Historia del Iusnaturalismo y su Evolución
Temas abordados
Historia del Iusnaturalismo y su Evolución
Temas abordados
Ancient iusnaturalism emerged during a period of cultural and civilizational crisis in the West, with thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates laying the foundations of a 'naturalist tradition' that influenced both Roman and Medieval Christian thought. It establishes connections to concepts like 'Dikaion Thesei' and 'Dikaion physei' in Greek, and terms like 'ius,' 'fas,' and 'mores' in Roman law, emphasizing natural law's divine derivation. In contrast, modern juridical rationalism arose during the 17th and 18th centuries, advancing with Enlightenment and changes like the discovery of America and the Reformation, favoring codification over natural origins and addressing issues like state relations and legal voids through a more secular and nationalistic lens .
Modernity, solidified through doctrines taught in Protestant and later Catholic educational institutions from the 17th and 18th centuries, produced a shift towards a rationalized codified legal system during Enlightenment. This period saw the decline of unified religious doctrine, political fragmentation with the rise of nation-states, advances in scientific understanding, and new geographical discoveries, all of which challenged the traditional reliance on natural law, leading to its displacement by a more positivist and secular legal framework .
Geny's reasoning and neo-iusnaturalism focus on deriving legal principles from the fundamental characteristics inherent in human nature and reality, a concept lauded during the 'second resurrección' of iusnaturalism. Hume's critique, however, questions the normative implications of deriving 'ought' from 'is,' critiquing the extrapolation from natural states of affairs to prescriptive justice principles, which challenges the rational consistency of such iusnaturalist arguments and their practical legal applications .
Cicero's concept of natural law transcended temporal and spatial constraints, emphasizing its immutable and eternal nature, thus providing a foundation for modern iusnaturalism. This perspective was unusual for Roman jurists who typically did not engage with such abstract and philosophical conceptions of law, focusing instead on practical legal matters and precedents. Cicero's approach represented a philosophical deviation amidst a predominantly empirical Roman legal tradition .
Codification, by aspiring to encapsulate all legal principles as products of legislative acts, displaced the role of natural law as an interpretative and integrative mechanism within legal discourse. Codification made law an outcome solely of the legislator’s will, relegating natural law principles to theoretical rather than practical application, thereby contributing to a crisis where natural law's validity and necessity were questioned within a positivist framework oriented towards legal stability and precision .
Iusnaturalism asserts a necessary connection between law and morality; an immoral law is not truly a law. Legal positivism, as articulated by Hart following Bentham, posits a strict separation where law and morality are contingently connected and a law remains a law regardless of moral judgment. This separation allows for moral critique of legal systems, maintaining that unjust laws do not lose their legal status, while iusnaturalism may obscure moral critique by insisting on holiness of law .
Contemporary neo-iusnaturalism is more influenced by ancient iusnaturalism as it seeks to reassert the relevance of natural law which posits a universal, often divine, justice beyond human law, perceived as lost amid the mechanistic and secular focus of modern juridical rationalism. This revival reflects a desire for moral and ethical dimensions in law that are timeless and transcendental, offering an alternative to the positivist legal frameworks dominant in the modern world, viewed as overly rigid and disconnected from morality .
In Greek thought, 'dikaion' combines the notions of natural and positive law, suggesting that justice is both mutable and immutable depending on a natural or legal framework. The Greeks viewed justice as mutable within the context of imposed laws ('Dikaion Thesei') but immutable when aligned with natural truths ('Dikaion physei'). In contrast, Roman 'ius' differentiated more clearly, attributing legal understanding to 'justice,' 'custom' ('mores'), and 'religious law' ('fas'). Romans specialized in jurisprudence, emphasizing a distinct juridical literature, unlike the predominantly rhetoric-focused Greek traditions .
Radbruch's formula suggests that when legal statutes reach a level of injustice intolerable to justice itself, such laws could be voided of their legal status, allowing disobedience. In the case of excessively high taxes, if deemed intolerably unjust, Radbruch’s principle supports their reconsideration or repeal. However, practical application often demands a legal framework to address and potentially revise such laws rather than outright disobedience or nullification, highlighting the tension between legality and morality .
Iusnaturalism incorporates both rationalist and voluntarist elements. The rationalist perspective, inaugurated by Hugo Grotius, emphasizes respect for pacts and the rational derivation of legal principles, advocating for an international law based on consensual agreements beyond mere customary practice. Alternatively, the voluntarist perspective, championed by Hobbes, centers on legislative will, positing that legality derives from explicit legal prohibition rather than inherent rational principles, highlighting the scepticism towards autonomous legal reasoning without legislative backing .