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atenet-router no longer exposes its plaintext xDS server on the pod IP - #2443
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The router's xDS server (ADS/CDS/LDS/RDS/SDS on --port-xds) is plaintext and unauthenticated, but listened on all interfaces, so any pod that could reach the atenet-router pod IP could stream the dataplane's listeners, routes, clusters and secret paths. Envoy in the same pod already dials it at 127.0.0.1, so bind it there and stop declaring the port on the container. Tests check the bound address is loopback and that the shipped manifest's Envoy bootstrap dials a loopback IP on --port-xds, with no container declaring that port. Fixes agent-substrate#2276
Bowei Du (bowei)
approved these changes
Oct 10, 2026
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Binds the atenet-router's xDS server (ADS/CDS/LDS/RDS/SDS on
--port-xds) to127.0.0.1instead of all interfaces. It is plaintext and unauthenticated, so any pod that could reach the router pod IP could stream the dataplane's listeners, routes, clusters and secret paths. Envoy in the same pod already dials127.0.0.1:18000, so nothing changes for it. Also drops thexdscontainerPort from the Deployment.Fixes #2276
xds_listen_test.gochecks the bound address is loopback (including a real listen), and that the shipped manifest's Envoy bootstrap dials loopback on--port-xdswith no container declaring that port. Both tests fail against the old code.