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GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Sep 7, 2026 in gitpython-developers/GitPython • Updated Sep 30, 2026

Package

pip GitPython (pip)

Affected versions

<= 3.1.61

Patched versions

3.1.62

Description

Affected: GitPython 3.1.61 (latest release) and main — git/objects/submodule/base.py. git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty, so both are identical here.


The gap

The fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc added Submodule._validated_name() and wired it into update() and five siblings, closing the .gitmodules name → .git/modules/<name> traversal. The other attacker-controlled .gitmodules field, path, is read raw:

# git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177
def _set_cache_(self, attr):
    if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
        reader = self.config_reader()
        self.path = reader.get("path")          # raw .gitmodules value

and GitPython's own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:

400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path)      # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment)
542:     path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)        # add()   — guarded
1041:    module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)   # move() — guarded

update() validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:

788:  self._validated_name(self.name)                    # NAME only
801:  checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath             # derived from self.path — unguarded
821:  os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)

So path = ../../../tmp/escaped in an attacker-authored .gitmodules selects the directory that gets created and, on the clone path, populated from the submodule URL. The same absolute location is what force_remove hands to shutil.rmtree.

The asymmetry is the argument: this is not a missing concept — the project wrote _to_relative_path() precisely for this, and add()/move() use it. update() does not.

Honest limits (please read before rating)

  • The most common flow is not affected. Repo.clone_from(...) → repo.submodules → sm.update(init=True) re-derives path from a canonical tree lookup, and real git refuses to check out a tree containing a .. component, so an evil .gitmodules never lands in the working tree in the first place. A reachable trigger therefore requires the victim's code to name a non-HEAD commit (a historical-commit API such as submodule_update(previous_commit=...)).
  • The researcher did not build that end-to-end trigger. The researcher only verified first-hand the code above: the guard's two call sites, the name-only validation in update(), and the unguarded abspath → os.makedirs() flow at 3.1.61 == main.

Suggested fix

Apply the guard the project already has, wherever the path is consumed:

# in update(), before deriving abspath (and in any other consumer of self.path):
checkout_rel = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, self.path)   # raises if it escapes the working tree

Better still, validate at the boundary: reject a .gitmodules entry whose path is absolute or contains a .. component when the section is first read in _set_cache_()/iter_items(), so no consumer can be added later without the check. A regression test with path = ../escaped alongside the existing name test would pin both fields.

Prior art checked

GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc (this is a residual of its fix, in the sibling field, not a re-report) plus the repository's 30 published advisories — none mentions the path field or _to_relative_path. Searched issues and PRs for _to_relative_path, gitmodules path and submodule traversal: no report of this.

Credit

kta1kri.


Appendix — EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)

=== EVIDENCE: GitPython — the .gitmodules 'path' field reaches os.makedirs()/clone unguarded ===
Mon Aug 31 18:45:22 UTC 2026

--- artifact: tag 3.1.61 (latest release); git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty ---

--- the containment guard GitPython owns, and its only two call sites ---
33:    _to_relative_path,
400:    def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo: "Repo", path: PathLike) -> PathLike:
407:            path = _to_relative_path(parent_repo.working_tree_dir, path)
542:        path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)
1041:        module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)

--- the parent fix (_validated_name) call sites: it validates the NAME ---
309:    def _validated_name(cls, name: str) -> str:
321:        name = cls._validated_name(name)
541:        cls._validated_name(name)
788:            self._validated_name(self.name)
1040:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1181:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1439:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1440:        self._validated_name(new_name)
1489:        self._validated_name(self.name)

--- update(): name validated, path not; abspath -> os.makedirs ---

        try:
            self._validated_name(self.name)

            # ENSURE REPO IS PRESENT AND UP-TO-DATE
                # END early abort if init is not allowed

                checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath
                module_abspath = self._module_abspath(self.repo, self.path, self.name)

                # ``git submodule deinit`` leaves the repository in
                # ``.git/modules`` and empties the checkout. Reconnect that retained
                # repository instead of trying to clone over it.
                if not dry_run and osp.isdir(module_abspath):
                    try:
                        git.Repo(module_abspath)
                    except InvalidGitRepositoryError:
                        pass
                    else:
                        if osp.lexists(checkout_module_abspath) and (
                            osp.islink(checkout_module_abspath)
                            or not osp.isdir(checkout_module_abspath)
                            or os.listdir(checkout_module_abspath)
                        ):
                            raise OSError(
                                "Module directory at %r does already exist and is non-empty" % checkout_module_abspath
                            )
                        os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)
                        self._write_git_file_and_module_config(checkout_module_abspath, module_abspath)
                        mrepo = git.Repo(checkout_module_abspath)

--- where self.path comes from (raw .gitmodules value) ---
    def _set_cache_(self, attr: str) -> None:
        if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
            reader: SectionConstraint = self.config_reader()
            # Default submodule values.
            try:
                self.path = reader.get("path")
            except cp.NoSectionError as e:

References

@Byron Byron published to gitpython-developers/GitPython Sep 7, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Sep 30, 2026
Reviewed Sep 30, 2026
Last updated Sep 30, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity High
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction Passive
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity High
Availability Low
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. Learn more on MITRE.

External Control of File Name or Path

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

No known CVE

GHSA ID

GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w

Credits

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