Beginning with the publication of Liberal Purposes in 1991, William Galston has developed an appe... more Beginning with the publication of Liberal Purposes in 1991, William Galston has developed an appealing theory of liberal pluralism that entails strong commitments to expressive liberty, political pluralism and Berlinian value pluralism. However, given these commitments, Galston might be expected to be more open to a theory of civic pluralism, understood as recognition and toleration of multiple reasonable conceptions of good citizenship, rather than advancing (as he does) a robust but unitary view of citizenship and civic education. This article offers a modest set of arguments on behalf of civic pluralism, based in part on Galston’s own theory of liberal pluralism, in the hope of prompting him to move in this direction.
Aristotle famously argues that friendship can serve as a normative model for the practice of citi... more Aristotle famously argues that friendship can serve as a normative model for the practice of citizenship, and this view has been widely accepted by neo-Aristotelians. Liberals, however, are quick to reject both Aristotle’s view of friendship and his view of citizenship. Does this mean that the concept of friendship is politically irrelevant for liberalism? This essay suggests, on the contrary, that the concept of friendship is far from obsolete, even for liberals. Specifically, communicative constraints derived from the norms of friendship, as interpreted by Ralph Waldo Emerson, could serve to promote the modest instrumental purposes of liberal citizenship—personal freedom, social justice, and civil peace—while simultaneously allowing the practice of liberal citizenship to develop in noninstrumental directions, enriched rather than strained by the multicultural realities of most modern societies.
Historically many political theorists have closely associated the practice of politics with the d... more Historically many political theorists have closely associated the practice of politics with the disposition of courage. During the past two centuries or so, however, some theorists—particularly liberals—have striven to tame the concept of politics, emphasizing the importance of gentler qualities such as toleration, civility, compassion, and reasonableness over the more bellicose quality of courage. But liberals are far from unanimous on this point. Judith Shklar, for instance, is more ambivalent about courage, recognizing both the continued relevance of moral courage for liberalism's long, difficult struggle against cruelty and fear and, at the same time, acknowledging the dangers of endowing the concept of politics with a heroic quality. Taking Shklar's ambivalence as a starting place, this article explores the current relevance of courage for politics.
Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choic... more Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choices between incommensurable values. In this instance, the choice appears to be between personal freedom and autonomy, on one hand, and civic virtue and good citizenship, on the other. To promote a reasonably high level of civic virtue and good citizenship, freedom and autonomy may need to be limited in appreciable ways. Likewise, to secure a high level of freedom and autonomy, liberal democratic societies will likely have to endure a scarcity of virtue. This paper argues that liberal democratic states may safely promote civic education, but only when it is based on civic pluralism, as opposed to some unitary scheme. Young citizens (at about secondary education level) could be exposed to a range of rival views of good citizenship, rather than indoctrinated into any officially prescribed view. Similarly, the workings of the current U.S. political system could be presented with explicit reference to different modes of political participation. The paper examines prominent civic and liberal theories of civic education and argues that neither is likely to provide a sufficient pool of civic capital for liberal democracies. It limits discussion to a few representative figures. The paper elaborates on the suggestion that liberal democracies are best served by civic education based on civic pluralism. Finally, it explains why (and how) the number and range of views of good citizenship presented to young citizens must be limited, even within a pluralistic scheme of civic education. Includes 73 notes. (BT) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.
Aristotle famously argues that friendship can serve as a normative model for the practice of citi... more Aristotle famously argues that friendship can serve as a normative model for the practice of citizenship, and this view has been widely accepted by neo-Aristotelians. Liberals, however, are quick to reject both Aristotle’s view of friendship and his view of citizenship. Does this mean that the concept of friendship is politically irrelevant for liberalism? This essay suggests, on the contrary, that the concept of friendship is far from obsolete, even for liberals. Specifically, communicative constraints derived from the norms of friendship, as interpreted by Ralph Waldo Emerson, could serve to promote the modest instrumental purposes of liberal citizenship—personal freedom, social justice, and civil peace—while simultaneously allowing the practice of liberal citizenship to develop in noninstrumental directions, enriched rather than strained by the multicultural realities of most modern societies.
Historically many political theorists have closely associated the practice of politics with the d... more Historically many political theorists have closely associated the practice of politics with the disposition of courage. During the past two centuries or so, however, some theorists—particularly liberals—have striven to tame the concept of politics, emphasizing the importance of gentler qualities such as toleration, civility, compassion, and reasonableness over the more bellicose quality of courage. But liberals are far from unanimous on this point. Judith Shklar, for instance, is more ambivalent about courage, recognizing both the continued relevance of moral courage for liberalism's long, difficult struggle against cruelty and fear and, at the same time, acknowledging the dangers of endowing the concept of politics with a heroic quality. Taking Shklar's ambivalence as a starting place, this article explores the current relevance of courage for politics.
Cambridge Journals Online (CJO) is the e-publishing service for over 270 journals published by Ca... more Cambridge Journals Online (CJO) is the e-publishing service for over 270 journals published by Cambridge University Press and is entirely developed and hosted in-house. The platform's powerful capacity and reliable performance are maintained by a combination of our own expertise ...
... Jack Crittenden's cri-tique of American democracy, however, identi-fies ... more ... Jack Crittenden's cri-tique of American democracy, however, identi-fies two significant failures where deliberation is concerned. ... On this point, Crittenden is in agreement with Stephen Macedo (Diversity and Distrust, 2000) but not with Eamonn Callan, who has argued that ...
Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choic... more Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choices between incommensurable values. In this instance, the choice appears to be between personal freedom and autonomy, on one hand, and civic virtue and good citizenship, on the other. To promote a reasonably high level of civic virtue and good citizenship, freedom and autonomy may need to be limited in appreciable ways. Likewise, to secure a high level of freedom and autonomy, liberal democratic societies will likely have to endure a scarcity of virtue. This paper argues that liberal democratic states may safely promote civic education, but only when it is based on civic pluralism, as opposed to some unitary scheme. Young citizens (at about secondary education level) could be exposed to a range of rival views of good citizenship, rather than indoctrinated into any officially prescribed view. Similarly, the workings of the current U.S. political system could be presented with explicit reference to different modes of political participation. The paper examines prominent civic and liberal theories of civic education and argues that neither is likely to provide a sufficient pool of civic capital for liberal democracies. It limits discussion to a few representative figures. The paper elaborates on the suggestion that liberal democracies are best served by civic education based on civic pluralism. Finally, it explains why (and how) the number and range of views of good citizenship presented to young citizens must be limited, even within a pluralistic scheme of civic education. Includes 73 notes. (BT) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.
Beginning with the publication of Liberal Purposes in 1991, William Galston has developed an appe... more Beginning with the publication of Liberal Purposes in 1991, William Galston has developed an appealing theory of liberal pluralism that entails strong commitments to expressive liberty, political pluralism and Berlinian value pluralism. However, given these commitments, Galston might be expected to be more open to a theory of civic pluralism, understood as recognition and toleration of multiple reasonable conceptions of good citizenship, rather than advancing (as he does) a robust but unitary view of citizenship and civic education. This article offers a modest set of arguments on behalf of civic pluralism, based in part on Galston’s own theory of liberal pluralism, in the hope of prompting him to move in this direction.
Aristotle famously argues that friendship can serve as a normative model for the practice of citi... more Aristotle famously argues that friendship can serve as a normative model for the practice of citizenship, and this view has been widely accepted by neo-Aristotelians. Liberals, however, are quick to reject both Aristotle’s view of friendship and his view of citizenship. Does this mean that the concept of friendship is politically irrelevant for liberalism? This essay suggests, on the contrary, that the concept of friendship is far from obsolete, even for liberals. Specifically, communicative constraints derived from the norms of friendship, as interpreted by Ralph Waldo Emerson, could serve to promote the modest instrumental purposes of liberal citizenship—personal freedom, social justice, and civil peace—while simultaneously allowing the practice of liberal citizenship to develop in noninstrumental directions, enriched rather than strained by the multicultural realities of most modern societies.
Historically many political theorists have closely associated the practice of politics with the d... more Historically many political theorists have closely associated the practice of politics with the disposition of courage. During the past two centuries or so, however, some theorists—particularly liberals—have striven to tame the concept of politics, emphasizing the importance of gentler qualities such as toleration, civility, compassion, and reasonableness over the more bellicose quality of courage. But liberals are far from unanimous on this point. Judith Shklar, for instance, is more ambivalent about courage, recognizing both the continued relevance of moral courage for liberalism's long, difficult struggle against cruelty and fear and, at the same time, acknowledging the dangers of endowing the concept of politics with a heroic quality. Taking Shklar's ambivalence as a starting place, this article explores the current relevance of courage for politics.
Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choic... more Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choices between incommensurable values. In this instance, the choice appears to be between personal freedom and autonomy, on one hand, and civic virtue and good citizenship, on the other. To promote a reasonably high level of civic virtue and good citizenship, freedom and autonomy may need to be limited in appreciable ways. Likewise, to secure a high level of freedom and autonomy, liberal democratic societies will likely have to endure a scarcity of virtue. This paper argues that liberal democratic states may safely promote civic education, but only when it is based on civic pluralism, as opposed to some unitary scheme. Young citizens (at about secondary education level) could be exposed to a range of rival views of good citizenship, rather than indoctrinated into any officially prescribed view. Similarly, the workings of the current U.S. political system could be presented with explicit reference to different modes of political participation. The paper examines prominent civic and liberal theories of civic education and argues that neither is likely to provide a sufficient pool of civic capital for liberal democracies. It limits discussion to a few representative figures. The paper elaborates on the suggestion that liberal democracies are best served by civic education based on civic pluralism. Finally, it explains why (and how) the number and range of views of good citizenship presented to young citizens must be limited, even within a pluralistic scheme of civic education. Includes 73 notes. (BT) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.
Aristotle famously argues that friendship can serve as a normative model for the practice of citi... more Aristotle famously argues that friendship can serve as a normative model for the practice of citizenship, and this view has been widely accepted by neo-Aristotelians. Liberals, however, are quick to reject both Aristotle’s view of friendship and his view of citizenship. Does this mean that the concept of friendship is politically irrelevant for liberalism? This essay suggests, on the contrary, that the concept of friendship is far from obsolete, even for liberals. Specifically, communicative constraints derived from the norms of friendship, as interpreted by Ralph Waldo Emerson, could serve to promote the modest instrumental purposes of liberal citizenship—personal freedom, social justice, and civil peace—while simultaneously allowing the practice of liberal citizenship to develop in noninstrumental directions, enriched rather than strained by the multicultural realities of most modern societies.
Historically many political theorists have closely associated the practice of politics with the d... more Historically many political theorists have closely associated the practice of politics with the disposition of courage. During the past two centuries or so, however, some theorists—particularly liberals—have striven to tame the concept of politics, emphasizing the importance of gentler qualities such as toleration, civility, compassion, and reasonableness over the more bellicose quality of courage. But liberals are far from unanimous on this point. Judith Shklar, for instance, is more ambivalent about courage, recognizing both the continued relevance of moral courage for liberalism's long, difficult struggle against cruelty and fear and, at the same time, acknowledging the dangers of endowing the concept of politics with a heroic quality. Taking Shklar's ambivalence as a starting place, this article explores the current relevance of courage for politics.
Cambridge Journals Online (CJO) is the e-publishing service for over 270 journals published by Ca... more Cambridge Journals Online (CJO) is the e-publishing service for over 270 journals published by Cambridge University Press and is entirely developed and hosted in-house. The platform's powerful capacity and reliable performance are maintained by a combination of our own expertise ...
... Jack Crittenden's cri-tique of American democracy, however, identi-fies ... more ... Jack Crittenden's cri-tique of American democracy, however, identi-fies two significant failures where deliberation is concerned. ... On this point, Crittenden is in agreement with Stephen Macedo (Diversity and Distrust, 2000) but not with Eamonn Callan, who has argued that ...
Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choic... more Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choices between incommensurable values. In this instance, the choice appears to be between personal freedom and autonomy, on one hand, and civic virtue and good citizenship, on the other. To promote a reasonably high level of civic virtue and good citizenship, freedom and autonomy may need to be limited in appreciable ways. Likewise, to secure a high level of freedom and autonomy, liberal democratic societies will likely have to endure a scarcity of virtue. This paper argues that liberal democratic states may safely promote civic education, but only when it is based on civic pluralism, as opposed to some unitary scheme. Young citizens (at about secondary education level) could be exposed to a range of rival views of good citizenship, rather than indoctrinated into any officially prescribed view. Similarly, the workings of the current U.S. political system could be presented with explicit reference to different modes of political participation. The paper examines prominent civic and liberal theories of civic education and argues that neither is likely to provide a sufficient pool of civic capital for liberal democracies. It limits discussion to a few representative figures. The paper elaborates on the suggestion that liberal democracies are best served by civic education based on civic pluralism. Finally, it explains why (and how) the number and range of views of good citizenship presented to young citizens must be limited, even within a pluralistic scheme of civic education. Includes 73 notes. (BT) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.
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