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jamieknvidiaaraza008
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docs(mxc-etw): note cmd_line is captured raw with no privacy filtering
Review item #3 (Shailendra): add a PRIVACY NOTE on map_process_launch stating cmd_line is copied verbatim into OCSF process.cmd_line with no redaction, so secrets/PII on a command line land unredacted in the durable audit trail (deliberate audit-fidelity trade-off; treat the log as sensitive). Redaction is owned by an upstream privacy layer, not this path; no general audit-output PII scrubber exists today (openshell_core::secrets [CREDENTIAL] redaction is scoped to the proxy HTTP-target logging, a separate egress path). Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <[email protected]>
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‎crates/openshell-driver-mxc/src/etw_consumer.rs‎

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@@ -1254,6 +1254,20 @@ fn map_config_state(ctx: &SandboxContext, ev: &DecodedEtwEvent) -> OcsfEvent {
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}
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/// `CreateProcessInSandbox` (populated) → Process Activity [1007] "Launch".
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///
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/// PRIVACY NOTE (review item #3): `cmd_line` is copied **verbatim** from MXC's
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/// ETW event into the OCSF `process.cmd_line` field. This consumer performs **no
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/// privacy/secret filtering** — if a caller passes credentials, tokens, or PII on
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/// the command line, they will appear **unredacted** in the durable audit trail.
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/// This is deliberate (audit fidelity), so the OCSF log must be treated as
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/// sensitive at rest and in transit.
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///
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/// Redaction is intentionally **not** done here and is owned by an upstream
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/// privacy layer, not the ETW→OCSF path. Note that no general PII/secret scrubber
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/// covers this field today: the only redaction that exists
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/// (`openshell_core::secrets`, `${…}` → `[CREDENTIAL]`) is scoped to the network
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/// proxy's HTTP-target logging, a separate egress path. If/when a general
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/// audit-output PII filter lands, this field is where it must apply.
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fn map_process_launch(ctx: &SandboxContext, ev: &DecodedEtwEvent, cmd_line: &str) -> OcsfEvent {
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// The created process's own pid isn't in this event (it appears later in
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// `ProcessLaunched`); the emitting pid is the sandbox host (wxc-exec).

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