Thesis by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Talks by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Es un error común confundir la llamada “Ley de Hume” con la falacia naturalista. Aunque ambas son... more Es un error común confundir la llamada “Ley de Hume” con la falacia naturalista. Aunque ambas son cuestiones lógicas relacionas con la ética, son diferentes. La primera se refiere a un supuesto error lógico al deducir proposiciones prescriptivas a partir de proposiciones puramente descriptivas. Y la segunda se refiere a si es posible o no definir el concepto de ‘bueno’. Propondré dos maneras diferentes de deducir proposiciones prescriptivas a partir de proposiciones descriptivas sin cometer errores lógicos. La primera consistirá en considerar a la ética como un sistema de imperativos hipotéticos, de manera que se pueden deducir premisas prescriptivas sin siquiera definir ‘bueno’, por lo que no se comete la falacia naturalista. Y la segunda manera se lograra por medio de definir los términos normativos ‘bueno’ y ‘deber’. En caso de lograrlo, los problemas lógicos que nos impiden naturalizar la ética normativa serán superados.
The confusion between the so-called “Hume’s Law” and the naturalistic fallacy is a commonly made ... more The confusion between the so-called “Hume’s Law” and the naturalistic fallacy is a commonly made mistake, not only by philosophers, but also by psychologists, neuroscientists and cognitive scientists that talk about morality. Both are logical issues related to ethics, but different ones. The first one is concerned with deriving prescriptive propositions (ought-propositions) from descriptive propositions (is-propositions), so it applies to normativity in general; and the second one refers to a logically illegitimate way of identifying the property ‘good’ with another coextensive property. I propose two different ways of deriving prescriptive propositions from descriptive ones without making any logical mistakes.
Papers by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Oral History Review, 2017
The Latino Generation offers a vivid image of the saga that some Latin Americans experienced whil... more The Latino Generation offers a vivid image of the saga that some Latin Americans experienced while migrating to the United States. The book contains interviews with thirteen Latino college students...
In this chapter we will develop a way for moral realism to respond to evolutionary debunking argu... more In this chapter we will develop a way for moral realism to respond to evolutionary debunking arguments. In general terms, debunking arguments that appeal to evolutionary theory hold that natural selection and moral realism are incompatible. Our aims are threefold. First, we will describe some of the relevant arguments in the debate on this topic. We distinguish between a modal argument, a parsimony argument, and Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma. Second, we will focus on Street’s argument, which has ignited most of the recent interdisciplinary debate between philosophy of biology and metaethics. We will focus on the overlooked fundamental tenets of moral realism to open a route for defending it: its cognitivist character, its representational language nature, and the relationship between evaluative judgments and their truthmakers (which are facts). This will allow us to propose a response to the evolutionary debunking arguments. Finally, contra Street, we will argue that moral reali...
En este artículo defiendo al naturalismo ético de los argumentos que G. E. Moore presenta en su P... more En este artículo defiendo al naturalismo ético de los argumentos que G. E. Moore presenta en su Principia Ethica. Utilizo la distinción fregeana entre sentido y referencia para argumentar que el naturalismo ético no necesariamente comete la llamada falacia naturalista. Sobre el argumento de la pregunta abierta sostengo que lo más que podría mostrar es que ‘bueno’ y cualquier definición que se dé de este concepto no son sinónimos, mas no demuestra la imposibilidad de definir ‘bueno’. Por último señalo que si ‘bueno’ no fuera un objeto natural se entraría en contradicción con la tesis de la clausura causal, causando graves problemas ontológicos y epistemológicos. Concluyo que los argumentos de Moore no afectan al naturalismo ético.
Drafts by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
In his book The Ethical Project, Philip Kitcher (2011) offers a naturalistic account of Ethics, w... more In his book The Ethical Project, Philip Kitcher (2011) offers a naturalistic account of Ethics, which he dubs Pragmatic Naturalism. Based in evidence from primatology, archeology and anthropology, and some speculation from evolutionary biology, his account is intended to be normative and not merely descriptive, therefore it has to fulfill a challenge posed by Hume (1978) that any normative naturalistic account of ethics has to fulfill: how to bridge the is-ought gap, i.e. how can a prescription of an ethical practice be made from purely descriptive premises. The purpose of this paper is to explore the details of how this challenge could be met using the framework of pragmatic naturalism. My answer will be that pragmatic naturalism is able to give a logically valid argument from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ using descriptive claims and conceptual truths as premises. Its normative force is not delivered as an absolute authority—as some moral realists would like—but that is not a problem for pragmatic naturalism, since it does not have that aim.
Books chapters by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Life and Evolution, 2020
In this chapter we will develop a way for moral realism to respond to evolutionary debunking arg... more In this chapter we will develop a way for moral realism to respond to evolutionary debunking arguments. In general terms, debunking arguments that appeal to evolutionary theory hold that natural selection and moral realism are incompatible. Our aims are threefold. First, we will describe some of the relevant arguments in the debate on this topic. We distinguish between a modal argument, a parsimony argument, and Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma. Second, we will focus on Street’s argument, which has ignited most of the recent interdisciplinary debate between philosophy of biology and metaethics. We will focus on the overlooked fundamental tenets of moral realism to open a route for defending it: its cognitivist character, its representational language nature, and the relationship between evaluative judgments and their truthmakers (which are facts). This will allow us to propose a response to the evolutionary debunking arguments. Finally, contra Street, we will argue that moral realism is not scientifically inferior to moral anti-realism and therefore the former is not debunked.
Artículos by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Número Generalista, 2013
Dos razones hacen de Mutatis Mutandis el lema de nuestra Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía. Pri... more Dos razones hacen de Mutatis Mutandis el lema de nuestra Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía. Primero, que creemos firmemente en la labor de una filosofía crítica y de un pensamiento que se comprometa con sus propuestas, que interpele a sus lectores, al mundo, y que no se detenga sólo en la exégesis filosófica en clave académica. Si bien la nuestra es, de todas maneras, una revista académica, lo es en tanto consideramos que la academia también tiene algo que aportar (y que cambiar) en este aspecto. Es así como cambiando lo que se deba cambiar es además de un lema, una apuesta, pretensión a la cual queremos dar cuerpo en este proyecto editorial, al tiempo que un imperativo: en el viejo lugar que justificaba lo existente, hoy se está cambiando lo que se debe cambiar. Este será para nosotros nuestro espíritu en el trabajo editorial y el fundamento de nuestro compromiso para con nuestros autores y lectores.
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Thesis by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Talks by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Papers by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Drafts by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Books chapters by Jorge Oseguera Gamba
Artículos by Jorge Oseguera Gamba