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wesbillmannpub1cl47vfhsqpqy9pwndphpm36vcp7vvz5h2js4qpqm5yewzj7nutkq7xyw8c
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fix(sharing): preserve agent/team snapshot tEXt chunks through media sanitization (#2438)
Signed-off-by: npub1cl47vfhsqpqy9pwndphpm36vcp7vvz5h2js4qpqm5yewzj7nutkq7xyw8c <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1cl47vfhsqpqy9pwndphpm36vcp7vvz5h2js4qpqm5yewzj7nutkq7xyw8c <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
1 parent cb42c8d commit b096b0a

6 files changed

Lines changed: 572 additions & 7 deletions

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‎crates/buzz-media/src/validation.rs‎

Lines changed: 93 additions & 1 deletion
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -571,13 +571,32 @@ fn validate_jpeg_metadata_free(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(), MediaError> {
571571
Err(MediaError::InvalidImage)
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}
573573

574+
/// tEXt keywords that carry Buzz snapshot manifests (`.agent.png` /
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/// `.team.png`). These are deliberate product payloads — agent/team sharing
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/// embeds a manifest in a single tEXt chunk — so they are exempt from the
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/// metadata ban. Exactly one snapshot chunk is permitted per file; every
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/// other textual/metadata chunk remains forbidden.
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const PNG_SNAPSHOT_KEYWORDS: [&[u8]; 2] = [b"buzz_agent_snapshot", b"buzz_team_snapshot"];
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/// Returns true when a raw tEXt chunk payload is a Buzz snapshot manifest:
582+
/// the payload must start with an allowlisted keyword followed by the
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/// keyword/text NUL separator.
584+
fn is_snapshot_text_chunk(payload: &[u8]) -> bool {
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PNG_SNAPSHOT_KEYWORDS.iter().any(|keyword| {
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payload.len() > keyword.len()
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&& &payload[..keyword.len()] == *keyword
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&& payload[keyword.len()] == 0
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})
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}
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fn validate_png_metadata_free(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(), MediaError> {
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const SIG: &[u8] = b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n";
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if !bytes.starts_with(SIG) {
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return Err(MediaError::InvalidImage);
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}
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let mut i = SIG.len();
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let mut saw_iend = false;
599+
let mut saw_snapshot_chunk = false;
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while i < bytes.len() {
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if i + 12 > bytes.len() {
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return Err(MediaError::InvalidImage);
@@ -589,7 +608,19 @@ fn validate_png_metadata_free(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(), MediaError> {
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.and_then(|v| v.checked_add(len))
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.filter(|&v| v <= bytes.len())
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.ok_or(MediaError::InvalidImage)?;
592-
if matches!(&kind, b"eXIf" | b"tEXt" | b"zTXt" | b"iTXt" | b"iCCP") {
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if &kind == b"tEXt" {
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// Buzz agent/team snapshot manifests ride in a single tEXt chunk
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// with an allowlisted keyword. Anything else — other keywords, or
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// a second snapshot chunk — is a forbidden metadata channel.
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let payload = &bytes[i + 8..end - 4];
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if saw_snapshot_chunk || !is_snapshot_text_chunk(payload) {
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return Err(MediaError::MetadataForbidden);
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}
619+
saw_snapshot_chunk = true;
620+
i = end;
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continue;
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}
623+
if matches!(&kind, b"eXIf" | b"zTXt" | b"iTXt" | b"iCCP") {
593624
return Err(MediaError::MetadataForbidden);
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}
595626
// Unknown ancillary chunks are private metadata channels. Keep only
@@ -1272,6 +1303,67 @@ mod tests {
12721303
));
12731304
}
12741305

1306+
#[test]
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fn test_png_snapshot_text_chunks_are_allowed() {
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// Agent/team snapshot manifests ride in an allowlisted tEXt chunk;
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// the relay must accept exactly one such chunk per file.
1310+
let config = test_config();
1311+
for keyword in [b"buzz_agent_snapshot".as_slice(), b"buzz_team_snapshot"] {
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let mut payload = keyword.to_vec();
1313+
payload.push(0);
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payload.extend_from_slice(b"eyJmb3JtYXQiOiJidXp6In0=");
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let mut png = TINY_PNG[..TINY_PNG.len() - 12].to_vec();
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png.extend_from_slice(&png_chunk(b"tEXt", &payload));
1317+
png.extend_from_slice(&TINY_PNG[TINY_PNG.len() - 12..]);
1318+
assert_eq!(
1319+
validate_content(&png, &config).unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!(
1320+
"rejected snapshot tEXt keyword {}: {error}",
1321+
String::from_utf8_lossy(keyword)
1322+
)),
1323+
"image/png"
1324+
);
1325+
}
1326+
}
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1328+
#[test]
1329+
fn test_png_snapshot_text_chunk_rejected_when_duplicated_or_spoofed() {
1330+
let config = test_config();
1331+
1332+
// Two snapshot chunks: the second is a covert channel.
1333+
let mut payload = b"buzz_agent_snapshot".to_vec();
1334+
payload.push(0);
1335+
payload.extend_from_slice(b"data");
1336+
let mut png = TINY_PNG[..TINY_PNG.len() - 12].to_vec();
1337+
png.extend_from_slice(&png_chunk(b"tEXt", &payload));
1338+
png.extend_from_slice(&png_chunk(b"tEXt", &payload));
1339+
png.extend_from_slice(&TINY_PNG[TINY_PNG.len() - 12..]);
1340+
assert!(matches!(
1341+
validate_content(&png, &config),
1342+
Err(MediaError::MetadataForbidden)
1343+
));
1344+
1345+
// Keyword prefix without the NUL separator, and near-miss keywords,
1346+
// stay forbidden.
1347+
for payload in [
1348+
b"buzz_agent_snapshotX\0data".as_slice(),
1349+
b"buzz_agent_snapshot_extra\0data",
1350+
b"buzz_agent_snapshot", // no separator at all
1351+
b"Comment\0GPS=37.7,-122.4",
1352+
] {
1353+
let mut png = TINY_PNG[..TINY_PNG.len() - 12].to_vec();
1354+
png.extend_from_slice(&png_chunk(b"tEXt", payload));
1355+
png.extend_from_slice(&TINY_PNG[TINY_PNG.len() - 12..]);
1356+
assert!(
1357+
matches!(
1358+
validate_content(&png, &config),
1359+
Err(MediaError::MetadataForbidden)
1360+
),
1361+
"accepted non-snapshot tEXt payload {:?}",
1362+
String::from_utf8_lossy(payload)
1363+
);
1364+
}
1365+
}
1366+
12751367
#[test]
12761368
fn test_rejects_jpeg_app_metadata_comments_and_trailing_payload() {
12771369
let config = test_config();

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