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fix(e2): report child-process env pass-through as LOW instead of HIGH (NVIDIA#492)
* fix(e2): exempt child-process env pass-through from harvesting E2 fired HIGH at 0.6 confidence on `subprocess.run(cmd, env={**os.environ, ...})` and on an `os.environ.copy()` bound to a name and passed as `env=`, which is the standard way to hand an environment to a child process. A real harvester and the most common benign idiom were indistinguishable in the report. The analyzer's own docstring already excluded this case: a full mapping copy is a harvesting signal "unlike a targeted single-key lookup or passing os.environ through to a child process". The code did not implement the second half, because it keyed on the copy rather than on where the copy goes. Collect the expressions passed as `env=` to a known process launcher, plus the names bound to them, and skip those at emit time. An environ copy that goes anywhere else still fires, and network and execution sinks remain the behavioral taint analyzer's job. Fixes NVIDIA#441 Signed-off-by: Malin Fossum <[email protected]> * fix(e2): scope child-process env pass-through to the reaching definition The pass-through exemption keyed on every name ever handed to a launcher's env= anywhere in the file, so a later env = {} passed to subprocess.run hid an earlier env = os.environ.copy() that was posted to the network, and a single mapping that was both exfiltrated and passed through was hidden too. Bindings are now followed in evaluation order until the name is rebound; a copy is exempt only when every use up to that point is a child-process env= argument or an in-place edit of the mapping. Adds regression tests for the rebinding and dual-use cases. Signed-off-by: Malin Fossum <[email protected]> * fix(e2): track environment bindings per lexical scope The flow visitor kept one flat binding map, so a nested parameter, local assignment, lambda argument, comprehension target or class attribute with the same name closed the outer binding and left a benign pass-through copy reported as E2. Bindings now live in a scope stack that follows Python's resolution rules (global, nonlocal, class bodies, comprehension targets and walrus). A function or lambda body runs later, so its reads of an enclosing name count against every binding open at its definition or made after it. That also catches a leaking closure defined before the copy, which the flat map missed. Signed-off-by: Malin Fossum <[email protected]> * fix(e2): close environment bindings only on rebindings that surely run A rebinding now closes only the bindings made in its own block or in blocks nested inside it. One inside an if, try, with, match or loop body leaves the outer binding open, and later uses count against both. Nothing closes where a raise, break or continue can skip the rebinding (try, except, with and loop bodies), or through a walrus. A read anywhere in a loop counts against every binding made in that loop, which covers the next pass reading this pass's copy. This stays linear: visiting loop bodies twice would double the work at every nesting level, and the open bindings per name are capped so a crafted file cannot make the pass quadratic. pop and setdefault count as in-place edits when their value is discarded or comes from one literal key; popitem only when discarded. A walrus result, a class attribute, a class-body read that falls through to globals, and any name in a file that calls globals(), locals(), vars(), eval() or exec() keep the finding. A RecursionError in the flow pass falls back to reporting every full read instead of dropping the file's E1-E5 findings. Signed-off-by: Malin Fossum <[email protected]> * fix(e2): trust only imported launchers and unreachable bindings The pass-through trusted a launcher's spelling and one file's view of a name. Three ordinary spellings hid real exfiltration: - A local `def run` or `class subprocess` matched the launcher allowlist. A launcher root now counts only when it is bound solely by an absolute import from subprocess or asyncio, is never rebound in the file, and nothing writes to that module (attribute stores, setattr, vars, __dict__, sys.modules, star imports). - A module global can be imported by another file. By-name pass-through now needs a function local, or a module global bound in a top-level `if __name__ == "__main__":` body while `__name__` is never rebound. - `secret = env.pop("KEY")` counted as an edit. Literal-key pop and setdefault now count only when the result is discarded, as popitem. Any reference to globals, locals, vars, eval, exec or sys.modules, and any f_locals, f_globals or __globals__ attribute, now counts as a dynamic read, so an aliased `locals` or a frame lookup keeps the finding. Signed-off-by: Malin Fossum <[email protected]> * fix(e2): visit annotations and report pass-through copies as LOW The flow pass skipped argument and return annotations, type parameters and type alias values, so a copy read there was marked as pass-through. Visit them as reads that run when defined or later. Comprehension targets that only load a name no longer bind it, and an augmented assignment other than |= reads the old value. A copy traced only to a child process's env= is now reported as an E2 LOW at confidence 0.2 instead of being dropped. The pass covers ordinary Python evaluation, not frames, hooks or other introspection, so a read it misses lowers the finding rather than removing a HIGH. Signed-off-by: Malin Fossum <[email protected]> --------- Signed-off-by: Malin Fossum <[email protected]>
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‎README.md‎

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@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ SkillSpector detects **71 vulnerability patterns** across 17 categories:
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| ID | Pattern | Severity | Description |
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|----|---------|----------|-------------|
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| E1 | External Transmission | MEDIUM | Sending data to external URLs |
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| E2 | Env Variable Harvesting | HIGH | Enumerating, copying, or searching environment data to collect secrets |
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| E2 | Env Variable Harvesting | HIGH | Enumerating, copying, or searching environment data to collect secrets. A copy traced only to a child process's `env=` is reported LOW |
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| E3 | File System Enumeration | MEDIUM | Scanning directories for sensitive files |
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| E4 | Context Leakage | HIGH | Transmitting conversation context externally |
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