The novel introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into in vitro fertilization (IVF) technolo... more The novel introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into in vitro fertilization (IVF) technologies (AI(i)IVF) is, at the same time, medically promising and ethically disconcerting. The new possibilities and complexities generated by involving intelligent, powerful algorithms in human creation and reproduction, raise a host of ethical issues for IVF patients, practitioners-embryologists, in particular, and society at large. After introducing the various roles AI may play in IVF, and presenting research challenges and limitations, this paper seeks to identify and analyze various, as yet unexplored ethical implications of AI(i)IVF. We first originally contemplate a suitable framework for the ethical discussion, where biomedicine and patient rights are intertwined with AI and algorithmic decision-making. As these two domains are seemingly governed by distinct ethical frameworks-the long-standing bioethics and the currently evolving AI ethics-we suggest that a combination of these two (nuanced, yet considerably overlapping) sets of principles should be applied: human-centric AI ethics principles-applied to the technological architecture of the AI(i)IVF tool, and the patient-centric principles of bioethics-applied to personal and societal aspects of implementing AI(i)IVF. We then, respectively, apply relevant principles to analyze the ethical merits and caveats of implementing AI(i)IVF, particularly for embryo evaluation and selection, while consistently debating whether putting a higher threshold for AI(i)IVF ethicality, than the one set for traditional (non-AI) IVF, is indeed warranted or justified.
International Journal of Law, Policy and The Family
Owing to its pro-natalist approach, Israel is considered as an in-vitro fertilization (IVF) super... more Owing to its pro-natalist approach, Israel is considered as an in-vitro fertilization (IVF) superpower. With the high number of state-funded IVF treatments, IVF units find themselves stranded with around a million cryopreserved ‘surplus’ embryos; namely, embryos neglected or forgotten by patients, or abandoned due to personal or familial circumstances. The accumulation of such a vast number of surplus embryos creates operational and economic burdens for IVF units. Attempting to better comprehend this predicament, we conducted a survey. Its findings serve as a basis for the theoretical analysis provided in this article, which is based on the tension between reproductive autonomy on the one hand, and solidarity and personal responsibility, on the other. The survey examined present and former IVF patients’ attitudes towards relevant dispositions for surplus embryos in Israel. Our findings indicated that patients express an individualistic approach to autonomy, which was reflected, for ...
The novel introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into in vitro fertilization (IVF) technolo... more The novel introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into in vitro fertilization (IVF) technologies (AI(i)IVF) is, at the same time, medically promising and ethically disconcerting. The new possibilities and complexities generated by involving intelligent, powerful algorithms in human creation and reproduction, raise a host of ethical issues for IVF patients, practitioners-embryologists, in particular, and society at large. After introducing the various roles AI may play in IVF, and presenting research challenges and limitations, this paper seeks to identify and analyze various, as yet unexplored ethical implications of AI(i)IVF. We first originally contemplate a suitable framework for the ethical discussion, where biomedicine and patient rights are intertwined with AI and algorithmic decision-making. As these two domains are seemingly governed by distinct ethical frameworks-the long-standing bioethics and the currently evolving AI ethics-we suggest that a combination of these two (nuanced, yet considerably overlapping) sets of principles should be applied: human-centric AI ethics principles-applied to the technological architecture of the AI(i)IVF tool, and the patient-centric principles of bioethics-applied to personal and societal aspects of implementing AI(i)IVF. We then, respectively, apply relevant principles to analyze the ethical merits and caveats of implementing AI(i)IVF, particularly for embryo evaluation and selection, while consistently debating whether putting a higher threshold for AI(i)IVF ethicality, than the one set for traditional (non-AI) IVF, is indeed warranted or justified.
Genetic Information ABSTRACT. Sperm donors ’ obligations are typically constrained to the immedi-... more Genetic Information ABSTRACT. Sperm donors ’ obligations are typically constrained to the immedi-ate circumstances surrounding the donation and to its time frame. This paper makes the case for recognizing an ongoing ethical obligation that binds sperm donors to disclose, in a timely manner, meaningful genetic information to recipi-ents and donor-conceived children. The paper delineates and conceptualizes the suggested (potentially reciprocal) duty and argues that it is not the genetic link between the donor and the donor-conceived child that binds donors by said duty, but rather social responsibility. Accordingly, an original perception of the donor as an obligated alien is suggested and developed. The main thesis of the paper is supported inter alia by a comparison between transmitting infectious diseases and passing faulty genes on to donor-conceived children. The paper also provides an in-depth analysis of the conflicting interests of the parties generated by such an obligation a...
This paper considers children's rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is focused on... more This paper considers children's rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is focused on the futuristic prospect of postnatal GE, namely, genetic modifications, in vivo, of actual existing individuals. More specifically, the paper examines whether, in a future reality where pre-and postnatal human GE is safely and prevalently practiced, a child would have a right to be genetically enhanced by her parents or guardians, as well as the right not to be genetically enhanced. It is in fact the postnatal phase, inhabited by persons of indisputable moral status, subject of rights against others, which makes the child's putative right (not) to be genetically enhanced a relevant and legitimate subject of exploration. Since postnatal GE is a futuristic technology, an appropriate, concrete, rights-discourse has not yet been developed. In this paper, I therefore attempt to initiate such discourse, by identifying, through legal analysis, potential sources for the child's right to be genetically enhanced, and theorizing about its nature (derivative, or a newly created independent right; positive or negative right). I begin by considering several (mostly) contemporary candidate core rights, from which the child's right to be genetically enhanced could potentially derive; next, I consider the child's right not to be genetically enhanced, through ethical analysis; finally, I look into the merits of creating such a novel right of the child. I conclude, that the direct translation of the child's interests in being genetically enhanced, into any kind of recognized positive or negative right-whether derivative or a newly emerging independent right-is unlikely. As per the putative child's right not to be genetically enhanced postnatally, I determine that such a right could be recognized as a relative right, balanced against parental autonomy in rearing and shaping one's child.
Sperm donors' obligations are typically constrained to the immediate circumstances surrounding th... more Sperm donors' obligations are typically constrained to the immediate circumstances surrounding the donation and to its time frame. This paper makes the case for recognizing an ongoing ethical obligation that binds sperm donors to disclose, in a timely manner, meaningful genetic information to recipients and donor-conceived children. The paper delineates and conceptualizes the suggested (potentially reciprocal) duty and argues that it is not the genetic link between the donor and the donor-conceived child that binds donors by said duty, but rather social responsibility. Accordingly, an original perception of the donor as an obligated alien is suggested and developed. The main thesis of the paper is supported inter alia by a comparison between transmitting infectious diseases and passing faulty genes on to donor-conceived children. The paper also provides an in-depth analysis of the conflicting interests of the parties generated by such an obligation and proposes a model for embedding this ethical duty in a (legal) contractual framework.
This paper explores the role of the state, acting as parens patriae, with respect to the future-l... more This paper explores the role of the state, acting as parens patriae, with respect to the future-looking technology of postnatal human genetic enhancement (PoGE), applied to minors by their parents or the state. Considering postnatal rather than prenatal genetic enhancement (PGE) allows us to explore the putative obligations of the state with respect to actual persons, in contrast to future persons the subjects of speculative investigation in the traditionally studied case of PGE. Part I features PoGE, mostly by analogy to PGE and other (non-genetic) postnatal enhancements. Part II examines the nature and scope of the parens patriae doctrine, distinguishing between its protective and substitutive facets. I conclude, drawing on contemporary legal constructions, that: a) the state's interference in parental genetic enhancement (GE) discretion, under its protective role, should generally be minimal, reserved to extreme cases where grave harm to the child has been caused or is reasonably foreseeable; and b) since we cannot readily find parents obligated to genetically enhance their offspring, the state as parens patriae, under its substitutive role, will be respectively exempt from such duty towards state-dependent-children, save for certain GEs considered a sine qua non necessity, equally obligating parents and state to provide children with.
This paper considers children's rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is focused on... more This paper considers children's rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is focused on the futuristic prospect of postnatal GE, namely, genetic modifications, in vivo, of actual existing individuals. More specifically, the paper examines whether, in a future reality where pre-and postnatal human GE is safely and prevalently practiced, a child would have a right to be genetically enhanced by her parents or guardians, as well as the right not to be genetically enhanced. It is in fact the postnatal phase, inhabited by persons of indisputable moral status, subject of rights against others, which makes the child's putative right (not) to be genetically enhanced a relevant and legitimate subject of exploration. Since postnatal GE is a futuristic technology, an appropriate, concrete, rights-discourse has not yet been developed. In this paper, I therefore attempt to initiate such discourse, by identifying, through legal analysis, potential sources for the child's right to be genetically enhanced, and theorizing about its nature (derivative, or a newly created independent right; positive or negative right). I begin by considering several (mostly) contemporary candidate core rights, from which the child's right to be genetically enhanced could potentially derive; next, I consider the child's right not to be genetically enhanced, through ethical analysis; finally, I look into the merits of creating such a novel right of the child. I conclude, that the direct translation of the child's interests in being genetically enhanced, into any kind of recognized positive or negative right – whether derivative or a newly emerging independent right – is unlikely. As per the putative child's right not to be genetically enhanced postnatally, I determine that such a right could be recognized as a relative right, balanced against parental autonomy in rearing and shaping one's child.
ABSTR ACT This paper explores the role of the state, acting as parens patriae, with respect to th... more ABSTR ACT This paper explores the role of the state, acting as parens patriae, with respect to the future-looking technology of postnatal human genetic enhancement (PoGE), applied to minors by their parents or the state. Considering postna-tal rather than prenatal genetic enhancement (PGE) allows us to explore the putative obligations of the state with respect to actual persons, in contrast to future persons the subjects of speculative investigation in the traditionally studied case of PGE. Part I features PoGE, mostly by analogy to PGE and other (non-genetic) postnatal enhancements. Part II examines the nature and scope of the parens patriae doctrine, distinguishing between its protective and substitutive facets. I conclude, drawing on contemporary legal constructions , that: a) the state's interference in parental genetic enhancement (GE) discretion, under its protective role, should generally be minimal, reserved to extreme cases where grave harm to the child has been caused or is reasonably foreseeable; and b) since we cannot readily find parents obligated to genetically enhance their offspring, the state as parens patriae, under its substitutive role, will be respectively exempt from such duty towards state-dependent-children, save for certain GEs considered a sine qua non necessity , equally obligating parents and state to provide children with.
The post-genomics era and the public's growing 'genetic curiosity', together with the commercial ... more The post-genomics era and the public's growing 'genetic curiosity', together with the commercial offering of Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) genetic tests – merit particular attention and discretion with regard to the consumption of these tests. DTC genetic tests are becoming increasingly prevalent, emerging as a fashionable, widely-used health-assessment instrument. While viewed by some as an enabling tool for exercising one's autonomous quest for personal health information, others find them to be both ethically flawed and a disconcerting trend. The multiple ethical and legal concerns of the quest for genomic information through the use of DTC genetic tests will be highlighted in this paper, supporting the call for specific harmonised regulation of such tests.
Sperm donors’ obligations are typically constrained to the immediate circumstances surrounding th... more Sperm donors’ obligations are typically constrained to the immediate circumstances surrounding the donation and to its time frame. This paper makes the case for recognizing an ongoing ethical obligation that binds sperm donors to disclose, in a timely manner, meaningful genetic information to recipients and donor-conceived children. The paper delineates and conceptualizes the
suggested (potentially reciprocal) duty and argues that it is not the genetic link between the donor and the donor-conceived child that binds donors by said duty, but rather social responsibility. Accordingly, an original perception of the donor as an obligated alien is suggested and developed. The main thesis of the paper
is supported inter alia by a comparison between transmitting infectious diseases and passing faulty genes on to donor-conceived children. The paper also provides an in-depth analysis of the conflicting interests of the parties generated by such
an obligation and proposes a model for embedding this ethical duty in a (legal) contractual framework.
The novel introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into in vitro fertilization (IVF) technolo... more The novel introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into in vitro fertilization (IVF) technologies (AI(i)IVF) is, at the same time, medically promising and ethically disconcerting. The new possibilities and complexities generated by involving intelligent, powerful algorithms in human creation and reproduction, raise a host of ethical issues for IVF patients, practitioners-embryologists, in particular, and society at large. After introducing the various roles AI may play in IVF, and presenting research challenges and limitations, this paper seeks to identify and analyze various, as yet unexplored ethical implications of AI(i)IVF. We first originally contemplate a suitable framework for the ethical discussion, where biomedicine and patient rights are intertwined with AI and algorithmic decision-making. As these two domains are seemingly governed by distinct ethical frameworks-the long-standing bioethics and the currently evolving AI ethics-we suggest that a combination of these two (nuanced, yet considerably overlapping) sets of principles should be applied: human-centric AI ethics principles-applied to the technological architecture of the AI(i)IVF tool, and the patient-centric principles of bioethics-applied to personal and societal aspects of implementing AI(i)IVF. We then, respectively, apply relevant principles to analyze the ethical merits and caveats of implementing AI(i)IVF, particularly for embryo evaluation and selection, while consistently debating whether putting a higher threshold for AI(i)IVF ethicality, than the one set for traditional (non-AI) IVF, is indeed warranted or justified.
International Journal of Law, Policy and The Family
Owing to its pro-natalist approach, Israel is considered as an in-vitro fertilization (IVF) super... more Owing to its pro-natalist approach, Israel is considered as an in-vitro fertilization (IVF) superpower. With the high number of state-funded IVF treatments, IVF units find themselves stranded with around a million cryopreserved ‘surplus’ embryos; namely, embryos neglected or forgotten by patients, or abandoned due to personal or familial circumstances. The accumulation of such a vast number of surplus embryos creates operational and economic burdens for IVF units. Attempting to better comprehend this predicament, we conducted a survey. Its findings serve as a basis for the theoretical analysis provided in this article, which is based on the tension between reproductive autonomy on the one hand, and solidarity and personal responsibility, on the other. The survey examined present and former IVF patients’ attitudes towards relevant dispositions for surplus embryos in Israel. Our findings indicated that patients express an individualistic approach to autonomy, which was reflected, for ...
The novel introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into in vitro fertilization (IVF) technolo... more The novel introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into in vitro fertilization (IVF) technologies (AI(i)IVF) is, at the same time, medically promising and ethically disconcerting. The new possibilities and complexities generated by involving intelligent, powerful algorithms in human creation and reproduction, raise a host of ethical issues for IVF patients, practitioners-embryologists, in particular, and society at large. After introducing the various roles AI may play in IVF, and presenting research challenges and limitations, this paper seeks to identify and analyze various, as yet unexplored ethical implications of AI(i)IVF. We first originally contemplate a suitable framework for the ethical discussion, where biomedicine and patient rights are intertwined with AI and algorithmic decision-making. As these two domains are seemingly governed by distinct ethical frameworks-the long-standing bioethics and the currently evolving AI ethics-we suggest that a combination of these two (nuanced, yet considerably overlapping) sets of principles should be applied: human-centric AI ethics principles-applied to the technological architecture of the AI(i)IVF tool, and the patient-centric principles of bioethics-applied to personal and societal aspects of implementing AI(i)IVF. We then, respectively, apply relevant principles to analyze the ethical merits and caveats of implementing AI(i)IVF, particularly for embryo evaluation and selection, while consistently debating whether putting a higher threshold for AI(i)IVF ethicality, than the one set for traditional (non-AI) IVF, is indeed warranted or justified.
Genetic Information ABSTRACT. Sperm donors ’ obligations are typically constrained to the immedi-... more Genetic Information ABSTRACT. Sperm donors ’ obligations are typically constrained to the immedi-ate circumstances surrounding the donation and to its time frame. This paper makes the case for recognizing an ongoing ethical obligation that binds sperm donors to disclose, in a timely manner, meaningful genetic information to recipi-ents and donor-conceived children. The paper delineates and conceptualizes the suggested (potentially reciprocal) duty and argues that it is not the genetic link between the donor and the donor-conceived child that binds donors by said duty, but rather social responsibility. Accordingly, an original perception of the donor as an obligated alien is suggested and developed. The main thesis of the paper is supported inter alia by a comparison between transmitting infectious diseases and passing faulty genes on to donor-conceived children. The paper also provides an in-depth analysis of the conflicting interests of the parties generated by such an obligation a...
This paper considers children's rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is focused on... more This paper considers children's rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is focused on the futuristic prospect of postnatal GE, namely, genetic modifications, in vivo, of actual existing individuals. More specifically, the paper examines whether, in a future reality where pre-and postnatal human GE is safely and prevalently practiced, a child would have a right to be genetically enhanced by her parents or guardians, as well as the right not to be genetically enhanced. It is in fact the postnatal phase, inhabited by persons of indisputable moral status, subject of rights against others, which makes the child's putative right (not) to be genetically enhanced a relevant and legitimate subject of exploration. Since postnatal GE is a futuristic technology, an appropriate, concrete, rights-discourse has not yet been developed. In this paper, I therefore attempt to initiate such discourse, by identifying, through legal analysis, potential sources for the child's right to be genetically enhanced, and theorizing about its nature (derivative, or a newly created independent right; positive or negative right). I begin by considering several (mostly) contemporary candidate core rights, from which the child's right to be genetically enhanced could potentially derive; next, I consider the child's right not to be genetically enhanced, through ethical analysis; finally, I look into the merits of creating such a novel right of the child. I conclude, that the direct translation of the child's interests in being genetically enhanced, into any kind of recognized positive or negative right-whether derivative or a newly emerging independent right-is unlikely. As per the putative child's right not to be genetically enhanced postnatally, I determine that such a right could be recognized as a relative right, balanced against parental autonomy in rearing and shaping one's child.
Sperm donors' obligations are typically constrained to the immediate circumstances surrounding th... more Sperm donors' obligations are typically constrained to the immediate circumstances surrounding the donation and to its time frame. This paper makes the case for recognizing an ongoing ethical obligation that binds sperm donors to disclose, in a timely manner, meaningful genetic information to recipients and donor-conceived children. The paper delineates and conceptualizes the suggested (potentially reciprocal) duty and argues that it is not the genetic link between the donor and the donor-conceived child that binds donors by said duty, but rather social responsibility. Accordingly, an original perception of the donor as an obligated alien is suggested and developed. The main thesis of the paper is supported inter alia by a comparison between transmitting infectious diseases and passing faulty genes on to donor-conceived children. The paper also provides an in-depth analysis of the conflicting interests of the parties generated by such an obligation and proposes a model for embedding this ethical duty in a (legal) contractual framework.
This paper explores the role of the state, acting as parens patriae, with respect to the future-l... more This paper explores the role of the state, acting as parens patriae, with respect to the future-looking technology of postnatal human genetic enhancement (PoGE), applied to minors by their parents or the state. Considering postnatal rather than prenatal genetic enhancement (PGE) allows us to explore the putative obligations of the state with respect to actual persons, in contrast to future persons the subjects of speculative investigation in the traditionally studied case of PGE. Part I features PoGE, mostly by analogy to PGE and other (non-genetic) postnatal enhancements. Part II examines the nature and scope of the parens patriae doctrine, distinguishing between its protective and substitutive facets. I conclude, drawing on contemporary legal constructions, that: a) the state's interference in parental genetic enhancement (GE) discretion, under its protective role, should generally be minimal, reserved to extreme cases where grave harm to the child has been caused or is reasonably foreseeable; and b) since we cannot readily find parents obligated to genetically enhance their offspring, the state as parens patriae, under its substitutive role, will be respectively exempt from such duty towards state-dependent-children, save for certain GEs considered a sine qua non necessity, equally obligating parents and state to provide children with.
This paper considers children's rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is focused on... more This paper considers children's rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is focused on the futuristic prospect of postnatal GE, namely, genetic modifications, in vivo, of actual existing individuals. More specifically, the paper examines whether, in a future reality where pre-and postnatal human GE is safely and prevalently practiced, a child would have a right to be genetically enhanced by her parents or guardians, as well as the right not to be genetically enhanced. It is in fact the postnatal phase, inhabited by persons of indisputable moral status, subject of rights against others, which makes the child's putative right (not) to be genetically enhanced a relevant and legitimate subject of exploration. Since postnatal GE is a futuristic technology, an appropriate, concrete, rights-discourse has not yet been developed. In this paper, I therefore attempt to initiate such discourse, by identifying, through legal analysis, potential sources for the child's right to be genetically enhanced, and theorizing about its nature (derivative, or a newly created independent right; positive or negative right). I begin by considering several (mostly) contemporary candidate core rights, from which the child's right to be genetically enhanced could potentially derive; next, I consider the child's right not to be genetically enhanced, through ethical analysis; finally, I look into the merits of creating such a novel right of the child. I conclude, that the direct translation of the child's interests in being genetically enhanced, into any kind of recognized positive or negative right – whether derivative or a newly emerging independent right – is unlikely. As per the putative child's right not to be genetically enhanced postnatally, I determine that such a right could be recognized as a relative right, balanced against parental autonomy in rearing and shaping one's child.
ABSTR ACT This paper explores the role of the state, acting as parens patriae, with respect to th... more ABSTR ACT This paper explores the role of the state, acting as parens patriae, with respect to the future-looking technology of postnatal human genetic enhancement (PoGE), applied to minors by their parents or the state. Considering postna-tal rather than prenatal genetic enhancement (PGE) allows us to explore the putative obligations of the state with respect to actual persons, in contrast to future persons the subjects of speculative investigation in the traditionally studied case of PGE. Part I features PoGE, mostly by analogy to PGE and other (non-genetic) postnatal enhancements. Part II examines the nature and scope of the parens patriae doctrine, distinguishing between its protective and substitutive facets. I conclude, drawing on contemporary legal constructions , that: a) the state's interference in parental genetic enhancement (GE) discretion, under its protective role, should generally be minimal, reserved to extreme cases where grave harm to the child has been caused or is reasonably foreseeable; and b) since we cannot readily find parents obligated to genetically enhance their offspring, the state as parens patriae, under its substitutive role, will be respectively exempt from such duty towards state-dependent-children, save for certain GEs considered a sine qua non necessity , equally obligating parents and state to provide children with.
The post-genomics era and the public's growing 'genetic curiosity', together with the commercial ... more The post-genomics era and the public's growing 'genetic curiosity', together with the commercial offering of Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) genetic tests – merit particular attention and discretion with regard to the consumption of these tests. DTC genetic tests are becoming increasingly prevalent, emerging as a fashionable, widely-used health-assessment instrument. While viewed by some as an enabling tool for exercising one's autonomous quest for personal health information, others find them to be both ethically flawed and a disconcerting trend. The multiple ethical and legal concerns of the quest for genomic information through the use of DTC genetic tests will be highlighted in this paper, supporting the call for specific harmonised regulation of such tests.
Sperm donors’ obligations are typically constrained to the immediate circumstances surrounding th... more Sperm donors’ obligations are typically constrained to the immediate circumstances surrounding the donation and to its time frame. This paper makes the case for recognizing an ongoing ethical obligation that binds sperm donors to disclose, in a timely manner, meaningful genetic information to recipients and donor-conceived children. The paper delineates and conceptualizes the
suggested (potentially reciprocal) duty and argues that it is not the genetic link between the donor and the donor-conceived child that binds donors by said duty, but rather social responsibility. Accordingly, an original perception of the donor as an obligated alien is suggested and developed. The main thesis of the paper
is supported inter alia by a comparison between transmitting infectious diseases and passing faulty genes on to donor-conceived children. The paper also provides an in-depth analysis of the conflicting interests of the parties generated by such
an obligation and proposes a model for embedding this ethical duty in a (legal) contractual framework.
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Papers by Sivan Tamir
suggested (potentially reciprocal) duty and argues that it is not the genetic link between the donor and the donor-conceived child that binds donors by said duty, but rather social responsibility. Accordingly, an original perception of the donor as an obligated alien is suggested and developed. The main thesis of the paper
is supported inter alia by a comparison between transmitting infectious diseases and passing faulty genes on to donor-conceived children. The paper also provides an in-depth analysis of the conflicting interests of the parties generated by such
an obligation and proposes a model for embedding this ethical duty in a (legal) contractual framework.
suggested (potentially reciprocal) duty and argues that it is not the genetic link between the donor and the donor-conceived child that binds donors by said duty, but rather social responsibility. Accordingly, an original perception of the donor as an obligated alien is suggested and developed. The main thesis of the paper
is supported inter alia by a comparison between transmitting infectious diseases and passing faulty genes on to donor-conceived children. The paper also provides an in-depth analysis of the conflicting interests of the parties generated by such
an obligation and proposes a model for embedding this ethical duty in a (legal) contractual framework.