Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false groun... more Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem and arrive at a relatively simple theory with virtues linked to several issues at the heart of contemporary epistemology.p apq_1397 283..304
the past decade a revival of serious thinking about desert has taken place. Three philosophers in... more the past decade a revival of serious thinking about desert has taken place. Three philosophers in particular have recently explored the relation between desert and intrinsic value. Fred Feldman argues that consequentialism need not give much weight or indeed any weight at all to the happiness of persons who undeservedly experience pleasure.1 He defends the claim that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs is determined by the "fit" between the amount of well-being that a person receives and the amount of well-being that the person deserves. Shelly Kagan uses a similar claim to motivate the view that equality is not intrinsically valuable.2 Thomas Hurka argues that desert is a third-order value, which is a function of the relation between the second-order value of having a virtuous or vicious character and the first-order value of experiencing pleasure or pain.3 In this paper, we sketch a theory of desert as fittingness and defend a general account of the relation betwee...
I respond here to an argument given recently in this journal by Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, and... more I respond here to an argument given recently in this journal by Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, and Olle Risberg. The authors object to the counterfactual comparative account of harm. They argue that...
According to Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of medical disorder, t... more According to Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of medical disorder, the inability of some internal part or mechanism to perform its natural function is necessary, but not sufficient, for disorder. HDA also requires that the part dysfunction be harmful to the individual. I consider several problems for HDA's harm criterion in this article. Other accounts on which harm is necessary for disorder will suffer from all or almost all of these problems. Comparative accounts of harm imply that one is harmed when one is made worse off, that is, worse off than one otherwise would have been. Non-comparative accounts imply that one is harmed when one is put into some kind of condition or state that is, in some way, bad in itself. I argue that whether harm is construed comparatively or non-comparatively, HDA's harm criterion is problematic. I tentatively conclude that an analysis of medical disorder should not make use of the concept of harm.
Sometimes we say that there are greater and lesser goods, but there are different senses in which... more Sometimes we say that there are greater and lesser goods, but there are different senses in which one kind of good might be said to be greater, or higher, than another one. In this paper, I present a theory of value for one of these senses. Franz Brentano had it in mind, I think, when he made the following claim:“It is quite possible for there to be a class of goods which could be increased ad indefinitum but without exceeding a given finite good.” 1 I want to explore the consequences of the thesis that there is at least one kind of good any ...
Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false groun... more Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem and arrive at a relatively simple theory with virtues linked to several issues at the heart of contemporary epistemology.p apq_1397 283..304
the past decade a revival of serious thinking about desert has taken place. Three philosophers in... more the past decade a revival of serious thinking about desert has taken place. Three philosophers in particular have recently explored the relation between desert and intrinsic value. Fred Feldman argues that consequentialism need not give much weight or indeed any weight at all to the happiness of persons who undeservedly experience pleasure.1 He defends the claim that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs is determined by the "fit" between the amount of well-being that a person receives and the amount of well-being that the person deserves. Shelly Kagan uses a similar claim to motivate the view that equality is not intrinsically valuable.2 Thomas Hurka argues that desert is a third-order value, which is a function of the relation between the second-order value of having a virtuous or vicious character and the first-order value of experiencing pleasure or pain.3 In this paper, we sketch a theory of desert as fittingness and defend a general account of the relation betwee...
I respond here to an argument given recently in this journal by Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, and... more I respond here to an argument given recently in this journal by Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, and Olle Risberg. The authors object to the counterfactual comparative account of harm. They argue that...
According to Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of medical disorder, t... more According to Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of medical disorder, the inability of some internal part or mechanism to perform its natural function is necessary, but not sufficient, for disorder. HDA also requires that the part dysfunction be harmful to the individual. I consider several problems for HDA's harm criterion in this article. Other accounts on which harm is necessary for disorder will suffer from all or almost all of these problems. Comparative accounts of harm imply that one is harmed when one is made worse off, that is, worse off than one otherwise would have been. Non-comparative accounts imply that one is harmed when one is put into some kind of condition or state that is, in some way, bad in itself. I argue that whether harm is construed comparatively or non-comparatively, HDA's harm criterion is problematic. I tentatively conclude that an analysis of medical disorder should not make use of the concept of harm.
Sometimes we say that there are greater and lesser goods, but there are different senses in which... more Sometimes we say that there are greater and lesser goods, but there are different senses in which one kind of good might be said to be greater, or higher, than another one. In this paper, I present a theory of value for one of these senses. Franz Brentano had it in mind, I think, when he made the following claim:“It is quite possible for there to be a class of goods which could be increased ad indefinitum but without exceeding a given finite good.” 1 I want to explore the consequences of the thesis that there is at least one kind of good any ...
In his recent discussion'Brute Facts', Hud Hudson considers an argument that seems to s... more In his recent discussion'Brute Facts', Hud Hudson considers an argument that seems to show that if there are contingent truths, then a certain version of the principle of sufficient reason is false, l Hudson suggests that it is possible to accept both the principle of sufficient reason and the thesis that not every truth is a necessary truth; provided that one embraces a modal realist view of the sort favoured by David Lewis. Hudson argues for the claim that this sort of modal realism implies that some true propositions are neither contingently nor ...
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