Summary
Rendering an untrusted SVG whose <path d="..."> contains many segments is O(n²) CPU. A single <path> under 1 MiB burns tens of seconds. Two independent O(n²) sites in cairosvg/path.py:
- Tokenizer — the path-data parser consumes the
d string with a while string: loop that repeatedly slices/re-scans the remaining string (each step is O(len remaining)), giving O(n²) over the whole attribute.
- draw_markers — marker handling drains
node.vertices with while node.vertices: ... node.vertices.pop(0); list.pop(0) is O(n), so draining n vertices is O(n²).
Both are hit on a normal render path (svg2png/svg2pdf), attacker controls only the SVG document.
PoC (installed cairosvg 2.9.0)
import cairosvg
d = "M0 0 " + "L1 1 " * 100000
svg = f'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="10" height="10"><path d="{d}"/></svg>'
cairosvg.svg2png(bytestring=svg.encode()) # ~4.4 s for a 488 KB doc
| path segments |
SVG size |
time |
| 50,000 |
244 KB |
1.14 s |
| 100,000 |
488 KB |
4.36 s |
| 200,000 |
~960 KB |
~18 s |
Doubling segments ≈ 4× time ⇒ quadratic. Sub-MiB input ⇒ ~18 s CPU; any service rendering user-supplied SVG (thumbnails, avatars, PDF export) is a DoS target.
Reachability
Public API svg2png / svg2pdf / svg2ps on an untrusted SVG string.
Suggested fix
Tokenize with a single forward scan / index (or re.finditer) instead of re-slicing the remainder; drain vertices with an index or collections.deque.popleft instead of list.pop(0). Optionally cap path-segment count.
References
Summary
Rendering an untrusted SVG whose
<path d="...">contains many segments is O(n²) CPU. A single<path>under 1 MiB burns tens of seconds. Two independent O(n²) sites incairosvg/path.py:dstring with awhile string:loop that repeatedly slices/re-scans the remaining string (each step is O(len remaining)), giving O(n²) over the whole attribute.node.verticeswithwhile node.vertices: ... node.vertices.pop(0);list.pop(0)is O(n), so draining n vertices is O(n²).Both are hit on a normal render path (
svg2png/svg2pdf), attacker controls only the SVG document.PoC (installed cairosvg 2.9.0)
Doubling segments ≈ 4× time ⇒ quadratic. Sub-MiB input ⇒ ~18 s CPU; any service rendering user-supplied SVG (thumbnails, avatars, PDF export) is a DoS target.
Reachability
Public API
svg2png/svg2pdf/svg2pson an untrusted SVG string.Suggested fix
Tokenize with a single forward scan / index (or
re.finditer) instead of re-slicing the remainder; drainverticeswith an index orcollections.deque.popleftinstead oflist.pop(0). Optionally cap path-segment count.References