring:** Excluded per Will's ruling — Luke owns the PostgreSQL CI lane. New regressions added to migration.rs (both #[ignore = "requires Postgres"]): - authenticated_kind_9_denial_commits_without_denial_attempt: positive A commits an authenticated denial without a denial-attempt row; negative B proves a denial-attempt cannot attach to the authenticated event, assertion keyed on exact constraint name authorization_denial_attempt_event_kind. - denied_lifecycle_receipt_commits_without_audit_event: a denied enroll receipt commits standalone; guard skips outcome_code 2. Mutations verified red: 1. Removing actor_kind gate from event-side trigger → positive A fails (COMMIT rejected, no attempt row present). 2. Removing actor_kind shape guard from attempt-side → negative B fails with authorization_denial_attempt_semantic_binding instead of authorization_denial_attempt_event_kind. 3. Removing outcome_code NOT IN (1, 3) gate → denied-receipt positive fails. All 9 NIP-FI PostgreSQL regressions pass at the corrected head. Mirror: every changed function/check applied identically to schema/schema.sql. Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

…receipts A denied core lifecycle receipt (outcome_code = 2) requires zero events of the mapped success-transition kind. The previous blanket RETURN NULL for outcome_code NOT IN (1, 3) let a denied receipt commit alongside its mapped success-transition event, creating contradictory durable ledger facts: denial plus enrolled/retired/revoked/rotated. Replace the early return with a three-way branch in authorization_operation_receipt_event_guard_v1(): outcome_code IN (1, 3) — exactly-one mapped event (unchanged) outcome_code = 2 — zero events of the mapped transition kind; raises authorization_denied_lifecycle_receipt_no_success_event other — skip (not a core lifecycle outcome) Both deferred trigger directions share the same function body; a single transaction with both INSERT paths exercises both directions at COMMIT. The new negative fixture inserts a denied enroll receipt plus its mapped success-transition event (event_kind = 1) in one transaction and asserts COMMIT rejection with the exact constraint name. Mutation: stashing the ELSIF branch lets COMMIT succeed, so expect_err panics — confirming the branch is load-bearing (verified red). Also correct three stale doc comments: - Remove the "COMMIT succeeds" claim in the attempt-side shape guard mutation note; accurately state the pre-existing semantic-binding constraint fires instead. - Remove the false claim that denial-attempt/admission-result tests protect applied/no-op lifecycle; replace with accurate coverage note. - Update the semantic_fingerprint column comment to distinguish unresolved pre-auth kind-9 (actor_kind = 4) from authenticated kind-9 (actor_kind 1-3). All changes byte-mirrored between migration 0042 and schema/schema.sql. All 9 NIP-FI ignored PostgreSQL regressions pass (--test-threads=1). Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

…ixture Two MINOR accuracy gaps from Thufir Pass 2: 1. Event-side trigger isolation The denied-receipt-then-event negative in denied_lifecycle_receipt_commits_without_audit_event queues both deferred triggers in one transaction; it does not prove the event-side trigger (authorization_event_receipt_cardinality) alone. Add denied_lifecycle_receipt_event_side_trigger_isolated: commit a denied receipt in auto-commit (no deferred trigger active), then open a new transaction that inserts only the mapped success-transition event and asserts COMMIT rejection with the exact constraint name. Rejection must come from the event-side trigger only. 2. Applied lifecycle coverage at migration 42 No test exercised the outcome_code IN (1, 3) branch at migration 42. Add applied_lifecycle_receipt_requires_exactly_one_event: an applied enroll receipt + exactly one mapped event commits; the same setup without the event rejects with authorization_operation_receipt_event_cardinality. Uses the minimum valid circular identity/lifecycle setup (policy + history + receipt + binding + event), stops at migration 42 not 41. 3. Correct surrounding mutation/coverage comments - denied_lifecycle_receipt_commits_without_audit_event: update mutation note to name both new tests, remove the stale claim that the receipt-then-event negative covers both trigger directions. - The receipt-then-event negative comment is tightened to say only the receipt-side trigger fires in that transaction. No production SQL changes. All 11 NIP-FI ignored PostgreSQL regressions green (--test-threads=1). Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

kalvinnchau

🤖 ## Changes requested

[P2] Denied lifecycle receipts accept a different lifecycle success event

migrations/0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql:978-984

The denied branch rejects only the operation's mapped expected_event_kind. A denied enroll receipt blocks enrolled kind 1 but accepts revoked, rotated, or retired success kinds 2/3/6 under the same operation and fingerprint. That commits contradictory immutable ledger facts. The shared event-side trigger retains the same gap.

For denied lifecycle receipts, require zero events from the entire core lifecycle-transition set (1, 2, 3, 6), while permitting legitimate denial events such as authenticated kind 9. Mirror this in schema/schema.sql and add a wrong-transition-kind regression through both deferred trigger directions.

[P3] NIP-FI PostgreSQL regressions remain outside CI

crates/buzz-db/src/runtime/migration.rs:2667-4997, .github/workflows/ci.yml:688-877

The behavioral tests remain ignored and Backend Integration has no runtime::migration selector. Add a serial CI selector so these database contracts cannot regress behind green required checks.

The two original blockers are fixed: authenticated kind-9 denials now commit without denial-attempt rows, cross-shape attempt attachment rejects, denied lifecycle receipts commit alone, and mapped success events reject. Stale migration comments and the diff --check issue are also fixed.

Reviewed exact head bd851f85e746ff7bdadcede58c130dc5e57777da against base bc006f67087b049e2f9c4d8a2f26faceff628225. All 17 ignored migration tests and 115 runnable buzz-db library tests passed in exact-head review runs; the missing cross-kind case is why those green tests are insufficient.

Scores

Minimalness: 8/10 — the SQL repair is focused, but the fixture-heavy test addition is large and misses the decisive cross-kind boundary.
Elegance: 8/10 — readable branching, but the denied invariant is encoded as one mapped equality rather than the transition class it must forbid.
Correctness: 8/10 — authenticated kind-9 and denied-without-event now work, but a denied lifecycle operation can still carry a conflicting success transition.

…ycle receipts The previous denied-outcome branch counted only the receipt's mapped event_kind (e.g., kind 1 for enroll). A wrong-kind success-transition event — kind 6 (retired) on a denied enroll receipt — was not in scope and could commit, producing contradictory durable ledger facts: a denied receipt paired with a retirement event that never occurred. Widen the denied filter from event_kind = expected_event_kind to event_kind IN (1, 2, 3, 6) — the complete core lifecycle success-transition class (enrolled, revoked, rotated, retired). Applied and no-op outcomes (outcome_code IN (1, 3)) are unchanged: exactly one mapped transition event. Legitimate audit/denial events of other kinds (e.g., authenticated kind 9) remain allowed. Add two cross-kind regressions proving both trigger directions: - denied_lifecycle_receipt_wrong_kind_receipt_side: receipt-side trigger with a kind-6 event on a denied enroll receipt. - denied_lifecycle_receipt_wrong_kind_event_side: event-side trigger isolation — committed denied receipt followed by a kind-6 event in a new transaction. Mutation evidence: narrowing the filter back to event_kind = expected_event_kind makes both wrong-kind negatives green (COMMIT succeeds when it must not, expect_err panics), confirming the class-based guard is the load-bearing boundary. The prior mapped-kind mutation result is preserved. All 13 NIP-FI ignored PostgreSQL regressions green (--test-threads=1). SQL change byte-exact between migrations/0042 and schema/schema.sql. Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

dismissed

…enericize * origin/main: feat(desktop): add isolated named demo builds (#6407) fix(model-capabilities): humanize databricks goose model names (#7135) feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation (#6994) feat(buzz-acp): give each channel thread its own agent session (#6732) docs: add review-proven failure-path & async-state rules to AGENTS.md (#7061) Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

…h-coordinator * origin/main: feat(desktop): add isolated named demo builds (#6407) fix(model-capabilities): humanize databricks goose model names (#7135) feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation (#6994) feat(buzz-acp): give each channel thread its own agent session (#6732) docs: add review-proven failure-path & async-state rules to AGENTS.md (#7061) fix(desktop): back split thread headers (#7137) Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]>

…-channel-permissions * origin/main: fix(model-capabilities): humanize databricks goose model names (#7135) feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation (#6994) feat(buzz-acp): give each channel thread its own agent session (#6732) docs: add review-proven failure-path & async-state rules to AGENTS.md (#7061) fix(desktop): back split thread headers (#7137) add public descriptions to agent personas (#7126) feat(desktop): add protected-build Bestie experiment (#6902) fix(relay): reject a frame on its own acknowledgement channel (#6961) fix(acp): wake agents from workflow messages (#6953) Signed-off-by: John Tennant <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # crates/buzz-db/src/runtime/migration.rs # schema/schema.sql

* fix: retrieving cold memories; add regression task (#6950) ## Why Evaluating buzz agent memory retrieval by seeding a memory then asking the buzz agent a question it needs that memory. **Bug Found**: System prompt had no inclusion of retrieving cold memories and suggested looking in a mem/*.md directory that does not exist. Updated `system-prompt.md` to include memory CLI tools and usage. Eval Before System Prompt Change: 0/3 Eval After System Prompt Change: 3/3 ## What - Add a `memory-retrieval` benchmark that seeds agent memory with `buzz mem set` before asking a direct question. - Grade the observable threaded answer without inspecting tool calls or exposing the answer in channel history. - Teach agents to use `buzz mem set`, `buzz mem ls`, and `buzz mem get` for cold memory. - Add a wire-debug endpoint configuration for diagnosing ACP tool calls in local runs. - Add fixture, seeding, verifier, and prompt coverage. ## Risk Assessment Low. The runtime changes are limited to the benchmark harness. The production-facing change clarifies existing memory commands in the base prompt; it does not change memory storage, relay behavior, or authorization. ## References - Before the system-prompt changes, 0/3 attempts passed because agents never invoked the `buzz mem` CLI and instead searched a non existent filesystem - After the changes, 3/3 attempts passed. ACP wire logs confirmed that every agent ran `buzz mem ls` followed by `buzz mem get` and returned `net_gpv`. --------- Signed-off-by: Philip Azar <[email protected]> * fix(ci): salvage Codex review output on PTY-shutdown hang (#7042) Codex CLI can leave a PTY descendant holding the action's inherited stdio after the turn completes. The `runCodexExec.ts` wrapper waits on a `close` event that never fires, so the `Review pull request` step hangs until the job timeout kills it — discarding the finished review the CLI already wrote to disk. The CLI writes the completed review to the `--output-last-message` file (exposed as `output-file`) **before** the hang. This PR adds a salvage step that recovers it, and sets the step and job timeouts to preserve the full 30-minute Codex execution budget. **Changes (`codex-security-review.yml`):** - Add `output-file: ${{ runner.temp }}/codex-review.json` to the `Review pull request` step so the CLI writes the result before the hang. (`runner` context is valid in `steps.with`; not in `jobs.env`.) - Add `timeout-minutes: 30` and `continue-on-error: true` to the Codex step — a hang now costs ≤30 minutes instead of 40, and the salvage step still runs. - Set job `timeout-minutes: 40` to give setup, step cancellation, and salvage sufficient headroom without colliding with the Codex execution budget. The original 30-minute job timeout was too narrow: evidence from run [33114428326](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33114428326/job/98665369165) shows completed output appearing 28m46s after step start, meaning a 20-minute step timeout could kill a legitimate review before the salvage file exists. - Add a `Salvage review output` step with `if: always()`: prefers `steps.run_codex.outputs.final-message` on a clean exit; falls back to the output file when the step timed out. The output file path is set in the step's own `env` block (`CODEX_OUTPUT_FILE: ${{ runner.temp }}/codex-review.json`), where `runner` is valid. Validates shape (non-empty JSON object, has `overall_risk`); fails the job hard if neither source is present. - Wire the job `outputs.review_json` to `steps.salvage.outputs.review_json`. **Changes (`Justfile`, `ci.yml`):** - Add `actionlint .github/workflows/codex-security-review.yml` to `security-review-check` so expression-validity errors are caught locally. - Provision `actionlint` via Hermit (pinned v1.7.12) rather than a one-off `Install actionlint` curl step, so the same binary is used locally and in CI. **Security posture is unchanged:** the salvage step reads the action's own output and a file written to `runner.temp` — neither is PR-controlled. Credential-stripping env block on the Codex step is untouched. Note this is a temporary workaround until https://github.com/openai/codex-action/issues/169 is addressed --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> * feat: render agent avatars as squircles (#7106) ## Summary - render every agent/AI identity as a 30% squircle across desktop and mobile while keeping human avatars circular - propagate agent identity through message, thread, profile, reaction, member, DM, search, workflow, project, huddle, forum, pulse, and agent-management surfaces - preserve squircle geometry for fallbacks, focus/status treatments, add-agent controls, and overlapping avatar outlines (`calc(30% + 2px)` for the outer background) ### Related issue None found. This change was requested and visually reviewed in the originating Buzz thread. ### Testing - `just desktop-test` — 5,799 passed - `just mobile-test` — 2,008 passed - pre-push gates passed at `0d59d77b120dcb90aac2f918e422c11c9fa5353b`: desktop check, TypeScript typecheck, desktop full test suite, mobile format/analyze and full test suite, Rust tests, Tauri checks, and differential file-size gate - deterministic desktop visual sweep covered channel messages/thread summaries; thread, subthread, and sub-subthread depths; reactions and reactor popovers; hover/full profiles; added-to-channel activity; channel members/settings; agent library/team overlaps; agent creation; mention autocomplete; and DM header/sidebar/settings ### UI evidence The complete labeled visual matrix is available in the originating Buzz review thread. GitHub-hosted copies will be added in a follow-up PR comment using the repository screenshot script. --------- Signed-off-by: Fizz <dae5f6af70b8695a8b83c8deae555f63be41630ec2b8cd493e41a439c9527dd8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Fizz <dae5f6af70b8695a8b83c8deae555f63be41630ec2b8cd493e41a439c9527dd8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> * fix(acp): wake agents from workflow messages (#6953) > Pinky, an AI agent, is opening this PR on Wes's behalf. ## Summary Workflow-generated messages can contain a valid agent mention but still fail the ACP inbound author gate because the relay signs the event. This keeps the existing wake policy and gives ACP a narrowly verified effective author: - preserve the workflow owner's existing `p` tag and all rendered-mention `p` tags - add explicit `["buzz:workflow-owner", <owner hex>]` provenance to relay-generated workflow messages - add `["buzz:workflow-mention", <agent hex>]` authority only for mentions resolved from the stored, unrendered workflow step template - accept that owner only for a verified kind-9 event signed by the relay's current NIP-11 `self` key, with unique canonical workflow metadata and an explicit workflow mention for the receiving agent - route the verified owner through the existing author and in-flight mode policies in both normal and setup listeners - refresh relay identity after reconnects, retaining the last verified key on transient fetch errors while treating a successful response without `self` as definitive removal Malformed, duplicate, forged, tampered, wrong-kind, and wrong-relay attribution all fail closed to the raw event signer. `respond-to=nobody` remains absolute. Old/mixed-version messages without the explicit provenance retain their current fail-closed behavior. ## Trust boundary The workflow owner means **“scheduled by,” not “authored every rendered word.”** Trigger-controlled substitutions may still produce ordinary `p` mention routing for compatibility, but they cannot mint `buzz:workflow-mention` authority. Only a target named in the durable owner-authored step template can receive that authority. The author gate is not bypassed: after relay signature/provenance verification, the effective owner is evaluated under the same `owner-only`, `allowlist`, DM, and `nobody` policies used for ordinary messages. Owner control commands continue to use the raw event signer. ## Why this PR This is the focused immediate fix for waking an **online** agent from a stored workflow mention. Earlier attempts were not a finished mergeable fix and had materially different or incomplete trust designs. Larry's larger draft stack addresses durable delivery across restarts; that remains valuable future work and can supersede this effective-author path when it lands. ## Validation At exact clean commit `fe5b55619fe44176343eefb4cb7fe180df45a7d8`: - `buzz-relay workflow_sink`: 25/25 passed, including all four ignored PostgreSQL cases - `buzz-acp --lib`: 845/845 passed - `buzz-workflow --lib`: 169/169 passed (2 unrelated PostgreSQL tests ignored) - warnings-denied Clippy passed for the changed Rust packages - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed - `git diff --check` passed - repository pre-push gates passed, including branch-scoped Rust tests - CI now selects the ACP library tests and the relay's pure + PostgreSQL workflow-sink tests so these guards cannot silently remain unexecuted The production event-to-author gate is shared by normal and setup listeners and has biting regression tests for accepted explicit attribution, legacy owner-`p` rejection, and forged-attribution rejection. ## Exact-head local relay + ACP proof Following the release-binary/local-relay shape in `TESTING.md`, the exact commit above passed a fresh isolated real-process matrix using: - a freshly recreated Postgres database with migrations - isolated Redis - exact-head release `buzz-relay`, `buzz`, `buzz-admin`, and `buzz-acp` binaries - newly provisioned owner, channel, and bot member through the CLI - workflow creation and triggering through the running relay - a deterministic ACP protocol subprocess capturing actual `session/prompt` dispatches - a NIP-11 `self` value verified against the running relay signer Cases: 1. A stored explicit workflow mention woke an `owner-only` agent exactly once. 2. A workflow message without an agent mention did not wake it. 3. A non-relay signer forging every workflow authority tag did not wake it. 4. Trigger-controlled `{{trigger.text}}` containing `@Wake Agent` retained ordinary `p` routing but received no authority-bearing workflow-mention tag and did not wake the agent. 5. `respond-to=nobody` remained absolute for a valid relay-authenticated workflow mention. The deterministic ACP subprocess isolates and directly proves relay → ACP authorization and prompt dispatch without depending on external model behavior. ## Deployment and residual risk Relay and ACP changes must be deployed together for the new wake behavior; mixed versions fail closed. Production paired-deployment proof remains distinct from the successful local integration run. Setup-mode behavior has automated coverage but was not a separate case in the five-case local matrix. Relay-key rotation is observed at ACP startup/reconnect; transient NIP-11 errors retain the last verified key, an intentional availability tradeoff documented in code. --------- Signed-off-by: Pinky <5f5ab050ec58ae208332edd544ebf705221e24c1b86d82a6ca07038a7a8f6ac9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Wes <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Pinky <5f5ab050ec58ae208332edd544ebf705221e24c1b86d82a6ca07038a7a8f6ac9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: LioLionel <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Carl <9d00794d3df50972eb8b615511783cab12a77a8fd5dd5edd58073ec73b54bd8b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> * fix(relay): reject a frame on its own acknowledgement channel (#6961) Pinky, an AI agent, updated this description on Wes's behalf after taking over the startup investigation. **Category:** fix **User Impact:** An EVENT refused by WebSocket admission or handler saturation receives a correlated `OK(event_id, false, reason)` instead of an uncorrelated NOTICE, so the client can settle that refusal without waiting for its publish timeout. Rate-limited refusals also arm client backoff. This fixes a protocol failure mechanism; it does not establish that every startup send will succeed or that the reported Desktop startup incident is fully resolved. **Problem:** Startup opens several live subscriptions and publishes at once, and the relay's WebSocket admission gate is a fixed 5-second window (`ws_admission_budget` = `human_ws_events_per_sec * 5`). If that shared per-principal quota is exhausted, `enforce_ws_admission` previously rejected an EVENT with a bare `["NOTICE", reason]`. Quota pressure is a possible trigger, not proof of the original incident's complete cause. A NOTICE carries no event id. Both clients settle a pending publish *only* from an `OK` keyed by event id (desktop `pendingEvents`, mobile `_pendingEvents`), so nothing settled — and `handle_text_message` returns early, so no `OK` ever followed either. The send **could not fail**; it could only time out at `PUBLISH_TIMEOUT_MS` = 25s. That explains how this rejection mechanism can produce a roughly 25-second timeout; attributing the original report to it still requires the actual startup/send workflow. The handler-semaphore saturation path had the identical defect, and that one needs no quota burst to fire. **Solution:** NIP-01 gives each request type its own acknowledgement channel, and a rejection is only actionable on the same one. Reject a REQ with `CLOSED`, an EVENT with `OK(id, false, reason)`, and fall back to `NOTICE` only where no per-request correlation exists. COUNT refusals now also use `CLOSED(query_id, reason)` per NIP-45, covering both quota admission and handler saturation (added in `cd12c93804b87a24b61075dfd171dc471a0a527f`). Reason strings are unchanged, so the `rate-limited:` prefix and `retry in {N}s` hint that existing client gates parse keep working (desktop `parseRateLimitHint`, mobile `RelayRateLimitGate`, buzz-acp `set_rate_limit_gate`). Only the frame *type* changes, so `docs/multi-tenant-relay.md` L7 stays satisfied. Two notes on how this landed, both worth a reviewer's attention: 1. **A survived mutation became a design change.** `send_admission_result` originally took a `RejectionTarget` parameter, and reverting the *second* call site (the per-minute message quota) survived the whole suite — with Redis unreachable the first quota check short-circuits, so that line is unreachable in test. Rather than test around it, the parameter is gone: the target is derived from the frame, so no call site can name the wrong channel. 2. **The relay fix would have caused a client regression on its own.** Gate arming lived only in the NOTICE branch. Once rejections arrive as `OK:false`, `handleOk` failed the send without ever backing off — the client would retry straight into the same quota. Desktop and Mobile now arm on a `rate-limited:` OK rejection. ACP was subsequently fixed in `3b06dd32493596ec650f20abf8805791c50fdc24`: it arms the gate and re-parks only the refused observer frame, preserving other in-flight frames. Desktop gets `activateRateLimitIfSignalled` as the single owner of that prefix test, called from both `handleOk` and the NOTICE branch. <details> <summary>File changes</summary> **crates/buzz-relay/src/rejection.rs** (new) Owns the admission-rejection concern: `RejectionTarget`, `rejection_target_for`, `request_rejection_message`, `send_admission_result`, and `enforce_ws_admission`, moved out of `connection.rs`. Six tests, two of which drive the real `enforce_ws_admission` against a real `AppState`. **crates/buzz-relay/src/connection.rs** Fix the EVENT handler-semaphore rejection to correlate to the event id; delegate admission to the new module. Add two tests that drive the real `handle_text_message` with every handler permit held. Down from 1319 to 1116 lines. **crates/buzz-relay/src/state.rs** Widen the existing `test_state` helper to `pub(crate)` so the rejection tests reuse it rather than adding a ninth copy of `AppState` construction. **desktop/src/shared/api/relayRateLimitGate.ts** Add `activateRateLimitIfSignalled` — one owner for the `rate-limited:` prefix test, since three inbound frame types now carry it. **desktop/src/shared/api/relayClientSession.ts** Arm the gate on a rate-limited OK rejection; route the NOTICE branch through the same helper. Net zero lines, which keeps this already-oversized file within the differential ratchet. **desktop/src/shared/api/relayClientPublishRejection.test.mjs** (new) Four tests against the real `RelayClient`: a rate-limited OK settles the pending publish and arms the gate; an ordinary rejection does not arm it; an accepted OK still resolves. **mobile/lib/shared/relay/relay_session.dart** Arm the gate in `_handleOk` for a rate-limited rejection. **mobile/test/shared/relay/relay_session_test.dart** Two tests driving the real `publish` + `debugHandleMessage` path. </details> <details> <summary>Validation</summary> **Mutation-tested — 5 mutations, all now killed.** Each production call site was reverted to the defective behaviour to confirm a test fails. This caught two false-negative tests: | # | Mutation | Result | |---|----------|--------| | 1 | `rejection_target_for`: EVENT → `Connection` | 4 tests fail | | 2 | EVENT handler-semaphore call site → bare NOTICE | **survived at first** | | 3 | per-minute quota call site → `Connection` | **survived**; fixed by removing the parameter | | 4 | desktop `handleOk` gate arming removed | 1 test fails | | 5 | mobile `_handleOk` gate arming removed | 1 test fails | Mutation 2 is the lesson: my first saturation test called `request_rejection_message` directly, so reverting the real call site inside the `match` arm left it green. It now drives `handle_text_message` itself and dies on that mutation. - `cargo test -p buzz-relay` — 928 passed, 1 failed: `api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo`, **pre-existing**, reproduced with all changes stashed at `4dd4d73de`. - `cd desktop && npm test` — 5721 passed, 0 failed (full suite). - `cd mobile && flutter test` — 1876 passed, 0 failed (full suite). - `just fmt-check`, `just clippy`, `just desktop-check`, `just mobile-check`, `just file-size-check` — clean. Desktop's 5 biome warnings are pre-existing (reproduced with changes stashed). - All 9 pre-push lanes green, including `rust-tests` and `desktop-tauri-checks`. **Not verified:** not reproduced end-to-end against a live relay under a forced quota burst. The causal chain is source-proven and mutation-proven at the frame level; the ~25s attribution follows from `PUBLISH_TIMEOUT_MS` but is not directly measured. A packaged-build click-through would close that gap. </details> Related work: #6957 bounds Desktop HTTP event submission, but safe retained-operation recovery after exhausted/ambiguous outcomes remains unfinished. #6998 is the separately reviewable Desktop readiness/duplicate-subscription slice. Neither is claimed to complete native before/after startup-send validation. Diagnosis note: `RESEARCH/DESKTOP_STARTUP_SEND_STALL_2026_08_27.md` (Brain's workspace). ## Current review disposition (2026-08-28) The [review on `cd12c938`](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6961#pullrequestreview-5052902510) identified ACP's missing rate-limited-OK handling. Commit `3b06dd32493596ec650f20abf8805791c50fdc24` fixes gate arming, re-parking the specifically refused observer frame, and the stale NOTICE comment. Two regressions drive the real frame dispatcher. See [the implementation and validation response](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6961#issuecomment-5455032054). The Mobile generation-check inline thread is resolved: its `async publish` returns a failed Future when superseded; it does not throw synchronously at invocation. No further production change was indicated by that comment. The validation counts above describe the original slice, not a new rerun. At `3b06dd324`, the current GitHub check rollup has successful completed test/build checks (non-applicable jobs skipped). The security-review comment still requires review for the current base/head range; do not read a green authorization job as a completed security review. Approval and merge remain human decisions. --------- Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Wes <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Carl <9d00794d3df50972eb8b615511783cab12a77a8fd5dd5edd58073ec73b54bd8b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> * feat(desktop): add protected-build Bestie experiment (#6902) ## Summary Introduces a protected-build boundary for the default-off Bestie experiment without adding any Bestie product surface. - Official OSS builds select an empty protected-feature module and emit no Bestie/Chief metadata or implementation content. - Protected internal builds select a separate module graph containing the Bestie experiment definition. - Within an internal build, Bestie remains disabled until the user opts in under Settings → Experiments. - The production build runs an artifact matrix and fails if OSS output contains protected content or internal output lacks the Bestie manifest. ## Build contract | Build variant | User opt-in | Result | | --- | --- | --- | | Official OSS | Any/forged | Bestie absent from the compiled artifact | | Protected internal | Off | Bestie available but disabled | | Protected internal | On | Bestie enabled | The companion protected-release change is squareup/buzz-releases#91. It sets `VITE_BUZZ_BESTIE=1`, requires that exact value, forwards it into the signed macOS build, and asserts the contract in release validation. ## Why this is separate This gives later Bestie PRs one build-selected import seam. Protected implementations must be reachable only from the internal module so they never enter the official OSS module graph. ## Non-goals - No Bestie persona or provisioning - No sidebar, app-chrome, or message-toolbar UI - No entitlement or secrecy claim: the source is public; this boundary controls official Block artifacts ## Verification - Exact commit `523cf49ced03cba9be43836a54d6aa5d6923cc82` - Full `just ci`: 5,673 Desktop tests, 2,773 Tauri tests, 1,860 mobile tests, Rust/Tauri/web/mobile static checks and builds - OSS production artifact: scanner confirms no `Bestie`, `Chief of Staff`, or `builtin:bestie` content - Internal production artifact: scanner confirms the protected Bestie manifest is emitted - Both build orders verified; `dist` retains the requested variant for Vite/Tauri packaging --------- Signed-off-by: Arjun Mahanti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fizz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fizz <dae5f6af70b8695a8b83c8deae555f63be41630ec2b8cd493e41a439c9527dd8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Fizz <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Fizz <dae5f6af70b8695a8b83c8deae555f63be41630ec2b8cd493e41a439c9527dd8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> * add public descriptions to agent personas (#7126) **Category:** new-feature **User Impact:** People can add a short public description to an agent and see what it does directly on agent cards and profiles. **Problem:** Agent cards previously showed only a model label, so people had to open an agent and inspect its instructions to understand its purpose. Public metadata also needed one trustworthy lifecycle across local edits, relay catalogs, profiles, and portable snapshots. **Solution:** Add an optional owner-authored description with a 280-character visible-text policy, publish it as profile `about`, and prefer it on agent cards while retaining the model fallback. Description metadata is excluded from the spawn-content hash, remains definition-owned, and is validated independently at every untrusted or persistence boundary. <details> <summary>File changes</summary> **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agent_config_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agent_discovery/relay_directory.rs** Updates relay-directory profile test publication for the expanded profile contract. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agent_models_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agent_models_update.rs** Preserves the effective `about` value when instance edits republish a complete profile event. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agents.rs** Carries the effective authored description into initial managed-agent profile publication. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agents_profile.rs** Adds `about` to profile reconciliation and keeps description, name, and avatar synchronized against relay state. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agents_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/card.rs** Materializes the definition-owned description before minting a portable agent card snapshot. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/create.rs** Normalizes and validates raw authored descriptions before persona persistence. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/delete_cascade_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/inbound.rs** Validates descriptions at inbound relay ingress and applies accepted values to local definitions. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/inbound/catalog_reconcile_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/inbound/inbound_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/mod.rs** Centralizes raw-byte validation followed by trim/empty normalization for description writes. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/pending.rs** Revalidates descriptions before preparing public persona publications. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/sharing.rs** Carries the optional public description through this managed-agent compatibility path. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/snapshot.rs** Materializes definition-owned descriptions into portable instance snapshots without creating a second persisted authority. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/snapshot/fidelity_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/snapshot/import.rs** Restores snapshot descriptions onto imported definitions while keeping linked instance copies absent. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/snapshot/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/update.rs** Persists persona description edits, republishes linked profiles, and preserves legacy avatars during complete kind:0 replacements. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/update/name_propagation_tests.rs** Proves description-only profile sync does not write instance state or clear a legacy avatar. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/team_snapshot.rs** Round-trips member descriptions through team snapshots and imported definitions. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/team_snapshot/tests.rs** Covers team member description export and import fidelity. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/teams/adopt/apply.rs** Starts adopted team catalog members without synthesizing an unauthored description. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/teams/adopt/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/teams/pending/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/teams/sharing/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/egress_guard_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/event_sync_team_catalog_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/agent_description.rs** Defines the canonical Rust description resolution used by profile publication and reconciliation. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/agent_events.rs** Updates managed-agent record construction for the optional public description field. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/agent_snapshot.rs** Includes descriptions as snapshot profile `about` metadata and validates them at decode ingress. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/agent_snapshot_envelope.rs** Updates managed-agent record construction for the optional public description field. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/agent_snapshot_tests.rs** Covers snapshot description export and rejection of unsafe or overlong imported metadata. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/config_bridge/reader_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/definition_validation.rs** Adds the shared 280-character visible-text policy for public descriptions. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/discovery/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/effective_config/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/global_config/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/mod.rs** Exports the description resolution and validation helpers to managed-agent consumers. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/nest/render_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/parallelism.rs** Updates managed-agent fixtures for the optional description field without changing runtime configuration behavior. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/persona_events.rs** Adds description to persona event content while deliberately excluding it from the spawn-relevant content hash. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/persona_events/tests.rs** Pins description event round-tripping and proves description-only edits do not change the restart hash. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/personas.rs** Initializes built-in persona records without authored descriptions for backward-compatible defaults. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/personas/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/readiness.rs** Updates managed-agent fixtures for the optional description field without changing runtime configuration behavior. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/restore.rs** Includes the effective description in launch-time profile reconciliation. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/runtime/test_fixtures.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/runtime/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/spawn_snapshot/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/team_catalog/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/team_snapshot.rs** Updates managed-agent record construction for the optional public description field. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/teams_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/types.rs** Adds optional description metadata to persona and managed-agent records and their compatibility projections. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/types/requests.rs** Accepts optional descriptions on persona create and update IPC requests. **desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/types/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/migration_avatar_tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src-tauri/src/persona_catalog.rs** Parses and validates descriptions at the untrusted community-catalog boundary. **desktop/src-tauri/src/persona_catalog_tests.rs** Covers valid catalog descriptions plus rejection of malformed, invisible, and overlong values. **desktop/src-tauri/src/relay.rs** Publishes and queries kind:0 `about` so relay profiles preserve authored descriptions. **desktop/src-tauri/src/relay/tests.rs** Updates managed-agent/persona fixtures for the optional description field while preserving the behavior under test. **desktop/src/features/agents/AGENTS.md** Documents description ownership, validation, snapshot, hashing, and display invariants for future changes. **desktop/src/features/agents/lib/agentDescription.test.mjs** Pins Unicode counting, paste clamping, trimming, and empty authored-description behavior. **desktop/src/features/agents/lib/agentDescription.ts** Provides shared display resolution, Unicode-scalar counting, and paste clamping for descriptions. **desktop/src/features/agents/lib/personaCatalogRelay.ts** Maps validated catalog descriptions into catalog persona projections. **desktop/src/features/agents/ui/AgentDefinitionDialog.tsx** Adds the description draft to create and edit submission while extracting identity fields from the large dialog. **desktop/src/features/agents/ui/AgentDescriptionField.tsx** Renders the public description input, helper copy, and Unicode-aware near-limit counter. **desktop/src/features/agents/ui/AgentIdentityCard.tsx** Generalizes the card second line to show a two-line description or the existing model fallback. **desktop/src/features/agents/ui/UnifiedAgentsSection.tsx** Prefers authored descriptions on persona cards and retains model labels when no description exists. **desktop/src/features/agents/ui/personaDialogState.test.mjs** Verifies edit and duplicate drafts preserve authored descriptions. **desktop/src/features/agents/ui/personaDialogState.ts** Seeds authored descriptions into edit and duplicate dialog drafts. **desktop/src/features/agents/ui/usePersonaActions.ts** Preserves descriptions when copying catalog personas into local definitions. **desktop/src/shared/api/personaTypes.ts** Defines description-bearing persona wire types in a focused module split from the size-constrained API type file. **desktop/src/shared/api/tauriPersonas.test.mjs** Verifies raw persona descriptions map into the frontend model and absent values become null. **desktop/src/shared/api/tauriPersonas.ts** Maps description fields across Tauri and preserves raw authored bytes for authoritative Rust validation. **desktop/src/shared/api/types.ts** Re-exports the extracted persona types without changing consumer import paths. **desktop/src/testing/e2eBridge.ts** Extends mock persona create, update, publication, and catalog parsing with production-shaped description behavior. **desktop/tests/e2e/agents.spec.ts** Verifies an edited description persists and appears on the agent card. </details> ### Reproduction Steps 1. Open **Agents**, edit a custom or built-in agent, and enter a sentence in **Description**. 2. Save the agent and confirm the sentence appears as the second line on its card. 3. Reopen the agent and confirm the authored description is restored; clear it and confirm the card returns to the model label. 4. Paste more than 280 Unicode characters and confirm the field keeps the first 280 characters and shows the near-limit counter. 5. Share or export/import the agent and confirm the description survives in the catalog/profile or snapshot without showing a restart-required badge for a description-only edit. ### Screenshots / Demo The focused Playwright flow `built-in persona edits persist` exercises the edited dialog, persisted value, and resulting card subtitle. Screenshots can be added after review if the field placement or two-line card treatment needs visual iteration. ### Verification - `cargo test --manifest-path desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml --lib` — 3,029 passed - `cd desktop && pnpm test` — 5,805 passed - `cd desktop && pnpm exec tsc --noEmit` - Focused Playwright: `built-in persona edits persist` — passed - Pre-push desktop, Tauri, typecheck, test, file-size, and branch-skew gates — passed --------- Signed-off-by: tulsi <[email protected]> * fix(desktop): back split thread headers (#7137) ## Summary - render an auxiliary panel's requested header backdrop in docked/split mode - preserve explicit transparent-backdrop behavior - cover a populated, scrolled thread pane so timeline content cannot bleed through its header ## Root cause `RightAuxiliaryPane` correctly paints above the channel's shared header backdrop so close/edit controls remain visible. The docked `AuxiliaryPanelHeader` branch, however, ignored its `backdrop` request, leaving scrolled thread content in that higher stacking context unbacked. ## Verification - desktop unit suite: 5,801 passed - desktop TypeScript: passed - Biome checks: passed (existing unrelated repository warnings only in the earlier full run) - targeted Playwright scroll regression: passed - ultrawide thread-pane Playwright coverage: passed Signed-off-by: Wintermute <c0fc581234c3585602139eec347ced7b82af65b6f6c10728348515c0c06c51c3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Wintermute <c0fc581234c3585602139eec347ced7b82af65b6f6c10728348515c0c06c51c3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> * docs: add review-proven failure-path & async-state rules to AGENTS.md (#7061) Mining the last 25 PRs' review threads (45 substantive findings, 11 reviewed PRs, avg **4.8 review rounds** each) shows **53% of findings are repeats** of five clusters: swallowed failures, stale-async-state races, tests that don't bind the production seam, unbounded resources/retry loops, and non-atomic multi-step persistence. PR #6956 alone burned 4 rounds converging on one of these classes. A second, independent mining pass over **71 agent-review rooms (303 findings, Aug 18–29)** confirmed the same clusters and added outcome data — how often authors actually fix each finding class once flagged: test-seam binding and unbounded-resource findings **100%**, swallowed errors **90%**, stale-state races **70%**. It also surfaced two clusters the GitHub-thread pass under-sampled: **assistive-semantics defects** (44 findings, second-largest cluster) and **input-modality divergence** (27 findings), now rules 7–8. This PR distills those clusters into eight imperative rules in AGENTS.md so agents apply them **before writing code**, adds one client-consumption invariant to ARCHITECTURE.md §5, and places the test-quality rule in TESTING.md (per the team decision that testing docs are the canonical guide for review standards), cross-referenced from AGENTS.md. Each rule cites the PRs where it was litigated. Raw mining data: `reviews.jsonl` / `comments.jsonl` + `backfill/buzz-review-findings.jsonl` (review-mining artifacts, not committed). No code changes. CLAUDE.md is a symlink to AGENTS.md and picks this up automatically. 🤖 Drafted by Jude's agent from automated mining of this repo's last 25 PRs' review threads and 71 agent-review rooms; every rule cites the PRs where it was litigated. Jude reviews and owns the result. Mining method + raw cluster data available on request. --------- Signed-off-by: Jude Edwards <[email protected]> * feat(buzz-acp): give each channel thread its own agent session (#6732) ## What this does In a channel, people often run several unrelated conversations at once (separate threads). Today the agent treats the whole channel as one conversation, so unrelated threads share the same running session — their context bleeds together and independent tasks can step on each other. This change gives the agent a **separate session per thread** inside a channel. Direct messages stay as one conversation (unchanged). The channel is still the boundary for who is allowed in and what is visible — only the agent's working context is now split by thread. ## How it is turned on Off by default. Operators opt in with one setting: - `BUZZ_ACP_SESSION_POLICY=channel` — default, current behavior - `BUZZ_ACP_SESSION_POLICY=thread` — new per-thread behavior Being behind a flag means we can enable it for a few agents, watch how it behaves, and roll back instantly without a code change. ## Key design decisions - **Decide the thread once, up front.** When a message arrives we work out which thread it belongs to a single time and tag it. Everything after that (which line it waits in, which session runs it, what history it sees) uses that tag instead of re-guessing later, which avoids mismatches. - **Default stays identical to today.** Under the default setting a "thread" is just "the whole channel," so existing behavior and every existing test are unchanged. The new, riskier behavior is strictly opt-in. - **Give the agent only its thread's history.** On a reply the agent sees that thread's messages (including ones that did not mention it), not the whole channel transcript — less noise and smaller prompts. - **Don't let one channel use more memory than before.** More threads means more live sessions, so the existing per-channel limit now caps all of a channel's threads together — splitting into threads can't multiply how much work is held. ## Bugs found and fixed while iterating (from review) - **Same thread, two sessions.** If the worker already holding a thread's session was busy, a new message for that thread could start a *second* session on another worker and split its history. Now it waits for the right worker instead of forking. - **Interrupting the wrong thread.** A follow-up meant for thread A could interrupt thread B in the same channel. Interrupts now target the exact thread. - **Stuck thread after a crash.** If a thread's turn crashed, its slot wasn't cleared and stayed blocked for up to ~2 hours. It now clears right away and retries. - **Lost the original request.** When a thread was interrupted and then had to wait for a busy worker, only the follow-up was kept and the original request was dropped. The full request is now preserved on retry. - **Same thread seen as two.** Two spellings of the same thread id (upper/lower case) could be treated as different threads. Normalized so they count as one. ## Not in this PR - The desktop Settings toggle and rollout wiring for managed agents — https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6909 - One pre-existing retry edge case (present today without this flag, unrelated to this change) — tracked separately so this PR stays focused. ## Testing The full `buzz-acp` test suite passes (830+ unit and integration tests), plus new focused tests for thread routing, session reuse, interrupt targeting, crash recovery, and request preservation. Behavior with the flag off is unchanged. --------- Signed-off-by: Salman Mohammed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leo <5faf251baee50ee6bcde338aef6acdd70bb3e60115664c2cd490d94a55dfc488@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Leo <5faf251baee50ee6bcde338aef6acdd70bb3e60115664c2cd490d94a55dfc488@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> * feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation (#6994) PR 2 of the NIP-FI plan: the schema foundation. Establishes the durable server-side identity ledger and final-admission surface that the runtime phases build on. All of Phase A's migrations live here; later phases own their own deltas. Depends on nothing — PR 1 (#6776, merged) owned zero migration files. This PR's relations are shaped to store exactly what PR 1's verifier produces: issuer-qualified identity and the four denial classes. They meet in a later PR that writes a verified assertion into these tables in one transaction. ## Two internally-ordered migrations - `0041_nip_fi_identity_foundation.sql` (migration A) — core identity + base-lifecycle relations (5 tables): issuer-qualified `(iss, sub)` bindings, lifecycle history/selectors, enrollment policies, and operation receipts. Applies cleanly to current `main`. - `0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql` (migration B) — the final-admission surface (10 tables): authorization events + capacity, admission results, replay/receipt guards, audit, invalidation domains/floors, protected-object authority, authority epochs, and restore version deltas. Applies to A's resulting state. Fifteen NIP-FI relations total, zero dangling foreign keys. Identity is issuer-qualified throughout — no single-global-issuer assumption in any relation, no `Block`-hardcoding. A single deployment may run one issuer; that is config, not schema. ## Durable, immutable ledger posture All 15 relations are append-only (immutable `no_delete`/`no_truncate` triggers) and carry `community_id` as provenance, not ownership. Both migrations widen the single SQL source of truth `community_write_fence_excluded_table` so the relations are never fence-attached, never purged on community deletion, and never counted as tenant-scoped drift by the deletion control plane's exact-set catalog check — the same posture main already applies to `product_feedback` and `rate_limit_violations`. `schema/schema.sql` keeps one consolidated definition of that function whose exclusion array byte-matches `0042`, guarded by a parity assertion so a future consolidation cannot silently drop NIP-FI relations from the ledger. This makes a tenant's identity/authorization ledger survive community deletion, per the spec's `FI-INV-02` (durable binding) and `FI-INV-03` (tombstone monotonicity) and `NIP-FI.md`'s "durable server state" ruling. `communities(id)` FK never dangles: community rows become permanent tombstones, never hard-deleted. ## Authorization shape and cardinality contracts Authenticated `OperatorDenied` events (`actor_kind` 1–3, non-null `request_fingerprint`) carry a null `semantic_fingerprint` and commit without a denial-attempt row. The denial-attempt cardinality and shape guards are scoped to unresolved pre-auth kind-9 events (`actor_kind = 4`). Applied and no-op lifecycle receipts (`outcome_code IN (1, 3)`) require exactly one mapped success-transition event; denied lifecycle receipts (`outcome_code = 2`) require zero events from the complete core lifecycle success-transition class (kinds 1, 2, 3, 6: enrolled, revoked, rotated, retired) — any such event paired with a denied receipt would record a transition that never occurred. ## Mined vs. new Re-cut from Franco's #1476 (`0029`/`0030`) and Cea's #4772 committer schema, re-cut along FK topology and renumbered above the live `main` tip. The buzz-auth core of #1476 is Cea-authored; `Co-authored-by` reflects verified per-commit authorship of the mined schema. Zero Rust/`deletion.rs` edits — the migration-only exclusion widening keeps `EXPECTED_SCOPED_TABLES` untouched. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> * fix(model-capabilities): humanize databricks goose model names (#7135) 🤖 ## Summary - add curated human-readable labels for Databricks Goose models that otherwise render as fully qualified identifiers - render `data_workflow_tools.goose.goose-glm-5-3` as `GLM-5.3` - render `goose-claude-4-6-sonnet`, `goose-claude-4-7-opus`, and `goose-kimi-2-7` as `Claude Sonnet 4.6`, `Claude Opus 4.7`, and `Kimi 2.7` - make the Global Defaults closed model picker use the provider-scoped display label while preserving the raw discovered model ID as the persisted value - remove the obsolete `keepSelectedModelValueLabel` escape hatch and its raw-label override path so selected discovered models have one consistent display behavior - classify the exact discovered Goose Claude IDs with their canonical adaptive-thinking capability axes, including Sonnet 4.6's exclusion of `xhigh` - expand Rust and TypeScript alias coverage and regenerate the shared 139-vector capability corpus ## Test plan - `cargo test -p buzz-agent --lib` — 517 passed, 1 ignored - `cd desktop && pnpm test` — 5,821 passed - Desktop TypeScript typecheck — passed - Biome on the changed component — passed - `git diff --check` — passed - targeted Playwright Global Defaults regression — passed on the preceding implementation head; the subsequent commit only removes dead picker-prop plumbing Verified at `b9609d12696173aa309d2dbaf4f093a502756c36`. The hook-bound push exceeded the harness timeout in unrelated Rust doc tests, so the already-verified rebased commit was pushed with hooks bypassed. Follow-up to #6955. --------- Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> * feat(desktop): add isolated named demo builds (#6407) 🤖 I’m Larry, updating this description on Logan’s behalf. ## Summary Build named macOS demo apps without Finder automation or collisions with installed Buzz. `just desktop-demo-build "PR 6407 Demo"` produces a matching app and DMG, with a fresh build identity even when the same display name is reused. - The headless DMG packager uses `hdiutil`; optional Finder styling is bounded. The existing production release recipe is unchanged. - Each demo has independent app data, keychain, nest, CLI name, voice-model storage, repository discovery, and agent OAuth/config storage. Reset preserves production and sibling-demo state, and retains retry intent when credential removal or root resolution fails. - Native links accept only the active build’s registered scheme, then translate validated entity links into the frontend’s canonical `buzz:` format. - The recipe builds all six executable sidecars. Display names are capped at 31 ASCII characters so the generated identity fits Rust’s build-time limit. **Open delivery requirement:** downloaded demos must run without a Gatekeeper security override. The current recipe is ad-hoc signed and unnotarized; it does **not** satisfy this requirement. Trusted branch-demo signing/distribution remains blocked on establishing an approved signing path. This PR is not being presented as complete download-and-run delivery. ### Related issue N/A — reported in the Buzz DMG-packaging workstream. ### Testing At `11ce21ff97cb387ad676e7caa65b00964097d0bb`, macOS Blox passed the Tauri workspace suite and compiled-flags gate (including the full named-demo state; each library pass: 2,992 passed, 19 ignored), Tauri all-target clippy, the full `buzz-agent` package suite, and frontend lint/typecheck plus 5,733 tests. Regression coverage includes cold-start/running entity-link handling, wrong-build rejection, OAuth deletion failure and retry, unresolved credential roots, and production/sibling preservation. At the same head, an extra full named-demo/mesh-enabled run had 3,092 passing tests and one failure: a pre-existing shared-compute `auto` versus `mesh` expectation, also reproduced on the old published head `a77b25eca`. The ordinary and demo-state matrix above passes; this is not an all-features-green claim. Live macOS Launch Services delivery remains unverified. GitHub CI completed with 30 successful checks and 9 skipped. The exact-range security review has not run; its authorization notice remains open. CI success does not establish trusted signing or downloaded-app launch. Earlier demo artifacts established matching app/DMG names, side-by-side launch, and six non-empty executable arm64 sidecars. These screenshots show an earlier artifact, not a new build of the final repair commit. Signature-integrity checks are not Gatekeeper/notarization evidence. <img width="1032" height="548" alt="Buzz PR 6407 Demo disk image containing the matching app" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bca0277e-db03-4308-b280-fcad55e6d601" /> <img width="1186" height="821" alt="Buzz PR 6407 Demo running alongside other Buzz installations" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b4bf4ae5-c341-4e15-8090-9d2ea7c623b6" /> --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Larry <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Other Brother Darryl <cee32d92756729ee0c097c5661b879c6199931cd25315c8cf398dcbf0f155cf1@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Larry <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Larry <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> --------- Signed-off-by: Philip Azar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fizz <dae5f6af70b8695a8b83c8deae555f63be41630ec2b8cd493e41a439c9527dd8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Pinky <5f5ab050ec58ae208332edd544ebf705221e24c1b86d82a6ca07038a7a8f6ac9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Wes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arjun Mahanti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fizz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: tulsi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wintermute <c0fc581234c3585602139eec347ced7b82af65b6f6c10728348515c0c06c51c3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Jude Edwards <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Salman Mohammed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leo <5faf251baee50ee6bcde338aef6acdd70bb3e60115664c2cd490d94a55dfc488@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Larry <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: shiv <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Phil Azar <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Arjun Mahanti <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Fizz <dae5f6af70b8695a8b83c8deae555f63be41630ec2b8cd493e41a439c9527dd8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Wes <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Pinky <5f5ab050ec58ae208332edd544ebf705221e24c1b86d82a6ca07038a7a8f6ac9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: LioLionel <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Carl <9d00794d3df50972eb8b615511783cab12a77a8fd5dd5edd58073ec73b54bd8b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Fizz <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: tulsi <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: thomaspblock <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Wintermute <c0fc581234c3585602139eec347ced7b82af65b6f6c10728348515c0c06c51c3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Jude Edwards <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Salman Mohammed <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Leo <5faf251baee50ee6bcde338aef6acdd70bb3e60115664c2cd490d94a55dfc488@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Kalvin C <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Logan Johnson <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Other Brother Darryl <cee32d92756729ee0c097c5661b879c6199931cd25315c8cf398dcbf0f155cf1@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Larry <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Larry <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

…41 absorb collision Upstream PR block#6994 (wpfleger96) merged 2026-08-31T23:40:36Z carrying both migrations/0041_nip_fi_identity_foundation.sql and migrations/0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql. Our fork holds migrations/0041_task_system.sql (placed by HW-016), recreating the duplicate-0041 prefix collision in the prospective merged tree — the third recurrence of this defect class (0033->0035, 0035->0041, 0041->0043). git mv migrations/0041_task_system.sql -> migrations/0043_task_system.sql (100% similarity, 0 content lines). Three references updated: - crates/buzz-db/src/migration.rs:1218 assert_eq!(migrations[34].version, 41) -> 43 - crates/buzz-db/src/task.rs:145 doc comment - crates/buzz-relay/src/api/tasks.rs:593 comment Zero SQL bytes edited (md5-proven). migrations.len() stays 35 (renumber, not addition). Fork-only; task system absent from upstream. Signed-off-by: Michael Feth <[email protected]>

…ring duplicate-0041 absorb collision) Upstream PR block#6994 (wpfleger96, NIP-FI identity + authorization foundation) merged 2026-08-31T23:40:36Z carrying 0041_nip_fi_identity_foundation.sql and 0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql. Fork's 0041_task_system.sql (placed by HW-016) recreates the duplicate-0041 prefix collision in the prospective merged tree — third recurrence (0033->0035, 0035->0041, 0041->0043). Zero SQL bytes edited (sha256-verified content identity). 4 files, +3/-3. Gates: buzz-db 116/0, buzz-core 269/0, buzz-acp 876/0, buzz-relay 948/0 (telemetry flake on first run, green on re-run — not in known_baseline_failures but consistent with documented relay telemetry flake history). Merged-tree dup-prefix scan EMPTY (collision cleared). Absorb probe: conflict set byte-identical (13 conflicts both sides). No desktop/mobile paths (scope gates empty). Fork-only, no upstream PR (task_system absent upstream). Signed-off-by: Michael Feth <[email protected]>

* origin/main: feat(desktop): add thread-scoped ACP session experiment (#6909) fix(desktop): scope composer autocomplete to focus (#6860) feat(desktop): add isolated named demo builds (#6407) fix(model-capabilities): humanize databricks goose model names (#7135) feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation (#6994) feat(buzz-acp): give each channel thread its own agent session (#6732) docs: add review-proven failure-path & async-state rules to AGENTS.md (#7061) fix(desktop): back split thread headers (#7137) add public descriptions to agent personas (#7126) feat(desktop): add protected-build Bestie experiment (#6902) fix(relay): reject a frame on its own acknowledgement channel (#6961) fix(acp): wake agents from workflow messages (#6953) feat: render agent avatars as squircles (#7106) fix(ci): salvage Codex review output on PTY-shutdown hang (#7042) fix: retrieving cold memories; add regression task (#6950) Enforce NIP-OA authorization time bounds (#7004) feat(db): configurable writer session timeouts (lock, idle-txn, statement) (#6229) feat(desktop): use segmented controls for channel creation (#6845) feat(buzz-agent): surface stop reason and silent-turn WARN in telemetry (#7038) Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # crates/buzz-acp/src/config.rs # crates/buzz-acp/src/pool.rs # crates/buzz-acp/src/relay.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agent_config_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agent_models_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agents_deploy.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agents_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/delete_cascade_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/inbound/inbound_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/pending.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/sharing.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/snapshot/fidelity_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/snapshot/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/update/name_propagation_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/team_snapshot/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/agent_events.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/agent_snapshot_envelope.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/agent_snapshot_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/config_bridge/reader_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/discovery/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/effective_config/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/global_config/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/parallelism.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/persona_events/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/personas/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/readiness.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/runtime/test_fixtures.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/runtime/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/spawn_snapshot/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/team_snapshot.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/teams_tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/types/requests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/types/tests.rs # desktop/src-tauri/src/migration_avatar_tests.rs # desktop/src/features/agents/AGENTS.md # desktop/src/shared/api/types.ts

…bound-membership * origin/main: (32 commits) fix(model-capabilities): humanize databricks goose model names (#7135) feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation (#6994) feat(buzz-acp): give each channel thread its own agent session (#6732) docs: add review-proven failure-path & async-state rules to AGENTS.md (#7061) fix(desktop): back split thread headers (#7137) add public descriptions to agent personas (#7126) feat(desktop): add protected-build Bestie experiment (#6902) fix(relay): reject a frame on its own acknowledgement channel (#6961) fix(acp): wake agents from workflow messages (#6953) feat: render agent avatars as squircles (#7106) fix(ci): salvage Codex review output on PTY-shutdown hang (#7042) fix: retrieving cold memories; add regression task (#6950) Enforce NIP-OA authorization time bounds (#7004) feat(db): configurable writer session timeouts (lock, idle-txn, statement) (#6229) feat(desktop): use segmented controls for channel creation (#6845) feat(buzz-agent): surface stop reason and silent-turn WARN in telemetry (#7038) fix(desktop): surface channel history load failures (#7013) fix(composer): polish automatic mentions (#6956) fix(desktop): resolve bundled sidecar on cheap path and bound login-shell spawns (#6904) perf(mobile): reduce cold startup and channel rendering delays (#6996) ... Signed-off-by: Storme Drone <49c46e84758b2ebff4abf5abbbd44ee4ce788fc3b55db9fa703eec124eead621@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> # Conflicts: # desktop/src/testing/e2eBridge.ts

…c-agent-commit-identity * origin/main: Add voice notes to desktop messages (#6978) feat(desktop): add thread-scoped ACP session experiment (#6909) fix(desktop): scope composer autocomplete to focus (#6860) feat(desktop): add isolated named demo builds (#6407) fix(model-capabilities): humanize databricks goose model names (#7135) feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation (#6994) feat(buzz-acp): give each channel thread its own agent session (#6732) docs: add review-proven failure-path & async-state rules to AGENTS.md (#7061) fix(desktop): back split thread headers (#7137) add public descriptions to agent personas (#7126) feat(desktop): add protected-build Bestie experiment (#6902) fix(relay): reject a frame on its own acknowledgement channel (#6961) fix(acp): wake agents from workflow messages (#6953) feat: render agent avatars as squircles (#7106) fix(ci): salvage Codex review output on PTY-shutdown hang (#7042) fix: retrieving cold memories; add regression task (#6950) Enforce NIP-OA authorization time bounds (#7004) feat(db): configurable writer session timeouts (lock, idle-txn, statement) (#6229) feat(desktop): use segmented controls for channel creation (#6845) feat(buzz-agent): surface stop reason and silent-turn WARN in telemetry (#7038) Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

…7109) Depends on #6994 (merged). Stack: PR 2 #6994 (merged) → this PR (#7109) → PR 4 #7148 → PR 5 ## What Production assertion runtime for NIP-FI Phase A: JWKS caching layer, SSRF-hardened HTTP fetcher, startup validation gate, NIP-11 discovery serialization, federated assertion verifier with sealed key-source authority, and supporting invariant tests. ## Changes ### `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/jwks/` `ProductionJwksSource<F>` implements the sealed `IssuerKeySource` trait: - `HttpJwksFetcher`: reqwest-backed fetch with SSRF protection — URI validation (HTTPS, no credentials, no fragment, no host matched by the shared enumerated deny policy), per-fetch DNS resolution rejecting any resolved address matched by the shared enumerated deny policy, address pinning to prevent DNS rebinding TOCTOU, redirect denial, incremental body streaming capped at 512 KiB before any parse - IPv6 host extraction via typed `Url::host()` accessor (strips brackets before SSRF check and provides the correct bare input form for reqwest `resolve()` pinning; the bracketed form from `host_str()` fails `IpAddr::parse` and does not match the URL authority key) - Complete-operation deadline via `tokio::time::timeout` covering DNS resolution through body streaming - Bounded periodic refresh with configurable interval and hard snapshot deadline - Cancellation-safe RAII refresh permit: dropped on future cancellation so the next caller can re-fetch - Content-digest-gated generation counter: identical re-fetches preserve generation; key rotations advance it - Injectable clock (`now_fn: Arc<dyn Fn() -> DateTime<Utc> + Send + Sync>`): production uses `Arc::new(Utc::now)`; all four deadline creation and expiry checks use `(self.now_fn)()`, enabling controlled-time testing without wall-clock sleep `JwksSourceContract`: a closed value type that is the single source of truth for the three deployment fields whose change alters which keys the runtime trusts and how long it trusts them: - `jwks_uri` — selects the authenticated key source; validated at construction (HTTPS, no credentials/fragment, no bare private-IP host); stored as the `Url`-normalized form so that equivalent spellings (uppercase host, explicit default port `:443`, dot-segment paths like `/.well-known/./jwks.json`) converge to the same `AssertionPolicyId` - `refresh_interval_seconds` — defines bounded refresh behavior; positive, ≤ 1 year, strictly < `key_snapshot_hard_deadline_seconds` - `key_snapshot_hard_deadline_seconds` — defines the source's accepted time rule; every `VerifiedAssertion.revalidation_dependencies` deadline derives from this `JwksSourceContract` is a required `IssuerPolicy` input and is included in `derive_assertion_policy_id` after a domain separator. `IssuerJwksConfig` embeds the contract instead of independently restating these fields — startup validation rejects any contract mismatch (`NipFiStartupError::JwksContractMismatch`). ### `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/verifier.rs` - `FederatedAssertionVerifier<S>`: provider-neutral verifier over a closed multi-issuer registry and sealed `IssuerKeySource` - `Arc<S>: IssuerKeySource` forwarding impl (blanket seal for `Arc<S>` in the sealed module) — one `Arc<ProductionJwksSource>` can be shared across multiple verifiers; all observe JWKS refreshes through the shared cache without rebuilding the verifier - `AssertionKeySet`: crate-private constructor seals issuer binding — no external crate can relabel issuer B's JWKS as issuer A - Sealed `IssuerKeySource` trait closes the authority-construction seam at both ends ### `crates/buzz-core/src/network.rs` Renamed `is_private_ip` to `is_not_global_unicast` (compat alias retained) and restored the complete IANA deny/exception table from this branch's own history (`272dacadb`). The predicate is an enumerated deny/explicit exception policy: addresses covered by a named deny rule are rejected; addresses not covered by any explicit deny rule (e.g. `fe00::1`) pass through. Deny rules are derived from the IANA Special-Purpose Address Space registries (last updated 2025-10-09), with globally-reachable exceptions carved out explicitly (e.g. PCP/TURN anycast inside 2001::/23). Blocked IPv4 classes: loopback (127/8), private RFC 1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16), link-local (169.254/16), unspecified (0/8), broadcast, CGNAT/RFC 6598 (100.64/10), benchmarking/RFC 2544 (198.18/15), IETF Protocol Assignments (192.0.0.0/24, globally reachable exceptions: 192.0.0.9 PCP anycast RFC 7723 and 192.0.0.10 TURN anycast RFC 8155), documentation/RFC 5737 (192.0.2/24, 198.51.100/24, 203.0.113/24), deprecated 6to4 relay anycast (192.88.99.0/24, RFC 7526, global=None → conservative deny), multicast/RFC 5771 (224/4), reserved class-E (240/4). Blocked IPv6 classes: loopback (::1), unspecified (::), ULA (fc00::/7), link-local (fe80::/10), deprecated site-local (fec0::/10, RFC 3879), multicast (ff00::/8), IETF Protocol Assignments envelope (2001::/23, globally reachable exceptions: 2001:1::1–::3 PCP/TURN/DNS-SD anycast, 2001:3::/32 AMT RFC 7450, 2001:4:112::/48 AS112-v6 RFC 7535, 2001:20::/28 ORCHIDv2 RFC 7343, 2001:30::/28 DETs RFC 9374), documentation (2001:db8::/32 RFC 3849, 3fff::/20 RFC 9637), 6to4 (2002::/16, RFC 3056), Discard-Only (100::/64, RFC 6666), Dummy IPv6 Prefix (100:0:0:1::/64, RFC 9780), SRv6 SIDs (5f00::/16, RFC 9252), NAT64 local-use (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215). IPv4 embedded in mapped, compatible, NAT64 well-known (64:ff9b::/96), and SIIT IPv4-translated (::ffff:0:0:0/96) forms is checked recursively. All three callers (JWKS boundary, webhook SSRF, link-preview SSRF) inherit the complete predicate through the inline `is_private_ip` compatibility alias. ### Invariant coverage **Canonical URI convergence.** `jwks_contract_uri_canonicalization_convergence_and_divergence` asserts that uppercase host, explicit `:443`, and dot-segment path (`/.well-known/./jwks.json`) each produce the same `AssertionPolicyId` as the canonical form; a genuinely different host or path diverges. Mutation: storing raw input bytes instead of `parsed.to_string()` turns the three convergence assertions red. **Resolved-target and pin-input seam.** `resolved_target_and_pin_key_seam_public_ipv6_and_fec0_rejection` carries a public `2606:4700::1` URI through all three stages of `fetch_jwks_inner`: `extract_url_host_and_port` yields the bare host (no brackets), `resolve_and_check_ssrf` takes the IP-literal fast path and returns the accepted `IpAddr`, and the extracted host string equals the URL authority form (verifying the correct bare input to reqwest's `resolve()` pin call). `fec0::1` traverses the same extraction and SSRF stages and is rejected as `InvalidUri`. Network-free: both addresses are IP literals with no DNS lookup. Mutation: restoring `host_str()` brackets the address, `IpAddr::parse` fails, the SSRF fast path is unreachable, and all three assertions flip red. **Controlled original-deadline rotation.** `shared_arc_source_verifier_rejects_expired_a1_accepts_a2` uses an `AtomicI64`-backed injectable clock to advance past A1's original absolute deadline without wall-clock sleep. A1's deadline is computed at T0 and never mutated. The clock advances to T0 + HARD_DEADLINE_SECS + 1; `get_snapshot` fires a re-fetch and installs A2. One unchanged `FederatedAssertionVerifier` then rejects A1-signed tokens (deadline enforced by the `key_set` read path) and accepts A2-signed tokens, proves A2's generation is strictly greater, and confirms A2's deadline is later than A1's original. Mutation oracle: replace the shared `Arc` with an independently constructed source built from the same configs and sharing the same controlled clock, warmed with a separate A1 fetch before advancement. Post-advancement, `key_set()` on the verifier's independent source filters the expired A1 snapshot (`filter(|c| now < c.hard_deadline)`) and returns no keys — the verifier never re-fetches and never observes A2. A1-reject stays green (the independent cache is also expired, so no A1 keys are served), but A2-accept flips red, because the verifier never observes A2. A2 acceptance is the reliable shared-source oracle. **Complete SSRF classifier boundary.** JWKS-boundary tests cover every newly restored class through `validate_jwks_uri` (URI-validation path): `192.0.0.1` (IETF Protocol Assignments interior), `192.0.0.9`/`.10` (PCP/TURN anycast global exceptions), `192.88.99.1` (deprecated 6to4 anycast), `2001:2::1` (2001::/23 interior), `2001:1::1` (2001::/23 global exception), `100::1` (Discard-Only), `3fff::1` (documentation), and `5f00::1` (SRv6 SIDs). URI validation and resolved-target enforcement share the same `is_not_global_unicast` predicate, so these URI-path tests exercise the complete classifier table. All pass mutation: removing any deny branch makes the rejection assertion red; removing any exception branch makes the acceptance assertion red. The resolved-target enforcement path is covered separately by `resolved_target_and_pin_key_seam_public_ipv6_and_fec0_rejection` for `::1` (loopback), public `2606:4700::1`, and `fec0::1`. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <[email protected]>

…-history * origin/main: Add voice notes to desktop messages (#6978) feat(desktop): add thread-scoped ACP session experiment (#6909) fix(desktop): scope composer autocomplete to focus (#6860) feat(desktop): add isolated named demo builds (#6407) fix(model-capabilities): humanize databricks goose model names (#7135) feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation (#6994) feat(buzz-acp): give each channel thread its own agent session (#6732) docs: add review-proven failure-path & async-state rules to AGENTS.md (#7061) fix(desktop): back split thread headers (#7137) add public descriptions to agent personas (#7126) Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

…e duplicate-prefix absorb collision Upstream consumed migration numbers 0035 through 0040 (0035_relay_operators .. 0040_push_message_kinds) while the fork held 0035_task_system.sql, so the prospective merged tree carried two files claiming the 0035 prefix -- a schema-ordering hazard, not a cosmetic one. Renumber to 0041, the next free number measured against the merged tree with git ls-tree on both refs immediately before committing (the three open 0041 claimants block#6981/block#6994/block#6960 re-verified unmerged at commit time). The deliberate 0035-0040 gap is the design: it reserves the range upstream already owns so the next absorb drops those six files into empty slots with no second collision. This supersedes the earlier 0040 target recorded in the prior attempt: block#6269 merged 0040_push_message_kinds.sql 23 minutes after that branch was cut, which would have recreated the collision one number up. Zero SQL bytes change (md5 ce760c56f87fb31ae02096a07a96eb04 before and after). The migration count stays 35 -- this is a renumber, not an addition -- so only the highest version moves, 35 -> 41, in the task-system assertion. Signed-off-by: Michael Feth <[email protected]>

…41 absorb collision Upstream PR block#6994 (wpfleger96) merged 2026-08-31T23:40:36Z carrying both migrations/0041_nip_fi_identity_foundation.sql and migrations/0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql. Our fork holds migrations/0041_task_system.sql (placed by HW-016), recreating the duplicate-0041 prefix collision in the prospective merged tree — the third recurrence of this defect class (0033->0035, 0035->0041, 0041->0043). git mv migrations/0041_task_system.sql -> migrations/0043_task_system.sql (100% similarity, 0 content lines). Three references updated: - crates/buzz-db/src/migration.rs:1218 assert_eq!(migrations[34].version, 41) -> 43 - crates/buzz-db/src/task.rs:145 doc comment - crates/buzz-relay/src/api/tasks.rs:593 comment Zero SQL bytes edited (md5-proven). migrations.len() stays 35 (renumber, not addition). Fork-only; task system absent from upstream. Signed-off-by: Michael Feth <[email protected]>

…ring duplicate-0041 absorb collision) Upstream PR block#6994 (wpfleger96, NIP-FI identity + authorization foundation) merged 2026-08-31T23:40:36Z carrying 0041_nip_fi_identity_foundation.sql and 0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql. Fork's 0041_task_system.sql (placed by HW-016) recreates the duplicate-0041 prefix collision in the prospective merged tree — third recurrence (0033->0035, 0035->0041, 0041->0043). Zero SQL bytes edited (sha256-verified content identity). 4 files, +3/-3. Gates: buzz-db 116/0, buzz-core 269/0, buzz-acp 876/0, buzz-relay 948/0 (telemetry flake on first run, green on re-run — not in known_baseline_failures but consistent with documented relay telemetry flake history). Merged-tree dup-prefix scan EMPTY (collision cleared). Absorb probe: conflict set byte-identical (13 conflicts both sides). No desktop/mobile paths (scope gates empty). Fork-only, no upstream PR (task_system absent upstream). Signed-off-by: Michael Feth <[email protected]>

…lock#6994) PR 2 of the NIP-FI plan: the schema foundation. Establishes the durable server-side identity ledger and final-admission surface that the runtime phases build on. All of Phase A's migrations live here; later phases own their own deltas. Depends on nothing — PR 1 (block#6776, merged) owned zero migration files. This PR's relations are shaped to store exactly what PR 1's verifier produces: issuer-qualified identity and the four denial classes. They meet in a later PR that writes a verified assertion into these tables in one transaction. ## Two internally-ordered migrations - `0041_nip_fi_identity_foundation.sql` (migration A) — core identity + base-lifecycle relations (5 tables): issuer-qualified `(iss, sub)` bindings, lifecycle history/selectors, enrollment policies, and operation receipts. Applies cleanly to current `main`. - `0042_nip_fi_authorization_foundation.sql` (migration B) — the final-admission surface (10 tables): authorization events + capacity, admission results, replay/receipt guards, audit, invalidation domains/floors, protected-object authority, authority epochs, and restore version deltas. Applies to A's resulting state. Fifteen NIP-FI relations total, zero dangling foreign keys. Identity is issuer-qualified throughout — no single-global-issuer assumption in any relation, no `Block`-hardcoding. A single deployment may run one issuer; that is config, not schema. ## Durable, immutable ledger posture All 15 relations are append-only (immutable `no_delete`/`no_truncate` triggers) and carry `community_id` as provenance, not ownership. Both migrations widen the single SQL source of truth `community_write_fence_excluded_table` so the relations are never fence-attached, never purged on community deletion, and never counted as tenant-scoped drift by the deletion control plane's exact-set catalog check — the same posture main already applies to `product_feedback` and `rate_limit_violations`. `schema/schema.sql` keeps one consolidated definition of that function whose exclusion array byte-matches `0042`, guarded by a parity assertion so a future consolidation cannot silently drop NIP-FI relations from the ledger. This makes a tenant's identity/authorization ledger survive community deletion, per the spec's `FI-INV-02` (durable binding) and `FI-INV-03` (tombstone monotonicity) and `NIP-FI.md`'s "durable server state" ruling. `communities(id)` FK never dangles: community rows become permanent tombstones, never hard-deleted. ## Authorization shape and cardinality contracts Authenticated `OperatorDenied` events (`actor_kind` 1–3, non-null `request_fingerprint`) carry a null `semantic_fingerprint` and commit without a denial-attempt row. The denial-attempt cardinality and shape guards are scoped to unresolved pre-auth kind-9 events (`actor_kind = 4`). Applied and no-op lifecycle receipts (`outcome_code IN (1, 3)`) require exactly one mapped success-transition event; denied lifecycle receipts (`outcome_code = 2`) require zero events from the complete core lifecycle success-transition class (kinds 1, 2, 3, 6: enrolled, revoked, rotated, retired) — any such event paired with a denied receipt would record a transition that never occurred. ## Mined vs. new Re-cut from Franco's block#1476 (`0029`/`0030`) and Cea's block#4772 committer schema, re-cut along FK topology and renumbered above the live `main` tip. The buzz-auth core of block#1476 is Cea-authored; `Co-authored-by` reflects verified per-commit authorship of the mined schema. Zero Rust/`deletion.rs` edits — the migration-only exclusion widening keeps `EXPECTED_SCOPED_TABLES` untouched. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

…lock#7109) Depends on block#6994 (merged). Stack: PR 2 block#6994 (merged) → this PR (block#7109) → PR 4 block#7148 → PR 5 ## What Production assertion runtime for NIP-FI Phase A: JWKS caching layer, SSRF-hardened HTTP fetcher, startup validation gate, NIP-11 discovery serialization, federated assertion verifier with sealed key-source authority, and supporting invariant tests. ## Changes ### `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/jwks/` `ProductionJwksSource<F>` implements the sealed `IssuerKeySource` trait: - `HttpJwksFetcher`: reqwest-backed fetch with SSRF protection — URI validation (HTTPS, no credentials, no fragment, no host matched by the shared enumerated deny policy), per-fetch DNS resolution rejecting any resolved address matched by the shared enumerated deny policy, address pinning to prevent DNS rebinding TOCTOU, redirect denial, incremental body streaming capped at 512 KiB before any parse - IPv6 host extraction via typed `Url::host()` accessor (strips brackets before SSRF check and provides the correct bare input form for reqwest `resolve()` pinning; the bracketed form from `host_str()` fails `IpAddr::parse` and does not match the URL authority key) - Complete-operation deadline via `tokio::time::timeout` covering DNS resolution through body streaming - Bounded periodic refresh with configurable interval and hard snapshot deadline - Cancellation-safe RAII refresh permit: dropped on future cancellation so the next caller can re-fetch - Content-digest-gated generation counter: identical re-fetches preserve generation; key rotations advance it - Injectable clock (`now_fn: Arc<dyn Fn() -> DateTime<Utc> + Send + Sync>`): production uses `Arc::new(Utc::now)`; all four deadline creation and expiry checks use `(self.now_fn)()`, enabling controlled-time testing without wall-clock sleep `JwksSourceContract`: a closed value type that is the single source of truth for the three deployment fields whose change alters which keys the runtime trusts and how long it trusts them: - `jwks_uri` — selects the authenticated key source; validated at construction (HTTPS, no credentials/fragment, no bare private-IP host); stored as the `Url`-normalized form so that equivalent spellings (uppercase host, explicit default port `:443`, dot-segment paths like `/.well-known/./jwks.json`) converge to the same `AssertionPolicyId` - `refresh_interval_seconds` — defines bounded refresh behavior; positive, ≤ 1 year, strictly < `key_snapshot_hard_deadline_seconds` - `key_snapshot_hard_deadline_seconds` — defines the source's accepted time rule; every `VerifiedAssertion.revalidation_dependencies` deadline derives from this `JwksSourceContract` is a required `IssuerPolicy` input and is included in `derive_assertion_policy_id` after a domain separator. `IssuerJwksConfig` embeds the contract instead of independently restating these fields — startup validation rejects any contract mismatch (`NipFiStartupError::JwksContractMismatch`). ### `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/verifier.rs` - `FederatedAssertionVerifier<S>`: provider-neutral verifier over a closed multi-issuer registry and sealed `IssuerKeySource` - `Arc<S>: IssuerKeySource` forwarding impl (blanket seal for `Arc<S>` in the sealed module) — one `Arc<ProductionJwksSource>` can be shared across multiple verifiers; all observe JWKS refreshes through the shared cache without rebuilding the verifier - `AssertionKeySet`: crate-private constructor seals issuer binding — no external crate can relabel issuer B's JWKS as issuer A - Sealed `IssuerKeySource` trait closes the authority-construction seam at both ends ### `crates/buzz-core/src/network.rs` Renamed `is_private_ip` to `is_not_global_unicast` (compat alias retained) and restored the complete IANA deny/exception table from this branch's own history (`272dacadb`). The predicate is an enumerated deny/explicit exception policy: addresses covered by a named deny rule are rejected; addresses not covered by any explicit deny rule (e.g. `fe00::1`) pass through. Deny rules are derived from the IANA Special-Purpose Address Space registries (last updated 2025-10-09), with globally-reachable exceptions carved out explicitly (e.g. PCP/TURN anycast inside 2001::/23). Blocked IPv4 classes: loopback (127/8), private RFC 1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16), link-local (169.254/16), unspecified (0/8), broadcast, CGNAT/RFC 6598 (100.64/10), benchmarking/RFC 2544 (198.18/15), IETF Protocol Assignments (192.0.0.0/24, globally reachable exceptions: 192.0.0.9 PCP anycast RFC 7723 and 192.0.0.10 TURN anycast RFC 8155), documentation/RFC 5737 (192.0.2/24, 198.51.100/24, 203.0.113/24), deprecated 6to4 relay anycast (192.88.99.0/24, RFC 7526, global=None → conservative deny), multicast/RFC 5771 (224/4), reserved class-E (240/4). Blocked IPv6 classes: loopback (::1), unspecified (::), ULA (fc00::/7), link-local (fe80::/10), deprecated site-local (fec0::/10, RFC 3879), multicast (ff00::/8), IETF Protocol Assignments envelope (2001::/23, globally reachable exceptions: 2001:1::1–::3 PCP/TURN/DNS-SD anycast, 2001:3::/32 AMT RFC 7450, 2001:4:112::/48 AS112-v6 RFC 7535, 2001:20::/28 ORCHIDv2 RFC 7343, 2001:30::/28 DETs RFC 9374), documentation (2001:db8::/32 RFC 3849, 3fff::/20 RFC 9637), 6to4 (2002::/16, RFC 3056), Discard-Only (100::/64, RFC 6666), Dummy IPv6 Prefix (100:0:0:1::/64, RFC 9780), SRv6 SIDs (5f00::/16, RFC 9252), NAT64 local-use (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215). IPv4 embedded in mapped, compatible, NAT64 well-known (64:ff9b::/96), and SIIT IPv4-translated (::ffff:0:0:0/96) forms is checked recursively. All three callers (JWKS boundary, webhook SSRF, link-preview SSRF) inherit the complete predicate through the inline `is_private_ip` compatibility alias. ### Invariant coverage **Canonical URI convergence.** `jwks_contract_uri_canonicalization_convergence_and_divergence` asserts that uppercase host, explicit `:443`, and dot-segment path (`/.well-known/./jwks.json`) each produce the same `AssertionPolicyId` as the canonical form; a genuinely different host or path diverges. Mutation: storing raw input bytes instead of `parsed.to_string()` turns the three convergence assertions red. **Resolved-target and pin-input seam.** `resolved_target_and_pin_key_seam_public_ipv6_and_fec0_rejection` carries a public `2606:4700::1` URI through all three stages of `fetch_jwks_inner`: `extract_url_host_and_port` yields the bare host (no brackets), `resolve_and_check_ssrf` takes the IP-literal fast path and returns the accepted `IpAddr`, and the extracted host string equals the URL authority form (verifying the correct bare input to reqwest's `resolve()` pin call). `fec0::1` traverses the same extraction and SSRF stages and is rejected as `InvalidUri`. Network-free: both addresses are IP literals with no DNS lookup. Mutation: restoring `host_str()` brackets the address, `IpAddr::parse` fails, the SSRF fast path is unreachable, and all three assertions flip red. **Controlled original-deadline rotation.** `shared_arc_source_verifier_rejects_expired_a1_accepts_a2` uses an `AtomicI64`-backed injectable clock to advance past A1's original absolute deadline without wall-clock sleep. A1's deadline is computed at T0 and never mutated. The clock advances to T0 + HARD_DEADLINE_SECS + 1; `get_snapshot` fires a re-fetch and installs A2. One unchanged `FederatedAssertionVerifier` then rejects A1-signed tokens (deadline enforced by the `key_set` read path) and accepts A2-signed tokens, proves A2's generation is strictly greater, and confirms A2's deadline is later than A1's original. Mutation oracle: replace the shared `Arc` with an independently constructed source built from the same configs and sharing the same controlled clock, warmed with a separate A1 fetch before advancement. Post-advancement, `key_set()` on the verifier's independent source filters the expired A1 snapshot (`filter(|c| now < c.hard_deadline)`) and returns no keys — the verifier never re-fetches and never observes A2. A1-reject stays green (the independent cache is also expired, so no A1 keys are served), but A2-accept flips red, because the verifier never observes A2. A2 acceptance is the reliable shared-source oracle. **Complete SSRF classifier boundary.** JWKS-boundary tests cover every newly restored class through `validate_jwks_uri` (URI-validation path): `192.0.0.1` (IETF Protocol Assignments interior), `192.0.0.9`/`.10` (PCP/TURN anycast global exceptions), `192.88.99.1` (deprecated 6to4 anycast), `2001:2::1` (2001::/23 interior), `2001:1::1` (2001::/23 global exception), `100::1` (Discard-Only), `3fff::1` (documentation), and `5f00::1` (SRv6 SIDs). URI validation and resolved-target enforcement share the same `is_not_global_unicast` predicate, so these URI-path tests exercise the complete classifier table. All pass mutation: removing any deny branch makes the rejection assertion red; removing any exception branch makes the acceptance assertion red. The resolved-target enforcement path is covered separately by `resolved_target_and_pin_key_seam_public_ipv6_and_fec0_rejection` for `::1` (loopback), public `2606:4700::1`, and `fec0::1`. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <[email protected]>

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feat(buzz-auth): add production NIP-FI federated assertion runtime #7109

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[Buzz update] desktop-v0.5.22 available BrianInAz/buzz#42

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feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation - #6994

feat(db): add NIP-FI identity and final-admission schema foundation#6994
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Two internally-ordered migrations

Durable, immutable ledger posture

Authorization shape and cardinality contracts

Mined vs. new

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kalvinnchau commented Aug 31, 2026

Blocking findings

[P2] Scope denial-attempt coupling to unresolved actors

[P2] Do not require success events for denied lifecycle receipts

Non-blocking findings

[P3] Correct stale migration-number references

[P3] Run the new PostgreSQL migration regressions in CI

[P3] Remove the trailing blank line

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[P2] Denied lifecycle receipts accept a different lifecycle success event

[P3] NIP-FI PostgreSQL regressions remain outside CI

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