Papers by Apichai Shipper
Pacific Affairs, Jun 1, 2022
This paper argues that a pragmatist theory of international relations,
combined with parables of... more This paper argues that a pragmatist theory of international relations,
combined with parables of alliance formation from local proverbs and
literary classics, best explains the art of Thai diplomacy from a historical
perspective. Notably avoiding Western colonization, the Thais have enjoyed
relative sovereignty and independence throughout their history. Rather than
balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging, our study finds that Thailand has
deliberately leveraged asymmetrical partnerships between often-opposed
great powers and more symmetrical partnerships with less powerful states
and multilateral organizations in order to maintain its physical and identitybased
ontological security. We draw our empirical evidence from four
historical periods: the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, World War
II, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War modern era. Our findings can be
applied to other Southeast Asian states and their own parables of alliance.
The Sociological Review Magazine, 2020
Even in this age of globalization when people, ideas and goods readily move across national borde... more Even in this age of globalization when people, ideas and goods readily move across national borders on an unprecedented scale, political rhetoric in support of prevailing notions of the static boundaries of citizenship remain pervasive. In particular, the increasing frequency, intensity and scale of transnational migrations—combined with innovations in transportation and communications technologies—have generated new challenges to the concept of citizenship. In the twenty-first century, it is crucial to understand the transnational and increasingly fluid definitions of collective consciousness and individual identity that cannot be understood in the context of exiting conceptions of race and territorially bounded political community. Political communities across nations and historical epochs have included or excluded groups according to different and often shifting criteria. Treating citizenship and a sense of belonging as unfixed and subjected to changes over time, this special iss...
Critical Asian Studies, 2002
Japan organizes its labor markets for foreign workers hierarchically according to "race" or "nati... more Japan organizes its labor markets for foreign workers hierarchically according to "race" or "nationality." Zainichi foreigners and nikkeijin are at the high end of the racial hierarchy with better jobs, higher pay, and better working conditions than other foreign workers. At the bottom end are South Asians with casual jobs, poor pay, and dangerou s working environments. This racialized hierarchy, which produces differentiated wages and other privileges across different groups of foreign workers, is a political construction of Japanese government officials, who form policies that both establish the legal superiority of certain races over others and constrain the operation of each tier of foreign workers. Japanese employers perpetuate this labor market arrangement by cooperatin g with government bureaus and ya kuza in maintaining labor disciplines tailored to each racial group. These actions create and sustain a racialized economy in Japan that is characterized by inferior jobs, little security, and few benefits for certain sectors of the labor market.
Critical Asian Studies, 2016
Several scholars have written and will continue to write about the enormous impact of Benedict An... more Several scholars have written and will continue to write about the enormous impact of Benedict Anderson’s co-authored “Cornell Paper” (properly titled “A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia”) and often-cited Imagined Communities, originally published in 1983, on which I have little to add. Instead, I prefer to highlight his intellectual contributions to Asian Studies that emphasize language-based, in-depth fieldwork. By combining his gift for languages with wide and comparative reading, Anderson could advance a more global/regional perspective in his research. At a time in which regression analysis and generalizable models shunt careful fieldwork to the margins in some social science disciplines, Ben taught me the value and joy of mastering this methodological skill through mixing travel with creative activity rather than just orthodox classroom discussions. He instilled in me and his other students a love for languages, literature, and film in deepening our understanding of the political culture we study. Many know of his unsurpassed language skills that greatly enhanced his critical analyses of the world. Just as important was how he mastered those languages – not only in classrooms and language labs, but also in the street, talking with everyday people and eating local foods. In his private email communications with me, he regularly mixed English with the vernacular street language of Thai youth. For example, he usually typed “555555” after a joke because “five” in Thai is pronounced “hah.” Ben, who had an affinity for country people, always referred to Bangkok as Maha Narok (Great Hell) – a playful take on its common name in Thai, “Krungthep Maha Nakorn” (Great City of Angels). Even at the age of seventy-nine, he joyfully picked up a new and anti-establishment word, “ngeee,” from the streets of Bangkok. Ngeee has no literal meaning, but when spoken produces an unappealing sound that annoys the politically conservative Bangkok establishment. At his last public lecture on “Anarchism and Nationalism” in Jakarta a few days before he died, Ben wore a black t-shirt with “NGEEE!!!” printed on the front. This was so indicative of Ben, speaking intellectually about anarchy, while showing off his newlydesigned, anti-establishment t-shirt. One importance of languages in comparative work is an absence of a word or concept. After I returned from a year of studying and working in Japan that had been arranged for me by Ben, he inquired about the state of my Japanese. I replied, “My spoken Japanese has improved but my reading and writing are still poor.” He then asked, “How do you say: ‘I am an idiot’ in Japanese?” I confidently replied: “Watashi wa baka desu.”He exclaimed, “No! No! No! NOT I am crazy but I am an idiot” [his emphasis]. I began to think harder and awkwardly replied “Watashi wa idietto
Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, 2020
Fighting for Foreigners, 2016
Activism in Contemporary Japan: New Ideas, Players and Arenas? by David Chiavacci and Julia Obinger, Eds., 2018
The type of activism that small immigrant rights’ (pro-foreigner) groups engage is what I have ca... more The type of activism that small immigrant rights’ (pro-foreigner) groups engage is what I have called “associative activism.” Associative activism arises when like-minded activists address specific problems and eventually seek to transform inflexible and relatively unresponsive political institutions through coordinated activities. These are aimed at resolving some particular problem that, while not directly in conflict with prevailing government policies, is nonetheless in tension with the broader political status quo. In contrast, the type of activism that xenophobic (anti-foreigner) groups practice can be understood as “reactionary activism,” which consists of demonstrations and protests that showcase hate speech against foreigners. I define reactionary activism as history-conscious activists publicly demonstrate their lo...
of contemporary society, it would behoove Micronesians and their leaders to "appreciate a bit mor... more of contemporary society, it would behoove Micronesians and their leaders to "appreciate a bit more deeply an important aspect of their traditional culture, one that permeated everything else" (221).
Critical Asian Studies, 2020
Transnational Civil Society in Asia, 2021
Fighting for Foreigners, 2016
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 2021
East Asian countries have varying levels of ethnic homogeneity. North and South Korea have long b... more East Asian countries have varying levels of ethnic homogeneity. North and South Korea have long been considered among the most ethnically homogeneous nation-states in the world. Yet, since the mid-1990s, the amount of immigration to the country as well as transnational marriages have transformed South Korea into a multiethnic state. The Japanese also view themselves as a racially distinct and homogeneous people, despite the historical presence of foreigners and ethnic minorities. China is composed of a patchwork of ethnicities with around 55 state-recognized minority groups. However, according to the 2010 census, minorities accounted for only 8.49% of the overall population or 114 million people. Despite different levels of ethnic homogeneity, China, Korea, and Japan are witnessing a rise in international (and internal) migration, which started in the late 20th century and has continued into the early 21st century. The increase of foreign migrant workers and spouses has challenged the dominant perceptions of ethnic homogeneity in Korea and Japan, while further strengthening the bonds of ethnic heterogeneity in China. These changes have not only forced a reshaping of the notions of identity and citizenship, but have also helped fuel the rise of various “reactive” forms of neo-nationalism, such as “state nationalism,” “ethnic nationalism,” and “cultural nationalism,” that attempt to fortify or recuperate ethnic or race-based definitions of national identity.
The variation in immigration politics in Japan, the United States, and Sweden is best explained t... more The variation in immigration politics in Japan, the United States, and Sweden is best explained through the interpretation, prevalent among leaders and elites during the nation-building process, of the concept of the person, which concerns with creating (and serving) citizens. In other words, differences in immigration policies are explained through the role of ideas, in particular moral-philosophical conceptions of citizenship and personhood, and how these ideas get reinforced or reinterpreted in that country’s modern history. Specifically, different kinds of policy assumptions are importantly based on distinct political mythologies and their often-implicit philosophical traditions on the concept of citizenship and personhood. These different conceptualizations of the person are reflected in each country’s view of foreigners and immigration policy. In Japan, foreigners are viewed as temporary workers, in the United States as potential citizens, and in Sweden as free and equal persons. Therefore, the immigration control approach in Japan creates hierarchical categories of foreigners based on bloodline and profession/occupation. Japanese policymakers do not view a foreigner as a complete person unless s/he marries a Japanese national, which may than result in the birth of a Japanese offspring (i.e. someone with Japanese blood). Whereas the United States immigration policy forces foreigners to assimilate by encouraging civic friendship, the Swedish policy respects ethnic differences relatively more in its efforts to create an egalitarian, multicultural society. Here, the concept of the person in the United States and Sweden allows for a foreigner to become a citizen or complete person in an easier and more transparent manner than in Japan.
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Papers by Apichai Shipper
combined with parables of alliance formation from local proverbs and
literary classics, best explains the art of Thai diplomacy from a historical
perspective. Notably avoiding Western colonization, the Thais have enjoyed
relative sovereignty and independence throughout their history. Rather than
balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging, our study finds that Thailand has
deliberately leveraged asymmetrical partnerships between often-opposed
great powers and more symmetrical partnerships with less powerful states
and multilateral organizations in order to maintain its physical and identitybased
ontological security. We draw our empirical evidence from four
historical periods: the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, World War
II, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War modern era. Our findings can be
applied to other Southeast Asian states and their own parables of alliance.
combined with parables of alliance formation from local proverbs and
literary classics, best explains the art of Thai diplomacy from a historical
perspective. Notably avoiding Western colonization, the Thais have enjoyed
relative sovereignty and independence throughout their history. Rather than
balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging, our study finds that Thailand has
deliberately leveraged asymmetrical partnerships between often-opposed
great powers and more symmetrical partnerships with less powerful states
and multilateral organizations in order to maintain its physical and identitybased
ontological security. We draw our empirical evidence from four
historical periods: the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, World War
II, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War modern era. Our findings can be
applied to other Southeast Asian states and their own parables of alliance.