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JupyterLab: Cross-site scripting (XSS) via crafted settings file (`overrides.json`)

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 21, 2026 in jupyterlab/jupyterlab • Updated Aug 12, 2026

Package

pip jupyterlab (pip)

Affected versions

>= 4.6.0, <= 4.6.1
>= 3.3.0, <= 4.5.9

Patched versions

4.6.2
4.5.10

Description

JupyterLab 4.5+ allows notebook settings to be shared and applied through an overrides.json file using the Import button in the Settings Editor.

Certain notebook display settings were not properly validated before being applied. As a result, a crafted settings file could contain hidden instructions that run as code inside JupyterLab when imported, instead of only changing a display preference.

Because importing a settings file appears harmless, a user could import a file shared by another party without realizing it could do more. On multi-tenant file systems without proper permission control, another user could plant a malicious overrides.json.

CVE assignment pending, GitHub CNA is experiencing severe backlog

Impact

When a malicious settings file is applied, the embedded code runs with the same access as the affected user. This could allow an attacker to read or modify that user's notebooks and files, and to run code on the user's behalf through the notebook server, including on any connected kernel.

User Interaction vs Privileges Required

Write access to a loaded settings location

If an attacker can write to a directory JupyterLab loads settings from (e.g. on shared or multi-tenant file system), they could place a crafted overrides.json that is applied to another user automatically at startup. This requires high privilages but no action by the victim.

User-imported settings file

A user can import a crafted overrides.json through the Import button in the Settings Editor, having received it from another party. This requires no privileges but a deliberate action by the victim, who reasonably expects a settings file to change preferences rather than run code.

Patches

JupyterLab 4.6.2 and 4.5.10 were patched.

Workarounds

None

Hardening

  1. Treat a settings file as something that can affect how JupyterLab behaves, not only how it appears. Administrators are encouraged to establish a trusted process for distributing configuration rather than relying on ad-hoc importing of shared files.
  2. On multi-tenant or shared file systems, restrict write permissions on the application settings directory and other Jupyter configuration paths so that one user cannot place an overrides.json (or other configuration) readable by another user. A settings file in these locations is applied automatically, without an import step, so directory permissions are the primary control against cross-user tampering.

References

@krassowski krassowski published to jupyterlab/jupyterlab Jul 21, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 22, 2026
Reviewed Jul 22, 2026
Last updated Aug 12, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction Active
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability Low
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability Low

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(55th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users. Learn more on MITRE.

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-73417

GHSA ID

GHSA-pppj-hq3g-57pj

Source code

Credits

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