Vulnerability Details
File: node.js
Function: normalizeStats() (line ~214), reached from getStat() (called
unconditionally on every browserslist() call) and loadStat()
Root Cause
function normalizeStats(data, stats) {
if (!data) { data = {} }
if (stats && 'dataByBrowser' in stats) { stats = stats.dataByBrowser }
if (typeof stats !== 'object') return undefined
var normalized = {}
for (var i in stats) {
var versions = Object.keys(stats[i])
if (versions.length === 1 && data[i] && data[i].versions.length === 1) {
var normal = data[i].versions[0]
normalized[i] = {}
normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]]
} else {
normalized[i] = stats[i]
}
}
return normalized
}
stats is untrusted: it comes from JSON.parse()-ing a
browserslist-stats.json file — auto-discovered by walking up the directory
tree from the project root on every browserslist() call, regardless of
the query (env.getStat(opts, browserslist.data) runs unconditionally
inside browserslist()) — or from opts.stats passed programmatically /
via the CLI's --stats= flag. data is browserslist.data, a plain object
populated only with real browser names.
Two independent bugs from the same root cause (unguarded for...in over
untrusted keys used with plain-object bracket access/assignment):
- Crash:
data[i] has no hasOwnProperty guard. If stats contains a
key that also happens to be an inherited Object.prototype member name —
"__proto__", "toString", "valueOf", "constructor",
"hasOwnProperty", "isPrototypeOf", etc. — data[i] resolves to that
inherited function/object (always truthy), and the code then does
data[i].versions.length → undefined.length → uncaught TypeError,
for any such key whose JSON value has exactly one sub-key, e.g.:
{ "toString": { "onekey": 5 }, "chrome": { "100": 50 } }
- Prototype write:
normalized[i] = ... on the fresh
normalized = {} — if i is exactly "__proto__" (and normalized has
no own property by that name yet), this computed assignment invokes the
real Object.prototype.__proto__ setter, changing normalized's actual
[[Prototype]] instead of creating a plain property.
Because this runs on every browserslist() call regardless of the
query, simply committing a poisoned browserslist-stats.json anywhere in a
project's directory tree breaks every subsequent Browserslist call in that
project — including calls made by Autoprefixer, Babel preset-env,
Stylelint, or PostCSS internally, for completely unrelated queries.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker submits a PR (or a compromised dependency) adding a
browserslist-stats.json file anywhere between the project root and
filesystem root, containing e.g.
{"toString": {"onekey": 5}, "chrome": {"100": 50}}.
- The victim's build/CI pipeline runs any tool that calls
browserslist()
internally, for any query.
- The auto-discovered poisoned file crashes the process with an uncaught
TypeError on the very first call.
Measured Impact
Confirmed crash (real browserslist() call, v4.28.6) with stats keys:
__proto__, toString, valueOf, hasOwnProperty, constructor,
isPrototypeOf — each paired with a one-key JSON object — for any query,
including browserslist('defaults') which never mentions stats.
Recommended Fix (implemented and verified)
var normalized = Object.create(null)
for (var i in stats) {
var versions = Object.keys(stats[i])
var known = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, i) && data[i]
if (versions.length === 1 && known && known.versions.length === 1) {
var normal = known.versions[0]
normalized[i] = Object.create(null)
normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]]
} else {
normalized[i] = stats[i]
}
}
return normalized
normalized uses Object.create(null) so a write to "__proto__" is an
ordinary property set, never a [[Prototype]] change; data[i] is replaced
with an explicit hasOwnProperty check so it never resolves to an inherited
Object.prototype member.
Verification:
NODE_ENV=test npx uvu test .test.js → 301/301 pass unmodified
(test/custom.test.js, test/shareable-stats.test.js, test/cover.test.js
exercise the stats-handling paths).
- All 6 previously crash-inducing keys, tested individually, now resolve
without error.
- The realistic file-based auto-discovery scenario (poisoned
browserslist-stats.json + an unrelated browserslist('defaults') call)
now returns a normal result instead of crashing.
Impact
- Who is affected: Any project whose build/CI invokes Browserslist
(directly or via Autoprefixer/Babel/Stylelint/PostCSS) in a directory tree
an attacker can place a file into (external PR, compromised dependency),
or any app that passes user-influenced data into opts.stats.
- What an attacker achieves: Immediate DoS — crashes the invoking
process on the first Browserslist call after the file is present, for any
query, no special syntax needed.
- Conditions required: No authentication — only the ability to add a
file to the project's directory tree, or influence opts.stats.
Verification Environment
browserslist @ HEAD (== v4.28.6, current latest stable release) under local
Node.js v20.19.5. Pure JS library — executed directly, no server needed.
Note
Found via a systematic review of prototype-pollution-adjacent patterns in
this codebase after confirming two unrelated algorithmic-complexity issues
(reported separately as GHSA-rrmg-cfrq-23vv and GHSA-g6p8-hj8g-x889) in the
same research pass. A similar for...in + bracket-write pattern in
index.js's copyObject() (used by normalizeAndroidData) was already
guarded against __proto__/constructor/prototype keys by a prior,
unrelated commit — that guard was never applied to this function.
References
Vulnerability Details
File:
node.jsFunction:
normalizeStats()(line ~214), reached fromgetStat()(calledunconditionally on every
browserslist()call) andloadStat()Root Cause
statsis untrusted: it comes fromJSON.parse()-ing abrowserslist-stats.jsonfile — auto-discovered by walking up the directorytree from the project root on every
browserslist()call, regardless ofthe query (
env.getStat(opts, browserslist.data)runs unconditionallyinside
browserslist()) — or fromopts.statspassed programmatically /via the CLI's
--stats=flag.dataisbrowserslist.data, a plain objectpopulated only with real browser names.
Two independent bugs from the same root cause (unguarded
for...inoveruntrusted keys used with plain-object bracket access/assignment):
data[i]has nohasOwnPropertyguard. Ifstatscontains akey that also happens to be an inherited
Object.prototypemember name —"__proto__","toString","valueOf","constructor","hasOwnProperty","isPrototypeOf", etc. —data[i]resolves to thatinherited function/object (always truthy), and the code then does
data[i].versions.length→undefined.length→ uncaughtTypeError,for any such key whose JSON value has exactly one sub-key, e.g.:
{ "toString": { "onekey": 5 }, "chrome": { "100": 50 } }normalized[i] = ...on the freshnormalized = {}— ifiis exactly"__proto__"(andnormalizedhasno own property by that name yet), this computed assignment invokes the
real
Object.prototype.__proto__setter, changingnormalized's actual[[Prototype]]instead of creating a plain property.Because this runs on every
browserslist()call regardless of thequery, simply committing a poisoned
browserslist-stats.jsonanywhere in aproject's directory tree breaks every subsequent Browserslist call in that
project — including calls made by Autoprefixer, Babel
preset-env,Stylelint, or PostCSS internally, for completely unrelated queries.
Attack Scenario
browserslist-stats.jsonfile anywhere between the project root andfilesystem root, containing e.g.
{"toString": {"onekey": 5}, "chrome": {"100": 50}}.browserslist()internally, for any query.
TypeErroron the very first call.Measured Impact
Confirmed crash (real
browserslist()call, v4.28.6) withstatskeys:__proto__,toString,valueOf,hasOwnProperty,constructor,isPrototypeOf— each paired with a one-key JSON object — for any query,including
browserslist('defaults')which never mentions stats.Recommended Fix (implemented and verified)
normalizedusesObject.create(null)so a write to"__proto__"is anordinary property set, never a
[[Prototype]]change;data[i]is replacedwith an explicit
hasOwnPropertycheck so it never resolves to an inheritedObject.prototypemember.Verification:
NODE_ENV=test npx uvu test .test.js→ 301/301 pass unmodified(
test/custom.test.js,test/shareable-stats.test.js,test/cover.test.jsexercise the stats-handling paths).
without error.
browserslist-stats.json+ an unrelatedbrowserslist('defaults')call)now returns a normal result instead of crashing.
Impact
(directly or via Autoprefixer/Babel/Stylelint/PostCSS) in a directory tree
an attacker can place a file into (external PR, compromised dependency),
or any app that passes user-influenced data into
opts.stats.process on the first Browserslist call after the file is present, for any
query, no special syntax needed.
file to the project's directory tree, or influence
opts.stats.Verification Environment
browserslist @ HEAD (== v4.28.6, current latest stable release) under local
Node.js v20.19.5. Pure JS library — executed directly, no server needed.
Note
Found via a systematic review of prototype-pollution-adjacent patterns in
this codebase after confirming two unrelated algorithmic-complexity issues
(reported separately as GHSA-rrmg-cfrq-23vv and GHSA-g6p8-hj8g-x889) in the
same research pass. A similar
for...in+ bracket-write pattern inindex.js'scopyObject()(used bynormalizeAndroidData) was alreadyguarded against
__proto__/constructor/prototypekeys by a prior,unrelated commit — that guard was never applied to this function.
References