Julieta A . Rabanos
I am currently a Ramón y Cajal Fellow at the Universitat de Girona, Facultat de Dret - Cátedra de Cultura Jurídica. I got my law degree at the University of Buenos Aires (with honours), an M.A. at the University of Genoa, and a PhD in Law - curriculum Philosophy of Law and History of Legal Culture (summa cum laude) at the University of Genoa. I have also been a postdoctoral researcher at the Tarello Institute for Legal Philosophy, University of Genoa, and a postdoctoral Fellow in Theory and Philosophy of Law at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law, within the Horizon Twinning project "ALF - Advancing cooperation on the Foundations of Law".
I have worked as a professor, teaching assistant and guest lecturer in graduate and postgraduate courses at different universities in Latin America and Europe, and I have participated as assistant researcher in various research projects in the field of theory and philosophy of law such as the Jean Monnet Module "ViROL - Violations of the Rule of Law: Classification, Proof and Remedies" and the EU Horizon "ALF - Advancing Cooperation on the Foundations of Law). Moreover, I am currently Editor-in-Chief of Eudaimonia - Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy and co-founder and co-host of the Heavily Accented Philosophy of Law podcast.
Other than my academic and teaching experience, I have also served as a full-time legislative advisor to the First Minority Leader of the Honourable Chamber of Deputies of the Argentine Republic (2012-2015).
My main research topics are the theory and philosophy of law, theoretical models of authority, theories of legislation, theories of legal interpretation and argumentation, coercion and the (Rule of) law, legal systems and norms, legal methodology and legal realism (in particular, Scandinavian legal realism).
Address: Facultat de Dret, Campus Montilivi
Carrer de la Universitat 12, despacho 035
17003 - Girona, España
I have worked as a professor, teaching assistant and guest lecturer in graduate and postgraduate courses at different universities in Latin America and Europe, and I have participated as assistant researcher in various research projects in the field of theory and philosophy of law such as the Jean Monnet Module "ViROL - Violations of the Rule of Law: Classification, Proof and Remedies" and the EU Horizon "ALF - Advancing Cooperation on the Foundations of Law). Moreover, I am currently Editor-in-Chief of Eudaimonia - Journal of Legal, Political and Social Theory and Philosophy and co-founder and co-host of the Heavily Accented Philosophy of Law podcast.
Other than my academic and teaching experience, I have also served as a full-time legislative advisor to the First Minority Leader of the Honourable Chamber of Deputies of the Argentine Republic (2012-2015).
My main research topics are the theory and philosophy of law, theoretical models of authority, theories of legislation, theories of legal interpretation and argumentation, coercion and the (Rule of) law, legal systems and norms, legal methodology and legal realism (in particular, Scandinavian legal realism).
Address: Facultat de Dret, Campus Montilivi
Carrer de la Universitat 12, despacho 035
17003 - Girona, España
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Papers by Julieta A . Rabanos
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the revitalised debate by arguing for the importance of coercion both for the existence of law and for the function(s) of law. I will argue that if law is seen as a tool or artefact, the fulfilment of its function(s) depends both on its existence and on its possession of a certain property that enables the achievement of that end. I will then show how coercion can be understood as necessary for the existence of law by analysing two main arguments for coercion-dependent existence: that coercion is motivationally necessary to ensure conformity to law, and that it is necessary to ensure the existence of a community. Finally, even if this argument fails, I will show that coercion can nevertheless be understood as the particular property that law has to fulfil its function(s). I will argue that this is the case for most of the possible functions of law, especially those related to behaviour-guidance and coordination-solving.
I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I will address some useful definitions of coercion and law and offer some insights into the view of law as an artefact and the functions ascribed to it. In section 3, I will set out some general theoretical positions on the relationship between coercion and law that will help to frame the content of the arguments that follow in the next section. In section 4, I will analyse the role and significance of coercion for the existence of legal systems (4.1) and for the function of legal systems (4.2). Finally, in section 5, I will offer some concluding remarks.
el texto que resulta aprobado. En §3, plantearé el interrogante de si no sería más provechoso realizar ulteriores diferenciaciones entre los contextos jurídicos en los cuales Poggi analiza la aplicación y aplicabilidad de la teoría de Grice. Intentaré mostrar cómo esas diferenciaciones se vuelven necesarias, especialmente para evaluar la posibilidad de que sí existan contextos cooperativos en el ámbito jurídico y situaciones donde podrían coexistir contemporáneamente contextos cooperativos y no cooperativos. Finalmente, en §4 ofreceré una breve conclusión.
Responder a esta pregunta implica la solución de dos problemas diferentes. Por una parte, un problema conceptual: ¿qué tipo de teoría o enfoque puede dar mejor cuenta de las normas de derechos humanos? Por otra parte, un problema axiológico: ¿cómo deberíamos considerar a las normas de derechos humanos, de acuerdo con una determinada (correcta, mejor) doctrina o ideología?
En este artículo, intento explorar y ofrecer algunas respuestas a esta pregunta central y a sus problemas conectados.
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the revitalised debate by arguing for the importance of coercion both for the existence of law and for the function(s) of law. I will argue that if law is seen as a tool or artefact, the fulfilment of its function(s) depends both on its existence and on its possession of a certain property that enables the achievement of that end. I will then show how coercion can be understood as necessary for the existence of law by analysing two main arguments for coercion-dependent existence: that coercion is motivationally necessary to ensure conformity to law, and that it is necessary to ensure the existence of a community. Finally, even if this argument fails, I will show that coercion can nevertheless be understood as the particular property that law has to fulfil its function(s). I will argue that this is the case for most of the possible functions of law, especially those related to behaviour-guidance and coordination-solving.
I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I will address some useful definitions of coercion and law and offer some insights into the view of law as an artefact and the functions ascribed to it. In section 3, I will set out some general theoretical positions on the relationship between coercion and law that will help to frame the content of the arguments that follow in the next section. In section 4, I will analyse the role and significance of coercion for the existence of legal systems (4.1) and for the function of legal systems (4.2). Finally, in section 5, I will offer some concluding remarks.
el texto que resulta aprobado. En §3, plantearé el interrogante de si no sería más provechoso realizar ulteriores diferenciaciones entre los contextos jurídicos en los cuales Poggi analiza la aplicación y aplicabilidad de la teoría de Grice. Intentaré mostrar cómo esas diferenciaciones se vuelven necesarias, especialmente para evaluar la posibilidad de que sí existan contextos cooperativos en el ámbito jurídico y situaciones donde podrían coexistir contemporáneamente contextos cooperativos y no cooperativos. Finalmente, en §4 ofreceré una breve conclusión.
Responder a esta pregunta implica la solución de dos problemas diferentes. Por una parte, un problema conceptual: ¿qué tipo de teoría o enfoque puede dar mejor cuenta de las normas de derechos humanos? Por otra parte, un problema axiológico: ¿cómo deberíamos considerar a las normas de derechos humanos, de acuerdo con una determinada (correcta, mejor) doctrina o ideología?
En este artículo, intento explorar y ofrecer algunas respuestas a esta pregunta central y a sus problemas conectados.
Para conmemorar esa impresionante trayectoria de un filósofo excepcional y un maestro entrañable, se publican, en dos volúmenes, 47 trabajos originales de teóricos y filósofos del derecho de Argentina, Chile, Brasil, México, Colombia, Estados Unidos, España, Italia, Portugal, Alemania, Francia y Rusia. Todos estos artículos giran en torno a problemas y desafíos que Bulygin ha enfrentado a lo largo de casi seis décadas: la forma y naturaleza de los argumentos jurídicos, la posibilidad de una lógica de normas, la distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas, los límites del derecho, la ontología de las normas y la plausibilidad del positivismo jurídico.
Coordinated by Pedro Moniz Lopes and Jorge Silva Sampaio (University of Lisbon)