Thanks for the careful write-up on #1063 and for following through with a fix — really appreciate it. The analysis in the issue was spot-on and is what made the security fix easy to land quickly.

Quick context: we merged the minimum-diff fix in #1067 yesterday to close the immediate gap (dropped id-token: write and security-events: write from ok-to-test.yaml's call to qualification.yaml). That's why this branch is now showing dirty against main.

That said, the privileged_ci toggle here is a meaningfully cleaner answer than the implicit-degradation we landed in #1067 — explicit > implicit, no half-coverage from the cli-e2e fork-gate quirk, and the pattern is reusable for any future unprivileged-context invocation. I'd like to keep this PR open and merge it as a refactor on top.

Could you rescope to just the still-net-new parts? After rebasing onto current main:

• qualification.yaml: add the privileged_ci input (default true, preserves behavior for merge-gate / on-push / on-tag callers) and the if: inputs.privileged_ci gates on cli-e2e and security-scan. Same as you have today.
• ok-to-test.yaml: only add privileged_ci: false to the with: block. The permissions block is already cleaned up by #1067 — nothing to do there.
• PR title/description: reframe as refactor(ci): make /ok-to-test's unprivileged status explicit via privileged_ci input. References #1063 / #1067 for context.

One small naming consideration in my inline review — privileged_ci is fine, but trusted_source or trusted_workflow more accurately captures what the flag governs (the trust level of the checked-out ref). Take it or leave it.

Thanks again for the contribution.