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Commit c19df63
Document why both trust mechanisms are needed
An end-to-end test of OpenCode against a private-CA HTTPS endpoint corrected an
assumption. The npm package installs a native opencode-linux-x64 ELF carrying Bun
runtime symbols rather than a Node entrypoint, and Bun reads the OS trust store:
opencode 1.18.25 reached the endpoint with the trust store alone and no CA
variables set, as well as with each variable independently. The upstream
1.17.12+ NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS regression (anomalyco/opencode#35365) did not
reproduce, so no version pin is needed.
That cuts against the earlier framing that Node-family agents all require
NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS. It holds for agents that really are JS under Node -- pi
installs with --ignore-scripts so no native binary is fetched, and gemini-cli is
plain npm -- but not for the Bun-packaged binaries. Node 22 does fail with
UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE while curl succeeds against the same server, so
the trust store alone is genuinely insufficient for those.
The useful conclusion is that packaging varies per agent and per version, which
is the argument for keeping both halves rather than picking one. Documented as a
table of runtime to trust mechanism, with the verification scope stated as what
was actually observed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>1 parent bce5460 commit c19df63
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