Skip to content

Glob: AbortSignal cancellation bypass allows post-timeout filesystem traversal

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Oct 27, 2026 in isaacs/node-glob • Updated Oct 30, 2026

Package

npm glob (npm)

Affected versions

>= 9.0.0, <= 14.0.1

Patched versions

14.0.2

Description

Summary

In glob 13.0.6, an aborted async walk rejects or emits an error but continues recursively reading directories in the background.

The root cause is that abort branches in src/walker.ts call cb() without returning. As a result, callers that rely on signal or AbortSignal.timeout() to bound glob traversal cost can still incur filesystem I/O and CPU work after the request has already been rejected.

Details

This was reproduced on glob v13.0.6 (commit e80cb38ae60d6cbff9e75f39032a994858994d35).

The README documents that the signal option cancels the glob walk. However, in src/walker.ts, the following methods call cb() when this.signal?.aborted is true but do not return:

  • GlobUtil.walkCB()
  • GlobUtil.walkCB2()
  • GlobUtil.walkCBSync()
  • GlobUtil.walkCB2Sync()

Example vulnerable pattern:

if (this.signal?.aborted) cb()

Because execution continues after cb(), the walker still reaches processor.processPatterns(), readdirCB(), and recursive walkCB2() calls.

The issue was directly demonstrated against v13.0.6. A source-history review shows the same missing-return pattern is present in tagged releases from v9.0.0 through v13.0.6.

The issue affects both glob() and globStream().

Recommended fix:
Change each abort branch to return immediately:

if (this.signal?.aborted) return cb()

Proof of concept

Environment:

  • Linux x86_64
  • Node.js v22.23.3
  • npm 10.9.9
  • glob 13.0.6

Reproduction steps:

  1. Install the affected package:
    npm init -y
    npm install [email protected]

  2. Run the attached PoC:
    node poc/abort-continues-work.mjs

The PoC aborts after the first readdir() call, waits briefly, and counts how many more directory reads happen after the promise has already rejected.

Observed output on the vulnerable version:

{
"rejection": "Error: probe-abort",
"readdirCalls": 1365,
"readdirCallsAtReject": 5,
"readdirCallsAfterReject": 1360
}

Expected behavior:
readdirCallsAfterReject should be 0.

A second PoC using AbortSignal.timeout() also reproduces the issue:

{
"rejection": "TimeoutError: The operation was aborted due to timeout",
"readdirCalls": 133,
"readdirCallsAtReject": 1,
"readdirCallsAfterReject": 132
}

The same test against a patched build with return cb() in the four abort branches stops immediately:

{
"readdirCalls": 1,
"readdirCallsAtReject": 1,
"readdirCallsAfterReject": 0
}

Impact

This is an availability issue.

Applications that expose globbing over attacker-influenced patterns or attacker-controlled directory trees and use AbortSignal / AbortSignal.timeout() as a traversal budget can still perform significant filesystem I/O and CPU work after a request has already timed out or been canceled.

Repeated timed-out requests can stack background glob walks and degrade worker throughput or service availability.

No confidentiality or integrity impact was observed.

References

@isaacs isaacs published to isaacs/node-glob Oct 27, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Oct 29, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Oct 30, 2026
Reviewed Oct 30, 2026
Last updated Oct 30, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability Low
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(29th percentile)

Weaknesses

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-118773

GHSA ID

GHSA-3g3m-2fjr-6pw4

Source code

Loading Checking history
See something to contribute? Suggest improvements for this vulnerability.