| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
0.4.x (latest main) |
✅ |
0.3.x and older tags |
|
0.2.x and older |
❌ (please upgrade) |
Supplies for releases are verifiable rather than trusted: every artifact is
published with an SPDX SBOM, a SHA256SUMS.txt and a build-provenance
attestation (gh attestation verify <file> --repo Alvandcode/image-metadata-cleaner).
Please do not open a public issue.
Use GitHub's private channel:
If you cannot use advisories, contact the maintainer on Telegram (@a_c_official) and say only that you have a security report — send the details through the private advisory once opened.
Please include:
- affected version / commit,
- steps to reproduce,
- impact (e.g. metadata leak, DoS, code execution),
- a suggested fix if you have one,
- whether you want to be credited in the release notes.
I acknowledge reports within 72 hours and aim to publish a fix and a release as soon as possible. Credit is given in the advisory and release notes unless you prefer to stay anonymous.
A full model — adversaries, trust boundaries, why a compromised dependency still
cannot exfiltrate a photo in the web app, and the risks that remain — lives in
THREAT_MODEL.md. The short version follows.
The project has two very different deployments, with different trust levels.
- There is no backend. All processing happens in the browser with Canvas.
- No upload. The page's Content-Security-Policy sets
connect-src 'none', so even a compromised script in the page cannot send your image anywhere. - Your photos never leave the device, and they are not stored anywhere.
- The service worker caches only static assets, never image data.
In scope:
- Metadata leaks: any output that still carries EXIF/GPS/XMP/ICC/comment
chunks.
clean_metadata()re-analyses its own output and reportsverified.has_metadata; a leak there is a security bug. - Input mutation: the input file must never be modified or deleted.
- API hardening:
MAX_CONTENT_LENGTHbypass, path traversal throughsecure_filename, SSRF/RCE through Flaskdebugmode, unbounded memory use from uploads. - DoS: decompression bombs (
Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS,MAX_PIXELS), oversized--resizetargets.
Out of scope:
- Someone with local read access to your original file seeing its metadata.
- Serving
api.serverdirectly to the public internet without a reverse proxy, TLS and rate limiting. It is a single-purpose tool, not a hardened public gateway: put it behind a proxy and add auth if you expose it. - Anything in third-party vendored files under
docs/vendor/— report those upstream (JSZip, exifr), but tell me too so I can ship an updated copy.