Parent: #739

Summary

Audit each component's container images for supply-chain provenance: cosign signatures, SBOMs, and SLSA provenance attestations. Produce a matrix that informs verification policy and customer security review.

Motivation

AICR pulls images from many public registries with varying provenance maturity. Some publish signed images with SBOMs (e.g., NVIDIA, Kubernetes SIG); others may not. Customers performing security review need to know which can be cryptographically verified and which cannot.

Proposed approach

For each component (and each image it deploys, per BOM output), check:

Output: a matrix in docs/security/provenance-matrix.md showing per-component status, with links to verification commands.

Success criteria

• Every component has documented provenance status.
• Verification commands are reproducible.
• Gaps (unsigned images, missing SBOMs) are flagged for follow-up with upstream maintainers.
• Optionally: a cosign verify step in our deployment validation for components where signatures are available.

Notes

• Depends on BOM tooling (separate issue) for the canonical image list.
• AICR's own validator/runtime images are out of scope (covered by goreleaser/SLSA already).
• This is an audit/documentation issue first; enforcement (e.g., admission policy) is a follow-up if warranted.