This paper addresses two general questions. First: is it possible to give an explanation in evolu... more This paper addresses two general questions. First: is it possible to give an explanation in evolutionary terms for the behaviors, language, and sentiments that have been considered distinctly moral? Second: if such an evolutionary account is possible, what can its existence tell us about what morality is? I engage with a view typified by Richard Joyce in The Evolution of Morality (2006). This view answers the first question in the affirmative and the second by arguing that the existence of an evolutionary explanation of moral behavior, language, and sentiments should in fact lead us to agnosticism about the existence of morality, at least in the sense in which it has been commonly understood. I push back against Joyce’s arguments for moral agnosticism, instead arguing that the evolutionary account itself gives a foundation for a new kind of moral naturalism.
This paper addresses two general questions. First: is it possible to give an explanation in evolu... more This paper addresses two general questions. First: is it possible to give an explanation in evolutionary terms for the behaviors, language, and sentiments that have been considered distinctly moral? Second: if such an evolutionary account is possible, what can its existence tell us about what morality is? I engage with a view typified by Richard Joyce in The Evolution of Morality (2006). This view answers the first question in the affirmative and the second by arguing that the existence of an evolutionary explanation of moral behavior, language, and sentiments should in fact lead us to agnosticism about the existence of morality, at least in the sense in which it has been commonly understood. I push back against Joyce’s arguments for moral agnosticism, instead arguing that the evolutionary account itself gives a foundation for a new kind of moral naturalism.
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Papers by Ben Serber