Psychology

Background: Patients with social anxiety disorder (SAD) report fear content relating to the perceived aversive consequences of their anxiety for others in their social environment. However, no studies to date have examined the diagnostic specificity of these fears to SAD as well as predictors to treatment response of these fears. Aims: To examine relative specificity of fears related to causing discomfort to others, as measured by Social Anxiety–Fear of Causing Discomfort to Others (SA-DOS), among patients with anxiety disorders, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and major depressive disorder (MDD), in addition to relation between dysfunctional attitudes and treatment response among patients with SAD. Method: In study 1, a large (n = 745) sample of DSM diagnosed OCD, MDD and anxiety disorder participants completed the SA-DOS. In study 2, patient participants with SAD (n = 186) participated in cognitive behavioural group therapy (CBGT) and completed measures of social anxiety symptoms and dysfunctional attitudes. Results: In study 1, the SAD group demonstrated significantly elevated SA-DOS scores compared with participants with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), OCD and panic disorder with or without agoraphobia (PD/A), but not the MDD group. In study 2, CBGT treatment was found to lead to significant reductions in SA-DOS scores. Need for approval (NFA) but not perfectionism, predicted treatment response to

Objective This research aims to determine the long-term impact of the Bloor Street Viaduct suicide barrier on rates of suicide in Toronto and whether media reporting had any impact on suicide rates. Design Natural experiment. Setting City of Toronto, Canada; records at the chief coroner's office of Ontario 1993-2003 (11 years before the barrier) and 2004-2014 (11 years after the barrier). Participants 5403 people who died by suicide in the city of Toronto. Main outcome measure Changes in yearly rates of suicide by jumping at Bloor Street Viaduct, other bridges including nearest comparison bridge and walking distance bridges, and buildings, and by other means. Results Suicide rates at the Bloor Street Viaduct declined from 9.0 deaths/year before the barrier to 0.1 deaths/year after the barrier (incidence rate ratio (IRR) 0.005, 95% CI 0.0005 to 0.19, p=0.002). Suicide deaths from bridges in Toronto also declined significantly (IRR 0.53, 95% CI 0.40 to 0.71, p<0.0001). Media reports about suicide at the Bloor Street Viaduct were associated with an increase in suicide-by-jumping from bridges the following year. Conclusions The current study demonstrates that, over the long term, suicide-by-jumping declined in Toronto after the barrier with no associated increase in suicide by other means. That is, the barrier appears to have had its intended impact at preventing suicide despite a short-term rise in deaths at other bridges that was at least partially influenced by a media effect. Research examining barriers at other locations should interpret short-term results with caution.

Objectives: Our study of cardiac outpatients participating in a mental health screening program aimed to explore: a) sub-ethnic differences in the severity and/or prevalence of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and suicidal ideation, and b) whether intrusion and avoidance symptoms of distress equally or differentially predict severity of depression among sub-ethnic groups.

“How can Psi Chi best partner with international psychologists to expand the honor society worldwide?”
This has been an important question since 2009, when the 1,100 chapters of Psi Chi in the United
States voted to become “The International Honor Society in Psychology”. This report updates and expands
on a unique symposium offered at the 120th meeting of the American Psychological Association in Orlando,
Florida, in August of 2012 — the first symposium on the Presidential theme of “Building Bridges” between
Psi Chi and international psychology [8]. Here, seven leaders in international psychology in North and South
America join to address different aspects of this timely question--with many suggestions on how to “build
bridges” to expand Psi Chi globally. It was in part due to this historic symposium that in 2013 Guatemala
became the first nation in Latin America, and Russia the first nation in mainland Europe to launch a chapter
of Psi Chi.

This article evaluates and compares the performance of two ratio scaling methods, the eigenvalue method proposed by Saaty (1977, 1980) and the geometric mean procedure advocated by Williams and Crawford (1980), given random data. The two methods were ex amined in a series of monte carlo simulations for two response methods (direct estimation and constant sum) and various numbers of stimuli and response scales. The sampling distributions of the measures of consist ency of the two methods were tabulated, rules for de tecting and rejecting inconsistent respondents are out lined, and approximation formulas for other designs are derived. Overall, there was a high level of agree ment and correspondence between the results from the two scaling techniques even when the data were ran dom.

Four new measures of multidimensional profile dissimilarity are proposed that are (1) either sym metric or asymmetric and (2) either conditional or unconditional on profile shape. The four similarity indices are based on alternative normalizations of the regular distance (D) statistic of Cronbach and Gleser (1953), all taking values between 0 and 1. Methods of calculation and interpretations of the indices are demonstrated and discussed, and sev eral generalizations are suggested.

A new method is proposed for comparing all predictors in a multiple regression model. This method generates a measure of predictor criticality, which is distinct from and has several advantages over traditional indices of predictor importance. Using the bootstrapping (resampling with replacement) procedure, a large number of samples are obtained from a given data set which contains one response variable and p predictors. For each sample, all 2 p 2 1 subset regression models are ®tted and the best subset model is selected. Thus, the (multinomial) distribution of the probability that each of the 2 p 2 1 subsets is`the best' model for the data set is obtained. A predictor's criticality is de®ned as a function of the probabilities associated with the models that include the predictor. That is, a predictor which is included in a large number of probable models is critical to the identi®cation of the best-®tting regression model and, therefore, to the prediction of the response variable. The procedure can be applied to ®xed and random regression models and can use any measure of goodness of ®t (e.g., adjusted R 2 , C p , AIC) for identifying the best model. Several criticality measures can be de®ned by using different combinations of the probabilities of the best-®tting models, and asymptotic con®dence intervals for each variable's criticality can be derived. The procedure is illustrated with several examples.

Groups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single-trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requestedprivately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff was induced by assigning to each group member a different pointsto-money exchange rate. The results show that as the uncertainty about the pool size increases subjects (1) overestimate the pool size, (2) increase their requests, and (3) expect others to increase their requests. In addition (4) individual requests and expectations regarding others ' requests are inversely related to the exchange rates, reflecting attempts to equate payoffs across group members.

Prior studies of the effects of dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA) on cognition have produced complex and inconsistent results. We hypothesize that these results may arise, in part, because of DHEA's metabolism into estrogens and androgens that produce opposing effects on cognition. Our study administered 50 mg of oral DHEA daily for 4 weeks in a placebo-controlled crossover design to six postmenopausal women. We measured blood levels of androgens (total testosterone, free testosterone, DHEA, DHEAS), estrogens (estradiol, estrone), and cognitive performance on recognition memory, perceptual identification, digit span memory, and visual attentional vigilance under both drug and placebo conditions. Multiple regression models incorporating the factors of age and body mass index (BMI) were used to ascertain the relation between sex steroids and cognitive performance. Our results demonstrated that estrogens produced a positive effect on recognition memory, while androgens produced a negative effect. This pattern reversed in perceptual identification with estrogens producing a negative effect and androgens producing a positive effect. In addition, BMI produced a negative effect on digit span memory, age produced a negative effect on perceptual identification, and androgens produced a negative effect on visual attentional vigilance. These results help, in part, to explain DHEA's complex effects on cognition. The diverse effects of sex steroids across tasks underscore the importance of identifying the specific cognitive mechanisms influenced by sex steroids and emphasizes that one should not expect sex steroids to produce homogeneous effects across cognitive tasks.

Following the study by Rapoport and Budescu (1992), two experiments are reported whose main purpose is to compare the generation of random sequences in one-and two-person games. The first experiment addresses the generation of trinary series in two-person zerosum games with asymmetric players. The second examines the generation of binary series using a between-subjects design, and compares the cognitive processes operating in one-and two-person games. Although both types of games result in similar deviations from randomness, they seem to induce qualitatively different cognitive processes. KEY WORDS Game Theory Randomness Negative recency Induction The intention of this paper is to bring together two streams of research, which have developed independently of each other in two separate areas of behavioral decision making. Both of these streams are concerned with people's ability to generate or simulate random sequences of discrete events. STUDIES OF SUBJECTIVE RANDOMIZATION The first line of research o n subjective randomization may be traced back to a claim made by Reichenbach (1949) that people untrained in probability theory cannot generate random sequences of events, even when specifically instructed to d o so (e.g. Budescu, 1987; Falk, 1981; Lopes, 1982; Wagenaar, 1972a,b). Evidence gathered by experimental psychologists in the last thirty years or so strongly supports this claim. A variety of tasks have been devised in experiments instructing their subjects to produce random sequences (see literature reviews by Tune, 1964a,b; Wagenaar, 1972a; Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991). In order to bypass the problem of explicating the concept of randomness, which is a n unobservable property of some generating process and not an observable property of finite sequences of outcomes, some of these studies omitted any mention of 'randomness' in their instructions. Instead, they instructed their subjects to simulate the outcomes of familiar 'random devices' such as dice and coins (Bakan, 1960). Regardless of what instructions were used, standard

The average probability estimate of J > 1 judges is generally better than its components. Two studies test 3 predictions regarding averaging that follow from theorems based on a cognitive model of the judges and idealizations of the judgment situation. Prediction 1 is that the average of conditionally pairwise independent estimates will be highly diagnostic, and Prediction 2 is that the average of dependent estimates (differing only by independent error terms) may be well calibrated. Prediction 3 contrasts between-and within-subject averaging. Results demonstrate the predictions' robustness by showing the extent to which they hold as the information conditions depart from the ideal and as J increases. Practical consequences are that (a) substantial improvement can be obtained with as few as 2-6 judges and (b) the decision maker can estimate the nature of the expected improvement by considering the information conditions. On many occasions, experts are required to provide decision makers,or policymakers with subjective probability estimates of uncertain events (Morgan & Henrion, 1990). The extensive literature (e.g., Harvey, 1997; McCleUand & Bolger, 1994) on the topic shows that in general, but with clear exceptions, subjective probability estimates are too extreme, implying overconfidence on the part of the judges. The theoretical challenge is to understand the conditions and the cognitive processes that lead to this overconfidence. The applied challenge is to figure out ways to obtain more realistic and useful estimates. The theoretical developments of Wallsten, Budescu, Erev, and Diederich (1997) provide one route to the applied goals, and they are the focus of this article.

A two-stage within subjects design was used to compare decisions based on numerically and verbally expressed probabilities. In Stage 1, subjects determined approximate equivalences between vague probability expressions, numerical probabilities, and graphical displays. Subsequently, in Stage 2 they bid for (Experiment 1J or rated (Experiment 2) gambles based on the previously equated verbal, numerical, and graphical descriptors. In Stage 1, numerical and verbal judgments were reliable, internally consistent, and monotonically related to the displayed probabilities. However, the numerical judgments were significantly superior in all respects because they were much less variable within and between subjects. In Stage 2, response times, bids, and ratings were inconsistent with both of two opposing sets of predictions, one assuming that imprecise gambles will be avoided and the other that verbal probabilities will be preferred. The entire pattern of results is explained by means of a general model of decision making with vague probabilities which assumes that in the present task, when presented with a vague probability word, people focus on an implied probability interval and sample values within it to resolve the vagueness prior to forming a bid or a rating.

Despite the common reliance on numerical probability estimates in decision research and decision analysis, there is considerable interest in the use of verbal probability expressions to communicate opinion. A method is proposed for obtaining and quantitatively evaluating verbal judgments in which each analyst uses a limited vocabulary that he or she has individually selected and scaled. An experiment compared this method to standard numerical responding under three different payoff conditions. Response mode and payoff never interacted. Probability scores and their components were virtually identical for the two response modes and for all payoff groups. Also, judgments of complementary events were essentially additive under all conditions. The two response modes differed in that the central response category was used more frequently in the numerical than the verbal case, while overconfidence was greater verbally than numerically. Response distributions and degrees of overconfidence w...

of a model to explain the paradox of the same data appearing to suggest over-and underconfidence, depending on how they are analyzed; (b) definitions of true judgment and error; and (c) specific use of judgments transformed to log-odds and a model formulated in those terms. The authors of the present article strongly disagree with the first point and discuss the importance of using models to interpret data. With regard to the second, the authors admit that the constructs of true judgment and error are poorly named but dispute L. Brenner's specific criticisms. Concerning the third, the authors had not claimed that the log-odds metric has any special status in judgment research and thus agree with L. Brenner's basic point. We appreciate the opportunity provided by Brenner's (2000) critique in this issue to clarify some important issues in Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu (1994). Brenner raises three main points. First, he chides us for focusing on "model constructions (true judgments) over observed data" (p. 943). Second, he says that the work "suffers from a basic flaw: the lack of a clear definition of either the true judgment t or the error term e" (p. 944). Third, focusing on our use of the log-odds model, he says that "no compelling rationale was provided by Erev et al. (1994) for the log-odds model, beyond the suggestion that covert confidence should be represented on an unbounded (-»,"») rather than [0, 1] scale" (p. 944). We respond to these criticisms in reverse order so that we may concentrate on the first, which is the most fundamental. With regard to the arbitrariness of the log-odds model, we agree with Brenner. Indeed we wrote, "we make no special claims regarding the log-odds model" (Erev et al., 1994, p. 545). We further stated that its primary virtue is that it is a convenient special case, used for illustrative purposes only, of a much more general model representing a broad class of psychological theories. Our point was not that any particular metric is better than another, but to provide

We review 74 experiments with no, low, or high performance-based financial incentives. The modal Ž . result is no effect on mean performance though variance is usually reduced by higher payment . Higher incentive does improve performance often, typically judgment tasks that are responsive to better effort. Ž . Incentives also reduce ''presentation'' effects e.g., generosity and risk-seeking . Incentive effects are comparable to effects of other variables, particularly ''cognitive capital'' and task ''production'' demands, and interact with those variables, so a narrow-minded focus on incentives alone is misguided. We also note that no replicated study has made rationality violations disappear purely by raising incentives.

As part of a method for assessing health risks associated with primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards, T. B. Feagans and W. F. Biller (Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, May 1981) developed a technique for encoding experts' subjective probabilities regarding dose-response functions. The encoding technique is based on B. O. Koopman's (Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1940, 46, 763-764; Annals of Mathematics, 1940, 41, 269-292) probability theory, which does not require probabilities to be sharp, but rather allows lower and upper probabilities to be associated with an event. Uncertainty about a dose-response function can be expressed either in terms of the response rate expected at a given concentration or, conversely, in terms of the concentration expected to support a given response rate. Feagans and Biller (1981, cited above) derive the relation between the two conditional probabilities, which is easily extended to upper and lower conditional probabilities. These relations were treated as coherence requirements in an experiment utilizing four ozone and four lead experts as subjects, each providing judgments on two separate occasions. Four subjects strongly satisfied the coherence requirements in both conditions, and three more did so in the second session only. The eighth subject also improved in Session 2. Encoded probabilities were highly correlated between the two sessions, but changed from the first to the second in a manner that improved coherence and reflected greater attention to certain parameters of the dose-response function.