Skip to content

Commit b894356

Browse files
committed
docs: record the outcome of the upstream get-env report (corroborated, patched, not yet fixed)
The draft in this file was posted as modelcontextprotocol/servers#4882 and has been corroborated by two outside commenters and picked up by a third-party patch. Every fact in the new Outcome section was re-read from the GitHub API on 2026-09-29 rather than transcribed: the issue is open; @sattyamjjain adds the angle this draft did not have (get-env is annotated readOnlyHint: true, so hosts that auto-approve read-only tools run the full environment dump without asking) and points at three pre-existing PRs; @shleder confirms severity, names the credential classes, and proposes allowlisting plus name-pattern redaction; PR #4889 (Resolves #4882, 2 files, +209/-14, with its own unit tests and an AI-assistance disclosure) is open and unmerged. The section is explicit about what must NOT be claimed: this was not the first report (issue #3986 predates it by five months and is still open), and nothing is fixed - upstream main still returns JSON.stringify(process.env, null, 2) and still declares readOnlyHint: true, both re-checked today. It also states the honest one-paragraph form of the chain, and what to do when a fixed version ships (re-run the probe, record before/after scorecards here). This is the evidence chain for the benchmark paper's availability section; the paper draft itself is not touched.
1 parent c8b90af commit b894356

1 file changed

Lines changed: 47 additions & 0 deletions

File tree

‎docs/upstream-issue-server-everything.md‎

Lines changed: 47 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -93,3 +93,50 @@ table.
9393
in this repository.
9494
- Re-run `python -m bench run --target everything-public` once a new version is published, and record
9595
the result in the repository rather than in a chat log.
96+
97+
## Outcome (verified 2026-09-29 against the GitHub API)
98+
99+
The draft was posted, and it has been corroborated by third parties and picked up by a patch. Every
100+
line below was re-read from the API on 2026-09-29 rather than transcribed from a chat report.
101+
102+
| item | fact |
103+
|---|---|
104+
| our report | [issue #4882](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/issues/4882), opened 2026-09-27 22:15:37Z, **still open** |
105+
| external comment 1 | @sattyamjjain, 2026-09-28 16:57Z |
106+
| external comment 2 | @shleder, 2026-09-28 18:38Z |
107+
| patch | [PR #4889](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/pull/4889), opened 2026-09-28 19:53:47Z, `Resolves #4882`, **open and not merged** |
108+
| earlier report of the same weakness | [issue #3986](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/issues/3986), opened 2026-04-19 by another user, still open |
109+
110+
**What the comments added, in their own terms.**
111+
112+
* @sattyamjjain: the issue duplicates #3986 and three PRs are already open for it (#4001 and #4164
113+
restrict the output to a single key, #4009 adds a documentation warning), asking a maintainer to pick
114+
one. Independently of the duplicate question, that comment adds an angle this draft did **not** have:
115+
*"`get-env` is annotated with `readOnlyHint: true, destructiveHint: false`. Hosts that auto-approve
116+
read-only tools will run the full env dump without asking."* — and suggests registering the tool only
117+
behind an explicit opt-in, because the reference server is copied as a starting template.
118+
* @shleder: confirms the severity and names the mechanism — environment variables routinely hold
119+
`GITHUB_TOKEN`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, API keys and connection strings, so a prompt-injected or
120+
unprompted agent call can exfiltrate credentials — and proposes exactly the two remediations that were
121+
in the draft's third bullet: strict allowlisting, and redaction by name pattern (`KEY`, `TOKEN`,
122+
`SECRET`, `PASSWORD`, `AUTH`). The comment discloses that its author maintains a sandbox layer product.
123+
124+
**What the patch does**, per its own description: `isSensitiveEnvVar` + `getRedactedEnv` in
125+
`src/everything/tools/get-env.ts`, redacting to `[REDACTED]` on substring and prefix rules, plus expanded
126+
unit tests; 2 files changed, +209/−14. It discloses AI assistance under human review.
127+
128+
**What is still true, checked rather than assumed:** upstream `main`'s
129+
`src/everything/tools/get-env.ts` still returns `JSON.stringify(process.env, null, 2)` and still declares
130+
`readOnlyHint: true`. So as of 2026-09-29 the exposure is unchanged in the code, the issue is open, and the
131+
patch is open.
132+
133+
**How to describe this chain, in one honest paragraph.** The benchmark ran a fixed probe corpus against
134+
five servers and flagged `get-env` on the Everything reference server as its highest-severity result; the
135+
report was filed upstream as #4882 with a reproducible transcript, was independently corroborated by two
136+
outside commenters — one adding the auto-approval (`readOnlyHint`) angle, the other specifying
137+
allowlist/redaction — and a third-party patch (#4889) now resolves it, unmerged. It is **not** the first
138+
report of this weakness (#3986 predates it by five months), and it is **not** fixed yet. What it is: an
139+
independent reproduction with a harness that upstream contributors engaged with by name.
140+
141+
**Next, when a fixed version ships:** re-run `python -m bench run --target everything-public` and record
142+
the before/after scorecards in this repository, and update this section rather than a chat log.

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)