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Browserslist: Uncaught crash / prototype write via untrusted browserslist-stats.json custom stats (normalizeStats)

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 21, 2026 in browserslist/browserslist • Updated Sep 1, 2026

Package

npm browserslist (npm)

Affected versions

<= 4.28.6

Patched versions

4.28.7

Description

Vulnerability Details

File: node.js
Function: normalizeStats() (line ~214), reached from getStat() (called
unconditionally on every browserslist() call) and loadStat()

Root Cause

function normalizeStats(data, stats) {
  if (!data) { data = {} }
  if (stats && 'dataByBrowser' in stats) { stats = stats.dataByBrowser }
  if (typeof stats !== 'object') return undefined

  var normalized = {}
  for (var i in stats) {
    var versions = Object.keys(stats[i])
    if (versions.length === 1 && data[i] && data[i].versions.length === 1) {
      var normal = data[i].versions[0]
      normalized[i] = {}
      normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]]
    } else {
      normalized[i] = stats[i]
    }
  }
  return normalized
}

stats is untrusted: it comes from JSON.parse()-ing a
browserslist-stats.json file — auto-discovered by walking up the directory
tree from the project root on every browserslist() call, regardless of
the query
(env.getStat(opts, browserslist.data) runs unconditionally
inside browserslist()) — or from opts.stats passed programmatically /
via the CLI's --stats= flag. data is browserslist.data, a plain object
populated only with real browser names.

Two independent bugs from the same root cause (unguarded for...in over
untrusted keys used with plain-object bracket access/assignment):

  1. Crash: data[i] has no hasOwnProperty guard. If stats contains a
    key that also happens to be an inherited Object.prototype member name —
    "__proto__", "toString", "valueOf", "constructor",
    "hasOwnProperty", "isPrototypeOf", etc. — data[i] resolves to that
    inherited function/object (always truthy), and the code then does
    data[i].versions.length → undefined.length → uncaught TypeError,
    for any such key whose JSON value has exactly one sub-key, e.g.:
    { "toString": { "onekey": 5 }, "chrome": { "100": 50 } }
  2. Prototype write: normalized[i] = ... on the fresh
    normalized = {} — if i is exactly "__proto__" (and normalized has
    no own property by that name yet), this computed assignment invokes the
    real Object.prototype.__proto__ setter, changing normalized's actual
    [[Prototype]] instead of creating a plain property.

Because this runs on every browserslist() call regardless of the
query, simply committing a poisoned browserslist-stats.json anywhere in a
project's directory tree breaks every subsequent Browserslist call in that
project — including calls made by Autoprefixer, Babel preset-env,
Stylelint, or PostCSS internally, for completely unrelated queries.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker submits a PR (or a compromised dependency) adding a
    browserslist-stats.json file anywhere between the project root and
    filesystem root, containing e.g.
    {"toString": {"onekey": 5}, "chrome": {"100": 50}}.
  2. The victim's build/CI pipeline runs any tool that calls browserslist()
    internally, for any query.
  3. The auto-discovered poisoned file crashes the process with an uncaught
    TypeError on the very first call.

Measured Impact

Confirmed crash (real browserslist() call, v4.28.6) with stats keys:
__proto__, toString, valueOf, hasOwnProperty, constructor,
isPrototypeOf — each paired with a one-key JSON object — for any query,
including browserslist('defaults') which never mentions stats.

Recommended Fix (implemented and verified)

var normalized = Object.create(null)
for (var i in stats) {
  var versions = Object.keys(stats[i])
  var known = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, i) && data[i]
  if (versions.length === 1 && known && known.versions.length === 1) {
    var normal = known.versions[0]
    normalized[i] = Object.create(null)
    normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]]
  } else {
    normalized[i] = stats[i]
  }
}
return normalized

normalized uses Object.create(null) so a write to "__proto__" is an
ordinary property set, never a [[Prototype]] change; data[i] is replaced
with an explicit hasOwnProperty check so it never resolves to an inherited
Object.prototype member.

Verification:

  • NODE_ENV=test npx uvu test .test.js → 301/301 pass unmodified
    (test/custom.test.js, test/shareable-stats.test.js, test/cover.test.js
    exercise the stats-handling paths).
  • All 6 previously crash-inducing keys, tested individually, now resolve
    without error.
  • The realistic file-based auto-discovery scenario (poisoned
    browserslist-stats.json + an unrelated browserslist('defaults') call)
    now returns a normal result instead of crashing.

Impact

  • Who is affected: Any project whose build/CI invokes Browserslist
    (directly or via Autoprefixer/Babel/Stylelint/PostCSS) in a directory tree
    an attacker can place a file into (external PR, compromised dependency),
    or any app that passes user-influenced data into opts.stats.
  • What an attacker achieves: Immediate DoS — crashes the invoking
    process on the first Browserslist call after the file is present, for any
    query, no special syntax needed.
  • Conditions required: No authentication — only the ability to add a
    file to the project's directory tree, or influence opts.stats.

Verification Environment

browserslist @ HEAD (== v4.28.6, current latest stable release) under local
Node.js v20.19.5. Pure JS library — executed directly, no server needed.

Note

Found via a systematic review of prototype-pollution-adjacent patterns in
this codebase after confirming two unrelated algorithmic-complexity issues
(reported separately as GHSA-rrmg-cfrq-23vv and GHSA-g6p8-hj8g-x889) in the
same research pass. A similar for...in + bracket-write pattern in
index.js's copyObject() (used by normalizeAndroidData) was already
guarded against __proto__/constructor/prototype keys by a prior,
unrelated commit — that guard was never applied to this function.

References

@ai ai published to browserslist/browserslist Jul 21, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Aug 11, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Sep 1, 2026
Reviewed Sep 1, 2026
Last updated Sep 1, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(52nd percentile)

Weaknesses

Uncaught Exception

An exception is thrown from a function, but it is not caught. Learn more on MITRE.

Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes

The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-73088

GHSA ID

GHSA-73wf-gq98-2v4g
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