Impact
quote() emits a { comment } token as # followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator in that later string ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input:
quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#']);
// echo ok #x 'a
// id;#'
Passed to sh, bash, dash, ksh, or zsh, this runs id.
parse() emits a comment token for a # in the middle of a word (for example http://example.com/#frag), so callers that combine parse() output with another untrusted string, such as quote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg)), are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it.
Exploitation requires an attacker-controlled string containing a line terminator that follows a { comment } token in the same quote() call.
Patches
Fixed in v1.11.0: quote() throws a TypeError when a string after a { comment } token contains a line terminator (\n, \r, U+2028, or U+2029).
Workarounds
Drop every token after a { comment } token before calling quote(), or reject line terminators in untrusted strings. Separately, do not append other shell text after quote() output that contains a comment, since the comment swallows it.
References
Impact
quote()emits a{ comment }token as#followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator in that later string ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input:Passed to
sh,bash,dash,ksh, orzsh, this runsid.parse()emits a comment token for a#in the middle of a word (for examplehttp://example.com/#frag), so callers that combineparse()output with another untrusted string, such asquote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg)), are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it.Exploitation requires an attacker-controlled string containing a line terminator that follows a
{ comment }token in the samequote()call.Patches
Fixed in v1.11.0:
quote()throws aTypeErrorwhen a string after a{ comment }token contains a line terminator (\n,\r, U+2028, or U+2029).Workarounds
Drop every token after a
{ comment }token before callingquote(), or reject line terminators in untrusted strings. Separately, do not append other shell text afterquote()output that contains a comment, since the comment swallows it.References