You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
{{ message }}
Repository navigation
Commit 369ffa0
Browse filesBrowse the repository at this point in the historyBrowse files
authored
feat(relay): verify NIP-FI agent tokens and admit agents through owners (#8401)
The relay side of NIP-FI agent tokens. An agent token has its own type,
`nip-fi-agent+jwt`, and carries its human owner's pubkey in
`nostr_owner_pubkey`. This PR verifies that claim, makes denying or
disconnecting the owner cut off every agent that owner authorized, and
makes the verified owner decide community admission. A relay without
agent support refuses the unknown type, so nothing needs to advertise or
configure agent support. The `NIP-FI.md` text for the agent type is
included.
Builds on #8372 and #8377 (both merged).
### Owner claim and owner deny
- **Token type binds the owner claim (`buzz-auth`).** A `DedicatedNipFi`
issuer policy accepts `nip-fi+jwt` (human) and `nip-fi-agent+jwt`
(agent); `AccessTokenAtJwt` policies stay `at+jwt`-only with their
`client_id` and subject rules unchanged, and unknown types are refused.
An agent token must carry a lowercase-hex `nostr_owner_pubkey` distinct
from its `nostr_pubkey`; a human or `at+jwt` token carrying the claim
with any value, including null, is `evidence_rejected`. The verified
owner is exposed as `VerifiedAssertion::owner()`.
- **No agent switch.** There is no relay setting, NIP-11 field or
operator binding field for agent support.
- **Session owner.** Each connection records its NIP-FI issuer and the
agent's owner (`NipFiSession`) on the root WebSocket manager and the
audio registry. `disconnect_nip_fi(iss, target)` closes a connection
when either its own key or its recorded owner equals the target.
- **Owner deny check.** `nip_fi_core::assertion_denied` checks the deny
set for both `(iss, k)` and `(iss, owner)`, and every existing deny
check uses it: WebSocket before upgrade and after registration, HTTP,
audio, and the shadow observer, so shadow and enforce make the same
decisions. The shadow disconnect observer matches a session's key or
owner under its issuer with the same rule, so an owner's disconnect
records a would-close for its agents.
### Shadow owner check
In shadow mode, WebSocket AUTH, audio join and HTTP admission record a
`Stage::Owner` verdict when an admitted agent token's owner is banned
(`owner/denied`), conflicts with the agent's stored owner
(`owner/denied`), or cannot be checked because a read failed
(`owner/unavailable`). These are reads only; shadow admission is
unchanged. Shadow applies the same stored-owner rule as enforce but
never writes the link, so it can't predict a later owner-link write
failure, or which of two racing first links wins.
### Admission through the verified owner
- **Owner bans, unconditionally.** `community_ban_outcome` takes the
token owner and checks its ban in place of a NIP-OA owner. That applies
whether the agent is a member itself, the relay is open, or the agent is
admitted through its owner.
- **Owner-derived membership.** In
`api::relay_members::check_membership`, an agent that is a member itself
is still admitted first. Otherwise, when a verified assertion names an
owner, the owner's membership decides (`MembershipDecision::ViaOwner`),
and no NIP-OA is needed on the connection. The issuer has already passed
this community's NIP-FI binding check at that point. When a token owner
is present it is the only owner considered.
- **Stored-owner consistency.** `link_agent_owner` replaces the boolean
`materialize_nip_oa_owner` result with `OwnerLink::{Linked, Conflict,
Unavailable}`. An unset stored owner is recorded, so relay bans and
roster removal of the owner reach the agent through
`revoke_live_access`. Shadow and enforce judge the stored owner through
one read, `stored_owner_link`, and `link_agent_owner` writes
(atomically, first write wins) only when that read finds no owner; a
failed read fails closed. If the stored owner differs from the token
owner, the request is refused with `authorization denied` on HTTP, WS
and audio. A NIP-OA owner conflict keeps its existing link-error
refusal.
- **One decision on every surface.** Root WS AUTH, audio registration
and every NIP-98 HTTP route (bridge, `buzz/v1`, git transport and
settings, invites, media, workflows, moderation reads) pass
`NipFiAdmission::token_owner()` / `VerifiedAssertion::owner()` into the
same ban, membership and owner-link steps. The final socket check
rereads bans and writer-side membership; it doesn't reread the owner
link, which is written once from NULL. HTTP membership still goes
through the bounded replica read. With a verified agent token, every
HTTP admission refusal, including the fresh ban rereads in `buzz/v1` and
Git settings, is NIP-FI's fixed `authorization_denied` (or
`authorization_unavailable` when a dependency fails), and audio checks
bans before writing the owner link. `enforce_relay_membership` now takes
the `TenantContext`, because it writes the owner link.
- **Publishing.** A ban caught while publishing over `POST /events`
after the shared membership check is also an admission refusal. Ingest
reports it as a typed `IngestError::Ban` (banned, or ban lookup
unavailable) at the write gate, the HTTP typing indicator's cached gate,
and the moderation and relay-admin command rereads. `IngestError::Ban`
carries the legacy error. The bridge turns it into the fixed
`authorization denied` / `authorization unavailable` only when the
request carries a verified agent token. WebSocket and token-less HTTP
responses are byte-for-byte unchanged, and timeouts, scopes, permissions
and every other ingest error keep their existing responses.
### Rollout
- **Deploy the relay before kgoose.** An older relay refuses
`nip-fi-agent+jwt`, so agents are locked out until both are deployed.
Humans are unaffected.
- **There is no agent-only switch.** Setting NIP-FI to shadow or off
turns it off for humans too.
- **Rollback is safe for owner links.** Stored owner links survive a
rollback, and the older code still honors them.
- **Shadow signals:** in `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total`, `stage="owner"`
means an owner would-deny (`owner/denied`) or an owner read that was
unavailable (`owner/unavailable`), not a success. A clean agent
admission shows as `stage="admit", outcome="admit"`.
- **The relay checks that the owner is a member, not which issuer the
owner logged in through.** In a community that trusts several issuers,
any trusted issuer can name any member as owner. That matches the spec:
the issuer is trusted to vouch for the owner, and kgoose requires the
owner's attestation.
Agent tokens are only issued to relays whose NIP-FI binding trusts the
issuer, and NIP-FI itself is off unless configured. No deployed config
or secrets change.
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
0 commit comments