fix: CSRF double-submit cookie check in consent flow#3519
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| cookie_csrf_tokens = self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_CONSENT_STATE") | ||
| if csrf_token not in cookie_csrf_tokens: |
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Preserve CSRF state across concurrent consent transactions
This new check rejects valid approvals when a user has more than one consent flow open in the same browser: _submit_consent now requires the posted token to exist in MCP_CONSENT_STATE, but _show_consent_page rewrites that cookie with only the latest token each time a consent page is rendered. If tab A is opened, then tab B is opened, submitting tab A will now return 403 even though its transaction and CSRF token are still valid.
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| "txn_id": txn_id, | ||
| "csrf_token": csrf_token, | ||
| }, | ||
| cookies={}, # No cookies — simulates cross-origin submission |
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Simulate missing CSRF cookie with a clean client session
Using cookies={} here does not remove cookies already stored in Starlette/httpx TestClient; cookies set by the preceding consent-page GET are still sent on this POST. As a result, this test does not actually exercise the “no CSRF cookie” path it claims to cover, so it can miss regressions in the double-submit protection logic (or fail for the wrong reason).
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| cookie_csrf_tokens = self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_CONSENT_STATE") | ||
| if csrf_token not in cookie_csrf_tokens: |
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Reject non-__Host consent-state cookie on HTTPS
In ConsentMixin._submit_consent, the new double-submit gate calls _decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_CONSENT_STATE"), but that decoder still accepts the weaker __MCP_CONSENT_STATE fallback name even when self._is_https is true (_decode_list_cookie reads request.cookies.get(secure_name) or request.cookies.get(f"__{base_name}")). On HTTPS deployments, a sibling-subdomain attacker can replay a signed consent-state cookie value from their own flow via a domain-scoped __MCP_CONSENT_STATE cookie, then POST their txn_id/csrf_token and pass this new check, which re-opens the consent-CSRF path this patch is meant to close.
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Jeremiah Lowin <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Marvin Context Protocol <41898282+Marvin Context [email protected]> Co-authored-by: voidborne-d <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: marvin-context-protocol[bot] <225465937+marvin-context-protocol[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: d 🔹 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Jeremiah Lowin <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: nightcityblade <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Bill Easton <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Sumanshu Nankana <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Eric Robinson <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Martim Santos <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: d 🔹 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Matthieu B <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Sascha Buehrle <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Hakancan <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: nightcityblade <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Matt Hallowell <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: nate nowack <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Bill Easton <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Marcus Shu <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Rushabh Doshi <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: AIKAWA Shigechika <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Jeremy Simon <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Miguel Miranda Dias <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Anthony James Padavano <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Mostafa Kamal <[email protected]> Fix auto-close MRE script posting comment without closing (#3386) Fix WorkOS token scope verification bypass 🤖 Generated with Codex (#3407) Fix initialize McpError fallthrough 🤖 Generated with Codex (#3413) Fix transform arg collisions with passthrough params (#3431) Fix get_* returning None when latest version is disabled (#3439) Fix get_* returning None when latest version is disabled (#3421) Fix server lifespan overlap teardown (#3415) Fix $ref output schema object detection regression (#3420) resolved annotations (#3429) Fix async partial callables rejected by iscoroutinefunction (#3438) Fix async partial callables rejected by iscoroutinefunction (#3423) fix: add version to components (#3458) fix: use intent-based flag for OIDC scope patch in load_access_token (#3465) Fixes #3461 fix: normalize Google scope shorthands and surface valid_scopes (#3477) fix: resolve ty 0.0.23 type-checking errors and bump pin (#3481) fix: shield lifespan teardown from cancellation (#3480) fix: forward custom_route endpoints from mounted servers (#3462) fix updates _get_additional_http_routes() to traverse providers, Fixes #3457 fix: remove hardcoded version from CLI help text (#3456) fix: monty 0.0.8 compatibility, drop external_functions from constructor (#3468) fix: task test teardown hanging 5s per test (#3499) Closes #3498 fix: validate workspace path is a directory before cursor install (#3440) Fixes #3426 fix: handle re.error from malformed URI templates in build_regex (#3501) fix: reject empty/OIDC-only required_scopes in AzureProvider (#3503) fix: restrict $ref resolution to local refs only (SSRF/LFI) (#3502) fix warnings and timeouts (#3504) close upgrade check issue when build passes (#3505) Closes #3484 fix: URL-encode path params to prevent SSRF/path traversal (GHSA-vv7q-7jx5-f767) (#3507) fix: prevent path traversal in skill download (#3493) fix: prefer IdP-granted scopes over client-requested scopes in OAuthProxy (#3492) fix: remove unrelated transform and http.py changes from PR scope fix: remove forced follow_redirects from httpx_client_factory calls (#3496) fix: stop passing follow_redirects to httpx_client_factory fix: restore follow_redirects=True for custom httpx client factories Closes #3509 fix: CSRF double-submit cookie check in consent flow (#3519) fix: validate server names in install commands (#3522) fix: use raw strings for regex in pytest.raises match (#3523) fix: reject refresh tokens used as Bearer access tokens (#3524) fix: route ResourcesAsTools/PromptsAsTools through server middleware (#3495) fix: resolve Pyright "Module is not callable" on @tool, @resource, @prompt decorators (#3540) fix: filter warnings by message in KEY_PREFIX test (#3549) fix: suppress output schema for ToolResult subclass annotations (#3548) fix: increase sleep duration in proxy cache tests (#3567) fix: store absolute token expiry to prevent stale expires_in on reload (#3572) fix: preserve tool properties named 'title' during schema compression (#3582) Fix loopback redirect URI port matching per RFC 8252 §7.3 (#3589) Fix app tool routing: visibility check and middleware propagation (#3591) Fix query parameter serialization to respect OpenAPI explode/style settings (#3595) Fix dev apps form: union types, textarea support, JSON parsing (#3597) fix(google): replace deprecated /oauth2/v1/tokeninfo with /oauth2/v3/userinfo (#3603) fix: resolve EntraOBOToken dependency injection through MultiAuth (#3609) fix(docs): correct misleading stateless_http header (#3622) fix: filesystem provider import machinery (#3626) Closes #3625 (issues 2, 3, 6) fix: recover StdioTransport after subprocess exits (#3630) fix(server): preserve mounted tool task metadata (#3632) fix: scope deprecation warning filter to FastMCPDeprecationWarning (#3649) fix imports, add PrefabAppConfig (#3650) fix: resolve CurrentFastMCP/ctx.fastmcp to child server in mounted background tasks (#3651) Fix blocking docs issues: chart imports, Select API, Rx consistency (#3652) closed by default (#3657) Fix prompt caching middleware missing wrap/unwrap round-trip (#3666) fix: serialize object query params per OpenAPI style/explode rules (#3662) Fixes #2857 fix: HTTP request headers not accessible in background task workers (#3631) fix: restore HTTP headers in worker execution path for background tasks (#3681) fix: strip discriminator after dereferencing schemas (#3682) fix: remove stale ty:ignore directives for ty 0.0.26 (#3684) Fix docs gaps in app provider pages (#3690) fix: dev apps log panel UX improvements (#3698) fix dev server empty string args (#3700)
The consent binding cookie fix in #3201 (GHSA-rww4-4w9c-7733) prevented confused deputy attacks by requiring the browser that approved consent to present a signed cookie on the IdP callback. However, an attacker could bypass this by CSRFing the consent approval itself — they start their own OAuth flow, extract the
tx_idandcsrf_tokenfrom their consent page, then trick the victim's browser into POSTing those values to the consent endpoint. The server-side CSRF check passed (the token matched the transaction store), the consent binding cookie got set on the victim's browser, and the original attack was viable again.The fix adds a double-submit check: the CSRF token submitted in the form must also be present in the
MCP_CONSENT_STATEcookie, which is set when the consent page is rendered. A cross-origin POST from the attacker's site won't include the victim's cookies (the cookie isSameSite=Lax,HttpOnly), so the check fails.