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perf(relay): drop per-pulse ban reads and owner-link writes on HTTP (#8233)
## Why
Agents send an HTTP typing pulse (`POST /events`, kind 20002) every 3–5
seconds while they work. #8207 already routes the pulse's
write-restriction and serving checks through #8208's short-TTL caches.
Two per-pulse costs were still left at the membership step:
- **A fresh ban read** for the agent, plus its owner when the agent
comes in through NIP-OA (`deny_banned` → `community_ban_outcome`).
- **Four writer round-trips for owner-admitted agents**, on every
request: `materialize_nip_oa_owner` runs 2× `ensure_user` + the
`agent_owner_pubkey` upsert + an `is_agent_owner` confirm, even though
the link already exists.
## What changes
- **Typing's ban check reads the restriction cache.** `submit_event`
already parses the event before the membership step, so typing pulses
call a new `enforce_relay_membership_ephemeral`. Its ban check reads
through `restriction_state_cached`, the same 30s bound the pulse's
write-restriction check already has. Every other HTTP route, persistent
`POST /events`, and socket auth still read fresh (`cached: false`).
- **`materialize_nip_oa_owner` skips a link it already knows.** If
`observer_owner_cache` already holds `(community, agent, owner) = true`,
it returns `true` right away. `agent_owner_pubkey` has one production
writer, which sets it only `WHERE agent_owner_pubkey IS NULL`, and
nothing clears it, so the skipped writes were no-ops. This helps every
caller (HTTP, socket auth, audio). The owner-link disconnect only runs
on the first write, so it still runs.
- **`observer_owner_cache` capacity goes from 1k to 100k**, so
concurrently active agents actually hit it. That's tens of MB per pod at
most, the same scale as `restriction_cache`.
Per-pulse Postgres work at the membership step:
| Agent | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Direct relay member | host lookup (writer) + membership + ban | host
lookup (writer) + membership |
| Owner-admitted (NIP-OA) | host lookup + 2 memberships + 2 bans + 4
writer trips | host lookup + 2 memberships |
## Not in this PR
- **Caching host → community.** It's the tenant-binding step every HTTP
request goes through, and it reads from the writer. Community deletion
depends on new requests not binding once a community leaves `active`. A
cache would keep binding a quiescing community for its TTL. The
serving-write leases may make that harmless, but that needs a closer
look than a "safe fixes" PR.
- **Caching relay membership.** Removing a member has no HTTP equivalent
of the socket disconnect, so a cache would delay removal by its TTL.
- **The desktop client reusing one connection.** That's going in a
separate buzz-app PR.
## Unrelated one-liner
The `sadscan` pre-commit hook scans whole staged files. It blocked this
commit on a pre-existing test-only URI in `handlers/auth.rs`
(`postgres://buzz:[email protected]:1/buzz`, a deliberately unreachable
stub). I added the hook's own `// sadscan:disable np.postgres.1` marker
to that line.
## Testing
- New Postgres tests. I confirmed each one fails when its guard is
removed:
- `typing_ban_gate_uses_cached_restriction_row`: a member banned in
Postgres with a cached clear row can still type. Fails if typing reads
fresh.
- `persistent_post_ban_gate_reads_fresh`: a stale cached ban doesn't
refuse a kind-9 post that Postgres allows. Fails if every kind reads the
cache.
- `known_owner_link_skips_materialize_writes`: after the link is cached,
deleting the agent row behind the cache's back stays deleted. Fails
without the short-circuit.
- `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-relay --lib --tests`: 397/397
passed. This was local PG14.
- `cargo test -p buzz-relay`: 1430 passed and 7 failed. The same 7 fail
without this commit in this environment: 6 `api::media` tests can't find
a `buzz` role on :5432, and `mesh_demo` returns a 504.
- `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay --all-targets -D warnings` is clean.
- An independent agent review found no blockers. Its optional
suggestions are test gaps: nothing pins the owner-cascade cached read,
or the `false` literals at socket auth.
- **Not yet done:** a run against a live local relay, and human testing.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Signed-off-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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