Papers by Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen
Index of Names
Northern European Overture to War, 1939-1941, 2013
Force Postures and European Security
Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 1986
Conventional military forces can be structured for operational versatility, or they can be struct... more Conventional military forces can be structured for operational versatility, or they can be structured for a limited set of missions. They can be equally capable of offensive and defensive operations, or they can be specialised for the defensive.
Chapter Six. The Development Of The Air Defence Of Copenhagen
BRILL eBooks, 2011
Military history and experience was considered highly relevant both by politicians and the profes... more Military history and experience was considered highly relevant both by politicians and the professional military in Europe at the beginning of the last century. The natural place to be developed into a fortress was Copenhagen. The artillery defence should be supplemented with a low-level air defence of fourteen light double machine-gun positions on buildings in the city. While the army was making the final calculations to prepare for the deployment of a basic air defence structure, the navy was able to demonstrate its first 'anti-balloon' cannon to the king on 9th December 1915, when the monarch visited the coastal artillery ship Peter Skram . Any further development depended on the acquisition of additional suitable equipment. The combination of air defence weapons covering the Tune Position would create an additional forward defence to the southeast. Keywords: army development; Copenhagen air defence
Foreign Military Assistance
Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2003
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have now succeeded in achieving the main goal of their security po... more Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have now succeeded in achieving the main goal of their security policy aspirations: all three were invited to join NATO at the November Prague Summit. The mature political and economic development in the three-very different-states has made this step natural. During the last five or so years the three have also gradually accelerated their efforts to prepare their developing armed forces for a role in the Alliance. This task has not been and will not be easy. One of the reasons is that this task included first a build-up from scratch and thereafter a total reform of those first structures. The latter challenge is similar to that required everywhere in the Central and Eastern European armed forces: to make them focused and cost-effective. This article will cover different key aspects of the security reform needs in all these states, thereby indirectly covering the security situation in the Baltic States since 1991 and into the coming years. It is built on eight years of observation, study, conversations, and work in the three states as an insider, albeit one with the perspective of an outsider. In the last three years, the regional perspective has been supplemented and enriched with observations and conversations in several other Central and East European countries. The initial build-up of the Baltic states' armed forces In the period immediately following independence, the build-up of the armed forces was seen as urgent. During the first few years, there was an acute perception of threat. The Russian occupation troops were still present, and statements from a variety of sources in the Russian Federation reinforced the inherently problematic nature of their presence. Something had to be done, quickly, to develop the ability to fight back. This was not easy. Cadres for the armed forces had to be recruited. Some were found among the limited number of relatively untainted professionals from the Soviet Armed Forces. Others came from the volunteer cadres of the home guard forces that were created or recreated in 1990-91. The latter group was supplemented with officers, normally retired, from the Baltic diaspora in the U.S. and elsewhere. A strained relationship between these two groups and their political friends added to the problems on several occasions. None had any experience in building and operating armed forces in small democracies. © The operational forces must be organized as flexible "tool boxes," where the elements are equipped and well exercised in cooperation between themselves and with forces from other states.
Historisk Tidsskrift, 1990
Index of Names
BRILL eBooks, 2013
The Armoured Commerce Raider: The Concept that Guided German Naval Lobbying for Control of Norway
BRILL eBooks, 2013
Northern European Overture to War offers an international perspective on the diplomatic and milit... more Northern European Overture to War offers an international perspective on the diplomatic and military factors that shaped the course of events in Northern Europe as the region became increasingly drawn into the wider great power war.
Professional De-learning: The Dry Rot of Brain and Soul of the Danish Army 1998-2017Tørråddet af den danske hærs hjerne og sjæl 1998-2017
Historisk Tidsskrift, 1989
When you want to inspire a young man or woman to become a good and motivated professional officer... more When you want to inspire a young man or woman to become a good and motivated professional officer in one of the armed services and then one of their branches, you should use national, service and unit history both as a bait and tool. Thereby you can offer a framework for the junior officer’s initial efforts by presenting the organisation’s roots and highlight the hoped for professional ethos, and it can present a well-illustrated role models copy.
It is almost an impossible challenge for the military professional to predict how a hypothetical ... more It is almost an impossible challenge for the military professional to predict how a hypothetical future conflict will run and end. When advising politicians, professional leaders will seek to present options that they estimate can bring the relatively cheap, early, and acceptable conclusion that both they and their Government hope for. However, the opponent is an independent actor, and he will do everything possible to avoid or at least delay an unfavourable outcome, and all action and interaction in war is influenced by friction and chance. Another reason why prediction is exceedingly difficult is that even known technologies have not been tested under realistic conditions. If the conflict lasts longer than a few months, latent or immature technologies will be developed to a level where they can influence the outcome of the conflict in a decisive way. It is not only the opponent that is an independent actor, so are allies and formally neutral states, and it is very hard to predict ...
On 14 June 1916 the Danish army purchasing officer in London, Cavalry Major Count Frederik ”Fritz... more On 14 June 1916 the Danish army purchasing officer in London, Cavalry Major Count Frederik ”Fritz” Moltke, had a working lunch with his contact in the Admiralty, the Danish language speaking Lieutenant Commander Frank Stagg. From the next table a MI5 counter-intelligence officer monitored the conversation that was meant to expose Moltke as a German spy and pass him incorrect information about the recent naval battle off Jutland. Later that summer Denmark was forced to transfer Moltke to the U.S., but at that time the disinformation passed to him and reinforced by the Danish Minister in London had already worsened a senses in Copenhagen that Denmark was moving closer to involvement in the war. The article follows the chain of disinformation and events.
On retiring in spring 1907, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson assisted his respected First Sea Lord, John... more On retiring in spring 1907, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson assisted his respected First Sea Lord, John Fisher, by consolidating their common ideas into a memorandum about how to defeat Germany quickly via the destruction of the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea, thereby creating an alternative to sending the army to the Continent. His memo mirrored the observational blockade concepts of Captain George Ballard and the work of Captain Henry Jackson on how to employ wireless telegraphy in fleet command and control. This article follows how these ideas in interplay with experience from the annual manoeuvres influenced the developing war planning up to the start of the war in summer 1914.
Billedet på bagsiden af tidsskriftet: Dansk Militaerhistorisk Kommissions logo: Det aeldste bille... more Billedet på bagsiden af tidsskriftet: Dansk Militaerhistorisk Kommissions logo: Det aeldste billede af en dansk soldat, landsknaegt fra Den Store Garde i Kong Hans' haer under operationerne i Ditmarsken i vinteren 1500. Traesnit fra en skillingsvise.
Bondefanget til borgerkrigen: Det danske korstog til ærkeenglen Michaels by
Slagmark - Tidsskrift for idéhistorie, 2018
Hvilke muligheder er der for at udvikle de følelsesmæssige bånd mellem verdens borgere, således a... more Hvilke muligheder er der for at udvikle de følelsesmæssige bånd mellem verdens borgere, således at risikoen for fremmedhad mindskes, det fremmedhad, der kan være medvirkende til at få folk til at acceptere krigen, fordi de andre er anderledes?"
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Papers by Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen