The network.allowed block is overly broad due to wildcard entries like "*.se", "*.com", "*.org", "*.io", plus default, which effectively lets the Copilot agent connect to almost any external host. If the MCP server or other data sources are compromised or abused for prompt injection, they can direct the agent to exfiltrate repository data or tokens to an attacker-controlled domain under these TLDs. Tighten network.allowed to only the specific domains required for this workflow (e.g., the MCP service, GitHub, and official Riksdag/Government endpoints) and remove generic wildcard patterns and unnecessary hosts.

The network.allowed configuration uses very broad wildcards like "*.se", "*.com", "*.org", "*.io", and default, allowing the Copilot agent to initiate outbound connections to a wide range of external hosts. In case of a compromised MCP endpoint or successful prompt injection, this enables exfiltration of repository data or credentials to arbitrary attacker-controlled domains within those TLDs. Restrict network.allowed to just the small set of domains actually needed by this workflow (MCP, GitHub, and the official data sources) and drop the wildcard patterns.

The network.allowed section includes wildcard hosts such as "*.se", "*.com", "*.org", "*.io", plus default, making outbound network access from the Copilot agent far broader than necessary. If an upstream data source (like the MCP server) is compromised or used for prompt injection, it could instruct the agent to send repository data or tokens to any attacker-controlled domain matching these patterns. Limit network.allowed to the specific required endpoints for propositions generation (MCP, GitHub, and Riksdag/Government APIs) and remove the generic wildcard entries.

This workflow's network.allowed list uses broad wildcards like "*.se", "*.com", "*.org", "*.io" together with default, which allows the Copilot agent to connect to almost any host under those TLDs. A compromised MCP response or crafted prompt injection could leverage this to have the agent exfiltrate repository contents or tokens to attacker-controlled domains. Reduce the network.allowed hosts to only the explicit domains actually needed for motions coverage and remove the wildcard patterns to minimize exfiltration risk.

The network.allowed configuration here is very permissive, with wildcard entries "*.se", "*.com", "*.org", "*.io" plus default, effectively giving the Copilot agent open egress to many external domains. If the MCP or another data source is compromised or provides malicious prompts, it could direct the agent to send sensitive repository data or tokens to attacker-controlled hosts under those TLDs. Constrain network.allowed to just the explicit domains required for monthly review generation and remove the wildcard and unused hosts.

The network.allowed section for this workflow includes wildcard host patterns like "*.se", "*.com", "*.org", "*.io" and default, which is much broader than necessary for month-ahead article generation. This wide egress enables an attacker (via MCP compromise or prompt injection) to have the Copilot agent exfiltrate repository data or tokens to arbitrary domains within those TLDs. Narrow network.allowed down to only the specific endpoints you need (MCP, GitHub, and official data APIs) and eliminate wildcard entries.

The network.allowed configuration uses generic wildcard hosts ("*.se", "*.com", "*.org", "*.io") plus default, which effectively gives the Copilot agent broad outbound network access. If an attacker controls or influences an upstream source (e.g., via MCP compromise or prompt injection), they could instruct the agent to send repository data or tokens to attacker-controlled domains that match these wildcards. Restrict network.allowed to a minimal, explicit set of required domains for committee-report generation and remove the wildcard patterns to reduce exfiltration risk.