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fix(desktop): discover authenticated owned relay agents (block#7122)
πŸ€– ## Summary An agent you own could be missing from **New message β†’ To:** and **Channel members β†’ Add people and agents** on a machine that has never managed it. This PR lets those existing lists find your agent without requiring a shared channel first. Desktop now checks records proving you own it, rather than looking only at agents in channels you've already joined. **No new screen or control is added.** For example, an agent with verified ownership and **Who can send instructions β†’ Only me (default)** can now appear even with no shared channels. Each screen still applies its existing access rules; this does not make every discovered agent selectable everywhere. | Screen / control | Before | After this PR alone | | --- | --- | --- | | **New message β†’ To:** recipient picker | An owned agent absent from this machine and shared-channel bot lists could be missing. | Its named **agent** row can appear; selecting it adds a recipient chip. This is recipient selection, not a guarantee that a later message will reach or wake the agent. | | **Channel members β†’ Add people and agents** | The same agent could be missing from **Not in this channel** search results. | Its row can appear with the existing **Add** button. If you can add members, that button submits the existing channel-membership request; finding the row alone changes no membership. | | **Stream / forum composer β†’ @ suggestions** | An owned agent already in the channel under an ordinary member role could be missing from agent suggestions. | Its actual membership is recognized without requiring the bot role. Agents not managed on this device still need membership in that channel. | | **Pulse β†’ Agents** | An agent absent from both local management and the server's agent list was omitted from the count and author lookup. | The count and feed's author lookup can include it; notes appear only if it has published them. | Being listed does **not** mean the agent is online, add it to a channel, or grant local Start/Edit controls. For agents not managed on this device, global **Search** still excludes those configured for β€œOnly me”, and DM @ selection is not added here. DM @ selection and message-driven nonmember invitation are addressed in [block#7124](block#7124); the standalone forum **Invite / Cancel** flow is in [block#7125](block#7125). <details> <summary>Ownership and membership checks</summary> A discovery lead is not proof: the latest agent profile must have a valid signature and exactly one valid ownership attestationβ€”the owner's signed link to that agent. Its response policy must be signed by that verified owner; an invalid latest policy cannot restore an older permission. Membership comes separately from the latest server-signed roster, including removals. Existing profile cards, owner labels and agent-avatar shapes also use this stricter verification: malformed or forged evidence must not supply ownership/agent classification on its own. Valid ownership was already recognized; no profile-picture or badge design changes. Attestation time conditions apply to the signed event's timestamp, not a live expiry timer. Existing legacy compatibility and builds requiring verified owner policy retain their respective rules. Discovery and sending remain separate operations, not an atomic permission check. </details> ### Review corrections - When runtime and owner policy overlap, **explicit online/away/offline from the verified latest runtime is retained**. Policy still supplies ownership/permissions; claimed runtime membership is not restored. Missing/unrecognized status stays unknown, and invalid latest policy cannot revive runtime permissions. - Discovery without runtime evidence is now **unknown**, not offline: native conversion, both IPC adapters, Pulse, Projects and profile/session consumers preserve that distinction. Unknown has no status dot and is not promoted to a deployed/running agent. - Both relay-only picker paths retain the authenticated owner, including the existing **managed by you** label. The analogous global Search projection is fixed without changing its existing β€œanyone” filter. - Authorized stored profile activity remains visible when liveness becomes unknown/absent or the active turn ends. History reads do not start a live subscription, grant access, or imply current availability. ### Related issue Independent base: `main`. Child: [block#7124](block#7124), then [block#7125](block#7125). Extracted from [block#7114](block#7114), retained as historical source (`98fe33ec`). [Behavior contract](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/3a56d17824522580fe04cae463b54f4c7ba66021/docs/owned-agent-discovery.md). Originating [Buzz discussion](buzz://message?channel=f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1&id=7aa1f0ab23dce514bd8a0221441cf005bf428914621171472b79747c50820848) Β· channel `f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1`. ### Testing Current candidate: `3a56d17824522580fe04cae463b54f4c7ba66021`, a four-file native/test/doc runtime-status repair atop published `ae23c1c9680a881cee7eed94e259bf15bf8ce3f7`. Branch ancestry is main `1c8321cd08feb597f8bcff5195c21148fb3e98ed`; refreshed main `0e878664b08cdf7fb2d89d940bc2aa92cdc485f7` adds only the independent CI-workflow split. Read-only mergeability succeeds; this is not a tested merged-tree claim. **Local CI attempt and continuation (not an uninterrupted green run):** the new exact-head `just ci` passed formatting/static checks, workspace and Tauri clippy, workspace Rust tests, **5,910 desktop tests**, desktop production build and Tauri check. Its native main target finished **3,073 passed / 1 failed / 19 ignored** (exit 101): `cheap_discovery_reports_absent_before_any_forced_probe` saw a process-global login-shell counter of 2 instead of 0. The counter includes unrelated version/adapter probes whose tests do not hold the failed test's PATH mutex; no managed-agent discovery implementation changed in the runtime repair. The unchanged failing test then passed **three isolated invocations**. Only the failed native workspace lane was retried with `RUST_TEST_THREADS=1 just desktop-tauri-test`: **3,074 main-target tests passed / 19 ignored**, all additional workspace targets passed (exit 0). The previously unrun `just web-build mobile-test` tail then passed (exit 0; **2,019 mobile tests**). Earlier successful lanes were reused; no source/guard changes or blanket CI rerun. The original failure and all diagnostic/retry logs are retained. - **71 native `nostr_convert` tests pass**, including seven new production merge regressions: online/away/offline, missing/invalid status, policy-only, status-less latest replacement and forged latest replacement. Before production repair, those seven yielded **4 failures / 3 passing controls**. - Reused frontend evidence from `ae23c1c9` (frontend is unchanged): Desktop TypeScript and isolated E2E build pass; **9 browser tests / 0 retries**, covering both relay-only picker journeys and seven adjacent stop-control regressions. Real UI with mock Tauri IPC, not live relay/native webview. - Earlier `ae23c1c9` local `just ci` passed without failures, including 3,067 native main-target tests / 19 ignored and 2,019 mobile tests; not substituted for the new source gate above. - Reused unchanged repair evidence: **17 real-store/hook history regressions**, **161 focused tests**, and independent **9 mounted owner/bot/identity revocation/regrant transitions** with zero hook-phase native calls. The regression was falsified before repair (14 failures, 3 controls). - Signed local-server fixtures cover discovery with no local/shared record, ordinary-role membership, forged ownership, invalid signatures, duplicate authentication, wrong-owner/latest-invalid policy, revoked membership and wrong destinations. These establish native data checks, not a live agent response. GitHub checks and renewed technical/security review must apply to the current published head; earlier-head green checks are not replacement-head proof. Local source review is not formal code-owner/latest-push approval or exact-range security authorization. A green security workflow with substantive review skipped is not security clearance. ### Screenshots #### Relay-only picker evidence β€” `ae23c1c9680a881cee7eed94e259bf15bf8ce3f7` These cropped rows come from the two real production picker journeys in [`owned-agent-discovery.spec.ts`](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/ae23c1c9680a881cee7eed94e259bf15bf8ce3f7/desktop/tests/e2e/owned-agent-discovery.spec.ts), using mock Tauri IPC with **no local agents and no user-search duplicate**. The fixture supplies verified-owner data and unknown availability; the browser test checks its presentation, not native signature verification. Both exact-tip journeys pass without retries. No live relay, native webview, invitation, delivery or wakeup is claimed. Before the repair, both relay-only candidate constructors discarded the owner, so the existing β€œmanaged by you” label was absent. These are after-repair captures; no before image was captured. #### New Message β†’ To The relay-only agent retains its authenticated owner label. ![new-message-owner](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/536c6d3c90776cf85b1d5ce58666f2c8ad518829/pr-7122--new-message-owner.png) #### Channel members β†’ Add people and agents The matching result retains β€œmanaged by you” beside the existing Add action; the test does not click Add or claim membership changed. ![member-add-owner](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/536c6d3c90776cf85b1d5ce58666f2c8ad518829/pr-7122--member-add-owner.png) --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
1 parent 0dbd036 commit 434dafe

32 files changed

Lines changed: 1362 additions & 86 deletions

β€Ždesktop/playwright.config.tsβ€Ž

Lines changed: 1 addition & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ export default defineConfig({
2020
name: "smoke",
2121
testMatch: [
2222
"**/smoke.spec.ts",
23+
"**/owned-agent-discovery.spec.ts",
2324
"**/thread-head-stale-edit.spec.ts",
2425
"**/sidebar-offcanvas-rail.spec.ts",
2526
"**/tooltip-semantics.spec.ts",

β€Ždesktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agent_discovery/relay_directory.rsβ€Ž

Lines changed: 38 additions & 7 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -134,9 +134,25 @@ async fn list_relay_agents_for_selection(
134134
.await?
135135
.ok_or_else(|| "relay agent membership authority is unavailable".to_string())?;
136136

137-
// Membership is the authoritative and bounded candidate source. Only
138-
// channels visible to this identity are read, and only bot-role p-tags can
139-
// drive the downstream managed-policy and owner-profile lookups.
137+
// Owned identities are relay state, even when this Desktop has never run
138+
// them or they have not joined a channel yet. Owner-authored coordinates
139+
// seed discovery only; the agent's signed NIP-OA profile still has to
140+
// authenticate ownership below. Scope selection queries to the exact keys.
141+
let mut owned_filter = serde_json::json!({
142+
"kinds": [30177],
143+
"authors": [&viewer_pubkey],
144+
});
145+
if let Some(requested_pubkeys) = requested_pubkeys {
146+
owned_filter["#d"] = serde_json::json!(requested_pubkeys);
147+
}
148+
let owned_events = query_all_relay_pages(state, owned_filter)
149+
.await
150+
.map_err(|error| format!("relay owned-agent query failed: {error}"))?;
151+
let owned_candidates = nostr_convert::managed_agent_pubkeys_from_events(&owned_events);
152+
153+
// Membership remains authoritative and visible only to this viewer.
154+
// Known owned identities can have any membership role; other candidates
155+
// must still have explicit bot-role evidence.
140156
let mut membership_filter = serde_json::json!({
141157
"kinds": [39002],
142158
"authors": [&relay_pubkey],
@@ -148,12 +164,21 @@ async fn list_relay_agents_for_selection(
148164
let membership_events = query_all_relay_pages(state, membership_filter)
149165
.await
150166
.map_err(|error| format!("relay agent channel-membership query failed: {error}"))?;
151-
let mut member_agent_channel_ids =
152-
nostr_convert::member_agent_channel_ids_from_events(&membership_events, &relay_pubkey);
167+
let mut member_agent_channel_ids = nostr_convert::member_agent_channel_ids_from_events(
168+
&membership_events,
169+
&relay_pubkey,
170+
&owned_candidates,
171+
);
153172
if let Some(requested_pubkeys) = requested_pubkeys {
154173
member_agent_channel_ids.retain(|pubkey, _| requested_pubkeys.contains(pubkey));
155174
}
156-
let candidate_pubkeys: Vec<String> = member_agent_channel_ids.keys().cloned().collect();
175+
let candidate_pubkeys: Vec<String> = member_agent_channel_ids
176+
.keys()
177+
.cloned()
178+
.chain(owned_candidates)
179+
.collect::<std::collections::HashSet<_>>()
180+
.into_iter()
181+
.collect();
157182
if candidate_pubkeys.is_empty() {
158183
return Ok(Vec::new());
159184
}
@@ -206,7 +231,10 @@ async fn list_relay_agents_for_selection(
206231
&mut agents,
207232
crate::managed_agents::owner_only_access_build(),
208233
);
209-
agents.retain(|agent| member_agent_channel_ids.contains_key(&agent.pubkey));
234+
agents.retain(|agent| {
235+
member_agent_channel_ids.contains_key(&agent.pubkey)
236+
|| agent.owner_pubkey.as_deref() == Some(viewer_pubkey.as_str())
237+
});
210238
for agent in &mut agents {
211239
agent.channel_ids = member_agent_channel_ids
212240
.get(&agent.pubkey)
@@ -569,3 +597,6 @@ mod real_relay_tests {
569597
assert_eq!(emitted_mentions, vec![agent.public_key().to_hex()]);
570598
}
571599
}
600+
601+
#[cfg(test)]
602+
mod owned_tests;
Lines changed: 192 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
1+
//! Exercise the production query plan against a loopback relay with signed fixtures.
2+
use super::*;
3+
use axum::{
4+
routing::{get, post},
5+
Json, Router,
6+
};
7+
use nostr::{EventBuilder, Keys, Kind, Tag};
8+
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9+
10+
#[tokio::test]
11+
async fn remote_owned_discovery_and_membership_do_not_require_local_records() {
12+
let _serial = crate::relay_admission::TEST_SERIAL.lock().await;
13+
crate::relay_admission::reset_rate_limit_gate();
14+
let relay = Keys::generate();
15+
let owner = Keys::generate();
16+
let agent = Keys::generate();
17+
let stranger = Keys::generate();
18+
let agent_key = agent.public_key().to_hex();
19+
let owner_key = owner.public_key().to_hex();
20+
let relay_key = relay.public_key().to_hex();
21+
let auth = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::compute_auth_tag(&owner, &agent.public_key(), "").unwrap();
22+
let auth: Vec<String> = serde_json::from_str(&auth).unwrap();
23+
let profile = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Metadata, r#"{"display_name":"Remote Scout"}"#)
24+
.tags([Tag::parse(auth).unwrap()])
25+
.sign_with_keys(&agent)
26+
.unwrap();
27+
let policy = |key: &str| {
28+
EventBuilder::new(
29+
Kind::Custom(30177),
30+
r#"{"name":"Remote Scout","parallelism":1,"respond_to":"owner-only"}"#,
31+
)
32+
.tags([Tag::parse(["d", key]).unwrap()])
33+
.sign_with_keys(&owner)
34+
.unwrap()
35+
};
36+
// An owner-authored coordinate is a discovery hint, not ownership proof.
37+
let forged = policy(&stranger.public_key().to_hex());
38+
let stranger_profile = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Metadata, "{}")
39+
.sign_with_keys(&stranger)
40+
.unwrap();
41+
let events = Arc::new(Mutex::new(vec![
42+
profile,
43+
policy(&agent_key),
44+
forged,
45+
stranger_profile,
46+
]));
47+
let queries = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::<serde_json::Value>::new()));
48+
let query_events = events.clone();
49+
let query_log = queries.clone();
50+
let router = Router::new()
51+
.route(
52+
"/",
53+
get(move || {
54+
let key = relay_key.clone();
55+
async move { Json(serde_json::json!({"self": key})) }
56+
}),
57+
)
58+
.route(
59+
"/query",
60+
post(move |Json(filters): Json<Vec<serde_json::Value>>| {
61+
let events = query_events.clone();
62+
let queries = query_log.clone();
63+
async move {
64+
queries.lock().unwrap().extend(filters.clone());
65+
let events = events.lock().unwrap();
66+
let result: Vec<_> = events
67+
.iter()
68+
.filter(|event| {
69+
filters.iter().any(|filter| {
70+
filter["kinds"]
71+
.as_array()
72+
.unwrap()
73+
.contains(&serde_json::json!(event.kind.as_u16()))
74+
&& filter.get("authors").is_none_or(|authors| {
75+
authors
76+
.as_array()
77+
.unwrap()
78+
.contains(&serde_json::json!(event.pubkey.to_hex()))
79+
})
80+
&& ["d", "p"].iter().all(|tag| {
81+
filter.get(format!("#{tag}")).is_none_or(|values| {
82+
event.tags.iter().any(|t| {
83+
t.as_slice().first().map(String::as_str)
84+
== Some(*tag)
85+
&& t.as_slice().get(1).is_some_and(|value| {
86+
values
87+
.as_array()
88+
.unwrap()
89+
.contains(&serde_json::json!(value))
90+
})
91+
})
92+
})
93+
})
94+
})
95+
})
96+
.cloned()
97+
.collect();
98+
Json(result)
99+
}
100+
}),
101+
);
102+
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
103+
let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
104+
let server = tokio::spawn(async move {
105+
axum::serve(listener, router).await.unwrap();
106+
});
107+
let state = crate::app_state::build_app_state();
108+
*state.keys.lock().unwrap() = owner.clone();
109+
*state.relay_url_override.lock().unwrap() = Some(format!("ws://{address}"));
110+
111+
let discovered = list_relay_agents_for_state(&state).await.unwrap();
112+
assert_eq!(discovered.len(), 1, "forged ownership must not be admitted");
113+
assert_eq!(discovered[0].pubkey, agent_key);
114+
assert_eq!(
115+
discovered[0].owner_pubkey.as_deref(),
116+
Some(owner_key.as_str())
117+
);
118+
assert!(
119+
discovered[0].channel_ids.is_empty(),
120+
"discovery is not membership"
121+
);
122+
123+
let membership = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(39002), "")
124+
.tags([
125+
Tag::parse(["d", "general"]).unwrap(),
126+
Tag::parse(["p", &owner_key, "", "member"]).unwrap(),
127+
Tag::parse(["p", &agent_key, "", "member"]).unwrap(),
128+
])
129+
.sign_with_keys(&relay)
130+
.unwrap();
131+
events.lock().unwrap().push(membership);
132+
let requested = std::collections::HashSet::from([agent_key.clone()]);
133+
let admitted = list_relay_agents_for_selection(&state, Some(&requested), Some("general"))
134+
.await
135+
.unwrap();
136+
assert_eq!(admitted.len(), 1);
137+
assert_eq!(admitted[0].channel_ids, vec!["general".to_string()]);
138+
let outside = list_relay_agents_for_selection(&state, Some(&requested), Some("private-other"))
139+
.await
140+
.unwrap();
141+
assert_eq!(outside.len(), 1);
142+
assert!(
143+
outside[0].channel_ids.is_empty(),
144+
"ownership cannot fabricate destination membership"
145+
);
146+
// A newer signed snapshot revokes membership, even if an old snapshot
147+
// is also returned. The owned identity remains discoverable, not admitted.
148+
let removed = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(39002), "")
149+
.tags([
150+
Tag::parse(["d", "general"]).unwrap(),
151+
Tag::parse(["p", &owner_key, "", "member"]).unwrap(),
152+
])
153+
.custom_created_at(nostr::Timestamp::from(
154+
nostr::Timestamp::now().as_secs() + 1,
155+
))
156+
.sign_with_keys(&relay)
157+
.unwrap();
158+
events.lock().unwrap().push(removed);
159+
let revoked = list_relay_agents_for_selection(&state, Some(&requested), Some("general"))
160+
.await
161+
.unwrap();
162+
assert!(revoked[0].channel_ids.is_empty());
163+
164+
let deny = EventBuilder::new(
165+
Kind::Custom(30177),
166+
r#"{"name":"Remote Scout","parallelism":1,"respond_to":"nobody"}"#,
167+
)
168+
.tags([Tag::parse(["d", &agent_key]).unwrap()])
169+
.custom_created_at(nostr::Timestamp::from(
170+
nostr::Timestamp::now().as_secs() + 2,
171+
))
172+
.sign_with_keys(&owner)
173+
.unwrap();
174+
events.lock().unwrap().push(deny);
175+
let denied = list_relay_agents_for_selection(&state, Some(&requested), Some("general"))
176+
.await
177+
.unwrap();
178+
assert!(
179+
denied.is_empty(),
180+
"latest unsupported policy cannot fall back to an older allow"
181+
);
182+
183+
assert!(queries
184+
.lock()
185+
.unwrap()
186+
.iter()
187+
.any(|filter| filter["kinds"] == serde_json::json!([30177])
188+
&& filter["authors"] == serde_json::json!([owner_key])
189+
&& filter.get("#d").is_none()));
190+
server.abort();
191+
crate::relay_admission::reset_rate_limit_gate();
192+
}

β€Ždesktop/src-tauri/src/nostr_convert.rsβ€Ž

Lines changed: 39 additions & 19 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -57,30 +57,47 @@ fn tags_named<'a>(event: &'a Event, name: &'a str) -> impl Iterator<Item = &'a [
5757

5858
/// Return the owner pubkey from a valid NIP-OA owner tag on a kind:0 profile.
5959
///
60-
/// NIP-OA marks an agent identity by having the owner sign an `auth` tag for
61-
/// the agent pubkey. We verify the tag against the profile event author, not
62-
/// against the owner, so a forged or stale marker does not turn a person into
63-
/// an agent in mention search.
60+
/// NIP-OA requires a valid event and exactly one well-formed `auth` tag whose
61+
/// owner signature and every condition apply to the event. Time clauses constrain
62+
/// the profile's `created_at`, not the verifier's clock. Ownership is provenance;
63+
/// the agent's pubkey remains the author.
6464
pub(crate) fn profile_valid_oa_owner_pubkey(event: &Event) -> Option<String> {
65-
let target_hex = event.pubkey.to_hex();
66-
let Ok(target_pubkey) = nostr::PublicKey::from_hex(&target_hex) else {
65+
if event.kind != nostr::Kind::Metadata {
6766
return None;
68-
};
67+
}
6968

70-
for tag in event.tags.iter() {
71-
let slice = tag.as_slice();
72-
if slice.first().map(String::as_str) != Some("auth") || slice.len() != 4 {
73-
continue;
74-
}
75-
let Ok(json) = serde_json::to_string(slice) else {
76-
continue;
77-
};
78-
if let Ok(owner_pubkey) = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::verify_auth_tag(&json, &target_pubkey) {
79-
return Some(owner_pubkey.to_hex());
80-
}
69+
let mut auth_tags = tags_named(event, "auth");
70+
let auth_tag = auth_tags.next()?;
71+
// Count malformed auth tags too: no first-valid-tag fallback is permitted.
72+
if auth_tags.next().is_some() {
73+
return None;
8174
}
8275

83-
None
76+
let json = serde_json::to_string(auth_tag).ok()?;
77+
// The structural parser also enforces canonical lowercase key/signature hex.
78+
buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::parse_auth_tag(&json).ok()?;
79+
event.verify().ok()?;
80+
let owner = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::verify_auth_tag(&json, &event.pubkey).ok()?;
81+
let conditions = auth_tag.get(2)?;
82+
// Syntax/ranges were checked by the SDK; evaluate every signed clause as-is.
83+
let applies = conditions.is_empty()
84+
|| conditions.split('&').all(|clause| {
85+
if let Some(value) = clause.strip_prefix("kind=") {
86+
value.parse::<u16>() == Ok(event.kind.as_u16())
87+
} else if let Some(value) = clause.strip_prefix("created_at<") {
88+
value
89+
.parse::<u64>()
90+
.is_ok_and(|bound| event.created_at.as_secs() < bound)
91+
} else if let Some(value) = clause.strip_prefix("created_at>") {
92+
value
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.parse::<u64>()
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.is_ok_and(|bound| event.created_at.as_secs() > bound)
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} else {
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false
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}
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});
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applies.then(|| owner.to_hex())
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}
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pub(crate) fn profile_has_valid_oa_owner(event: &Event) -> bool {
@@ -588,3 +605,6 @@ fn days_to_ymd(days: i64) -> (i64, u32, u32) {
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod oa_profile_tests;

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