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tlongwell-blockDawn (sprout agent)
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fix(security): authorize kind:9000 role changes in both directions (#3017)
## Summary NIP-29 `kind:9000` (PUT_USER) role changes were only authorized when the **new** role was elevated. Demotions were unauthorized, so any authenticated user could strip a channel owner to `member` with a single event — and the demotion was unrecoverable, since the ex-owner then lacked the privilege to restore themselves. Reported by @tyler in `#buzz-security`. Verified true, plus two adjacent defects the report flagged and one it did not. ## The defects 1. **Demotion unauthorized.** The actor check only fired when the *requested* role was elevated. Lowering someone's role skipped it entirely. 2. **Open channels skipped the actor check.** It was nested under `visibility == "private"`. 3. **`add_member` had no last-owner guard** while `remove_member` did — so a channel could be left with zero owners. 4. **(Not in the report.)** An absent `role` tag defaulted to `Member`, so a bare self-targeted PUT_USER silently demoted the sender. No attacker required. ## The fix **`crates/buzz-db/src/channel.rs`** — the authority, because it also covers the desktop/admin callers that bypass the relay validator: - Changing an **active** member's role requires an elevated actor **in both directions**. Re-adding at the same role stays unguarded and idempotent (the huddle bot-add and `kind:9021` join paths depend on this). - Last-owner guard in `add_member`, mirroring `remove_member`. - Keyed on the **active** role (`removed_at IS NULL`). A soft-removed row's role is history, not live authority — otherwise soft-deleted ownership becomes a resurrection token: a kicked owner self-rejoins via `9021` and silently regains ownership. - New `pg_advisory_xact_lock` on a channel-membership namespace, taken as the first statement in both `add_member` and `remove_member`. Both read an owner `COUNT` and then write a *different* row, so READ COMMITTED alone lets two concurrent demotions each observe 2 owners and together leave 0. - `remove_member`'s `is_agent_owner` lookup moved before the transaction opens — it borrows a second pool connection, and issuing it while holding the lock could self-deadlock on a small pool. Safe because `agent_owner_pubkey` is immutable (first-mint-wins). **`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/side_effects.rs`**: - Role tag is now `Option` — absent means "no role change requested" rather than defaulting to `Member`. - Actor-role lookup hoisted out of the `visibility == "private"` block, so open channels are covered. - Role-change and last-owner guards on every visibility. Rejecting here *as well as* in the DB means clients get a real error instead of an `OK` whose side effect then fails silently. ## Verification **Mutation tested — every guard stubbed individually to confirm a test actually dies.** Three of eight guards were originally uncovered and survived being disabled with the suite fully green: | Guard | Dying test | |---|---| | DB actor-auth | *survived* → **new** `unprivileged_member_cannot_demote_a_co_owner` | | DB last-owner | `owner_can_still_manage_roles_after_demotion_guard` | | DB active-role (soft-remove) | `kicked_owner_rejoins_as_member_not_owner` + 3 | | `add_member` advisory lock | `membership_writes_serialize_on_the_shared_channel_lock` | | `remove_member` advisory lock | + `remove_member_rejects_an_actor_demoted_while_it_waited` | | relay no-role-tag preservation | `test_nip29_put_user_without_role_tag_preserves_role` | | relay actor-auth | *survived* → **new** `test_nip29_relay_rejects_role_change_by_unprivileged_actor` | | relay last-owner | *survived* → **new** `test_nip29_relay_rejects_last_owner_self_demotion` | The three gaps shared one cause: every existing test asserts resulting **state** ("the role did not change"), and the DB guards enforce that state, masking every layer above them. With a relay guard stubbed the relay answers `accepted:true` and logs `Side effect failed: access denied: ...` while the state assertion still passes — the entire relay validator could be deleted unnoticed. The new relay tests assert `accepted == false` instead, the one observable only the validator controls. Each new test is verified in both directions: green against the real fix, failing with its intended message when its guard alone is stubbed. **Test runs** (at `9461eedb`): - `buzz-db`, serial: **210 passed / 3 failed** — the same 3 failures as clean `main` (202/3), which are pre-existing and unrelated (`concurrent_same_owner_create…`, `create_community_with_owner_is_atomic…`, `test_usage_metrics_lock_has_single_owner…`). +8 = the new tests. - `e2e_relay --ignored`: **40 passed / 3 failed**. Clean `main` on the same relay is 35/6 — the same 3 infra failures (`test_invite_mint_and_claim…`, `test_subscription_limit_enforced`, `test_unarchive_emits_member_added_notification`) plus the 3 security tests that fail unpatched and pass here. - `cargo fmt`, `clippy`, `git diff --check` all clean. **Live manual drive** against a locally running relay, using raw `nak`-signed events (the `buzz` CLI refuses malformed `kind:9000`, so the guards have to be exercised directly): - *Rejected:* member demotes owner; member demotes admin; self-promote to owner; self-promote to admin; admin demotes the last owner; sole owner self-demote; demoted ex-owner demotes last owner; private-channel member demotes owner; non-member demotes owner in private. - *Allowed:* bare PUT_USER with no role tag (owner keeps role); idempotent re-add at same role; owner promotes admin→owner, then owner2 legitimately demotes owner1. - *Resurrection defeated:* owner promotes attacker to admin → kicks them (`9001`) → attacker self-rejoins (`9021`) → returns as **member**, not admin, and cannot demote the owner. - Normal ops unaffected throughout: channel creation, messaging, member listing, and legitimate governance all work. ## Behavior change to be aware of Huddle bot-add sends `role="bot"`. If the target is **already an active member at a different role**, that is now a role change and requires an elevated actor. Previously it silently re-roled them — the same privesc primitive through a different door, so narrowing it is intended. This does not break the huddle flow in the path that matters: the ephemeral channel add (the one that fails hard) is performed by the host, who *created* that channel and is therefore its owner — verified live. The parent-channel add is already explicitly best-effort, capturing the error into `parent_error` with a comment anticipating "may already be member"; adding a non-member agent there still works. Flagging it rather than burying it. ## Notes - Commit is **signoff-only, not cryptographically signed** — `-S` fails in this environment (git tries to load the agent npub as an SSH key file). DCO trailers are present and correct. - Branch was merged with `origin/main` via `--no-ff` (not rebased). Upstream had 17 commits, none touching these files, no migration changes. --------- Signed-off-by: tlongwell-block <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Dawn (sprout agent) <c6237ef84fa537c78dcee78efd2d4e59f728859c7f194da42ac51ededfa0be05@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
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