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CHANGELOG.md

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Changelog

All notable changes to the workflows in this repository will be documented in this file.

The format is based on Keep a Changelog, and this project adheres to Semantic Versioning. See README.md for the SHA-pinning contract that consumers are expected to follow.

0.6.0 - 2026-11-13

Secret-scan maintenance release — no new scans, inputs, or hooks. One consumer-visible change: the Pulse secret-scan job is renamed, so its status check becomes … / pulse-secret. A repository whose branch protection requires the old … / pulse check must update that rule in the same change that repins, or the rule waits on a check that never reports. Inputs, permissions, failure_policy behaviour, and every pre-commit hook are unchanged.

Changed

  • Secret scan — the job is renamed from pulse to pulse-secret, matching pulse-oss and pulse-malware. Its status check becomes … / pulse-secret, so repositories that require the old … / pulse check must update branch protection when they repin.

Fixed

  • Secret scan — the filesystem scan checks out at depth 1 instead of fetching every branch and tag. filesystem mode reads the checked-out tree, not packed Git history, so the full fetch bought no scan coverage. In NVIDIA/cuda-python it spent ~317s of a ~404s job downloading 3.54 GB — most of it the unrelated gh-pages branch — to scan 33 MB of source.

0.5.0 - 2026-11-03

Additive release: two reusable workflows (vulnerability, malware) and one pre-commit hook (GuardWords). Existing suite callers need no change — enable-vuln-scan and enable-malware-scan default to false, and the scans' permissions (contents: read + id-token: write for the vulnerability scan, id-token: write alone for the malware scan) are already inside the suite's permission union.

Added

  • Vulnerability scan (SCA) reusable workflow — .github/workflows/vuln-scan-pulse-oss.yml. Runs NVIDIA's Pulse OSS scanner against a disposable copy of the checkout and reports to the nSpect backend over a Charon loopback tunnel. Consumers supply no credentials: GitHub OIDC is the only identity the scan presents, and the nvcr.io pull login comes from Vault. The scanner image and the tunnel settings are owned by the workflow, so a caller can substitute neither. pull_request / pull_request_target are rejected. Inputs and prerequisites are in the workflow catalogue; build-environment setup is in the scan guide.
  • Vulnerability scan — scan targeting. nspect_id is optional: left empty the scan runs unregistered, which is the only lane open to a repository with no nSpect registration and is rapid-only. sbom_name selects the registration when the registered branch carries more than one SBOM entry, and inventory_writeback requires it. copy-pr-bot mirrors (refs/heads/pull-request/*) are rapid-only.
  • Vulnerability scan — findings never decide the scanner's exit code. The CLI always runs with --no-fail and failure_policy is applied to the validated report, so a non-zero exit is always a failed scan rather than a finding.
  • Vulnerability scan — optional build controls, off by default and forwarded by the suite: prepared Python wheels, typed Detect properties, and redacted console/debug logging. Snippet scanning and snippet-match export are deferred to a follow-up release.
  • Malware scan reusable workflow — .github/workflows/malware-scan-pulse.yml. Asks the Pulse Malware Service to scan the calling run's own commit with ReversingLabs over the production Charon loopback tunnel. The service fetches the commit itself, so nothing is checked out and the scan cannot be pointed at another repository or commit. failure_policy is strict (default — SUSPICIOUS blocks too) or malicious-only; a MALICIOUS verdict, and any scan that ends without one, block under both. pull_request / pull_request_target are rejected. Prerequisites are in the workflow catalogue.
  • Security suite — enable-vuln-scan and enable-malware-scan, each with its own vuln-* / malware-* inputs, plus an unprefixed nspect-id: an nSpect ID identifies the repository rather than one scan, so every scan reporting to nSpect reads the same one. The malware scan requires it — enabling that scan without it fails the preflight.
  • GuardWords (pre-commit) — guardwords-scan-code-scanning sends the staged diff to NVIDIA's internal code-scanning service and blocks the commit on blocking findings. It is for NVIDIA employees only: where the client or service is unavailable it skips with a notice, so external contributors are never blocked. hooks/guardwords/install_client.py sets up the client in one command. See the GuardWords hook guide.
  • Pre-commit hook catalogue — hooks/README.md, the hook-side counterpart to the workflow catalogue.
  • CI — contract tests covering every gate in both new workflows, plus live integration runs. The vulnerability scan's integration is ungated, so its Vault and Charon prerequisites stay hard requirements.
  • Third-party notices — teleport-actions/setup and actions/upload-artifact, both pinned by SHA.

Changed

  • Security suite — the preflight reports every missing companion input in one run rather than exiting on the first.
  • Pin policy — the recommended pre-commit rev: pin is now the 40-character commit SHA with the release tag as a # frozen: comment, the form pre-commit autoupdate --freeze writes, matching the SHA pin already required for reusable workflows. Existing release-tag pins keep working; switch with pre-commit autoupdate --freeze at the next refresh. See Pin policy per surface.

Known limitations

  • Charon is a prerequisite for both scans. The tunnel authorizes per repository and per ref, so a consuming tenant must grant the Pulse backends and list every ref it scans from. Gating pull requests needs the pull-request/* mirrors listed; without them both scans are post-merge and scheduled gates. The malware scan-submission route is not granted by default and needs platform approval.
  • Scanner upgrades ship as workflow releases. Both scanners are pinned by digest — Pulse OSS 0.5.3-charon.11, Pulse malware 1.3.0 — so a new scanner reaches callers only through a new release of this repository.
  • Vulnerability scan — SARIF publication is a follow-up. Findings land in the job summary and an optional artifact, not the Security tab.
  • Vulnerability scan — build: true runs the repository's build inside the scanner. Maven and Go graphs resolve only through a build. Prefer it on post-merge and scheduled runs; see the workflow catalogue before enabling it on pull-request mirrors.
  • Vulnerability scan — Persistent and write-back scans are pilot-only. Inventory write-back with sbom_name against a branch with several SBOM entries has not been validated end-to-end.
  • Malware scan — Detection is not yet proven end-to-end. CI asserts transport and a CLEAN verdict; proving a blocking verdict needs a ProdSec-approved detection sample, and the contract tests cover how one is handled.
  • GuardWords — No CI counterpart. The hook is the only surface and it skips wherever the client or service is unavailable, so a commit that skipped is not re-scanned before merge.

0.4.0 - 2026-08-19

Additive release. Callers passing languages: '["actions","python"]' need no change; the declared permissions: are unchanged, and the analyze job keeps the name CodeQL (<language>) so required status checks continue to match.

Added

  • SAST (CodeQL) — build mode is resolved per language instead of one value applied to every matrix leg, so sets with conflicting requirements work in a single call. '["go","rust"]' could not previously be expressed (go needs autobuild, rust supports only none). Substitutions are reported as job-log notices and the resolved matrix is written to the job summary.
  • SAST (CodeQL) — languages entries may be objects carrying a per-language build-mode or runs-on: '[{"language":"swift","runs-on":"macos-14"},"rust"]'. Per-entry runs-on makes swift usable, as it requires a macOS runner.
  • SAST (CodeQL) — a resolve job validates the language set before any analysis starts, rejecting unknown languages, manual mode, unsupported explicit modes, duplicate languages, malformed JSON, and empty lists. New resolve-runs-on input (default ubuntu-latest); the suite passes suite-runs-on through to it.
  • Documentation — the workflow catalogue now lists the accepted languages values with per-language buildless support, plus the two coverage gaps: no shell analyzer (use shellcheck) and no CUDA analyzer (c-cpp skips .cu / .cuh).

Changed

  • SAST (CodeQL) — build-mode is now a preference applied where the language supports it; an explicit per-language mode is exact and errors if CodeQL rejects it. No existing caller changes behaviour.
  • SAST (CodeQL) — the analyze job keeps the name CodeQL (<language>), so required status checks still match. A new non-required check, Resolve language matrix, appears alongside it.

Fixed

  • Documentation — build-mode was described as working "for every language": go and swift reject none, Kotlin requires autobuild, and rust supports only none.
  • Documentation — the CodeQL prerequisite said Default setup must be off entirely. The conflict is per language: both publish /language:<lang>, so only an overlap collides. Default setup on other languages can coexist, as it already does on this repository.
  • Documentation — the catalogue gave CodeQL's runs-on default as linux-amd64-cpu4 (actual: ubuntu-latest) and required an nv-gha-runners label for every workflow, which does not apply to CodeQL.

0.3.0 - 2026-08-11

Added

  • Security suite reusable workflow — .github/workflows/security-suite.yml runs the scans a caller enables (enable-secret-scan, enable-sast-scan) in parallel behind one pinned reference. Every scan is opt-in, including scans added in future releases, so onboarding a repository to the suite never turns on a scan it did not ask for; category-prefixed inputs preserve the child workflows' runner and policy configuration. A suite call that enables nothing warns instead of failing.
  • SAST (CodeQL) reusable workflow — .github/workflows/sast-scan-codeql.yml. Generic, matrix-driven CodeQL analysis (languages, build-mode, queries, packs, config-file, runs-on inputs) with the github/codeql-action steps pinned by SHA. Positioned as the customization-tier lever — the fleet baseline for CodeQL is GitHub Default setup via org/enterprise Security Configurations. See .github/workflows/README.md for prerequisites (GHAS/code scanning, Default-setup conflict) and usage.

Changed

  • Secret-scan (Pulse) — the reusable workflow no longer uploads SARIF on CI self-test runs (ci_test_setup: true), so the disposable RSA fixture no longer publishes a code-scanning alert to the default-branch Security tab. Real consumer scans are unaffected.
  • Secret-scan (pre-commit) — secret-scan-trufflehog now installs the SHA-256-pinned TruffleHog release in pre-commit's isolated Python environment rather than the per-user cache.

Fixed

  • Secret-scan (pre-commit) — secret-scan-trufflehog no longer fails on pytest function names. A Lob API key is test_ followed by 35 characters, so TruffleHog's Lob detector matched names such as test_gpu_conf_compute_attestation_report and its verifier reported them as verified, the one result class the hook blocks on. Lob is now excluded from the hook's detector set.

0.2.0 - 2026-07-24

Changed

  • Secret-scan (pre-commit) — the secret-scan-trufflehog hook is now self-installing: on first use it downloads a pinned, checksum-verified TruffleHog release (3.95.9) into a per-user cache and reuses it thereafter, so contributors no longer install trufflehog manually. The archive is fetched over HTTPS and verified against a per-platform SHA-256 pinned from the release's cosign-signed checksums.txt; the hook fails closed on any mismatch. Supports Linux/macOS/Windows (amd64/arm64).

0.1.0 - 2026-07-22

First pilot release. Ships the secret-scan surface (Pulse reusable workflow + TruffleHog pre-commit hook). Pre-1.0: interfaces may change in a minor release while surfaces stabilize with ProdSec.

Added

  • Repository scaffolding — README, ROADMAP, GOVERNANCE, CONTRIBUTING, SUPPORT, MAINTAINERS, SECURITY, CODE_OF_CONDUCT, LICENSE.

  • Documentation — top-level README.md covers the two-surface model (reusable workflow + pre-commit hook) with consumption examples and the pin-policy table; .github/workflows/README.md is the workflow catalogue; ROADMAP.md tracks per-scan status.

  • OSRB compliance artifacts — LICENSE, NOTICE, THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md, no-contributions CONTRIBUTING.md per OSRB template (maintainer PR workflow lives in GOVERNANCE.md), and source/config SPDX copyright headers.

  • Contribution posture — clarified the OSS Type 2 model: public source code with NVIDIA-internal development and no external contribution intake.

  • Pin policy (README.md → Pin policy per surface) — 40-character commit SHA for GHA uses:; release tag for pre-commit rev:; branch references not acceptable. Release tags cut on consumer-visible behaviour or contract changes.

  • Repository tooling — pre-commit hygiene configuration (.pre-commit-config.yaml) running pre-commit-hooks, yamllint, shellcheck, actionlint, and codespell; agent guidance (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md).

  • copy-pr-bot — .github/copy-pr-bot.yaml to gate external-contributor pull-request CI on self-hosted runners.

  • Secret-scan (OSS) pre-commit hook — .pre-commit-hooks.yaml + hooks/trufflehog.sh, composing upstream trufflesecurity/trufflehog. The secret-scan-trufflehog hook scans changed files (pass_filenames: true) at the pre-commit and pre-push stages, fail-closed with NVIDIA default --results=verified and --no-update to keep the local scan fast. The wrapper resolves the trufflehog binary from $PATH and prints install guidance if it is missing. This is the local-advisory lane.

  • Dogfooding — .pre-commit-config.yaml runs the secret-scan-trufflehog hook from repo: local so edits to the wrapper are self-tested; skipped on pre-commit.ci (no trufflehog binary in that sandbox).

  • Secret-scan (Pulse) reusable workflow — .github/workflows/secret-scan-pulse.yml. Runs the Pulse Secret Scanner as the CI enforcement lane and publishes redacted SARIF (verified/unknown/unverified) to the repository Security tab. Enforcement via the failure_policy input (unverified | strict | all, default unverified; names match the GitLab secret-scan component). Fails closed on scanner/infra errors.

  • Continuous integration — .github/workflows/ci.yml. Lints all workflow/hook files and runs positive/negative Pulse integration tests across all three failure_policy values.

  • Third-party notices — TruffleHog (AGPL-3.0, developer-installed CLI) and the direct workflow actions (actions/checkout, hashicorp/vault-action, docker/login-action, actions/setup-python, github/codeql-action/upload-sarif) recorded in THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md with SHA pins where applicable.