Like many other people, I was delighted to read that the High Court had found in favour of the appeal against the proscription of Palestine Action as terrorist. You can find the full judgment here (pdf), but do set aside some time if you’re planning on reading it; it’s a High Court judgment, not a press release. This from Doughty Street Chambers is a thorough and reasonably clear summary. For commentary, I recommend DAT Green (good on the intersection between law and politics in the case) and Mark Elliott (more ‘legal-minded’ and a bit more sceptical).
Having read (as they say) the whole thing, I think the judgment is fairly solid, and I’m cautiously optimistic about its chances of being upheld – and ultimately put into action, not least with a repeal of the proscription).
Here are some thoughts. This post originated as a thread on Bluesky, but it’s heavily reorganised and revised here.
Update (18/2/26): I have added a brief reply to arguments raised by Gabriel Tan and Dane Luo.
Direct action, not terrorism
The High Court’s key finding was that Palestine Action is not a terrorist group but a direct action group – although the judgment also suggests that Palestine Action claimed to be engaged in civil disobedience, a claim which it disputes. Either way, it’s pretty clear that direct action is what Palestine Action engaged in, and (pace the High Court) they don’t appear to have claimed otherwise. Quite the reverse:

If you’re looking for a definition of direct action, that phrase “seeks to make it impossible” is a good pointer. If you carry out direct action you aren’t protesting in the hope that X will stop doing Y, you’re acting directly in such a way that X can’t do Y. Direct action tactics tend not to be legal; they generally involve breaking the law and subsequently going to prison. At least, they involve going to prison unless
– the perpetrators don’t get caught
– a jury declines to convict
– the government declines to prosecute
– the government changes the law
All four of these have been known to happen, and that tells us something about direct action as a type of offending. I mean, a jury isn’t likely to refuse to convict someone standing trial for street theft. If there’s a rash of phone thefts, say, the police may give up trying to do much about them, but you wouldn’t expect the Ministry of Justice to state that phone thieves would never be prosecuted, still less to change the law to legalise phone theft.
So: direct action isn’t like ordinary crime. It’s always political, almost always highly contentious, and generally aimed at preventing something which – the participants believe – should itself be a crime; a greater crime, by definition, than doing a bit of property damage trying to prevent it. And governments sometimes end up agreeing (usually without much fanfare).
When it comes to legitimising direct action, though, judges don’t tend to take the lead. This judgment’s no exception. Instead of going anywhere near the question of whether Palestine Action’s direct action might be legitimate, the High Court tackles the much easier question of whether it constituted peaceful civil disobedience.

There’s an awful lot of paraphrasing and reading between the lines here. “The submission” (which isn’t quoted) “rests on an assumption” that Palestine Action’s direct action was “synonymous with civil disobedience”? Really? This assumption seems to have been inferred by the Court; likening Palestine Action’s actions to the Civil Rights movement isn’t quite the same thing.
Still, the Court is to be commended, for resisting the government’s assertion that Palestine Action isn’t a peaceful protest group but a terrorist group, and especially for refusing to take those as the only possibilities. This is all the more striking given that the Court effectively directed itself not to consider “direct action”, the obvious third option. Ironically, a more open-minded and protest-friendly judgment – one that noted our tendency to endorse direct action tactics retrospectively, from the Suffragettes to Stop The Seventy Tour – would have been more welcome to the government, as it would have given an Appeal Court judge an obvious opening. The judgment’s avoidance of any kind of endorsement of Palestine Action, or of direct action generally, makes this key negative finding – that Palestine Action is not a terrorist group – all the stronger.
The Appeal: Grounds 8 and 5 (unsuccessful)
Palestine Action appealed against the proscription on eight grounds, of which four were permitted to proceed; these were handily, if not particularly memorably, numbered as Grounds 8, 5, 6 and 2. Ground 8 was that the Home Secretary should have notified them, giving them a chance to appeal, before making the proscription order. The Court points out that this would tie the Home Secretary’s hands in making any future proscription order – which might actually be against a terrorist group, and then where would we be?

A bit of a catch-22, really: “we can’t give you the chance to appeal against being branded a dangerous terrorist – what if you were a dangerous terrorist?”. In a judgment that’s centrally concerned with the difference between being labelled as a terrorist group and being one, it’s a shame the Court didn’t manage to peel the two apart in this respect.
Ground 5 – “failure to consider relevant matters” – also fell; the Court thought that it covered ground that was also covered in Grounds 6 and 2. To which, as they say, we now turn.
Ground 6: Discretion, but Constrained Discretion
Ground 6 concerns whether the Home Secretary followed her own policy in proscribing Palestine Action. There’s some discussion of different meanings of ‘proportionality’ (which I confess I didn’t entirely follow; I was glad of the Court’s rather disarming conclusion that it couldn’t affect the judgment either way), before we get this crucial passage:

There are two separate issues here: the Home Secretary’s discretion, as guided by existing policy; and the range of activities considered under that policy.
Firstly, the Home Secretary’s exercise of discretion. (I’ll warn you now, this part is a long one.) The Home Secretary has a power to proscribe, not a duty. That must mean that not every organisation which can plausibly be said to be involved in terrorism ends up being proscribed; there are other factors to consider.
There are four key points here. Firstly, the Home Secretary doesn’t automatically proscribe everything that looks like a terrorist organisation; there will always be edge cases, organisations that might qualify as terrorist from a certain angle but aren’t really candidates for proscribing. But, secondly, while she chooses to proscribe or not at her own discretion, it isn’t unfettered discretion: she can proscribe an organisation because (a) it’s involved in terrorism and (b) it poses an active threat, but not because (a) it’s involved in terrorism and (b) never you mind. Here are some of the factors which will be considered:

This is Home Office policy, going back to when the Terrorism Act was first passed. It’s not rocket salad; the Home Secretary should ask, among other things, “how big is it?”, “how bad is it?” and (if the first two questions don’t get anywhere) “are other countries banning it?”.
Thirdly, the nature of the policy is to limit the Home Secretary’s discretion: “to constrain use of the discretion so that not all organisations that meet the concerned in terrorism requirement will be proscribed” (italics added for clarity) – and all the relevant considerations have the same function. Implicitly the Home Secretary is asking herself and her advisors a series of negative questions – e.g. “are we sure that the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities aren’t too insignificant to justify proscription?”. And, while the policy allows the Home Secretary to consider other factors, the nature of the policy means that the other factors should also be of the same type.
Lastly, the tests applied by the policy are, implicitly, tests that can be failed: both logically and as a matter of real-world experience, it is always possible to look at what’s apparently a terrorist group and conclude that it’s not worth the bother for the UK government to proscribe it. What that means, though, is that the question isn’t really “how big is this organisation?” but “is this organisation particularly big (as compared with other organisations that aren’t proscribed)?”. And likewise, crucially, with those additional factors: the Home Secretary isn’t free to say “here’s an additional factor weighing in favour of proscription”, but needs to be saying “here’s an additional factor weighing in favour of proscription in this specific case“.
In short: proscription is at the Home Secretary’s discretion; that discretion needs to be exercised according to stated considerations; the nature of those considerations is to limit the choice to proscribe, specifying when it should and, in particular, when it shouldn’t be made; and the judgment required by those considerations is always relative, as it justifies the inclusion of one group in comparison to others which may have been excluded.
There’s no debate over whether Yvette Cooper, the then Home Secretary, took into account factors [1] to [5] above. The point at issue concerns the additional factors which she and her advisors also took into account.

(3) is a bog-standard “how bad is it?” criterion, while (4) to (6) are “side-effects of proscribing” questions. (The section 11-13 offences referred to here are the ‘membership’, ‘expression of support’ and ‘wearing or carrying an item suggesting support’ offences. The question of whether proscribing would (5) deter people from committing those offences or (4) place an enforcement burden on the police has now been answered fairly conclusively.)
(1) is the problematic element (and to a lesser extent (2), although that doesn’t say much on its own). The problem is that “proscribing organisation X will make it significantly easier to disrupt” is always true: proscribing Palestine Action would make it easier to disrupt its activities, but so would proscribing Reform UK or the Women’s Institute. So this is the wrong kind of ‘consideration’; it’s a consideration that shouldn’t be allowed to weigh in favour of a discretionary decision to proscribe in a specific case, because it will be valid in every case. To put it another way, it’s legitimate for a government to say “here’s how bad this terrorist organisation is, and therefore we’re proscribing it, which will give us powers to disrupt it” – but not to say “this organisation’s so bad we need the powers to disrupt it, therefore we’re proscribing it as terrorist”.
So a benefit of proscribing Palestine Action is cited, wrongly, as a reason for proscribing Palestine Action – in fact, the main reason. We see this again in the Proscription Review Group’s advice to the Home Secretary:

and again, perhaps inevitably, in Yvette Cooper’s statement justifying proscription:

When I quoted paragraphs 82-4 (some time ago now) I said that this section of the judgment raised two separate issues, and Cooper’s statement highlights the second one: the range of issues considered. To save on scrolling, here are those paragraphs again:

“The power in the 2000 Act is to proscribe organisations because they act in ways that mean they are concerned in terrorism, not because of other activities that fall short of terrorism. The nature and scale of an organisation’s activities ought therefore to concern only those activities that amount to terrorism.”
This is surely correct; thinking otherwise would open the door to rampantly opportunistic uses of counter-terrorism legislation, allowing the government to target an organisation it wanted to suppress by fitting one or a few of its actions to the (notoriously capacious) 2000 definition of terrorism and then arguing that the organisation should be proscribed because of all its other undesirable activities. “Regardless of whether this instance itself amounts to terrorism, such activity is clearly intimidatory and unacceptable”… is the kind of thing that a Home Secretary abusing counter-terrorism powers in this way might say.
Ground 2: interference with human rights
So that’s Ground 6, whether the Home Secretary followed her own policy in proscribing Palestine Action (and no, in a court of law it’s not open to the Home Secretary to say “but cynically using whatever powers I could lay my hands on was my policy!”). The other ground on which the High Court found against the government was Ground 2, relating to interference with human rights guaranteed under the European Convention. This can (with any luck) be dealt with a bit more briefly. The rights in question are those guaranteed by Article 10 – freedom of expression, including the right to receive and impart information – and Article 11 – freedom of association and assembly. Quite clearly, making it a criminal offence to (oh say for instance) sit on the ground holding a home-made sign reading “I oppose genocide. I support Palestine Action.” impinges on rights under articles 10 and 11. (It should be noted, for completeness’ sake, that there is a specific immunity from prosecution on the ‘membership’ and ‘support’ offences for anything done in relation to applications for deproscription made to the Home Secretary (as well as appeals against refusals to deproscribe to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC) and appeals to the Appeal Court against decisions of the POAC). I don’t know if there’s an active application to the Home Secretary to deproscribe Palestine Action (or an active appeal to the POAC, or to the Appeal Court against the POAC); if there is, it might be possible to hold a sign expressing support for it without falling foul of the law. Alternatively, of course, it might be considered that supporting a legal appeal doesn’t amount to doing anything in relation to it; in that case your sign, however carefully worded, would only “arouse reasonable suspicion that [you were] a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation” and get you in lumber under section 13.)
The rights under articles 10 and 11, it should be noted, are qualified rights, which governments may restrict for purposes such as public safety and the prevention of crime. More directly relevant here is Article 17, which provides that human rights may not be exploited so as to abuse human rights: death threats aren’t covered under freedom of expression.

Does article 17 get the government out of trouble? The (current) Home Secretary thought so.

You’ve got to admit it’s neat: protesting in support of Palestine Action and against their proscription isn’t protected by articles 10 and 11 because it “amounts to the expression of support for or association with terrorist activity”, because Palestine Action is proscribed. But here again the government was writing itself a blank cheque: if protests in support of a terrorist group are not covered by articles 10 and 11, and if proscription makes a group a terrorist group, then criminalising protests against a group’s proscription will never cause any interference with articles 10 and 11. Which is nice, for the government. It’s also an argument that would apply just as well, and in just the same way, if the government had proscribed Reform UK or the WI. And once again, the High Court was not impressed.

You need to look behind the label, in other words, and ask whether supporting terrorism is actually what the people being criminalised because of the proscription are doing. You also need to consider – a crucial point which the Court correctly highlighted – what the proscription is deterring people from doing; potentially much larger numbers of people.

The judgment goes on to cite journalists and academics as people who might be especially ‘risk-averse’ in this area, although the discussion of that point ends up largely walking it back and stressing the need to think about interference with rights in concrete terms. I think this is fair enough; it’d be nice if the judgment were a bit more strident in defence of free expression, but then it’d be nice if it admitted that direct action can sometimes be a legitimate tactic. It’s a High Court judgment, you take what you can get. Besides, as far as academia’s concerned it’s probably correct to say that the impact of the proscription wasn’t all that great: speaking as an academic who used to teach on terrorism and counter-terrorism, I think academics have been used to watching their step for some time now. I’d be more concerned about the proscription’s potential effect on students. (Many of my Asian students, in particular, were noticeably self-censoring five years ago – and quite a lot has happened in the last five years.)
Concluding and looking ahead
So: the High Court acknowledges the interference with articles 10 and 11, dismissing the government’s attempt to cover itself with article 17. The proscription did have the effect of interfering with rights to free speech and free assembly; that interference wasn’t justified by the terrorism or support for terrorism that it prevented. That justification could only apply if Palestine Action were a terrorist group – and “Palestine Action, terrorist group” was effectively a legal fiction, which only existed by virtue of the proscription itself. To say that the chilling effect of the proscription on free speech and assembly was justified under article 17 would be to say that it was justified by the proscription itself.
This, to recapitulate, was one of the two grounds on which the High Court found against the government. The other (Ground 6) was the “Home Secretary’s policy” ground: the Court found that, in guiding her discretion whether to proscribe Palestine Action, the Home Secretary had justified the proscription by reference not to the reasons for proscription but to the benefits of proscription, taking into account factors that would always apply, and consequently couldn’t justify a specific decision. To make matters worse, the benefits of proscription – the powers to disrupt Palestine Action that it would give the government – were presented with reference to Palestine Action’s activities in general, with specific reference to incidents which (as the government freely acknowledged) did not amount to terrorism. Reduced to its essentials, the government’s case was “we’re having trouble with this group committing crimes, we need to escalate to treating it as a terrorist threat” – and the government’s powers under counter-terrorism legislation don’t permit that.
Not that the law or the government is helpless against Palestine Action, even were they to be de-proscribed:

The Elbit trial did recently end in acquittals and failures to convict, admittedly – but it’s hard to imagine that counter-terror charges would have found a more co-operative jury. On the contrary, it looks as if the government’s recourse to proscription, and the subsequent legal victimisation of Palestine Action activists and supporters, may have massively backfired.
Will the decision to strike down the proscription of Palestine Action stand? The government has said it will appeal, but the current Home Secretary’s statement to that effect (on X, of course) doesn’t suggest they’ve got many shots in the locker:
The Court has acknowledged that Palestine Action has carried out acts of terrorism, celebrated those who have taken part in those acts and promoted the use of violence. It has also concluded that Palestine Action is not an ordinary protest or civil disobedience group, and that its actions are not consistent with democratic values and the rule of law. For those reasons, I am disappointed by the Court’s decision and disagree with the notion that banning this terrorist organisation is disproportionate. The proscription of Palestine Action followed a rigorous and evidence-based decision-making process, endorsed by Parliament. The proscription does not prevent peaceful protest in support of the Palestinian cause, another point on which the Court agrees.
I don’t know why Mahmood (or her advisors) imagined that listing her points of agreement with the judgment made her statement stronger. (She surely isn’t thinking of appealing on the basis of an error of law, arguing that the High Court misdirected itself. That would be courageous in the Yes, Minister sense of the word.) If anything it makes it weaker: yes, the High Court acknowledges that Palestine Action “has carried out acts of terrorism” and “is not an ordinary protest or civil disobedience group”; yes, the High Court notes that the proscription “does not prevent peaceful protest in support of the Palestinian cause”. This is all common ground! Mahmood’s actual challenge to the High Court seems to amount to
[1] disagree with the notion that banning [Palestine Action] is disproportionate. The proscription of Palestine Action followed a rigorous and evidence-based decision-making process, endorsed by Parliament.
To which the High Court – and, you’d think, any Appeal Court judge – would reply, “Firstly, the judgment sets out why and how it’s disproportionate; secondly, it was an evidence-based process, but based on the wrong evidence (as the judgement explains)”.
But we shall see. The government may even have factored in a defeat in the Appeal Court, allowing them to chase it up to the Supreme Court – who are both more likely to look under the bonnet of things like the Home Secretary having a policy constraining her own discretion, and (as currently composed) more deferential towards government justifications and invocations of raison d’état.
So it’s not over yet. But round 1 has gone against the government, I suspect rather to their surprise. I’ve known some bad Friday 13ths, but Friday 13th February was a good day: for Palestine Action, for the right to protest and for the rule of law.
Postscript: Tan and Luo on discretion
An interesting argument against the High Court’s conclusion on Ground 6 has been put forward by Gabriel Tan, and developed further in a blog post co-authored with Dane Luo. Tan and Luo highlight the fact that the High Court’s judgment was based not only on policy (rather than statute, or any other legal instrument), but on what the Court took to be the required interpretation of that policy – despite the requirement to interpret it in that way having to be inferred, as no such guidance appeared in the text. Put this way, this seems rather a weak basis for overturning a lawful order.
Similar points have been made by Mark Elliott (indeed, this is why I referred to his commentary as ‘sceptical’) and by Alan Greene, who usefully sets the controversy over this policy in the context of a broader trend towards the use, and exploitation, of ‘soft law’. But Tan and Luo go further. Tan objects to the High Court’s assumption that the purpose of the Home Secretary’s policy was to limit her discretion, and as such that the ‘considerations’ set out in the Home Secretary’s policy document (and by extension any additional considerations brought into play) must be negative conditions, restricting rather than enabling:
The better view is that the policy’s purpose (if necessary to assign it one) is simply to guide (a neutral term) the discretionary power to proscribe, rather than inherently being there to limit them. The fact that the consequences of proscription is [sic] not a factor limiting the power to proscribe therefore does not prevent it from being rationally considered in the proportionality balance.
Secondly, Tan objects to the argument that the operational benefits of proscription, applying in all cases, cannot be an argument in its favour in a specific case:
The fact that operational consequences and advantages of proscription, including the applicability of the s.11-13 offences, applies in every case of proscription does not make it any less of a relevant factor in favour of proscription. Indeed, it may be said that failure to consider this as a relevant factor within the proportionality balance would constitute failure to take into account a relevant consideration.
On the other hand (and thirdly), if benefits peculiar to a specific proscription are required, Tan and Luo argue that the High Court was incorrect to conclude that the Home Secretary did not cite any: on the contrary, Yvette Cooper’s statement to the House of Commons (quoted briefly earlier in this post) gave details of Palestine Action’s escalating campaign of politically-motivated criminal violence; she concluded by stressing the need for the government to have sufficient powers to disrupt these activities.
These are an interesting couple of posts, which seem to me to highlight a genuine area of weakness, even confusion, in the High Court’s reasoning. Unfortunately, Tan’s contribution highlights this confusion while also compounding it. I’m referring to the High Court’s assertion (or inference) that the purpose of the Home Secretary’s policy was to limit her discretion, countered by Tan with the assertion that the policy’s purpose is to guide discretion (if indeed it need be considered to have any purpose at all).
It seems to me that this is a troubled area of the High Court’s judgment, but that Tan’s response does little but add more confusion. If I may be allowed to resort briefly to common sense, the Home Secretary’s policy document is not a poem or an art installation; as a policy document it has to be considered to have some purpose. That purpose, moreover, is a purpose that bears in some way on the Home Secretary’s exercise of the discretionary power to proscribe – more specifically, on her discretionary choice whether or not to exercise that power. Once we grant that point, and take account of the fact that the considerations involved in the policy are specified in a non-exhaustive list, some of the distinctions made by the High Court and relied on by Tan seem less salient. Most obviously, the distinction between decision constrained by certain factors and one guided by those factors surely loses its sense if the decision-maker not only had a free choice among the factors specified, but was free to specify alternative and additional factors.
From his conclusion that the Home Secretary’s policy acted to guide rather than restrict discretion, Tan inferred that – pace the High Court – the considerations involved in the Home Secretary’s policy could include enabling as well as restrictive conditions. But this also seems to me to be a distinction that makes no difference. If the question governed by the policy were how to police a proscribed organisation, the difference between permissive and restrictive conditions would be highly salient. Suppose a policy specifying (restrictively) that a particular policing agency must not commit civil or criminal offences in the course of its duties; a court might well rule that the executive could not consistently add the (permissive) condition that the agency might do whatever was necessary to assure public safety. But if the question, as here, is whether to proscribe an organisation, the distinction between permissive and restrictive conditions falls away: to say that the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation on the grounds of the threat it poses or the policing advantages accruing from proscription is identical to saying that she must not proscribe any organisation that does not pose a substantial threat, or where the policing advantages accruing from proscription are not anticipated to be great enough. In insisting on the interpretation of relevant considerations as restrictive, and disqualifying the “benefits of proscription” consideration on that basis, it seems to me – from the eminence of my one-year Graduate Diploma in Law (with Distinction mind you) – that the High Court stumbled; Tan is right to argue that factors phrased in ‘permissive’ terms are not barred from consideration in the policy. However, this stipulation has little effect, as any factor bearing on a decision to proscribe can be phrased in ‘permissive’ (you may act when…) or in ‘restrictive’ (you must not act unless…) terms. In particular, and pace both Tan and (for different reasons) the Supreme Court, the benefit of the consequences of proscription is “a factor limiting the power to proscribe”: the less benefit can be identified, the less likely it is that proscription will be justifiable.
However, this is not to say (with Tan) that the benefit of the consequences of proscription can be cited as a relevant consideration. Of course, any government making a proscription order anticipates benefits from so doing, generally (although not necessarily) operational benefits; which is to say, enhanced capacity to pre-empt, criminalise, counter and mitigate the actions of the group proscribed. Tan makes hay with the seemingly absurd idea that the Home Secretary should supposedly be debarred from citing this fundamental benefit as a reason for the proscription which makes it possible. But this is to misrepresent the High Court’s position. The key point here is that any factor cited as a consideration in favour of proscribing a specific group should apply to that group specifically, and not to any group imaginable. Any consideration that counts towards the proscription of any and all groups cannot be cited as a consideration in favour of proscribing any particular group; this includes the operational benefits that can be reaped from doing so. That such benefits will be delivered in practice – in other words, that the powers associated with proscription will be used, and not left to lie on the statute book – is a relevant condition, but a threshold condition: no group should be nominated for proscription unless this condition is met.
So: operational benefits can be cited as a reason for proscribing a group – as a consideration, this is not debarred by its ‘affirmative’ or ‘permissive’ character – but the Home Secretary must be able to cite specific benefits associated with the proscription of the group in question, and not merely the benefits which necessarily accrue from proscription. Which brings us to the operational benefits of proscribing Palestine Action specifically. And, as Tan and Luo point out, the Home Secretary did in fact set these out at some length. However, in the view of the High Court what the Home Secretary described was not the actions of a terrorist group.
Under the Terrorism Act 2000, a terrorist act is one that has a political motive, involves ‘serious violence against a person’ or ‘serious damage to property’, and is ‘designed to influence the government … or to intimidate the public or a section of the public’. (Many other acts – and threats – may also qualify as terrorist, but this is the relevant core definition.) Now, I have only heard of one act of ‘serious violence against a person’ ascribed to Palestine Action; it would be decidedly odd to label a group as ‘terrorist’ exclusively, or almost exclusively, on the basis of property damage. (Or maybe not; we all denounce the planned campaign of terrorism for which Nelson Mandela was convicted, after all, not to mention the arson and explosive attacks carried out by those notorious terrorists the Suffragettes. Don’t we?)
But even if we assume that the ‘act’ component of the 2000 definition can be met by property damage alone, problems remain. Although the Home Secretary was clearly invoking the definition when she told the House of Commons that “Palestine Action has committed acts of serious damage to property with the aim of progressing its political cause and influencing the Government”, the High Court concluded that those acts were a small minority: the great majority of Palestine Action’s acts do not rise to the level of terrorism. (A pedant might also note that, even in those actions which could be plausibly argued to involve ‘serious damage to property’, there is generally no intention to ‘influence the government … or to intimidate the public or a section of the public’. Direct action is about intervening to prevent wrongdoing, not influencing wrongdoers.) And if a group’s actions don’t rise to the level of terrorism, the benefits to the government of dealing with them through counter-terrorist legislation are neither here nor there. In the words of the High Court:
“The power in the 2000 Act is to proscribe organisations because they act in ways that mean they are concerned in terrorism, not because of other activities that fall short of terrorism. The nature and scale of an organisation’s activities ought therefore to concern only those activities that amount to terrorism.”
The same applies to any consideration of the benefits of proscribing the organisation.
Tan and Luo make some good points, particularly on the weight the High Court puts on its distinction between restrictive and permissive considerations. But when the smoke blown up by their posts has cleared, the High Court judgment is still standing.