Papers by Fabian Freyenhagen
Oxford Handbook to Adorno, 2024
Ever since the West German student movement came into conflict with T.W. Adorno in the 1960s, the... more Ever since the West German student movement came into conflict with T.W. Adorno in the 1960s, the question of whether his theory and praxis were in some sort of problematic relationship has not gone away. In this Chapter, I will partially defend Adorno's views on theory and (political) praxis, focusing particularly on the 1960s. It is a defense because I will suggest that, in significant respects, Adorno's theory and practice were not in contradiction with each other but cohering well. Moreover, I will suggest that we can learn from his stance how to think about and engage in politicsspecifically from his contextualism and his emphasis on immersion in a local context. It is, however, merely a partial defense. I identify some tensions between Adorno's theory and practical stance that have gone unnoticed so far, contrasting his stance to that of Marcuse, notably in relation to paying sufficient attention to interrelations between local contexts, and the lack of an account of a global subject of change.
Krisis, 2021
A mini-essay reflecting on how Adorno's mid-20th century claim about how sickness proper to that ... more A mini-essay reflecting on how Adorno's mid-20th century claim about how sickness proper to that time was normality has been inverted in the 2020s to normality proper to our time is sickness, and yet the underlying problem of living in sick social normalities has remained the same.
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2020
This paper probes the format and underlying assumptions of insight conceptualizations and assessm... more This paper probes the format and underlying assumptions of insight conceptualizations and assessment procedures in psychiatry. It does so with reference to the oftenneglected perspective of the assessed person. It delineates what the mental steps involved in an insight assessment are for the assessed person, and how they become affected by the context and dynamics of the clinical setting. The paper examines how expectations of compliance in insight assessment tools and procedures extend far beyond treatment adherence, to compliance with diagnostic language and the assessment relationship. Such compliance can be ethically problematic and not in line with human rights standards, notably the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Most importantly, it can be counterproductive in supporting an individual to gain better insight in the sense of self-knowledge. The paper concludes with guidelines for a new approach to insight. This new approach requires taking into account currently neglected components of insight, in particular its relational and social dimensions, through which a person's insight operates and develops, and through which it could be supported. Concretely, this would mean removing the condition of compliance and reflecting on the influence of the clinician-patient relationship and assessment situation on insight.
International Journal of Law in Context, 2013
Mental capacity and autonomy are often understood to be normatively neutral – the only values or ... more Mental capacity and autonomy are often understood to be normatively neutral – the only values or other norms they may presuppose are those the assessed person does or would accept. We show how mental disorder threatens normatively neutral accounts of autonomy. These accounts produce false positives, particularly in the case of disorders (such as depression, anorexia nervosa and schizophrenia) that affect evaluative abilities. Two normatively neutral strategies for handling autonomy-undermining disorder are explored and rejected: a blanket exclusion of mental disorder, and functional tests requiring consistency, expression of identity, reflective non-alienation or lack of compulsion. Finally, we suggest ways in which substantivist alternatives to neutrality can be made more promising through increased transparency, democratic contestability of conditions for capacity and autonomy, and a historically sensitive caution concerning restrictions of liberty.
![Research paper thumbnail of Dogmatischer Dogmatismusvorwurf: Eine Replik auf Stefan Müller-Doohm und Roman Yos [‘Dogmatic Allegation of Dogmatism: A Reply to Stefan Müller-Doohm and Roman Yos’]](https://a.academia-assets.com/images/blank-paper.jpg)
Does theorising always presuppose a programme of justification? Does the Critical Theory of Adorn... more Does theorising always presuppose a programme of justification? Does the Critical Theory of Adorno and Horkheimer do so? Do they claim it does? The answer should be a resounding ‘no’ to all three question. In regard to the second and third question, I had sketched an argument to that effect in an earlier paper in this journal. In this paper, I offer a rejoinder to the critical reply offered by Stefan Muller-Doohm und Roman Yos on behalf of the Habermasian main- stream in Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This rejoinder depends on giving a negative answer also to the first question. In rejecting the Habermasian idea of a programme of justification, I stand accused of dogmatism and, following on from this, decisionism (for how else than by an arbitrary decision can one choose among dogmas?). I reveal that this accusation itself betrays a certain dogma- tism – insofar as it accepts that such a programme of justification is undeniably possible and required, without consideration of evid...
Traducao, por Ivan Rodrigues, de: FREYENHAGEN, Fabian. “Was ist orthodoxe Kritische Theorie?”. De... more Traducao, por Ivan Rodrigues, de: FREYENHAGEN, Fabian. “Was ist orthodoxe Kritische Theorie?”. Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie 65 (3), p. 456-469, 2017. Resumo do artigo: Lukacs formulou a famosa questao: "O que e marxismo ortodoxo?". Sua resposta foi que certo metodo seria a quintessencia do marxismo. E se levantarmos a questao ortodoxa em relacao a Teoria Critica? Nesse caso, a resposta, proponho, nao e um metodo particular. Alem disso, o que e critico na Teoria Critica tampouco e – contrariamente as opinioes prevalentes na literatura – um programa de fundamentacao. Na verdade, somente sem tal programa, a Teoria Critica pode ser adequada e apropriadamente critica. A posicao que defendo retorna a insights dos escritos de Horkheimer dos anos 1930 (e a obra de Adorno). Entretanto, essa posicao tambem e ortodoxa noutro sentido: ela toma a conviccao de um interesse partidario – o interesse em abolir a injustica social, a miseria e a falta de liberdade – como o unico crit...
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
Kantian Review
Must we ascribe hope for better times to those who (take themselves to) act morally? Kant and lat... more Must we ascribe hope for better times to those who (take themselves to) act morally? Kant and later theorists in the Frankfurt School tradition thought we must. In this article, I disclose that it is possible – and ethical – to refrain from ascribing hope in all such cases. I draw on two key examples of acting irrespective of hope: one from a recent political context and one from the life of Jean Améry. I also suggest that, once we see that it is possible to make sense of (what I call) ‘merely expressive acts’, we can also see that the early Frankfurt School was not guilty of a performative contradiction in seeking to enlighten Enlightenment about its (self-)destructive tendencies, while rejecting the (providential) idea of progress.
Kantian Review
Must we ascribe hope for better times to those who (take themselves to) act morally? Kant and lat... more Must we ascribe hope for better times to those who (take themselves to) act morally? Kant and later theorists in the Frankfurt School tradition thought we must. In this article, I disclose that it is possible – and ethical – to refrain from ascribing hope in all such cases. I draw on two key examples of acting irrespective of hope: one from a recent political context and one from the life of Jean Améry. I also suggest that, once we see that it is possible to make sense of (what I call) ‘merely expressive acts’, we can also see that the early Frankfurt School was not guilty of a performative contradiction in seeking to enlighten Enlightenment about its (self-)destructive tendencies, while rejecting the (providential) idea of progress.
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
Critical Theory is an umbrella term to denote those theorists who take up the task described by K... more Critical Theory is an umbrella term to denote those theorists who take up the task described by Karl Marx as the self-clarification of the age struggles and wishes of the age. As such, two elements are crucial: (a) a connection to social and political struggles of emancipation, and (b) self-reflexivity.Critical Theorists differ—sometimes quite fundamentally—about what these two elements require (and how they relate). For example, some such theorists (such as Max Horkheimer or Michel Foucault) take the normative orientations of struggles for emancipation as something that does not require grounding at the level of theorizing, while others (such as Jürgen Habermas) think such grounding is the main task of Critical Theory, securing moral validity for the struggles. These substantive differences also mean that there are no accepted methods on which all Critical Theorists would agree. To stay with the example, those Critical Theorists who reject discursive grounding of its normative stan...
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
Lukács’ famously asked: “What is orthodox Marxism?” His answer was that a certain method was quin... more Lukács’ famously asked: “What is orthodox Marxism?” His answer was that a certain method was quintessential. What if we ask the orthodox question about Critical Theory? The answer in this case, I propose, is not a particular method. Moreover, what’s critical about Critical Theory is also not – contrary to prevailing opinions in the literature – a program of justification. In fact, only without such a program can Critical Theory be adequately and appropriately critical. The position I advocate returns to insights from Horkheimer’s writings of the 1930s (and Adorno’s work). Indeed, it is also orthodox in another sense: taking the conviction of a partisan interest – the interest in abolishing social injustice, misery and unfreedom – as the only general criterion for Critical Theory. Its task is to contribute to the struggle against the aforementioned negative elements through conceptual work, self-reflection, and a critical appropriation of the genuine insights of traditional theorisin...
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology, 2000
Critical Theory has an uneasy relationship to philosophy, and it is a complex question whether it... more Critical Theory has an uneasy relationship to philosophy, and it is a complex question whether it constitutes a philosophical position at all: it both aims to leave philosophy behind and insists on the need for it.
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2015
In this article, I argue that autonomy has to be conceived substantively in order to serve as the... more In this article, I argue that autonomy has to be conceived substantively in order to serve as the qualifying condition for receiving the full set of individual liberal rights. I show that the common distinction between content-neutral and substantive accounts of autonomy is riddled with confusion and ambiguities, and provide a clear alternative taxonomy.At least insofar as we are concerned with liberal settings, the real question is whether or not the value(s) and norm(s) implied by an account of autonomy are acceptable to reasonable people, not whether these accounts are content-neutral, procedural or input-focused. Finally, I demonstrate how substantive constraints are compatible with, or even implied in, the notion of autonomy at play in (Rawls's) political liberalism. Overall, I present a normative reconstruction, clarification, and internal critique of liberalism, drawing on case law and statutes from England and Wales. with liberal settings, the real question is instead whether or not the value(s) and norm(s) implied by an account of autonomy are acceptable to reasonable people, not whether they are content-neutral or-partisan, procedural or non-procedural, input-or output-focused. My aim is a normative reconstruction, clarification, and internal critique of liberal practices and theories, not a defence of them against non-liberals (or even an endorsement of them). I am particularly concerned with those contemporary liberal theories that bs_bs_banner
Journal of European Studies, 2008
Telos, 2011
There is a perennial problem affecting Adorno's philosophy. It seems to lack the resources to acc... more There is a perennial problem affecting Adorno's philosophy. It seems to lack the resources to account for the normativity it contains. In an influential article, Finlayson has analyzed this problem and offered an intriguing solution to it. 1 According to Finlayson, Adorno subscribes to a normative ethics, but this normative commitment is in tension with his view that we cannot know the good or any positive values (in short, with his negativism). Finlayson argues that by drawing only on resources within Adorno's philosophy, it is, however, possible to provide access to a kind of good which is suitable as a normative basis for his ethics (namely, the good involved in the experiences of having ineffable insights), and this is the best way to resolve the tension between Adorno's normative commitment and his negativism. In this paper, I show that this proposal is unsuitable as (1) a normative basis of Adorno's ethics and also as (2) an explanation of the possibility of people acting according to this ethics. I end by outlining an alternative solution and by defending it against Finlayson's objections. II. Finlayson 's reconstruction of Adorno's ethics According to Finlayson, Adorno subscribes to an "ethics of resistance." 2 This ethics is a normative ethics insofar as it tells us how we should live in the late capitalist social world. It also provides a rationale for why we should live in the way it requires us to live. This rationale takes the form of a "new categorical imperative", which demands of us to arrange our "thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself." 3 In particular, this involves the requirement to resist the social * Among those who have commented and criticized earlier drafts of this paper, I would especially like to thank J.G.
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Papers by Fabian Freyenhagen