This paper presents a defense of mereological nihilism based on the ontological and ideological s... more This paper presents a defense of mereological nihilism based on the ontological and ideological simplicity of the theory. Nihilism endorses the existence of fewer entities, providing an advantage in terms of ontological simplicity, but Bennett (2009) has worried that the price of positing fewer entities is a level of ideological complexity that is equal to or even greater than the advantage gained on the ontological side. I argue that this worry about ideology relies on a misconception of the relation between the two kinds of simplicity, and that the nihilist has several ways to retain a relative advantage over restrictivist and universalist views of composition.
Noonan's objection to the Lewis/Sider vagueness argument conflates two types of vagueness-vaguene... more Noonan's objection to the Lewis/Sider vagueness argument conflates two types of vagueness-vagueness about properties and vagueness about composition-and so fails to analyze vagueness of the relevant type. If we consider a case of purported vagueness about composition sufficient to trigger Sider's P3 reductio, indeterminacy about the number of objects in the world remains, and proponents of restricted theories of composition must still abandon either their ontology or linguistic explanations of vagueness.
Some nihilists about composition believe that complex objects dont really exist, but that ordinar... more Some nihilists about composition believe that complex objects dont really exist, but that ordinary sentences about them are nevertheless true. The distinction between what is fundamental and derivative appears to allow nihilists to retain their ontological view without being pushed into an error theory about ordinary language. Once we count the costs of appealing to fundamentality, the strategy is no better than the standard Quinean alternative. First, a philosopher who does not already conceive of metaphysics as addressing questions about what fundamentally exists may not be motivated to endorse the new proposal. Second, fundamentalist nihilism actually runs a higher risk of being forced into an error theory. Third, if fundamentalist nihilism must allow the occurrence of terms referring to parthood within its explanations, the standard account can achieve a net advantage from this allowance. Finally, appeals to fundamentality squander the ideological simplicity gained by denying the parthood relation.
This paper presents a defense of mereological nihilism based on the ontological and ideological s... more This paper presents a defense of mereological nihilism based on the ontological and ideological simplicity of the theory. Nihilism endorses the existence of fewer entities, providing an advantage in terms of ontological simplicity, but Bennett (2009) has worried that the price of positing fewer entities is a level of ideological complexity that is equal to or even greater than the advantage gained on the ontological side. I argue that this worry about ideology relies on a misconception of the relation between the two kinds of simplicity, and that the nihilist has several ways to retain a relative advantage over restrictivist and universalist views of composition.
Noonan's objection to the Lewis/Sider vagueness argument conflates two types of vagueness-vaguene... more Noonan's objection to the Lewis/Sider vagueness argument conflates two types of vagueness-vagueness about properties and vagueness about composition-and so fails to analyze vagueness of the relevant type. If we consider a case of purported vagueness about composition sufficient to trigger Sider's P3 reductio, indeterminacy about the number of objects in the world remains, and proponents of restricted theories of composition must still abandon either their ontology or linguistic explanations of vagueness.
Some nihilists about composition believe that complex objects dont really exist, but that ordinar... more Some nihilists about composition believe that complex objects dont really exist, but that ordinary sentences about them are nevertheless true. The distinction between what is fundamental and derivative appears to allow nihilists to retain their ontological view without being pushed into an error theory about ordinary language. Once we count the costs of appealing to fundamentality, the strategy is no better than the standard Quinean alternative. First, a philosopher who does not already conceive of metaphysics as addressing questions about what fundamentally exists may not be motivated to endorse the new proposal. Second, fundamentalist nihilism actually runs a higher risk of being forced into an error theory. Third, if fundamentalist nihilism must allow the occurrence of terms referring to parthood within its explanations, the standard account can achieve a net advantage from this allowance. Finally, appeals to fundamentality squander the ideological simplicity gained by denying the parthood relation.
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Papers by Jared Woodard