[FEATURE] Desktop: persist sidecar server URL/credentials to disk (XDG_STATE_HOME) so companion tools can auto-discover #47206

Description

The Desktop app's embedded server (sidecar) is only reachable by the app's own renderer. Companion tools running on the same machine (status-bar widgets, CLI wrappers, IDE extensions, automation scripts) cannot discover or authenticate to it, because the server URL/credentials are generated in memory and never persisted.

Currently the only working "API" for external tools is scraping main.log for the URL:

[info] server ready { url: 'http://127.0.0.1:62057' }

…but the log never contains the password, so discovery always ends in HTTP 401.

Current behavior (v1.18.26, macOS)

• out/main/index.js: const password = randomUUID(); — a fresh password per launch, passed to the sidecar via postMessage, never written to disk.

• out/main/sidecar.js → prepareSidecarEnv() unconditionally overwrites the environment:

  Object.assign(process.env, {
    OPENCODE_SERVER_USERNAME: "opencode",
    OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD: password,   // always the IPC-provided value
    ...
  })

  so externally fixing the password (e.g. launchctl setenv OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD ...) has no effect.

• The password is only visible inside processes the server itself spawns (session tool processes). Tools outside that process tree cannot read it: ps -E shows the kernel-initial env, and the runtime-injected value is not there.

Result: every desktop restart rotates port + password, and each external tool has to implement a hack — e.g. running a "bridge" script inside an opencode session that dumps its own env to a well-known file — which only works after a session has started, and silently breaks again on the next restart.

Proposal

After server ready, persist the endpoint once, atomically, with 0600 perms, e.g.:

// $XDG_STATE_HOME/opencode/server.json  (sidecar already sets XDG_STATE_HOME)
{
  "url": "http://127.0.0.1:62057",
  "username": "opencode",
  "password": "<uuid>",
  "pid": 52431,
  "writtenAt": 1788490335685
}

• Rewrite it on every (re)start; remove or invalidate it on clean shutdown.
• Loopback-only listener + same-user-readable file puts it in the same trust domain as the existing env-var mechanism used by the CLI (OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD), so no new attack surface.

(Alternative, also fine: let the desktop honor an externally provided OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD instead of always generating one. Then tools can pin credentials via launchctl setenv and discover the port from main.log/lsof as they already do.)

Precedent inside the same codebase

The v2 CLI background-service path already treats credentials as externally retrievable:

const url = await run(binary, ["service", "start"], ...)
const password = await run(binary, ["service", "get", "password"], ...)

The desktop sidecar is currently the only server mode whose credentials are unreachable from outside the process tree.

Alternatives considered (and why they don't work today)

1. A plugin that writes credentials on startup — natural place for it, but desktop plugin loading is broken/limited on 1.18.x (see [Bug] Production Desktop 1.18.15 still cannot load Bun-target plugins (oh-my-openagent); V2 sidecar not bundled #41033, Desktop app: local plugins load and register but their hooks (tool.execute.before, event) are never invoked #38604, [Desktop][Windows] npm plugin from config is silently never loaded — no install attempt logged, docs/cache mismatch #44367), so it can't be relied on.
2. Scraping ps -E for OPENCODE_SERVER_PASSWORD — the value is injected at runtime, so it only appears in short-lived session tool processes; not a stable discovery channel.

Persisting the endpoint (or honoring an external password) would let the growing ecosystem of companion tools connect zero-touch, instead of every tool shipping its own rebridge hack.

Environment

• OpenCode Desktop 1.18.26, macOS 15 (arm64)
• Reproduction: start desktop → curl -u opencode:anything http://127.0.0.1:<sidecar-port>/global/health → 401, with no supported way to learn the real password from outside the app.