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Commit 16839a0
feat(nip-fi): admin disconnect/deny API with in-memory deny-until-TTL map (S4) (#7977)
This adds the NIP-FI S4 admin command surface. An authorized issuer
principal can deny an `(issuer, pubkey)` pair until a TTL expires. When
that happens, the relay records the entry in a bounded in-memory deny
map, closes matching live sockets on every pod, and refuses new
admissions while the entry is live.
Supersedes #7265
## Breaking
In `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=enforce`, every entry in `BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS` now
has to carry `maximum_command_age_seconds` (1–60) and a non-empty
`authorized_principals` list, and startup fails if any issuer is missing
either one. That means an S3-only enforce config that boots on `main`
won't boot with this change. No deployment sets `BUZZ_NIP_FI_*` yet. The
per-issuer field table and a working example are in the
`nip_fi_config.rs` module docs.
## What changes
- **`buzz-auth`**:
- `nip_fi/command.rs` verifies signed admin commands. It checks issuer
policy, command age, the authorized principal (exact, case-sensitive
`sub` match), and a `jti` of at most 512 bytes.
- `nip_fi/deny_map.rs` is a per-issuer, capacity-bounded deny-until-TTL
map on top of `DashMap`. Expired entries and `jti` reservations are only
swept when a write would otherwise hit capacity. The sweep is O(n) and
holds the lock every admission check takes, so this keeps it off the
admission path. Reads compare against `now`, so an expired entry that
hasn't been swept yet never counts as live.
- **Cross-pod command replay fence**: `nip_fi/command_replay.rs` adds a
`CommandReplayGuard` trait, and `buzz-pubsub` implements it in Redis
(`RedisCommandReplayGuard`), following the NIP-98 replay guard. Once a
command is authenticated, the verifier takes an atomic `SET
buzz:nip-fi:command:{sha256(len(iss)‖iss‖len(jti)‖jti)} 1 NX EX <ttl>`
claim, with the TTL set to the command's remaining validity rounded up
to whole seconds plus skew, clamped like NIP-98, so the claim outlives
acceptance by a verifier whose clock trails by the full skew. Before the
claim, the verifier reserves a pending `jti` and deny-entry slot in this
pod's deny map under the issuer lock, so a full deny set returns `503
deny set full` without touching Redis and the same signed command can be
retried. The claim is taken only after the signature and claims verify,
so a forged token cannot burn a real `jti`. A `jti` already claimed on
any pod returns `403`. A Redis error fails closed with `503
authorization unavailable`: no deny entry, no session close, no publish.
A replayed claim, a Redis error, or a cancelled request drops the
reservation. After a successful claim the reservation commits to the
`jti` record and deny entry, which cannot fail on capacity. A claim can
still remain with no deny entry if Redis applied `SET` but the reply was
lost, or the pod stops between claim and commit; that fails closed, and
a retry gets `403` until the TTL expires.
- **`api/nip_fi.rs`**: the admin disconnect/deny endpoint. It verifies
the command, inserts the deny entry, disconnects locally, and publishes
over `buzz-pubsub` `conn_control` so every other pod runs the same
disconnect. A receiving pod clamps `until` to its own ceiling instead of
rejecting it. Otherwise a pod whose clock trails the origin would drop a
command the origin already answered with 200, and the target's sockets
on that pod would stay open. Malformed pubkeys, unknown issuers, and
unrepresentable timestamps are still rejected.
- **Admission and live enforcement**:
- WS upgrade (`router.rs`) and HTTP (`nip_fi_http.rs`) refuse keys that
have a live entry with `403 authorization_denied`.
- Root NIP-42 auth and audio auth register the proven identity (pubkey +
admitting issuer) first, and only then check the deny map. With that
order, a concurrent disconnect either finds the socket in its close scan
or the check finds the entry. `OK(true)` isn't sent if a concurrent
disconnect already cancelled the session.
- `ConnectionManager::disconnect_nip_fi` and
`CommunityConnectionRegistry::disconnect_nip_fi` are scoped to the
issuer.
- **One wire form for `authorization_denied`** (FI-TRACE-DENIAL-ORACLE):
every root and audio WebSocket `authorization_denied` denial now goes
through one first-writer-wins transition on
`CommunityConnectionControl`. That covers the S4 deny-set hit and admin
disconnect, and also the existing S3 key-mismatch, lease-expiry, and
membership refusals. The transition sets the `AuthorizationDenied`
reason only if nothing else has set a reason, and only the winner
enqueues the denial frame. So every one of these denials is the class's
denial frame followed by `Close(1008, "authorization denied")`, and a
concurrent registry scan can't queue a second one. Before this, S3 key
mismatch and expiry closed with `Close(None)`, which made them
distinguishable from a deny-set hit on the wire. `evidence_rejected` and
`authorization_unavailable` keep the bare close.
- **Config**: see Breaking. `deny_set_capacity` is optional and defaults
to 50000. Setting any command field without a command age fails closed.
- **Boot** (`main.rs`): installs the command verifier and deny map. It
subscribes to cross-pod disconnects before the Redis subscriber starts,
so disconnects relayed during boot are buffered instead of dropped.
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>1 parent 04b040e commit 16839a0
33 files changed
Lines changed: 10348 additions & 211 deletions
File tree
- .github/workflows
- crates
- buzz-auth
- src
- nip_fi
- jwks
- buzz-pubsub/src
- buzz-relay/src
- api
- admin
- audio
- handlers
- scripts
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