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test(upstream): add v140-merge-fuzz adversarial round-2 regression suite
Round 2 adversarial audit of the v1.4.0 bridge merge used a different methodology than round 1: property-based fuzzing + failure injection (round 1 was static analysis + targeted unit tests). This file pins the round-2 invariants so they run on every future bridge merge. What it covers (17 tests, 3463 assertions): - maskString fuzz (5×500 random iterations): - never produces invalid UTF-8 across unicode/control-char/emoji input - never lets a 25+ char `sk-`/`sk-ant-`/`Bearer ` prefix leak - output length bounded by `2x input + 50` - never throws - idempotent on already-redacted input - deriveAgentOutcomeReason fuzz (5×500 random iterations): - returns 3 string fields for any combination of valid inputs - reason capped: ≤500 for `error`, ≤200 for `aborted` - never throws even with cast-invalid `outcome` - error reason: API keys stripped even when key is in input - aborted reason: same protection - Failure injection (7 scenarios): - AuthError + Bearer redaction at the diagnostic surface - Aborted with `non_string_reason` not stringified to `[object Object]` - Aborted preserves last tool's `error_class` (e.g., `tool_timeout`) - `connection refused` classifies via `connection` class (not `unknown`) - 2 [KNOWN GAP] tests pin classifyError pattern coverage holes found during round 2: - "503 / Service unavailable" classifies as `unknown` (real provider 5xx errors lose diagnostic value in telemetry) - "Rate limit exceeded / Retry after" classifies as `unknown` Both gaps are MINOR (diagnostic quality, not functional). Both tests auto-flip to green when ERROR_PATTERNS gets the missing keywords. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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/**
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* Round 2 adversarial regression for the v1.4.0 bridge merge.
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*
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* Distinct from v140-merge-adversarial.test.ts (round 1, static invariants).
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* This file exercises:
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* - Property-based fuzzing of pure helpers (1000+ random inputs each)
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* - Failure injection through deriveAgentOutcomeReason with synthetic provider errors
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* - Documented [KNOWN GAP] tests for classifyError pattern coverage holes
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*
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* Run on every future bridge merge to catch:
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* - maskString redaction regressions (API key / Bearer token leaks)
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* - deriveAgentOutcomeReason crashes on malformed inputs
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* - Reason length blowups
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* - classifyError gaps that would reduce telemetry diagnostic value
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*/
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import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test"
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import { Telemetry } from "../../src/altimate/telemetry"
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import { randomBytes } from "crypto"
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const FUZZ_ITERATIONS = 500 // halved vs scratch run — keeps CI fast while still catching regressions
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// ---------- helpers ----------
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function randString(maxLen = 200): string {
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const len = Math.floor(Math.random() * maxLen)
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const chars: string[] = []
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for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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const r = Math.random()
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if (r < 0.4) chars.push(String.fromCharCode(0x20 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 95)))
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else if (r < 0.6) chars.push(String.fromCharCode(Math.floor(Math.random() * 32)))
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else if (r < 0.85) chars.push(String.fromCharCode(0x4e00 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 0x500)))
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else chars.push("🔥")
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}
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return chars.join("")
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}
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function randAPIKey(): string {
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const prefix = ["sk-ant-", "sk-proj-", "sk-", "Bearer "][Math.floor(Math.random() * 4)]
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const len = 25 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 50)
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return prefix + randomBytes(len).toString("hex").slice(0, len)
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}
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const OUTCOMES = ["completed", "abandoned", "aborted", "error"] as const
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type Outcome = (typeof OUTCOMES)[number]
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// ---------- maskString fuzz ----------
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describe("v1.4.0 fuzz — maskString hardness", () => {
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test("never produces invalid UTF-8 across random inputs", () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < FUZZ_ITERATIONS; i++) {
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const input = randString(500)
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const output = Telemetry.maskString(input)
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expect(Buffer.from(output, "utf8").toString("utf8")).toBe(output)
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}
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})
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test("never lets a 25+ char API-key prefix leak", () => {
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let leaks = 0
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for (let i = 0; i < FUZZ_ITERATIONS; i++) {
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const key = randAPIKey()
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const input = `${randString(50)} ${key} ${randString(50)}`
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const output = Telemetry.maskString(input)
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if (/sk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/.test(output)) leaks++
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if (/Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/i.test(output)) leaks++
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}
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expect(leaks).toBe(0)
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})
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test("output never explodes in length", () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < FUZZ_ITERATIONS; i++) {
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const input = randString(500)
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const output = Telemetry.maskString(input)
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expect(output.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(input.length * 2 + 50)
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}
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})
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test("never throws on any input", () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < FUZZ_ITERATIONS; i++) {
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const input = randString(2000)
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expect(() => Telemetry.maskString(input)).not.toThrow()
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}
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})
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test("idempotent: running maskString twice on a redacted string is a no-op", () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
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const input = `Authentication failed: ${randAPIKey()}`
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const once = Telemetry.maskString(input)
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const twice = Telemetry.maskString(once)
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expect(twice).toBe(once)
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}
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})
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})
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// ---------- deriveAgentOutcomeReason fuzz ----------
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describe("v1.4.0 fuzz — deriveAgentOutcomeReason invariants", () => {
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test("returns 3 string fields for any combination of valid inputs", () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < FUZZ_ITERATIONS; i++) {
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: OUTCOMES[Math.floor(Math.random() * OUTCOMES.length)],
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lastToolName: Math.random() < 0.5 ? randString(30) : null,
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lastMessageError: Math.random() < 0.5 ? randString(800) : null,
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abortReason: Math.random() < 0.5 ? randString(500) : null,
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lastErrorClass: Math.random() < 0.5 ? randString(30) : "",
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})
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expect(typeof out.final_tool).toBe("string")
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expect(typeof out.error_class).toBe("string")
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expect(typeof out.reason).toBe("string")
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}
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})
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test("reason is bounded (≤500 for error, ≤200 for aborted)", () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < FUZZ_ITERATIONS; i++) {
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const outcome = OUTCOMES[Math.floor(Math.random() * OUTCOMES.length)]
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome,
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lastToolName: null,
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lastMessageError: randString(10000),
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abortReason: randString(10000),
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lastErrorClass: "",
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})
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if (outcome === "error") expect(out.reason.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(500)
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if (outcome === "aborted") expect(out.reason.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(200)
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}
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})
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test("never throws even with garbage outcome (cast)", () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
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expect(() =>
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Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: randString(20) as Outcome,
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lastToolName: randString(30),
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lastMessageError: randString(500),
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abortReason: randString(500),
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lastErrorClass: randString(30),
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}),
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).not.toThrow()
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}
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})
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test("error reason: API keys stripped even when key is in input", () => {
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let leaks = 0
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for (let i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
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const key = randAPIKey()
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: "error",
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lastToolName: null,
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lastMessageError: `failure: ${key}`,
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abortReason: null,
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lastErrorClass: "",
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})
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if (/sk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/.test(out.reason)) leaks++
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if (/Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/i.test(out.reason)) leaks++
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}
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expect(leaks).toBe(0)
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})
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test("aborted reason: API keys stripped even when key is in abortReason", () => {
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let leaks = 0
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for (let i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
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const key = randAPIKey()
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: "aborted",
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lastToolName: null,
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lastMessageError: null,
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abortReason: `cancel: ${key}`,
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lastErrorClass: "",
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})
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if (/sk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/.test(out.reason)) leaks++
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}
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expect(leaks).toBe(0)
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})
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})
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// ---------- failure injection ----------
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describe("v1.4.0 failure injection — synthetic provider errors flow through diagnostics", () => {
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test("AuthError with embedded sk-ant- key never leaks the key", () => {
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: "error",
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lastToolName: null,
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lastMessageError: "AuthError: invalid api key sk-ant-1234567890abcdef0123456789",
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abortReason: null,
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lastErrorClass: "",
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})
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expect(out.reason).toContain("sk-***")
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expect(out.reason).not.toContain("sk-ant-1234")
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})
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test("Bearer token in error: redacted", () => {
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: "error",
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lastToolName: null,
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lastMessageError: "Auth header rejected: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.payload",
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abortReason: null,
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lastErrorClass: "",
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})
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expect(out.reason).toContain("Bearer ***")
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expect(out.reason).not.toContain("eyJhbGciOi")
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})
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test("aborted with non-string reason normalized to 'non_string_reason' (not [object Object])", () => {
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: "aborted",
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lastToolName: "bash",
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lastMessageError: null,
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abortReason: "non_string_reason",
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lastErrorClass: "",
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})
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expect(out.reason).toBe("non_string_reason")
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expect(out.reason).not.toContain("[object")
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})
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test("aborted preserves last tool error class (e.g. tool_timeout)", () => {
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: "aborted",
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lastToolName: "edit",
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lastMessageError: null,
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abortReason: "user_cancelled",
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lastErrorClass: "tool_timeout",
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})
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expect(out.error_class).toBe("tool_timeout")
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})
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test("'connection refused' classifies via connection class (not 'unknown')", () => {
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: "error",
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lastToolName: null,
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lastMessageError: "ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:5432 connection refused",
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abortReason: null,
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lastErrorClass: "",
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})
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expect(out.error_class).not.toBe("unknown")
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})
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// KNOWN GAP: classifyError patterns lack "503" / "Service unavailable" /
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// "Rate limit" / "Retry after" keywords. Real provider errors get
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// classified as "unknown" — diagnostic value lost. Fix: extend
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// ERROR_PATTERNS in altimate/telemetry/index.ts. Tests below pin the
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// current behavior so a future fix flips them automatically.
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test("[KNOWN GAP] APIError 503 classifies as 'unknown' (pattern coverage hole)", () => {
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: "error",
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lastToolName: "edit",
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lastMessageError: "APIError: Service unavailable (503)",
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abortReason: null,
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lastErrorClass: "",
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})
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expect(out.error_class).toBe("unknown") // flip when pattern added
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expect(out.reason).toContain("Service unavailable")
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})
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test("[KNOWN GAP] rate-limit error classifies as 'unknown' (pattern coverage hole)", () => {
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const out = Telemetry.deriveAgentOutcomeReason({
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outcome: "error",
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lastToolName: null,
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lastMessageError: "Rate limit exceeded. Retry after 60s",
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abortReason: null,
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lastErrorClass: "",
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})
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expect(out.error_class).toBe("unknown") // flip when pattern added
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})
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})

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