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| 1 | +#!/usr/bin/env node |
| 2 | +/** |
| 3 | + * Governance Event Capture Hook |
| 4 | + * |
| 5 | + * PreToolUse/PostToolUse hook that detects governance-relevant events |
| 6 | + * and writes them to the governance_events table in the state store. |
| 7 | + * |
| 8 | + * Captured event types: |
| 9 | + * - secret_detected: Hardcoded secrets in tool input/output |
| 10 | + * - policy_violation: Actions that violate configured policies |
| 11 | + * - security_finding: Security-relevant tool invocations |
| 12 | + * - approval_requested: Operations requiring explicit approval |
| 13 | + * |
| 14 | + * Enable: Set ECC_GOVERNANCE_CAPTURE=1 |
| 15 | + * Configure session: Set ECC_SESSION_ID for session correlation |
| 16 | + */ |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | +'use strict'; |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +const crypto = require('crypto'); |
| 21 | + |
| 22 | +const MAX_STDIN = 1024 * 1024; |
| 23 | + |
| 24 | +// Patterns that indicate potential hardcoded secrets |
| 25 | +const SECRET_PATTERNS = [ |
| 26 | + { name: 'aws_key', pattern: /(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}/i }, |
| 27 | + { name: 'generic_secret', pattern: /(?:secret|password|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*["'][^"']{8,}/i }, |
| 28 | + { name: 'private_key', pattern: /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----/ }, |
| 29 | + { name: 'jwt', pattern: /eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}/ }, |
| 30 | + { name: 'github_token', pattern: /gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36,}/ }, |
| 31 | +]; |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | +// Tool names that represent security-relevant operations |
| 34 | +const SECURITY_RELEVANT_TOOLS = new Set([ |
| 35 | + 'Bash', // Could execute arbitrary commands |
| 36 | +]); |
| 37 | + |
| 38 | +// Commands that require governance approval |
| 39 | +const APPROVAL_COMMANDS = [ |
| 40 | + /git\s+push\s+.*--force/, |
| 41 | + /git\s+reset\s+--hard/, |
| 42 | + /rm\s+-rf?\s/, |
| 43 | + /DROP\s+(?:TABLE|DATABASE)/i, |
| 44 | + /DELETE\s+FROM\s+\w+\s*(?:;|$)/i, |
| 45 | +]; |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | +// File patterns that indicate policy-sensitive paths |
| 48 | +const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [ |
| 49 | + /\.env(?:\.|$)/, |
| 50 | + /credentials/i, |
| 51 | + /secrets?\./i, |
| 52 | + /\.pem$/, |
| 53 | + /\.key$/, |
| 54 | + /id_rsa/, |
| 55 | +]; |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | +/** |
| 58 | + * Generate a unique event ID. |
| 59 | + */ |
| 60 | +function generateEventId() { |
| 61 | + return `gov-${Date.now()}-${crypto.randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`; |
| 62 | +} |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | +/** |
| 65 | + * Scan text content for hardcoded secrets. |
| 66 | + * Returns array of { name, match } for each detected secret. |
| 67 | + */ |
| 68 | +function detectSecrets(text) { |
| 69 | + if (!text || typeof text !== 'string') return []; |
| 70 | + |
| 71 | + const findings = []; |
| 72 | + for (const { name, pattern } of SECRET_PATTERNS) { |
| 73 | + if (pattern.test(text)) { |
| 74 | + findings.push({ name }); |
| 75 | + } |
| 76 | + } |
| 77 | + return findings; |
| 78 | +} |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | +/** |
| 81 | + * Check if a command requires governance approval. |
| 82 | + */ |
| 83 | +function detectApprovalRequired(command) { |
| 84 | + if (!command || typeof command !== 'string') return []; |
| 85 | + |
| 86 | + const findings = []; |
| 87 | + for (const pattern of APPROVAL_COMMANDS) { |
| 88 | + if (pattern.test(command)) { |
| 89 | + findings.push({ pattern: pattern.source }); |
| 90 | + } |
| 91 | + } |
| 92 | + return findings; |
| 93 | +} |
| 94 | + |
| 95 | +/** |
| 96 | + * Check if a file path is policy-sensitive. |
| 97 | + */ |
| 98 | +function detectSensitivePath(filePath) { |
| 99 | + if (!filePath || typeof filePath !== 'string') return false; |
| 100 | + |
| 101 | + return SENSITIVE_PATHS.some(pattern => pattern.test(filePath)); |
| 102 | +} |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | +/** |
| 105 | + * Analyze a hook input payload and return governance events to capture. |
| 106 | + * |
| 107 | + * @param {Object} input - Parsed hook input (tool_name, tool_input, tool_output) |
| 108 | + * @param {Object} [context] - Additional context (sessionId, hookPhase) |
| 109 | + * @returns {Array<Object>} Array of governance event objects |
| 110 | + */ |
| 111 | +function analyzeForGovernanceEvents(input, context = {}) { |
| 112 | + const events = []; |
| 113 | + const toolName = input.tool_name || ''; |
| 114 | + const toolInput = input.tool_input || {}; |
| 115 | + const toolOutput = typeof input.tool_output === 'string' ? input.tool_output : ''; |
| 116 | + const sessionId = context.sessionId || null; |
| 117 | + const hookPhase = context.hookPhase || 'unknown'; |
| 118 | + |
| 119 | + // 1. Secret detection in tool input content |
| 120 | + const inputText = typeof toolInput === 'object' |
| 121 | + ? JSON.stringify(toolInput) |
| 122 | + : String(toolInput); |
| 123 | + |
| 124 | + const inputSecrets = detectSecrets(inputText); |
| 125 | + const outputSecrets = detectSecrets(toolOutput); |
| 126 | + const allSecrets = [...inputSecrets, ...outputSecrets]; |
| 127 | + |
| 128 | + if (allSecrets.length > 0) { |
| 129 | + events.push({ |
| 130 | + id: generateEventId(), |
| 131 | + sessionId, |
| 132 | + eventType: 'secret_detected', |
| 133 | + payload: { |
| 134 | + toolName, |
| 135 | + hookPhase, |
| 136 | + secretTypes: allSecrets.map(s => s.name), |
| 137 | + location: inputSecrets.length > 0 ? 'input' : 'output', |
| 138 | + severity: 'critical', |
| 139 | + }, |
| 140 | + resolvedAt: null, |
| 141 | + resolution: null, |
| 142 | + }); |
| 143 | + } |
| 144 | + |
| 145 | + // 2. Approval-required commands (Bash only) |
| 146 | + if (toolName === 'Bash') { |
| 147 | + const command = toolInput.command || ''; |
| 148 | + const approvalFindings = detectApprovalRequired(command); |
| 149 | + |
| 150 | + if (approvalFindings.length > 0) { |
| 151 | + events.push({ |
| 152 | + id: generateEventId(), |
| 153 | + sessionId, |
| 154 | + eventType: 'approval_requested', |
| 155 | + payload: { |
| 156 | + toolName, |
| 157 | + hookPhase, |
| 158 | + command: command.slice(0, 200), |
| 159 | + matchedPatterns: approvalFindings.map(f => f.pattern), |
| 160 | + severity: 'high', |
| 161 | + }, |
| 162 | + resolvedAt: null, |
| 163 | + resolution: null, |
| 164 | + }); |
| 165 | + } |
| 166 | + } |
| 167 | + |
| 168 | + // 3. Policy violation: writing to sensitive paths |
| 169 | + const filePath = toolInput.file_path || toolInput.path || ''; |
| 170 | + if (filePath && detectSensitivePath(filePath)) { |
| 171 | + events.push({ |
| 172 | + id: generateEventId(), |
| 173 | + sessionId, |
| 174 | + eventType: 'policy_violation', |
| 175 | + payload: { |
| 176 | + toolName, |
| 177 | + hookPhase, |
| 178 | + filePath: filePath.slice(0, 200), |
| 179 | + reason: 'sensitive_file_access', |
| 180 | + severity: 'warning', |
| 181 | + }, |
| 182 | + resolvedAt: null, |
| 183 | + resolution: null, |
| 184 | + }); |
| 185 | + } |
| 186 | + |
| 187 | + // 4. Security-relevant tool usage tracking |
| 188 | + if (SECURITY_RELEVANT_TOOLS.has(toolName) && hookPhase === 'post') { |
| 189 | + const command = toolInput.command || ''; |
| 190 | + const hasElevated = /sudo\s/.test(command) || /chmod\s/.test(command) || /chown\s/.test(command); |
| 191 | + |
| 192 | + if (hasElevated) { |
| 193 | + events.push({ |
| 194 | + id: generateEventId(), |
| 195 | + sessionId, |
| 196 | + eventType: 'security_finding', |
| 197 | + payload: { |
| 198 | + toolName, |
| 199 | + hookPhase, |
| 200 | + command: command.slice(0, 200), |
| 201 | + reason: 'elevated_privilege_command', |
| 202 | + severity: 'medium', |
| 203 | + }, |
| 204 | + resolvedAt: null, |
| 205 | + resolution: null, |
| 206 | + }); |
| 207 | + } |
| 208 | + } |
| 209 | + |
| 210 | + return events; |
| 211 | +} |
| 212 | + |
| 213 | +/** |
| 214 | + * Core hook logic — exported so run-with-flags.js can call directly. |
| 215 | + * |
| 216 | + * @param {string} rawInput - Raw JSON string from stdin |
| 217 | + * @returns {string} The original input (pass-through) |
| 218 | + */ |
| 219 | +function run(rawInput) { |
| 220 | + // Gate on feature flag |
| 221 | + if (String(process.env.ECC_GOVERNANCE_CAPTURE || '').toLowerCase() !== '1') { |
| 222 | + return rawInput; |
| 223 | + } |
| 224 | + |
| 225 | + try { |
| 226 | + const input = JSON.parse(rawInput); |
| 227 | + const sessionId = process.env.ECC_SESSION_ID || null; |
| 228 | + const hookPhase = process.env.CLAUDE_HOOK_EVENT_NAME || 'unknown'; |
| 229 | + |
| 230 | + const events = analyzeForGovernanceEvents(input, { |
| 231 | + sessionId, |
| 232 | + hookPhase: hookPhase.startsWith('Pre') ? 'pre' : 'post', |
| 233 | + }); |
| 234 | + |
| 235 | + if (events.length > 0) { |
| 236 | + // Write events to stderr as JSON-lines for the caller to capture. |
| 237 | + // The state store write is async and handled by a separate process |
| 238 | + // to avoid blocking the hook pipeline. |
| 239 | + for (const event of events) { |
| 240 | + process.stderr.write( |
| 241 | + `[governance] ${JSON.stringify(event)}\n` |
| 242 | + ); |
| 243 | + } |
| 244 | + } |
| 245 | + } catch { |
| 246 | + // Silently ignore parse errors — never block the tool pipeline. |
| 247 | + } |
| 248 | + |
| 249 | + return rawInput; |
| 250 | +} |
| 251 | + |
| 252 | +// ── stdin entry point ──────────────────────────────── |
| 253 | +if (require.main === module) { |
| 254 | + let raw = ''; |
| 255 | + process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8'); |
| 256 | + process.stdin.on('data', chunk => { |
| 257 | + if (raw.length < MAX_STDIN) { |
| 258 | + const remaining = MAX_STDIN - raw.length; |
| 259 | + raw += chunk.substring(0, remaining); |
| 260 | + } |
| 261 | + }); |
| 262 | + |
| 263 | + process.stdin.on('end', () => { |
| 264 | + const result = run(raw); |
| 265 | + process.stdout.write(result); |
| 266 | + }); |
| 267 | +} |
| 268 | + |
| 269 | +module.exports = { |
| 270 | + APPROVAL_COMMANDS, |
| 271 | + SECRET_PATTERNS, |
| 272 | + SECURITY_RELEVANT_TOOLS, |
| 273 | + SENSITIVE_PATHS, |
| 274 | + analyzeForGovernanceEvents, |
| 275 | + detectApprovalRequired, |
| 276 | + detectSecrets, |
| 277 | + detectSensitivePath, |
| 278 | + generateEventId, |
| 279 | + run, |
| 280 | +}; |
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