@@ -190,15 +190,15 @@ community configuration is missing or unavailable.
190190
191191### Multi-issuer registry
192192
193- The global [ ` IssuerRegistry ` ] ( ../../crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/config.rs ) remains
193+ The global ` IssuerRegistry ` remains
194194shared for issuer policy and JWKS lookup; community authorization is a separate
195195deployment mapping from canonical host URI to
196196` (expected_aud, authorized_issuers) ` . ` VerifyAssertion ` consumes the
197197Host-resolved mapping, so a globally known issuer is not implicitly trusted by
198198every community.
199199
200200The ` nostr_pubkey ` claim is unconditionally required — absence rejects
201- regardless of issuer policy (NIP-FI v2, PR # 7221 ) .
201+ regardless of issuer policy.
202202
203203### JWKS snapshot
204204
@@ -396,40 +396,6 @@ specified below is the recovery path for lost propagation, exactly as for relay
396396restart. A success response from the receiving process does not imply
397397cluster-wide application.
398398
399- > ** Note — adopted position (session-only vs deny-until-TTL):**
400- >
401- > The session-only model closes existing connections but places no
402- > protocol-level bound on reconnection. For session-only, if the issuer also
403- > stops issuing new assertions after a disconnect call, cumulative residual
404- > access is bounded by:
405- >
406- > ```
407- > max(0, min(exp, iat + maximum_assertion_age) - now)
408- > ```
409- >
410- > `max_connection_lifetime_seconds` only partitions that interval into
411- > individual sessions; it does not shorten the total window. If the issuer
412- > continues issuing new assertions, cumulative access extends indefinitely.
413- >
414- > The **deny-until-TTL** model closes this reconnect window. The relay holds a
415- > memory-resident deny set keyed by `(iss, pubkey)`, with absolute expiry
416- > carried by the issuer as `until` in the disconnect command. Any admission
417- > attempt for that key is denied until the entry expires. The issuer must boot
418- > the deny TTL to outlast the longest live assertion it may have already
419- > issued; otherwise an unexpired assertion lets the client back in the moment
420- > the entry expires.
421- >
422- > The deny set is RAM-cache, not a database — the same operational posture as
423- > the JWKS snapshot. A relay restart clears the set; the issuer, as the
424- > durable system of record for revocations, SHOULD re-push still-active denies
425- > when it observes a relay restart (same publish/cache pattern as JWKS). A
426- > fresh relay MAY consult the issuer before first admissions to close the
427- > startup race; this is non-normative.
428- >
429- > This design was chosen because session-only disconnection must outlast
430- > the live socket to mean anything as a revocation primitive; a self-expiring
431- > RAM entry preserves the zero-persistence guarantee while closing the window.
432-
433399### Transport
434400
435401The disconnect endpoint is an authenticated issuer→relay API, not a public
@@ -515,7 +481,7 @@ VerifyCommandJwt(token, request_method, request_path, request_body_pubkey):
515481 // leaves neither behind: the jti is not burned, and the caller may safely
516482 // retry the same signed command. Performing the jti reservation alone
517483 // (without the deny-entry insertion) would burn the command identity on a
518- // capacity failure, making the new 503 contract unimplementable. Capacity
484+ // capacity failure, making the 503 contract unimplementable. Capacity
519485 // is checked against the per-issuer bound for claims.iss; a different
520486 // issuer's capacity exhaustion does not produce a 503 here.
521487 // On same-key collision: retain max(existing_until, until) — never shorten
@@ -535,9 +501,6 @@ VerifyCommandJwt(token, request_method, request_path, request_body_pubkey):
535501Any failure at any step is fail-closed: no side effects occur and the relay
536502returns the appropriate error.
537503
538- This verifier and the disconnect API endpoint are follow-on code changes
539- outside this PR.
540-
541504### Request
542505
543506``` text
@@ -620,10 +583,9 @@ to all three requirements on all three endpoints, including both POST
620583endpoints; it is not a payload-only exemption.
621584
622585This exemption is required by Git's credential protocol. The credential helper
623- receives only credential metadata and never sees request bodies
624- (` crates/git-credential-nostr/src/lib.rs:98-132 ` ), so a body hash cannot exist
625- in the signed event. This limitation is architectural to Git's credential
626- protocol.
586+ receives only credential metadata and never sees request bodies, so a body
587+ hash cannot exist in the signed event. This limitation is architectural to
588+ Git's credential protocol.
627589
628590The NIP-FI assertion and pairing requirement is unchanged and applies per
629591request on every one of these endpoints. Each request MUST still carry and
@@ -645,8 +607,7 @@ The following compensating controls are REQUIRED for this proof pattern:
6456077 . Every push MUST pass pre-receive hook push authorization.
646608
647609This exemption applies solely to the Git credential-helper proof pattern on
648- these three endpoints. It is not a precedent for any other surface. A client
649- change that enables per-request signing supersedes this exemption.
610+ these three endpoints. It is not a precedent for any other surface.
650611
651612### Media possession-proof exception (Blossom, kind 24242)
652613
@@ -656,16 +617,15 @@ alternative possession format — not a general "signed Nostr event" escape hatc
656617and not precedent for any other surface. Any future alternative proof format
657618requires an explicit axis-by-axis security review covering: payload/resource
658619binding, method/operation scope, audience/tenant scope, freshness, signature/key
659- pairing, transport cardinality, and cross-endpoint replay. Per-request NIP-98
660- support supersedes this exception when available.
620+ pairing, transport cardinality, and cross-endpoint replay.
661621
662622#### Scope fence
663623
664624Kind-24242 proofs are valid ** only** on the following routes and operations:
665625
666626| Proof type (` t ` tag) | Valid route | Method |
667627| ---| ---| ---|
668- | ` upload ` | ` PUT /upload ` (and temporary alias ` PUT /media/upload ` until that alias is removed) | PUT |
628+ | ` upload ` | ` PUT /upload ` , ` PUT /media/upload ` | PUT |
669629| ` get ` | ` GET /media/{hash…} ` , ` HEAD /media/{hash…} ` | GET, HEAD |
670630
671631No other protected route may accept a kind-24242 proof. A kind-24242 event
@@ -738,17 +698,6 @@ requirement: full assertion verification, exact key equality between the
738698assertion's ` nostr_pubkey ` claim and the kind-24242 event's public key, and
739699deny-map enforcement (see Admission procedure, steps 1–6).
740700
741- The effectiveness of deny-map enforcement is contingent on the real
742- issuer-scoped deny map. Until that map is operational, the stub implementation
743- constitutes a ** known gap** in this section's security guarantees.
744-
745- #### Compliance note
746-
747- The implementation as of PR #7264 pairs via a permissive Blossom verifier and
748- is explicitly non-compliant with this section. The named gaps are:
749- multi-tag acceptance, a 3600-second proof window, and an optional ` server `
750- tag. These are resolved when the bounded hardening task lands.
751-
752701### Request format
753702
754703Each protected HTTP request MUST present both of the following:
@@ -868,7 +817,6 @@ normative behavior for them:
868817- Directory integration and account-offboarding automation: issuer-side.
869818- Audit logging beyond what the relay operator chooses to retain: issuer-side.
870819- Delegation: out of scope.
871- - Companion profiles (NIP-FI-EDGE, NIP-FI-LIFECYCLE, NIP-FI-DELEG, NIP-FI-CONF, NIP-FI-MODEL): removed.
872820
873821## Discovery
874822
@@ -979,10 +927,10 @@ gap by requiring assertion verification on every protected HTTP request.
979927The per-request re-verification model means there is no cached admission
980928window; a deny-set entry takes effect on the very next request.
981929
982- ** SSRF.** The JWKS fetcher implements SSRF protection: HTTPS-only URI
930+ ** SSRF.** The JWKS fetcher MUST enforce SSRF protection: HTTPS-only URI
983931validation, DNS resolution with IP deny-list enforcement, address pinning to
984- prevent DNS rebinding TOCTOU, and redirect denial. The complete IANA
985- Special-Purpose address deny table is implemented; see ` crates/buzz-core/src/network.rs ` .
932+ prevent DNS rebinding TOCTOU, and redirect denial. The IP deny-list covers
933+ the complete IANA Special-Purpose address registry .
986934
987935** Issuer compromise.** A compromised assertion issuer can impersonate any
988936identity but cannot prove possession of the assertion-named Nostr key. The NIP-42
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