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ip-address: Address6.isLinkLocal() recognizes fe80::/64 rather than fe80::/10, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass to on-link hosts

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Aug 29, 2026 in beaugunderson/ip-address • Updated Sep 28, 2026

Package

npm ip-address (npm)

Affected versions

<= 10.5.0

Patched versions

10.5.1

Description

Summary

Address6.isLinkLocal() recognizes fe80::/64 rather than fe80::/10. Link-local unicast is the whole /10 under RFC 4291 §2.4 and the IANA IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry, so the method returns false for every link-local address outside the one /64 that stateless address autoconfiguration happens to use. new Address6('fe81::1').isLinkLocal() is false.

The library contradicts itself on the same object: for fe81::1, getType() returns 'Link-local unicast', getScope() returns 'Link local', and isHostInSubnet(new Address6('fe80::/10')) returns true, while isLinkLocal() returns false.

An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks (for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF) will classify a link-local target as unremarkable and allow the request. SSRF is an attack in which a user-supplied address coaxes the server into making a request to an internal destination the user could not otherwise reach.

Details

isLinkLocal() in src/ipv6.ts compares the first 64 bits of the address against a literal string:

// Zeroes are required, i.e. we can't check isHostInSubnet with 'fe80::/10'
if (
  this.getBitsBase2(0, 64) ===
  '1111111010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000'
) {
  return true;
}

The comparison requires the first 64 bits to be exactly fe80:0000:0000:0000, so it accepts 2⁶⁴ of the 2¹¹⁸ addresses in fe80::/10. The comment states a premise the library disproves: getType() classifies the same range with isHostInSubnet against the 'fe80::/10': 'Link-local unicast' entry in src/v6/constants.ts, and Address4.isLinkLocal() is a plain isHostInSubnet test against 169.254.0.0/16. RFC 4291 §2.5.6 constrains the format of an autoconfigured link-local address; it does not define the range, and reading it as the definition is the likeliest origin of the /64 comparison.

The IPv4-mapped and NAT64 well-known paths of isLinkLocal() are unaffected: ::ffff:169.254.169.254 and 64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe are classified by their embedded IPv4 address and report true.

Affected versions

<= 10.5.0. The comparison has had this shape since Address6.isLinkLocal() was introduced, so every release exposing the method is affected.

Impact

Every well-formed address in fe80::/10 outside fe80::/64 is parsed successfully, isValid() is true, and the classifier reports something untrue about it. No other classifier catches these addresses: isPrivate() covers ULA (fc00::/7), not link-local.

Address isLinkLocal() getType() getScope()
fe80::1 true Link-local unicast Link local
fe81::1 false Link-local unicast Link local
fe8f::1 false Link-local unicast Link local
febf::1 false Link-local unicast Link local
fe80:0:0:1::1 false Link-local unicast Link local
fe80::1:0:0:0:1 false Link-local unicast Link local

Python's ipaddress module, the IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL macro in netinet6/in6.h, and Linux's ipv6_addr_type() all apply a ten-bit prefix test and classify every row above as link-local.

A request admitted through a guard built on isLinkLocal() reaches a link-local host on the server's own segment: a neighboring machine or the on-link router. An IPv6 link-local destination generally needs a zone index and a neighbor on the same link, so the reach is the server's own segment rather than the internet or a universal metadata endpoint, and the severity reflects that.

Proof of concept

npm i [email protected], then:

const { Address6 } = require('ip-address');

// A guard of the shape the library documents.
function isBlocked(host) {
  const a = new Address6(host);
  return a.isLoopback() || a.isLinkLocal() || a.isPrivate() || a.isMulticast() || a.isUnspecified();
}

for (const h of ['fe80::1', 'fe81::1', 'febf::1', 'fe80:0:0:1::1']) {
  const a = new Address6(h);
  console.log(isBlocked(h) ? 'BLOCK' : 'ALLOW', h, '-> getType()', a.getType());
}

On affected versions:

BLOCK fe80::1 -> getType() Link-local unicast
ALLOW fe81::1 -> getType() Link-local unicast
ALLOW febf::1 -> getType() Link-local unicast
ALLOW fe80:0:0:1::1 -> getType() Link-local unicast

Remediation

Upgrade to the patched release. In the fix, isLinkLocal() tests the address against fe80::/10 with the same isHostInSubnet predicate getType() and Address4.isLinkLocal() use. The same release adds 2001::/32 to the type table so getType() reports 'Teredo' for the addresses isTeredo() returns true for; that is a consistency correction with no security effect.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, test the range directly:

const LINK_LOCAL = new Address6('fe80::/10');
const linkLocal = new Address6(host).isHostInSubnet(LINK_LOCAL);

A note on SSRF defense

These methods are address classifiers, not a complete SSRF defense. Regardless of this fix, a robust SSRF guard must resolve the hostname and validate the resolved IP against the socket it connects to, and account for DNS rebinding and redirects. Treat these checks as one layer, not the only one.

References

@beaugunderson beaugunderson published to beaugunderson/ip-address Aug 29, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Sep 28, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Sep 28, 2026
Reviewed Sep 28, 2026
Last updated Sep 28, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity None
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(33rd percentile)

Weaknesses

Incorrect Comparison

The product compares two entities in a security-relevant context, but the comparison is incorrect. Learn more on MITRE.

Server-Side Request Forgery

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-101913

GHSA ID

GHSA-rpw4-54j3-4h4q

Credits

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