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crypto-maturity.en.md

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Oracle family — cryptographic maturity (honest)

This document states what the seventeen-oracle family is — and is not — from a cryptography and production-hardening perspective. Read it before treating oracle outputs as the sole trust anchor for high-value money flows.

Related: Chronos SECURITY.md · oracle-core SIGNING.md · Factory known-issues (KI-6)


Executive summary

Claim in marketing Honest status (2026-07)
Seventeen verifiable-math oracles True — live capabilities, unit tests, AIMarket v2 integration
Ed25519-signed manifests & receipts True — canonical forms match the Hub
Hybrid post-quantum (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65) Partial — implemented in oracle-core, off by default; Hub verifies Ed25519 only; no external crypto review
Chronos Wesolowski VDF Research-grade primitive — standard construction, parameters in source, not independently audited, no formal verification
Hardened production cryptographic service False today — see below

The family was built in roughly two months of focused engineering. That is enough for a strong research / prototype stack (correct math, tests, demos, lottery integration) — not enough for a fully hardened cryptographic service with published setup ceremonies, external audits, and proof-of-correctness artifacts reviewers expect before mainnet-scale TVL.


Chronos (Wesolowski VDF)

What exists in-repo

  • Fixed RSA-2048 challenge modulus (not per-request generation) — see chronos/vdf.py.
  • Documented parameters: generator derivation, T clamp [1, 1_000_000], 128-bit Fiat–Shamir challenge prime, verification equation.
  • Unit tests including adversarial cases; Foundry test-vector alignment for on-chain consumers.
  • SECURITY.md with setup transparency and threat model.

What a hardened production VDF service would still publish — and we do not yet

Gap Why it matters
Published parameter-selection guide Operators need T ↔ wall-clock mapping on reference hardware, security margin vs ASIC/GPU speedups, and recommended values per use case (lottery vs ordering). Today T is caller-chosen within a cap.
Standalone security analysis A reviewer-facing document (assumptions, adaptive-root usage, RSA-2048 anchor, grinding bounds) separate from README prose — suitable for citation in an audit scope letter.
External cryptographic audit No Trail of Bits / NCC / similar report; no public audit PDF.
Formal verification No Coq/Lean/TLA+ (or third-party) proofs tying implementation to Wesolowski semantics.
Operational transparency No public attestation log of modulus fingerprint, deployed T policies, or hardware profiles used in production.

Until closed: use Chronos for demos, testnet lottery, and grinding-resistance experiments. Do not treat it as the only trust anchor for large real-money flows without an independent review.


Signing & oracle-core

What exists

  • Shared oracle_core/signing.py: Ed25519 for manifests and receipts; optional additive ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204 via dilithium-py) when ORACLE_PQC=1.
  • Hybrid verify requires both signatures when PQ fields are present.
  • Tests in core/tests/test_core.py and Platon signing tests (skipped if dilithium-py absent).

What is still thin

Gap Detail
Normative hybrid spec AIMarket Protocol v2 documents Ed25519 receipts; the PQ extension (pq_algorithm, pq_public_key, pq_value) is implementation-defined in oracle-core, not a frozen RFC with test vectors in aimarket-protocol.
Hub parity Live Hub verification path checks Ed25519 only; PQ fields are ignored unless the consumer implements verify_signature_object.
Default posture PQC is off in production configs; the README badge describes capability, not deployment state.
Proof-of-correctness No independent review of canonical string formats, key lifecycle, or hybrid composition (e.g. binding PQ key to Ed25519 identity).
Key management File-based keys (data/*_signing_key, chmod 600) — no HSM/KMS integration guide for oracle operators.

Specification: core/docs/SIGNING.md — describes what the code does today; not a substitute for audit or protocol freeze.


Seventeen oracles — scope vs depth

Each oracle ships domain math + invoke handler + tests + portal scene. Shared infrastructure (protocol, signing, metrics, rate limits) is real and reused.

What cannot be done credibly in a short sprint for all seventeen:

  • Per-oracle cryptographic threat models reviewed by outsiders
  • Side-channel analysis of hot paths
  • Constant-time guarantees on non-crypto oracles (many are numerical, not constant-time by design)
  • Unified security incident response and key-rotation runbooks

Honest tier: research / prototype with production-style integration (Hub, lottery, on-chain vectors for Chronos/Sortes). Not a bank-grade or L1-grade crypto service.


Acceptance criteria (path to “hardened”)

We will treat the oracle crypto layer as production-hardened only when all of the following are true (tracked as KI-6):

  1. External cryptographic audit report published (scope: oracle-core signing, Chronos VDF, Sortes ECVRF at minimum).
  2. Chronos: published parameter guide + operator attestation checklist. — done 2026-10-12: chronos/docs/PARAMETERS.md.
  3. Hybrid PQC: normative extension in aimarket-protocol with negative test vectors; Hub verifies both layers when present. — done 2026-10-12: protocol §7.3.7–§7.3.8 + vectors.
  4. Key-management runbook (rotation, compromise, multisig or HSM option) for oracle operators. — done 2026-10-12: key-management.en.md.

Item 1 is still open. Self-verification on 2026-10-12 (standard RFC 8032 / RFC 9381 vectors and negative cases) found and fixed three real issues — Sortes VRF without validate_key, Ed25519 verification accepting small-order keys, Chronos y vs N − y — see KI-6 in the Factory known-issues. That is not an audit.

Until then: testnet, demos, and bounded pilots only — aligned with the Factory pre-mainnet checklist.


Reporting

Cryptographic issues: open a GitHub issue on alexar76/oracles with [crypto] in the title. Do not post working exploits publicly before a fix.

Other languages: crypto-maturity.ru.md