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rustls: An unauthenticated ServerHello poisons the per-name key-exchange record, so later ClientHellos carry only a classical X25519 share

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published Oct 14, 2026 in rustls/rustls • Updated Oct 27, 2026

Package

cargo rustls (Rust)

Affected versions

< 0.23.46
>= 0.24.0-dev.1, < 0.24.0-dev.2

Patched versions

0.23.46
0.24.0-dev.2

Description

Summary

The client records the server-selected key-exchange group per server name when it processes the ServerHello, before the server is authenticated. A network attacker can answer one connection attempt for a target name with a ServerHello that selects X25519 and close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry one X25519 share while supported_groups still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the server accepts that share instead of sending a HelloRetryRequest, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only and no error.

An attacker that answers one connection attempt for the target name with a ServerHello selecting X25519 changes every later ClientHello of that client for that name, for as long as the entry stays in the store. No certificate or completed handshake is needed: it parses the ClientHello, sends the ServerHello, and closes.

TLS 1.3 transcript binding stops an on-path attacker from editing the ClientHello of one connection. It does not stop the attacker from steering the client's prediction state beforehand, because that state is written from an unauthenticated message.

What does not trigger it

  • Servers that send a HelloRetryRequest. The connection stays hybrid and costs one extra round trip.
  • A client configuration with resumption disabled: nothing is stored.
  • A different server name: the record is per name.

Impact

If the genuine server picks the group for which a share is present, instead of sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only, between two peers that both support the hybrid group. No error is raised. The confidentiality of recorded sessions against a future quantum adversary is lost for those connections (harvest now, decrypt later). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.

Note that this behaviour is discussed at length in draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction so the actual security impact is largely down to a server policy decision.

References

@ctz ctz published to rustls/rustls Oct 14, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Oct 27, 2026
Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
Last updated Oct 27, 2026

Severity

Low

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation

A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used in a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

No known CVE

GHSA ID

GHSA-w44r-93j7-qv28

Source code

Credits

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