A lavish guide to the campaign histories, uniforms, weapons and equipment of the armies who fought against Napoleon and ultimately defeated him. The text is exceptionally well illustrated with over 200 pictures, including 100 original colour paintings of uniformed soldiers of the following units: The Russian Army, The Cossacks, The Austrian and Hungarian Army, Blucher’s Army, The King’s German Legion, The Black Brunswickers, and several British regiments ~ Black Watch, Coldstream Guards, Royal Scots Greys, The Buffs, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, The King’s Regiment, and the Royal Artillery. These illustrations are by some of Britain’s best-known uniform illustrators and provide a splendid, wide-ranging reference for military enthusaists, modellers, and war-gamers. The text contains enough background history to provide a general introduction to the Napoleonic Wars from 1804 to 1815, with the major campaigns and engagements graphically described. The bulk of the narrative, however, is given over toa description of the army organisations, uniform, and equipment of the soldiers of the allied and expatriate armies. As David Chandler brings out in his foreword, it was the combination of their ability and strength, not the effort of any single nation, which defeated Napoleon in the end.NAPOLEON’S ENEMIESNAPOLEON’S ENEMIES Edited by RICHARD WARNER With a foreword by David Chandler Osprey Publishing, LondonPublished in 1977 by Osprey Publishing Lid 12-14 Long Acre, London wear gtr Member company of the George Philip Group © Copyright 1977 Osprey Publishing Led. This book is copyrighted under the Berne Con- vention. All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism, or review, as permitted under the Copy- right Act, 1956, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or trans- mitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photo- copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner, Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers. ISBN 0 85045 1728 Filmset by BAS Printers Limited, Wallop, Hampshire and printed by Ebenezer Baylis and Son, Ltd., he Trinity Press, Worcester, and London4 Load Acknowledgement Much factual information, some half-tones, and ve been taken from books in the many colour pls Men-at-Arms fought against Napoleon, Iam very grateful to the authors and artists concerned for the material describing the armies which provided. I should like to thank Freda Marsh for making order out of chaos without a sigh RWFor Philip Warner 3 Drm RanrodContents LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ro FOREWORD 15 1 TACTICS OF WAR 19 Historical background 19 The Infantry 22 The Cavalry 32 The Artillery 39 Sieges and Sappers 50 2 BRITISH UNITS 54 The Black Watch 34 The Coldstream Guards 39 Royal Scots Greys (Royal North British Dragoons 69 The Scotch Brigade (88th) and De Burgh’s Regiment (g4th 2 The Butls 78 The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 83 ‘The King’s Regiment and the Queen's Own gt The Royal Artillery o4 3 CONTINENTAL ARMIES 100 The Austrian and Hw in Army 100, The Russian Army 120 The Cossacks 135, Bliicher’s Army 14 4 EXPATRIATE CORPS 158 The King’s German Legion 158 The Black Brunswickers 173 INDEX 189 6 fam coun lartrudgeBritish General in review order 20 Ensign of the Bast Norfolk Regiment 21 Adjutant-General 21 Id officer of the 7th Foot (Royal Fusiliers 24 Infantry officer of a Line Regiment 24 Rifleman of the g5th Foot (The Rifle Brigade) 25 Corporal of the Portuguese Infantry 25 Light Infantryman of the 5th Cagadores 28 Colour-Sergeant of the 11th Foot 28 Private of the roth Hussars 29 Officer of the Light Dragoons 32 Private of the 3rd Dragoon Guards 32 Le Marchant’s heavy brigade at Salamanca 33 Firing from the saddle 33 Gunner in service dress 36 Sapper of the Royal Sappers and Miners 36 Loading and firing, from a musketry manval 37 Drum Major of the 57th Foot 38 Duke of Wellington 38 General Lord Hill 39 The ‘Brown Bess’ 39 Royal Engineers officer 40 Pioncer of the 29th Foot 40 The g5th (the Rifle Brigade) in action 41 The Battle of Castalla 42 ; Marshal Beresford and a Polish lancer 43 British Hussars charging French cavalry 43 Gunner of the Royal Horse Artillery 44 Officer of the Royal Artillery 44 Trooper's Light Cavalry pattern sabre 45 ch howitzer 45 Royal Antllery drive Antillery officer laying a siege gun 47 Royal Horse Artillery changing ground 48 Murray’s DivisionartillerymencrossingtheDouro 49 Illustrations The Battle of Ciudad Rodrigo 50 ‘The Battle of Fuentes d’Onoro 51 The Black Watch at Quatre Bras 55 Black Watch officer’s gorget and sporran 55 Shoulder-belt plate 56 Black Watch officer's uniforms at the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars 56 Corporal of the Black Watch with bayonet fixed 57 Private of the Black Watch 57 Sergeant of the Black Watch 57 Drummer of the Coldstream Guards, 1 6o Grenadier of the Coldstream Guards Drum-major of the Coldstream Guards 61 Officer of the Coldstream Guards 61 Private of the grenadier company, Coldstream. ds 62 The first two State Guards 62 Flintlock 63 Trooper of the Royal Scots Greys 65 “Charge of the Scots Greys at Waterloo" 67 Officer of the Royal Scots Greys 68 Private of the Royal Scots Greys 68 with bicorn hat 68 lours of the Coldstream Greys office Royal Scots Greys trooper with equipment and bearskin 70, 71 Private of the Scotch Brigade, “Listing for the Connaught Rangers Siege and attack at S ‘The breaching of Ciuda The storming of Badajoz ‘The Battle of Salamanca 75 Scotch Brigade officer in India Service Dress 76 Private of the Scotch Brigade 76 “The Bulls in Flanders’ 79 73 ingapatam in India 74 RodrThe Bulls protecting the semin Delence of the colours at Albuh Ollicer of the Buffs with high-peaked, three- cornered hat Bo Sergeant of the Bulls with stove pipe hat 80 Officer of the Bulls with long-tailed coat 81 Private of the Bufls 81 Private of the Bufls with the Wellington shako 81 Wemyss of Wemyss, founder of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 84 Sergeant Samuel Macdonald 84 Ollicers of the Battalion Company, 93rd ry near Oporto 79 Highlanders 85 Private of the Battalion Company, 93rd Highlanders 8 Officer of the gist Argyllshire Highlanders 85, Recruits for the Argylls 86 Shoulder-belt phates 86 \ field kitchen of 1807 87 Cap badge, bonnet badge, and cross-belt buckle 87 Officer of the g3rd Highlanders with half-plaid 88 Field officer with earliest form of half-plaid 88 Sergeant of the g3rd Highlanders 89 The Battle of Mexandria gt Officer of the 8th or King’s Regiment 92 Private of the 63rd Regiment g2 Officer of the 96th Queen's Regiment 93 Gilt beltplate 94 Atkinson print of Artilleryman, 1807 95 Own (Royal Gunner with long coat a Gunner of the Royal Artillery 96 Officerofthe Gunnersin overseasservice uniform 97 dt bicorn hat 96 Austrian generals 100 Austrian soldier of Pioneers 101 Sapper officer of the Austrian army — 101 Miner officer of the Austrian army 101 Austrian officer of artillery and a*kanonier’ 102 ‘Two types of Austrian helmet and cuirass 103 Officer of Hungarian Grenadiers 104 Private of the Hungarian Infantry 104 Grenadier of the German Infantry, 1809 105 Major-General of the German Infantry 105 Miners and sappers of the Austrian army — 106 Officer and other rank from the Austrian wansport corps 106 Trooper of the Uhlans 108 Private of the German infar y 109 German Jiiger non-commissioned offi 109 General service saddle 110 army soldiers of Miners 1 n Transport Austria Drivers in the Aus Map of Europe, 1792, 14 Map of Europe, 1810115, Austrian mounted Jager and a Light Dragoon 116 Horse artillery of the Austrian army in action 14 Austrian artillery *kanonier’ with a 6-pounder gun 118 Prussian hussar officer's equipment 119 Trooper of the Horse-Eger Regiment 120 “NGO of the Tversky Dragoons 121 Student officer 121 Russian cuirassier helmets 122 NCO and two privates of the Eger regi Russian grenadier helmets 124 Grenadiers from the Tayrichesky Grenadier Regiment 125 Junior officer of the Kirnburnsky Dragoons 125 Cavalry helmets Fusili Kievsky Grenadie Corporal of the 2gth Eger re ‘Trooper of the Gu of thi Regiment 128 iment rds Cavalry Corps 1 Non-combatant sergeant of a Russian Infa Regiment 132 Ryadovoi of Ublans 13 Officer of the Horse Artillery 133 Russian Infantry general in summer parade uniform 133 Corporal of the Sumsky Hussars 13 Corporal of the Astrakhan Cuirassiers 154 Cossack Imperial Guard 136 Ural Cossack 136 Don Cossack 137 \ typical Cossack feat of b horsemanship 139 Ukrainian Cossack 140 Zaphorozhian Cossack 140 Tobolsk Cossack 141 Cossacks butchering French stragglers 142 \ charge by Don Cossack lancers 142 Black Sea Cossacks 143 ‘Trumpeter of the Count Platov 144 Oflicer of the 3rd Silesian Regiment 145 Oflicer of the 1st Pomeranian Regiment 145 Private of the ist Westphalian Regiment 145 Drummer of the 24th (4th Brandenburg) Regiment 146 aucasia n Guard Regiment 144Cannoncer of the Silesian Brigade of the Prussian Antillery 148 Adjutant of Prussian cavalry 148 Dragoon of the 5th Brandenburg Regiment 149 Officer of the 1st Kénigin Dragoons 149) Prussian mounted officer, Foot Artillery of the Guard 150 Feldjager of the Prussian Army 152 Men of the Silesian rifle battalion — 15; Elbe National Hussar Regiment 153 Kolberg Infantry Regiment, 1811153 Prussian privates of the and Silesian Infantry Regiment 154 Prussian dragoons at the Battle of Eckau 155 Bliicher at the Battle of Ligny Field Marshal Blicher 15 General on the Prussian Stall 156 Prussian volut rs setting off for the wars 156 The Prussian Noble Guard on the steps of the French Embassy 1 Dolman of an officer in the Horse Artillery 159 Jacket of a colour-sergeant in the 71h Line Battalion 160, Tunic of a Grenadier company sergeant 160 Trooper of the and Light Dragoons 161 Marshal Soult 161 Murat, King of Lieutenant G aples 162 neral Julius Hartman 162 ne Battalion of the Cap-plate and belt-plate of a L Legion 162 Ilustrated scroll commemorating Garcia- Hernandez 163 Officer of the 1st Hussars 164 Officer of the and Hussars 164 Officer in the 1st Light Battalion 168 Bugler of Sharpshooters 168 Colour-bearer, 5th line battalion 172 Sergeant of a Light Battalion 172 Gunner of a Hors ery battery 173 Private of a Line Battal order 174 Brunswick Corps lancer’s coat 175 mn in field service marching Officer, Horse Artillery 176 Officer and lancer of the Uhlans 178 Gelernte Jéigers and sergeant of the Leib-Bataillon 178 Privates of Hussar, light infantry, and rifle companies 174 Officers and trooper ofa Uhlan squadron 179) Shabrack and harness used by Hussar and Uhlan. officers 179 issar regiment 180 sharpshooter Company 180 Trooper ofa Hussar regiment 181 Sergeant in the Leib-Bataillon 181 Dolman and waistcoat of a subaltern of the Leib- Bi Hussar’s saddle and harness 182 Duke of Brunswick 183 Hussar trooper of the Black Horde 183 Sergeant-Major of the rst Line Battalion 183 ‘Trooper in the Uhlan Squadron 184 Soldier of an infantry regim 184 Sharpshooter of an infantry regiment in English aillon 182 in English service service 185 Officer of the Lieb-Bataillon 185 Driver of foot artillery 186 Ser Major of the 2nd Light Battalion 186 ptain ina Line Battalion 187 Private of the Line Battalion 188 Senior musician of a Line Battalion 188Foreword by David Chandler “Between old monarchies and a young republic the spirit of hostility must always exist,” remarked Napoleon Bonaparte at the time of the Peace of Amiens in 1802. ‘In the present state of affairs every peace treaty means no more than a brief armistice: and I believe that my destiny will be to fight almost continuously.” The First Consul’s forecast was to prove all (o0 correct. Ten years of continuous warfare had already stretched France's resources si fateful day of 20 April 1792, when the idealistic Girondin government had declared war on ‘the King of Hungary and Bohemia’ (the secondary titles of the Austrian Emperor) in a fit of patriotic revolutionay ugurating the long French Re- But the long ce the fervour, thus i volutionary and Napoleonic Wars campaigns against the First and Second Coalitions were to prove only the introduction, The fourteen month breathing spell represented by the duration of the Peace of Amiens did indeed prove no more than a “brief armistice’, serving to usher in a further eleven years of mounting conflicts, involving a succession of four more hostile coalitions, before Napoleon was induced to abdicate for the first time at Fontaine- bleau;and even then there would remain the dramatic events of the Hundred Days (which called into being the Seventh Coalition) before an exhausted Europe iod of peace and could settle down at long last to a pe reconstruction. ‘The true cost of this period of devastating wars will never be known, In terms of casualties, it has been estimated that France and her more or less willing confederates lost all of 1,750,000 killed and wounded between March 1804 and June 1815. Ifthe unknown losses of France's opponents and of the preceding Revolutionary Wars are also taken into account, a total in the region of five million casualties might not be exces Historians have spent much effort apportioning the responsibility for these appalling circumstances, and those who have tried to show that the major blame should be placed at Napoleon's door have proved as unconvincing as those who have sought to de- monstrate that France and its dynamic ruler were the hapless victims of an international conspiracy. In ive. sober fact, the period was distinctly war-prone from its outset, and there is every likelihood that Europe would have been torn by major conflicts whether or not Napoleon Bonaparte had appeared on the scene. For the Revolution had set France apart from the rest of Europe while the future Emperor was still an unknown lieutenant of artillery. The social and economic upheavals that followed the act of political defiance in 1789 implied the end ofthe Ancien Régime not only in France but throughout the Continent The old monarchies were bound to resist to the uttermost the concepts of Rousseau and Diderot, for the vaunted slogan of Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité n society and They also ationalistic threatened a total upheaval of Europe: the destruction of most vested interests signalled the liberation ofa great burstof energy and proselytising zeal amongst the French people — and this phenomenon was bound to lead to expansionist. wars whether or not Napoleon had ation. emerged to lead the It mattered little that the form of French govern- ment swung all the way from an extremist regicide republic to a continental empire, for the implicit menace was much the same. ‘The crowned heads of Europe ~ Austrian Habsburgs, Spanish and Neapol- itan Bourbons, Russian Romanovs and British 15Hanoverians — could no more wust the ‘Corsican, adventurer’ who was prepared to have the noble Due d’Enghien kidnapped from neutral territory and shot with his back to a wall at the Chateau de Vincennes in March 1804, than they could respect the memory of his revolutionary predecessors who had dragged Louis XVI and his queen beneath the blade of the guillotine i They might be temporarily lured into “compacts with the devil’ for reasons of mili "79 ccessity, dynastic interest or personal fascination but no such agreements held a stamp of true permanence for Napoleon wasn outsider and indeed an outlaw, or such was the view of most of the old- established régimes of Europe. The British govern- mer . for example, never acknowledged his assumed imperial rank, but relerred to him as °General in all official pronouncements and documents until afier his death, And itis also Bonapart signific les grandes dames of European monarchy. The implac- able hostility of the Dowager-Empress of Russia, the Empress Ludovica of Austria and Queen Li Prussia was a factor not to be igi influence over their sons or husbands was immense. Of course to a large extent Napoleon played into the hands of his reactionary opponents. He did not play the diplomatic game with the utmost tact, that elusive “golden quality” of statesmanship. There was lite time for compromise in his Corsican nature, despite the cunning and opportunism he displayed on certain occasions. All too often the ant that Napoleon found no acceptance from, ise of pred, for their treaties and pacifications he initiated were litle more than dictated peaces. The self-confident and arrogant tone of French negotiators and the pronou their master inevitably gave much offence and exacerbated international relations. His ms for terms off cted concessions, men to swell the ranks of the Empite’s armies and money to pay lor the munitions amiable relations were always high in extr food and 0 ex-enemy could be converted Thus into a convinced confederate, and even his genuine allies were often reduced to the status of resentful satellites and exploited vassals. This notwithstanding, it is improbable that the latent power of the new France and the genius that came to the head ofits government and armies at the turn of the century would have been baulked and ultimately defeated by the European monarchies had not the Great Britain of George HIT taken the lead of 16 the opposition. Time and again the continental armies would be crushingly defeated by French ar in successive wars and campaigns, but their eclipse cach case proved transitory. That this was the case was largely due to the steady hostility evinced by successive British ministries from 1793, the security provided by the Royal Navy and the Channel obstacles that Napoleon was never able to tame ~ and ional wealth that Brita the considerable in was prepared to distribute in the form of subsidies to her continental alliesin return for their adherence to fresh coalitions designed to challenge and thwart French purposes. From 1793 t0 1806 the prime mover behind British policy was William Pitt the You inister or working behind the hird er, whether in office as prime scenes. He was the Coalitions — and it was the collapse of the latter after the battle of Austerlitz that reputedly hastened his own death the following spring. Nevertheless his successors took over Pitt’s policies and general approach to the European scene, and his influence may be said to have continued to inspire British and cont leon for years after disappearance from the scene. ‘The earlier coalitions were very ramshackle affairs, undermined by selfish national interests and incon- architect of the Second and ntal hostility to Napc sistent war aims, The First Coalition (1792-7 which Britain joined rather than inspired — was bedevilled by Austrian and Prussian friction over Poland, and lacked co-ordination. “Their aims being as diverse as their methods were disputed Professor J. Holland-Rose, ition” applied to this league is began to fall apart Prussia and Sardinia made sep France over the next 18 months, and it finally collapsed when Austria signed the Pe: wrote First Coal- most a misnomer.” It the term, 1 carly 1795, and ‘Tuscany, ate peaces. with ice of Campo second Coalition lasted from 1798 until the Peace of Amiens, involving Britain, Russia, Naples and Turkey, and again lack of proper co-ordination led to military failure and diplomatic humiliation. The Third (April to December 1805) was very short-lived. The fact that the Austrians and Russians did not fully realise October 1797. Austria, that their wo countries were employing different calendars ~ a factor of great significance during the Ulm and Austerlitz campaigns, particularly at the start ~ gives some measure of the general inefliciency of these compacts. The Fourth Coalition, formed byBritain, Prussia and Russia fron ashed in July 1806, ruins after Jena-Auerstadt in the face of Napole blitzkrieg, but the ghost lingered on until the ‘T greements of July 1807, which again left B ted. The so-called Fifth Coalition (April to October 1809) brought Britain and Austria into briet alliance ~ until the defeat of Wagra Treaty of Vienna with France Only with the Sixth Coalition, which first came into existence in July 1812 and survived intact until Napoleon's first abdication on 16 April, 1814, did a truly effective alliance emerge. Great Britain, Russia, Spain and Portugal were the original participants, but they were ultimately joined by Prussia Austria by mid-1813, and by other German states as the bounds of the Napoleonic Empire recoiled towards the Rhine. \dedness and a com- mon purpose wei the Treaty of Chaumont (g March 1814) by which all the signatories solemnly undertook to commit all m led to Austria's gle-mi writt to such agreements as their national resources to the war, to enter into no separate treaties or negotiations with Napoleon, and to form a post-war Congress which would tackle the problems of Europe. If necessary, these obligations were to last for a full 20 years. The Congress of Vienna was, of course, in somewhat acrimonious session considering the re- organisation of post-war Europe when the news of ea bomb- Napoleon’s return from Elba exploded. shell. On 25 March 1815 all the former Sixth Coalition reaffirmed the Chaumont, outlawed Napoleon, and joined together in the Seventh Coalition, dedicated to pursuing all- out war against Napoleon until his final eclipse was assured, This came on 18 June long before the full weight of the Austrian and Russian military power could be brought to bear, but in the event the Anglo- Datch and Prussian armies of Wellington and Bliicher proved equal to the challenge, and Napolcon’s last desperate gamble ‘collapsed in resounding failure, Thus in the end the European powers learnt how to co-operate effectively aga common foe, but as we have indicated the necessary lessons were only slowly assimilated over two decades of failure and humiliation. Only Great Britain can be said to have shown true singleness of purpose from 1803 onwards, and but for her determination to bring Napoleon down, and her willingness to back her diplomatic undertakings with large sums of money, it ignatories of the terms of seems unlikely that an elleetive nd properly cohesive alliance would ever have emerged Of course, diplomatic considerations alone would never have defeated Napoleon unless there had been proper military backing to provide the teeth. The successive failure of five coalitions was as closely linked to the inadequacies of the forces the parti- cipants were compelled to deploy in the field as it was to their common rivalries and_ selfish national interests. This book pays ged from the hard n the E ‘mies that chool of experience, Apart ish Army, which developed along itsown sjor continental forces chose to remodel themselves along adaptations of Napoleon’s Grande Armée, adopting the army corps system and other salient features to good effect. The Archduke Charles of Austria, Scharnhorst in Prussia and Barclay de Tolly in Russia proved capable of borrowing the best French organisational and tactical concepts, and applying them to their own reformed armies. The processes of modernisation were often painful and were opposed by strong local vested interests, but the lessons of Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland could not be ignored, and within a decade Austria, Prussia and Russia had abandoned most of the facets of 18th century warfare and brought their armies up to date. In many ways the British army did not share in these developments. The humiliations sulfered during the American War of Independence had already led to some long overdu David Dundas overhauled and standardised the system of line infantry tactics, Sir John Moore reintroduced light infantry and his influence began to improve officer- man relationships within the regiments, and the Duke of York proved an administrator of considerable skill But, as this book brings out, the real strength of the lines, the m reforms: Sir British army lay in its individual regiments, and these proved than a match for the conscripts of the French many a Peninsular engagement. The British army receives pride of place in the pages that follow, and that is right; but it is also correct that space is found for the consideration of certain aspects, of the armies of our continental allies which rose like ashes of military defeat and the phoenix from th demonstrated the possibilities of international co- operation. Not even the genius of Napoleon could ultimately withstand the combined pressure of his united advers:I TACTICS OF WAR Historical background In the early eighteenth century, wars had generally been fought for limited objectives, and wars of position were more common than wars of movement A complete defeat of the enemy was believed to be beyond the means of any state; the method was a war of attrition, and the aim the seizure of fortresses and key points to put one side or other in a stronger position to bargain at the peace conferen The tactics of the day were dominated by the use of the smooth-bore musket, aud the pike or bayonet musket, in spite of its short range, inaccuracy and slowness of fire, could be decisive if fired in con- The normal order of battle centration and in volley for musketeers was in line three or four ranks deep, and the deployment and movement involved had to be learned on the parade-ground by professional troops who devoted their lives to the service. Such professional soldiers were valuable and were not to be Austrian generals in particular squandered, and became a byword for prudence, believing that it was better to preserve their own troops than to destroy those of the enemy. The great Field-Marshal Da was the protagonist of the creed that the defence was stronger then the offence; nor, even when pitted against a general of Frederick the Great's calibre, was For “he defeated he ly proved wrong. Frederick on successive occasions, using the stone- wall tactics of the period. The French Army had declined since its golden under Louis XIV, and it was left. to Frederick the Great to change military thinking from the middle of the century onwards, For Frederick believed only in the attack, whatever the odds, and his audacity, coupled with mobility of movement, won him battle after battle. Yet in many respects even Frederick was necessar of the old school. He maintained the efficieney of his officer corps by personal example, by rigorous energy, and by meticulous inquiry, but even he tok his olficers from the nobility and not from the bour- geoisie: only rarely did he commission soldiers from Jose-order drill remained the saleguard of and, although he not, on occasions, averse to eating bare the countryside of an the ranks. battle efficiency was enemy, he relied for supplies on an elaborate system of fortresses, state. magazines, depots, and supply convoys, and was unwilling to venture his armies nore than four days’ march from a supply base or over twenty miles from a navigable river. His troops, like professional sold merce his enemies, rs, although they w by the those of remained long-service sometimes by enforced con- reinforced ries, scription of prisoners, and by national levies. It was Frederick's tactics and methods that were original, not his philosophy. And the Austrians learned much from him which they turned to good advantage during the Seven Years Wat From 17 was radically changed by the French revolutionaries, for it was waged more ruthlessly and more efficiently as a conflict of ideologies. The French royalist artillery and engineer corps 2 onwards the whole oncept of warfare 1 remained in be together with most of its officer corps. The main body of the old infantry and cavalry had largely disappeared, however, and the new armies were formed by the fevée en masse, a compulsory conscription of the nation’s youth. Since there was no time to tain the new recruits in the old thods of deployment into line of battle, the onaries devised their own tactic of a column wo revolu advance, with fixed bayonets, enemy line, A single battalion had a frontage overwhelm an of forty 19This general's rank is shown by the even spacing of the loops (false buttonholes) on the lapels, uf, and the tails of his coate On active service his cocked hat would be worn fore and aft (Roffe/Osprey) men and a depth of twenty-four ranks; more battalions could give greater frontage and depth When ordered to attack, the battalion marched to the beat of the drum in serried ranks, rather like a phalanx or square, direct on to the enemy. There was no question of any use of musketry since the assault formation did not allow it; the me of the first two ranks might fire a round on closing with the er but this was done on the move, and the rapid march- step allowed no time to reload, Such attacks, in reality nothing more than marching right over the enemy, emy, 20 brought heavy losses (o the French, but as men were plentiful and lives were cheap, this was considered of little account. Fear of the guillotine, the penalty for failure by officers, ensured that commanders were energetic; the reward of promotion was all the more immediate because of the high number of casualties. One might imagine that the French tactics would spell disaster: the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian veterans found that this was not so, being rapidly swept away by the conscript columns of France. Why French so effective? The closed ranks made were th control easier; no man could falter or run away once formation, The column's advance was covered by artillery at the flank and skirmishers in front, who: k the enemy line of fire before the arrival ellect on enemy morale of the tried to bre of the main body, The steady advance of massed columns accompanied by artillery fire and the constant nagging of the skirmishers before the battle was properly joined also helped the French, convinced as they were of their bility. Finally, idealism, a poor factor on own, but_a powerful one when combined with strength, could give the volutionaries the edge when resisted: Napoleon was quick to recognize and use this quality, unaffected as he was by it himself Alone of Bonaparte’s opponents, Britain resisted the change to column attack which had brought France such great success, having the steadiness and temperament to sustain the bludgeon attacks. The French army at this time was superior to its enemies in organization, armament, and olfensive Promotion depended on merit not birth: confidence and spirit Morale, afier the suppression of the extremist revolutionaries, was excellent, and Napoleon was the curse of his enemies’ litle plagued by desertion long Napoleon himself w: y popular with his troops. Still there was much of the charlatan about im. With his remark, ‘What do the lives of half a illion men matter to a man like me?’ he certainly was not averse (0 the shedding of blood. Yet he lost more men in his rapid marches than he did in battle. enormous ‘or he was the strategist par excellence; the unfortunate Mack had been forced to surrender at Ulm in 1805, because no Aust the G Danube, a distance of nearly 700 miles, in under eight weeks. ‘an could conceive it possible that ande Armée could march from Boulogne to theThe ensign was the junior commissioned rank in the Infantry ‘equivalent to a cornet in the cavalry, He wears the Belgic shako and a double-breasted tailecoat. (Rolte|Osprey) Since the French revolutionaries could not afford o provide magazines and baggage-trains for their troops, the armies were ordered to live off the land; to do this they had to keep moving, preferably in the direction of the enemy. Napoleon continued the , applying it, if anything, more ruthlessly. In the early years it enhanced his mobility; in Russia it destroyed his army, Bonaparte in his prime had no peer as a soldie but his failure to delegate lity led to lack of initiative in his sub- ordinates. ‘Trus + he event- koning the strength of his opposition, Much of his success was due to the boldness of his plans and the simplicity and speed with which he executed them. He relied heavily on the advantage of surprise that this provided. As a tactician, on the other hand, his only great contri- bution was in his skilful use of artillery — the arm in which he had started his career. He remained faithful ing overmuch to his st ually became careless in xcellent marching powers of his troops, and the A staff oficer busy with plans. His branch of the service is showen by the siler facings on his uniform. (Roolfe|Ospreyto the method of attacking in column which had brought so much early success, even though his marshals had been defeated using the tactic in the Peninsula. At Waterloo he was finally defeated, still Gusting in the column method, which had been, bequeathed to him by Carnot The Infantry When Wellington took the field in the Peninsula in 1808, Britain lagged behind France in the higher organization of her armies, divisions had yet to be formed, and Wellington dealt direct with individual, brigade commanders. In June 1809, however, he adopted the divisional organization originated by the French, in which a number of brigacles were grouped, together under a single commander. Initially he formed four divisions, but by 1812 the number had risen to eight British and one Portuguese; he numbered his British divisions consecutively from one to seven: the eighth, the most famous, was known imply as the Light Division. Each was commanded by a liewtenant-general and usually comprised three brigades, wo of which were British, each under a major-general, and one foreign, often under a British, brigadier-general — countered in the Peninsular Army There were some exceptions. All three brigades of the 2nd Division were British, but since it normally operated with General Hamilton’s Portuguese Div- n, both under the command of Wellington's most trusted subordinate, General “Daddy” Hill, the «wo together virtually amounted to the equivalent of small Anglo-Portuguese army corps. In the 1st Division the foreign brigade was from the King’s German Legion, recruited by George III from the remnants of his Hanoverian Army; in the remainder (except for the Light Division which had a peculiar organization of its own) it came from the Portuguese Army which had been reorganized under the command of Marshal Beresford and stiffened by British officers who ha service rank otherwise seldom en- id transferred to the Portuguese The composition of the Light Division derived from an essential feature of Wellington’s tactics. He had served under the Duke of York in Flanders where he had noted how the French light troops, their Tirailleurs and Voltigeurs, could harass and weaken a battle line, so that when the heavy French columns attacked it they often broke through, He resolved to 22 counter this gambit by deploying forward of his positions such a mass of his own light troops that the Tirailleurs and Voltigeurs would be held well short of his main position, As a first step towards achieving this aim, he constituted the Light Division with the function of screening the army both at rest and on the move. It consisted of only wo small brigades each containing a Casadore battalion (Portuguese Light Infantry), four companies of riflemen from the 5th jater increased when the and and grd battalions of that regiment joined his army), and a British light infantry battalion (the role in which the 43rd and 52nd won immortal fame, ‘The 7th Division also was rather unusual; perhaps at first Wellington toyed with the idea of producing another light infantry division. It had two light infantry brigades, one containing two light battalions of the King’s German Legion and nine rifle compan ies of the Brunswick-Oels Jagers, and the other two newly-trained British light infantry batalions, the 5istand the 68th, and a battalion originally recruited from French emigr’s and deserters, the Chasseurs Britanniques, a regiment famous for the speed with which its men deserted. In addition there was the normal Portuguese brigade. This division, perhaps owing to its diversity of renown; the malicious affected t disbelieve in its very existence, and in 1813 it reverted to a more normal organization, the light infanuy battalions from the King’s German Legion being tansferred to the 1st Division. In the British brigades there were generally: three line battalions, Occasionally a fourth might be added, and in Guards Brigades, since a battalion of Foot Guards invariably outnumbered by a consider able margin those of the line, there were only two. On average a brigade numbered about 2,000 men, but races, never won much id casualties, or the ar ival of a strong battalion, could cause wide fluctuations. The Por- tuguese brigades followed the Continental model and embodied a Cacadore battalion and two line regiments, cach of two battalions; these had seven companies and an authorized strength of 750, but rarely put more than 500 in the field. Even so, Portuguese brigades on average numbered 2,500 and were almost always larger than the British, The organization of the British battalions re- mained remarkably constant throughout the war ‘h_ was commanded by a lieutenant-colonel andconsisted of a grenadier company, a light company, and eight line companies, all commanded by cap- tains. The colonel had two majors serving under him, nominally to command the two wings into which the battalion was customarily split. Their main function, however, was to deputize for him when he was away and to take charge of any large detachments the battalion might be called upon to make, Within the battalion their duties tended 10 depend on the particular whims or eccentricities of their com- manders, Wellington had with him wo senior generals whom he could send off'at a moment’s notice to take over an independent command or disentangle some unfortunate situation; it gave him a flexibility that allowed him to dispense with the system of Army Corps originated by the French, On the civil side there was an important depart- ment, the Commissariat, under a Commissary: General with assistants serving with every division and brigade. These were responsible for the provision of rations and the procurement of all local produce In the nature of things a thin or ill-provided commissary officer was rarely seen, and they were apt to receive more kicks than credit Working direct to Army Headquarters were the divisions; there was only an intermediate headquar- " independe minimum. colonel and author of A Narrative of the Peninsular War), an ADG with the 5th Division, records that at the Battle o rs when two or more were grouped together for an task. Here staffs were kept to the Leith Hay (later to become lieutenant- Salamanca the divisional staff consisted ‘of Colonel Berkeley, probably Assistant-Quarter- Master-General, and Major Gorm, probably Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, and four ADGs, possibly one per brigade and one to look afte the domestic arrangements of the headquarters. The high-sounding titles for stall officers have been retained to the present day, generally abbreviated to the initials, thereby ensuring that the army staff should be confusing to the other services and incomprehensible to other nations. At the level of the infantry brigade, there was a ingle staff officer, the major of brigade; he was a captain or sometimes an able young subaltern drawn, from one of its regiments. During the later stages of the war, when regimental officers had recognized the wisdom of wearing the same type of headdress as theit men, staff officers could be distinguished by their courageous refusal to abandon the traditional cocked hat In the companies, the captains had under them two junior officers, in theory a lieutenant and an ensign, but there was no set ratio of one rank to the other. A full-strength battalion, therefore, would be com- manded by a lieutenant-colonel with under him wo majors, ten captains, twenty lieutenants or ensigns, the adjutant, (generally a lieutenant), and the quartermaster; an assistant surgeon was normally attached. Sir David Dundas shows the strength of a company as being three officers, two sergeants, three corporals, one drummer, and thirty privates. This must have been at the peacetime establishment of one platoon. At war establishment, another platoon was added without any increase in the number of officers. When going to the Peninsula, companies: might number nearly 100, including a pay sergeant, perhaps four other sergeants, and six corporals. The gand went to the Peninsula with fifty-four sergeants and about 850 rank and file. But sickness and other casualties soon took their toll, and when in 1810 the and battalion of the 52nd disbanded, its total strength was twenty sergeants, twelve buglers, and 572 rank and file, of whom ten sergeants, five buglers, and eighty-five rank and file were unfit for duty A battalion with 700 men present in the field was looked on as strong; many fell well below this figure: and some had little more tha joo men, deducting the musicians, the adjutant’s batman, the clerks, the storemen, and others of that ilk likely to find their way into headquarters ~ say there would be 660 men serving with the 300. In a battalion of forty men companies; allowing again for the various duties that inexorably sap the strength of a regiment such as baggage-guards, storemen, men just gone sick, absentees, and so on, the company could probably put not much more than filty-five men into the line. Captain Sherer (later Major M. Sherer, author of Recollections of the Peninsula) vemarked that at the Battle of Vitoria he had eleven casualties out of a company of thirty-cight and does not comment that acd normally low, ‘The company for administrative pu divided into wo platoons, but organizations were far zed, and commanding olficers were who liked to run their fashion and did not is time his company strength was poses was from standard men of character often battalions afier thei 23,welcome interference frd 1 the nincompoops of the stall, The private soldier in the rounds of ball ammunitic rolled blanket or greatcoat, a fi and probably some other articles he had managed to acquire; his load might amount (ne pounds. AL first the heavy camp-kettles for cooking were carried on a company mule, | in 1812, Wellington m seale of three twelve: ranks carried sixty , a knapsack, a haversack, waterbottle rly. sixty A when d to issue tents to his men ata en bell-tents per company, the This field officer of the 7th Foot (Royal Fusiliers) wears tco chauleltes. He has the blue facings ~ which distinguished all royal’ regiments ~ and a fur cap. The Jasiliers had originally been formed for the purpose of escorting the artillery and were then ‘armed with the flintlock fusil. (Robfe/Osprey) 24 This infantry offer in a Line Regiment is wearing his cold cevather uniform. His stovepipe shako is protected by an oilskin over, of which the flap shows. The waist sash shows he is an affer. (Rote Osps tents were ea ed_on the mule and a lighter type of camp-kettle was carried in turn by the men of the company The * Brown Bess’ Oflicers we rmed with the sword, and sergeants with halberds or short pikes, called spontoons, rather to assist them in dressing the ranks than as weapons of offence. Most of the soldiers were armed with the musket, affectionately known as Brown Bess, that the Duke of Marlborough, when Master-General of the Ordnance, was said to have introduced. Its barrel wasThis rfleman of the 95th Foot (The Rifle Brigade) wears the dark green uniform of the huntsman. Note his black collar, cuff and shoulder straps, outlined in white braid. He is aiming the Baker Rifle. (Rolfe|Osprey about forty-two inches long with a diameter of 0.75 of an inch; its firing mechanism was reputedly the most reliable in Ei although at this time that was not necess ry great feat; its heavy triangular bayonet, seventeen inches long, fitted on the barrel well clear of the muzzle, Each soldier carried his sixty rounds of ball made up into cartridges, the propelling charge and the ball being sewn together in cartridge- paper to make a small cylindrical parcel, When the time came to load, the soldier bit the end of the cartridge, shook a little powder on to his priming and emptied the rest down the barrel; he then used his ramrod to ram home his ball with the cartridge paper on top to act as a wadding. When he pulled the trigger a spark from the flint ignited the powder in the pan which in turn caused the powder in the barrel to explode; the proportion of misfires, however, could be as high as one in six and, if the powder became damp, the musket would not fire at all. ‘an This corporal in the Portuguese infantry is wearing the normal blue coatee of the Portuguese army although this was probably ‘manufactured in England. His rank is shown by the double gold stripe round the enf]. (Role Osprey) 25The ball was not always a very close fit in the barrel, and the gases from the exploding charge might escape around it making it spin and swerve wildly in flight. Brown Bess had a certain feminine capricious ness: at fifiy yards it could be aimed with some hope up to 200 yards it could be uselilly fired at a group, the man actually aimed at being almost certain t escape harm; but over 200. yards. although the ball could carry up t 700, its behaviour was so eccentric that the noise of the discharge was more likely to excite terror than the ball, Rates of fire depended on how thoroughly the soldier performed his loading drills and the care that he took when he aimed. He could fire up to five rounds a minute if he was satisfied with producing an imposing number of bangs without worrying overmuch what happened to his ball, Taking into account battle condition atwell- wained soldier should bave been capable of firing nearly three eflzetive rounds a minute: Owing to the relative inaccuracy of the musket, the high number of misfires, and also the moral elfeet of a sudden blast of fire, a volley from a number of men was likely 10 produce a more awe-inspiring result than a comparable number of single shots, and the more concentrated the fire the more devastating it was likely to be; hence, throughout most of the eighteenth century, soldiers stood shoulder to shoul- der in a line that was three ranks deep: the French experimented with four but found that the fire of the fourth was more likely to endanger th than the enemy. At this time the three still the normal practice on the Continent as it gave the line a certain solidarity and catered for the replacement of casualties F comrades deep Tine was The Baker Rife In 1800 a committee of field officers met at Woolwich to select a rifle for use by the new Rifle Corps, later to be the Rifle Brigade samples of rifles from Europe and eventually settled for one made by London gunmaker. The ‘Baker Rifle’ known had a thirty-inch barrel, rifled to a quarter turn with seven grooves; the bore was o*625 in, The ball ammunition weighed twenty to the pound and the weight of the weapon itself was 9} Ib. Its maxi- The committee examined America but jel Baker, a as it came to be zel mum range was 300 yards and it was extremely accur= ate up to distances of 200 yards. A bayonet, measuring seventeen inches, was fited. ngular sword 26 During the War of especially in wild country against irregular bodies of . the British Army had be Battalions lrequently tought in only ovo ranks and, by European standards, these were American Independene rillemes yme accustomed toa looser ord not properly closed up. This was beneficial in that it led Wellington wo adopt a wwo-rank line in the Peninsula, but with the loose order regiments had come to devise tactical manoeuvres of their own and drill had become sloppy and haphazard ; the vesultsin Flanders had not always been happy. In Duke of York. the Comm n-Chiet, decided that «common tactical doctrine must b the whole of the infantry and issued a manual entitled Rules and regulations for the field formation exercise of uments of His Majests’s Forces, which he proceeded The manual, written by. Sir was largely based on forma qo2 the ndet adopted by rigorously to entorce David Dundas. current in the Prussian Army and has been reviled as intolerably rigid in outlook: nevertheless it gave a sound tactical doctrine to the infantry and was the basis of the battle-drills used in the Peninsul Dundas envisaged the men in a battalion standing shoulder to shoulder in a tine three ranks deep. As already mentioned, Wellington reduced this 10 10. ‘The first part of his manual was devoted to the individual drills such as turning, mavehing, and wheeling, that the soldier had to master before he was, fit to take his place in his company, In the remainder he laiel down a sevies of drills which, while retaining, the rigid, slow-moving line as the battle formation, yet enabled a battalion when not actually engaged in combat to move switily and easily over the battlefield He divided the battalion into eight equal divisions these roughly srresponded to the eight line compan- ies if the grenadier and light companies were both excluded; if they were present he allowed the number of divisions to be increased to ten; on the other hand, if the battalion was weak the number could be reduced proportionately. In practice it was rare for the light company to form part of the battle-line: its normal task was to screen the front oF flanks of the bav ion or brigade. The grenadier company, no longer specifically armed with grenades, wa posed of the adiest soldiers in the unit; it might be used for some particularly dangerous task, but the habit of brigading the grenadicr companies to make up ad foc grenadier battalions had largely disap- peared. In sony regiments the grenadier companywas divided, half being placed on the right and half on the left of the line. Dundas does not seem to have thought that any specific provision was necessary for its deployment. Although he described some eighteen manocuyres in detail, his drills in essence were based on four key formations — column of route, column of divisions, Jine, and square. Column of route was used for all movement when there was no immediate threat of contact with the enemy. Dundas laid down that this could be carried out in for s if the Tine formed wo deep, sixes if three deep. Since marching men required double the space occupied by the men when stationary the length of a column of route should equal the frontage of the same unit in line, and he emphasized that this length should not be exceeded. Mareh discipline much resembled that in force in the British Army until the 1930s, when the threat from the air enforced a greater degree Batialions started off from their camping-grounds with arms at the slope or shoulder and bands playing. After a short distance the men marehed at case and were permitted to break step. At every hour of the clock there was a short halt to enable the men to rest and adjust their equipment, Before the hourly halt and immediately after it, men marched to attention and in step for a few minutes, and the same drill was, observed when they arrived at thei of dispersion. were called upon to execute a manouevre When contact with the enemy beeame a possi- nged to column of bility, column of route was ch: divisions, or if the company organization had been In this formation preserved, column of compani cach division deployed in a two-deep line with the divisions ranged one behind the other, No. 1 Divisi On leading; occasionally it might be convenient to have No. 8 in front. Here two rather confusing terms were apt to be used. If No. 1 led, the battalion was said to be ‘right in front’ if No.8 ‘left in front’, the terms referring to their respective positions when in line, In some circumstances it was desirable to adopt 2 compromise between column and line. For this purpose Dundas had enacted that, besides being divided into eight divisions, the battalion line should also be divided into four grand divisions, and column of grand divisions, generally formed by grouping divisions in pairs, might be substituted for column of divisions. Intervals might be varied. In close column there might be only seven paces between the rear rank of one division and the front rank of the one im- mediately behind it. On the move, open column was, more usual; in this formation the distance between. divisions was equal to their front for an reason: with these intervals the batialion could form line facing lefi or right very quickly indeed, as each division needed to do no more than execute a separate right or lefi wheel for the whole to be in line. This was the manoeuvre so brilliantly executed by Pakenham and the 3rd Division at the battle of Salamanca, Forming line to the front was ach division came up in succession on the right or left of the division in front of it, depending on the flank ordered, until the line had been formed, while the leading division normally halted to allow the others to catch up; the rear division might therefore find it had some 200 yards to cover, and if, as sometimes mportant a slower process. happened, the whole brigade was advancing in column of companies or divisions, this distance might be tripled Once in line, the colours took post in the centre with the colonel, mount ind. The senior major and the adjutant, also mounted, took post respectively behind the 3rd and 6th Divisions; the company commanders, dismounted, took up a position on the right of the front rank of their company or division with a sergeant covering them in the rear rank, The remaining officers and sergeants, the drummers, pioncers, and any other hangers-on formed a third supernumerary rank with orders, as Dundas phrased it, 10 “keep the others closed up to the front during the attack and prevent any break beginning in the rear’. The n-command of the lefi-hand division, however, covered by a sergeant, took post on the left flank of that division When advancing in line the men on the flanks kept 1, six paces bel econd. their alignment by dressing on the colours in the centre, Ifa brigade advanced in line it was the duty of the colour parties to align themselves on the colours of the particular battalion that had been detailed to set In this formation the senior ext senior on the left, pace and direction. battalion was on the right, the and the junior in the centre The last formation, that of square, Dundas shows as being formed from line. With No. 1 Division on the right and No. 8 on the lefi, the procedu follows. The 4th and 5th Divisions stood fast, the 2nd and 3rd wheeled to their right rear forming a line at was as 27jon, while right angles to the right flank of No. 4 Di the 6th and 7th ina similar manner wheeled to thei left rear forming a line at right angles to the left flank of No. 5 Division. The 1st and 8th Divisions closed the square and faced the rear; the officers and colours took post in its centre, the officers waving their swords exultantly in the 3 ever a volley was fired The ny other drills for forming a square; sometimes it was formed in two ranks, sometimes in four; on occasion two battalions might unite, as at When two or wh Waterloo, to make up a single squ: more squares were necessary, alternate ones would be ‘The Portuguese were highly competent light infantry, excelling in skirmishing roles. This one is waring the normal brown uniform and the colour of the facings show his unit (the 5th Cagadores (Rotfe/Osprey) 28 echelonned back, so that the fire from one could sweep the face of the next. Itis evident that if'a square were to be formed quickly and without confusion, companies had to be of equal strength, and that some was. probably system, such as that of divisions, This colour-sergeant in the 1 1th Foot was the equivalent of the modern company sergeant-major, although the sank equivalent is now a stage lower. He wears one chevron below a crown and the Union flag. He carries a short pike and a sword. (Rofie/Osprey)leather. ( ned to heep the rain out of his neck. His trousers are fle Osprey)unavoidable, Nevertheless, the advantages of the fighting and the administrative units being identical, so that officers and NCOs knew the men they led in action, became more and more apparent; and the custom of using the company as the tactical unit became steadily more widespread as the war pro- gressed, To give still greater flexibility in manoeuvre, Dundas decreed that a division should be divided into two sub-divisions and four sections, but added that a section should never number less than five files (fifteen men if the ranks were three deep); these would operate the same formations within a division as a division within a battalion. As the division was the smallest sub-unit under an officer it may be surmised that these smaller formations were rarely ating independently used, unless a company was oper on its own. As regards frontages, Dundas stated that a man should occupy twenty-two inches. Two feet, however, would seem a more realistic figure, besides being easier to use for purposes of calculation. A battalion joo strong. after subtracting the light company, the musicians, and those in the supernumes rank, would probably muster about 560 men actually the battle-line; assuming a front rank of 280, the frontage for such a battalion would be in the region of 200 yards. Such a brigade normally fought with all three battalions in line, Its front would extend about ary third Goo yards. Infamy divisions on the other hand seldom had all three brigades in line. At the Battle of Salamanca the 4th Division did so with disastrous results; Wellington had, however prescience placed the 6th Division behind it to give the attack depth, and Lowry Cole commanding the 4th may well have taken this into account when determining his formation When the manoeuvring had ended and the fighting had begun it was important that at no time should a battalion be discovered with all its muskets unloaded: if this should happen it would be helpless before cavalry, and enemy infantry would be able to close and blast it off the battlefield with impunity. Dundas frowned on file firing whereby each front rank and rear rank man fired immediately afier the man on hi right, and favoured the firing of volleys. He stated ‘Line will fire by platoons, each battalion inde- pendent, and firing beginning from the centre of cach.’ In his regulations Dundas uses the terms of with customary 30 platoon and company as though they were the sam and presumably meant here that firing would be by company or division ; since there was only one office in the front rank of each division, except for the left flank one, it seems logical to suppose that these were the units of fire; on the other hand it is likely that battalions developed procedures of their own. After the first volley men almost certainly fired inde- pendently as fast as possible, the initial method of opening fire cnsuring that firing remained con- tinuous. At close range this fire could be murderou: after two or three minutes one side would almost certainly begin to fall inte disorder, and seeing this the other would probably clinch matters with th bayonet, Captain Sherer describing his action at the Battle of Albuhera gives some idea what the reality like must have beer ‘Just as our line had entirely cleared the Spaniards, the smoky shroud of battle was, by the slackening of fire, for one minute blown aside, and gave to our view the French grenadier caps, their arms, and the whole pect of their frowning masses. It was a momentary but a grand sight; a heavy atmosphere of smoke again enveloped us, and few objects could be discerned at all, none distinctly. The murderous contest of musketry lasted long. We were the whole time advancing on and shaking the enemy. At the distance of om them we received orders to charge, We ceased firing, cheered and had our bayonets in the charging position. ... The French infantry broke and fled, abandoning some guns and howitzers about sixty yards from us... To describe my feelings throughout this wild scene with fidelity would be impossible: at intervals bout twenty yards fi a shriek or a groan told me that men were falling about me; but it was. not always that the tumult of the contest suffered me to catch these sounds. A constant fecling [i.e. closing] to the centre of our line and the gradual diminution of our front more truly bespoke the havoc of death Fora battalion, the sequence of action might be an approach march in column of route, then a halt at an assembly area where battalion might close up in column of grand divisions, and stand poised ready to swing into action, Here colours would be uncased and primings checked. Then would come the advance in open column, deployment into line, and finally trial by fire.