Avances en Política Comparada 2012
Avances en Política Comparada 2012
Política Comparada
ISSN: 1390-4248 • diciembre 2012 • Volumen Nº. 6
Índice
Editorial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7
Parte 1:
PersPectivas teóricas
Parte 2:
régimen Político y formas de goBierno
El presidencialismo: análisis y
diseños institucionales en su contexto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49-76
dieter nohlen
Parte 4
reseñas BiBliográficas
na de las evidencias más claras para determinar el avance y mejora cualitativa del 5
U conocimiento científico tiene que ver con las propiedades de sus conceptos y los
criterios que usamos para medirlos.
lo que se acaba de afirmar no solo ocurre en una gran variedad de disciplinas científicas sino
también en el campo de la política comparada. las propiedades de los conceptos y los criterios
que usamos para medirlos se han complejizado a medida que nuestro objeto de estudio se lo ha
analizado desde puntos de vista más diversos, producto del grado de especialización de las dife-
rentes subdisciplinas pero al mismo tiempo de la integración del conocimiento.
Una muestra de ello son los trabajos que se presentan en este volumen de la revista
latinoamericana de Política comparada. no solo representan un aporte a los estudios ya
tradicionales sobre democracia e instituciones políticas sino que incluso indagan sobre
campos de estudio que comienzan a tener mayor preocupación por los especialistas como
son la calidad del gobierno, epistemología de la democracia, entre otros.
en la primera parte de la revista, el artículo del profesor Bo rothstein, “Quality of
government and epistemic democracy” pone en discusión un aspecto ausente en los estu-
dios comparados como es la relación que puede establecerse entre bienestar humano y
democracia. aunque siempre van a existir discrepancias para determinar si un país es o no
democrático –ya que mucho depende de la definición que usemos– uno de los aspectos
que también genera polémica tiene que ver con la forma de medir un sistema político.
rothstein, en el ámbito de la epistemología de la democracia, evidencia las dificultades que
existen para encontrar correlaciones positivas entre los indicadores estándar de democracia
y con los usados para medir el grado de bienestar humano. no obstante, a pesar de las
complicaciones que esto puede ocasionar, rothstein encuentra correlaciones positivas
entre los indicadores de la gobernanza o calidad del gobierno como corrupción, grado de
imparcialidad de la administración pública o respeto de los principios del estado de dere-
cho con las mediciones acerca del bienestar humano.
Perspectivas teóricas
Quality of Government and
Epistemic Democracy
Bo Rothstein
Abstract 11
a number of measures on human well-being are now available. in addition to the more traditional ones
such as infant and child mortality and other measures of population health, there are now measure of sub-
jective well-being (“happiness), interpersonal trust, years of schooling, percentage of children living in
poverty, literacy, gender equality, access to safe water, violent conflicts and people’s perception of the legit-
imacy of their government. the question is to know what extent politics can explain the huge variation
that exists between countries in these measures of human well-being. from the viewpoint of epistemic
democracy, a normatively quite troubling picture emerges from these data. since we now also have meas-
ures of to what extent countries are democratic, it turns is very difficult to find positive correlations
between the standard measures of democracy and the measures of human well-being. However, measures
of “good governance” or “quality of government” such as control of corruption, degree of impartiality in
the public administration and the respect for rule of law principles, have strong positive effects of most
measures of human well-being. this article argues that this can be explained by a neglected epistemic fac-
tor in measures of the quality of governments, namely the importance of merit-based recruitment to the
civil service.
Keywords: quality of government, good governance, absence of corruption, epistemic democracy, impar-
tiality
Resumen
en la actualidad existe un gran número de indicadores del bienestar de una sociedad. adicionalmente a
aquellos tradicionales como la tasa de mortalidad, y otras medidas acerca de la salud, existe ahora una pre-
ocupación por establecer el bienestar subjetivo de una persona, (la “felicidad”), confianza interpersonal,
años de escolaridad, porcentaje de niños en situación de pobreza, alfabetismo, igualdad de género, acceso
a agua potable, conflictos violentos alrededor de la persona y la percepción de las personas en la legitimi-
dad del gobierno. la cuestión aquí es saber hasta qué punto la política puede determinar la gran variación
que existe entre los países cuando se utiliza indicadores de bienestar humano. desde el punto de vista de
la democracia epistémica, surge un escenario normativo problemático cuando se utiliza esta información.
dado que existen también formas de medir hasta qué punto los países son democráticos, resulta bastante
difícil de encontrar correlaciones positivas entre los indicadores estándar de democracia y las mediciones
de bienestar humano. sin embargo, mediciones acerca de la gobernanza o de la calidad del gobierno como
el control de la corrupción, grados de imparcialidad en la administración pública y el respeto por los prin-
cipios del estado de derecho, influyen positivamente y de gran manera en muchas de las mediciones acer-
ca del bienestar humano. este artículo argumenta que esta situación puede ser explicada por un factor
epistémico dejado de lado en las mediciones acerca de la calidad de los gobiernos, concretamente, la
importancia de la contratación pública basada en un sistema meritocrático.
Palabras clave: calidad del gobierno, buen gobierno, ausencia de corrupción, epistemología de la demo-
cracia, imparcialidad
emocracy as an overall model for how societies should be governed has been a
d remarkable success over the last forty years. more countries than ever are now
considered to be democratic or at least on their way to becoming democracies
(diamond 2007, teorell 2010). various international organizations that have democracy
promotion on their agenda should nowadays be very content since there are certainly
many reasons to be enthusiastic about this historically remarkable development. the
enthusiasm is, however, dampened by the fact that empirical research show that there is no
guarantee that procedural democracy will produce policies that improve the general
human well-being of its citizens. as i will show below, established measures on various
12
aspects of human well-being that now exists for a great many countries either have a very
weak, or no, or sometimes even negative, correlation with measures of the level of democ-
racy. the reason, i will argue, is that electoral-representative democracy does not automat-
ically translate into what i define as quality of government (which is close but not identical
to what usually is labeled “good governance”). for example, the noted democratization
researcher and promoter larry diamond had the following to say when the U.s. based
National Endowment for Democracy celebrated its first twenty-five years of operations:
it is noteworthy that diamond here makes a distinction between democracy and good
governance. one aspect of the “specter” that haunts democracy is that a procedurally cor-
rect democratic system may produce decisions that are ill-informed and not in line with
what according to the factual matters is true. the idea behind what has become known as
epistemic democracy theory is that the decision taken by a democratically elected legisla-
tive assembly should not only result in decisions that are in accordance with procedural
fairness based on, for example, robert dahl’s idea of politically equality. instead, epistemic
democracy requires that the decisions are also based on what according to established
knowledge is true or right (anderson 2006, list and goodin 2001). What is “true” or
“right” is certainly contested in many policy areas, but one way to think about this can be
taken from medical ethics stating that diagnosis and treatments should be based on “sci-
ence and proven experience” as stated in, for example, the swedish Health and medical
service act. another definition would be that public policies should be “evidence based”.1
as for the political process, this has been stated by list and goodin (2001) as: “decision
rules ought to be chosen so as to track the truth”.
there are two problems with this understanding of epistemic democracy. the first
relates to the issue about “truth for what”: epistemic democracy cannot only be motivat-
ed on the ground that the decisions should be true in general since it is true that the chem-
ical Zyklon B works for mass killings of people if locked into air-tight chambers. or to
take a more recent example from the g. W. Bush administration in the U.s., epistemic
democracy is not to be a process for finding out what kind of torture that makes prison-
13
ers talk but at the same time does not maim them so much that they can no longer reveal
correct information (danner 2011).
the standard for a democratic system should be that the decisions are not only right
or true, but right or true so as to improve the well-being of citizens in respect of an exten-
sive set of liberal rights as suggested by John rawls. the second problem in discussions of
epistemic democracy is how to avoid “epistocracy”, that is, rule by experts, which is anath-
ema to most definitions of democracy (estlund 2008, colish 2010). the third problem is
“which rules” in the machinery of representative democracy should be altered so as to
increase the epistemic content in the decisions. most of the suggestions seem to be about
changing the rules on the “input” side of the democratic system, be they various forms of
deliberative processes or more jury-like or experimental processes (anderson 2006,
estlund 2008). these are theoretically interesting suggestions but they all suffer from a
certain lack of realism when it comes to establishing them as functioning alternatives in
real existing democracies. i will argue that there is a way to secure a more epistemic orien-
tation of today’s electoral representative democracies, namely to increase their quality of
government (henceforth Qog) defined as impartiality in the exercise of public policies.
this has several advantages, not least that it can be backed by considerable empirical analy-
ses showing that it improves the likelihood that a political system that combines represen-
tative democracy and Qog is more likely to launch policies that improve general human
well-being. in addition, it has been shown to work, it is relatively simple to implement and
it has a positive impact on political legitimacy.
1 there are now at least two scholarly journals published that cater to this notion of “evidence based policy”,
namely Evidence & Policy now in its seventh year and Journal of Evidence Based Social Work that started in
2003.
in a recently published article, nobel laureate amartya sen compares “quality of live” in
china and india and comes to the conclusion that on most standard measures of human
well-being, the communist-autocratic china now clearly outperforms democratically gov-
erned india (2011). this applies, inter alia, for infant mortality, mortality rates for chil-
dren under the age of five, life-expectancy, immunization of children, basic education of
children, poverty rates and adult literacy. sen comments on, but presents no explanation
to why india’s democratic system does so poorly when it comes to improving human well-
being for its population compared to autocratic china.
this problem can also be seen when comparing small countries. Jamaica and singapore
14
both achieved independence from British colonial rule in the early 1960s. they then had
about the same size population and were both very poor. if the typical social scientist at that
time would have predicted the situation for these two countries fifty years later, a fair guess
is that he or she would have painted a very rosy future for Jamaica but a much bleaker one
for singapore. Jamaica then (as now) had large areas of arable land, important natural
resources (bauxite), is located close to one of the world’s most important export markets and
could have developed a huge tourist industry, especially since cuba went out of this busi-
ness at that time. everyone in the country spoke english and very few ethnic-religious cleav-
ages existed. singapore, on the other hand, had no natural resources, no arable land, is far
away from major export markets and had very problematic ethnic-religious divisions. the
situation today, however, is completely the reversed of what would have been expected in
the early 1960s. singapore has nine times the gPd/capita than has Jamaica and hugely out-
performs Jamaica on all standard measures of human well-being. the problem is that
according to the best measure of democracy that i have come across, Jamaica has since inde-
pendence been counted as a democracy while singapore has never been close to being
regarded as a democracy (Werlin 2007, rothstein 2011, ch. 9).
the question is if these two comparisons of cases showing that autocracies can outper-
form democracies are matched by available cross-country statistics. in order to do such
analyses, one needs a theoretically defined measure of democracy. one such definition sug-
gested by Przeworski et. al. (2000) is that a democracy is “a regime in which those who
govern are selected through contested elections” where “contested” is defined as the pres-
ence of “an opposition that has some chance of winning office”. teorell (2010) has con-
vincingly criticized this and other dichotomous (or absolute) measures for democracy and
instead argued for a graded definition and measurement strategy. the graded measure of
democracy that he (together with Hadenius) has constructed is based on the average scores
of political rights and civil liberties reported by freedom House, and the combined autoc-
racy and democracy scores derived from the Polity iv data set (Hadenius & teorell 2005).
this index goes from 0 to 10 where 10 is most democratic and as the authors show, this
index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituents parts.
Using a set of thirty standard measures of national levels of human well-being and also
some variables known to be related to human well-being such as capacity for taxation, and
including between 75 and 169 countries, Holmberg and rothstein (2011a) find only
weak2, or no, or sometimes even negative, correlations between these standard measures of
human well-being and the level of democracy as defined above. these results are con-
firmed by other studies such as doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008), norris (forthcom-
ing) and UndP (2002). the picture that comes out of available measures and statistics is
this: representative democracy is not a safe cure against severe poverty, economic inequal-
15
ity, illiteracy, being unhappy or not satisfied with one’s life, infant mortality, short life-
expectancy, maternal mortality, access to safe water or sanitation, gender inequality, low
school attendance for girls, low interpersonal trust or low trust in Parliament. thus,
democracy measured in this way is only weakly correlated, or even unrelated, to more
“objective” measures of human well-being (such as population health statistics) as well as
to subjective measures (such as subjective well-being or interpersonal trust).
an objection to this bleak picture of the actual epistemic-based performance of democ-
racies is the argument that democracy results in respect for human rights which no doubt
is an important achievement. However, as råby and teorell (2010) have argued, this is close
to saying that democracy results in democracy since respect for at least basic human rights
is a condition for a country being defined as a democracy. it has often been said that rep-
resentative democracy would minimize the risk for internal violence like civil war. norris,
however, shows that this is not borne out by the facts. in itself, liberal representative democ-
racy, is not a cure against the outbreak of internal armed conflicts (norris forthcoming, see
also Öberg and melander 2010). as michael mann has argued, when it comes to ethnic
conflicts, democracy has a “dark side” (2005). in addition, råby and teorell (2010) using
data of interstate military conflicts from 1984 to 2000, have shown that democracy, con-
trary to what has been more or less taken for granted in international relations research, is
not strongly related to the absence of inter-state war. instead, they find that control of cor-
ruption trumps level of democracy for predicting the absence of war.
thus, the worries raised by the epistemic democracy theorists are for real. on average,
and as it is usually practiced, representative democracy alone does not produce “true” or
“right” decisions that cater to generally improving human well-being when compared to
non-democratic societies.
as could be expected, an extensive debate exists about how concepts like quality of gov-
ernment, good governance and state capacity should be defined. should it be about pro-
cedures only (like most definitions of representative democracy) or should it also contain
substantial policies? should the concept be universally applicable all over the globe (like
the Un declaration of Human rights) or should it be relativized to different cultures?
should the concept be equated with administrative and economic efficiency or should it
be understood as something that explains such efficiency? should good governance include
how well those who govern represent those who are governed or should it be about the
states’ capacity to steer society? one of the most frequently used definitions of good gover-
16
nance has been launched by the World Bank research institute and reads as follows:
the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. this includes
(1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capaci-
ty of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interac-
tions among them (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-lobatón 1999:1).
this definition forms the basis of the World Bank’s widely used Worldwide governance
indicators that has measures for “voice and accountability”, “political instability and vio-
lence”, “government effectiveness”, “regulatory quality”, “rule of law” and “control of cor-
ruption”. this is a very broad definition and it has been criticised for including both pol-
icy content (“sound policies”) and procedures (“rule of law”) as well as for containing both
the institutions for access to political power and those that exercise and implement laws
and policies (rothstein & teorell 2008). in the words of Keefer (2004:5), “if the study of
governance extends to all questions related to how groups of people govern themselves …,
then there are few subjects in all of political science and political economy that do not fall
within the governance domain”. yet, clearly some political institutions or aspects of “poli-
tics” must matter more than others for what should count as quality of government.
moreover, including “sound policies” in the definition raises the problematic “episto-
cratic” question of whether international (in this mostly economic) experts really can be
expected to be in possession of reliable answers to the question of what is “sound policies”.
for example, should pensions or health care or education be privately or publicly funded
(or a mix of these)? to what extent and how should financial institutions be regulated?
more generally, such a definition of good governance that is not restricted to procedures
but includes the substance of policies leads to what is known as the “Platonian-leninist”
problem of rule by experts.3 if those with superior knowledge decide policies, the demo-
cratic process will be emptied of most substantial issues (estlund 2008, colish 2010). the
argument against the “Platonian-leninist” alternative to democracy has been put forward
by robert dahl in the following way: “its extraordinary demands on the knowledge and
virtue of the guardians are all but impossible to satisfy in practice” (dahl 1989:65). there
are thus good reasons for keeping the definition of Qog to procedures which is in line with
how most definitions of representative democracy are constructed (teorell 2010).
17
one way out of the definitional problem would be to define quality of government and/or
good governance simply as the absence of corruption. this turns out to be problematic for
several reasons. first, corruption is in itself difficult to define. the standard definition is
that corruption is “the abuse of public power for private gain”. the problem with this def-
inition is that it is relativistic since what counts as “abuse” would vary in different parts of
the world (Kurer 2005). this is thus not a universal or complete definition because it is
dependent on how “abuse of public power” is defined. needless to say, this relativistic def-
inition would dramatically increase problems of operationalization and measurement in
comparative empirical analyses, but it would also carry all the ethical difficulties connect-
ed to relativistic definitions that are known from discussions about how human rights and
democracy should be defined. Without an universally accepted normative standard about
what forms of behavior of public authorities that are acceptable and appropriate, there is
no way to know (and measure) what should count as “abuse” when we compare various
systems of governance in order to see if they would qualify for the epithet “good” or not.
the second reason why Qog cannot be equated with the absence of corruption is that
there may exist many problems when governing societies that are not confined to what is
usually understood as corruption. a high degree of corruption is certainly an antithesis to
Qog, but so are many other practices that are not usually seen as corruption, such as clien-
telism, lack of respect for the rule of law and property rights, nepotism, cronyism, patron-
age, systemic discrimination and cases where administrative agencies are “captured” by the
interest groups that they are set out to regulate and control (rothstein & teorell 2008).
the common denominator for all these practices is that the implementation of policies are
3 When lenin did away with the last reminiscence of the internal party democracy at the 10th congress of
the Bolshevik party in 1921, his argument was that since marxism-leninism had made politics a science,
one could no longer vote on policy issues: instead, these were to be decided by the “avant-garde” in the party
who were in possession of the marxist-leninist scientific knowledge about politics.
impacted by some kind of undue favoritism of which corruption in the standard form of
bribes is just one kind.
in the long discussion of how representative democracy should be defined, the distinction
between procedural and substantive definitions is a central theme (cf. dowding, goodin
& Pateman 2004). since our purpose is to reach a universal and procedural definition that
could be acceptable to groups in a democracy with, to quote John rawls (2005:xvi), “a
pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable”, comprehensive religious, philosophical, and
18
moral doctrines, including substantial policies in the definition is a very risky business and
not likely to achieve broad-based legitimacy. this is also why i prefer the term “quality of
government” to the World Bank term “good governance” since the latter has too broad
connotations and often include non-government actors such as civil society organizations
as well as trade and business organizations (Pierre & Peters 2000). However, in terms of
the practicalities of empirical research, the difference between quality of government, good
governance and state capacity is mostly terminological. the different expert based meas-
ures used to capture this phenomenon, be it measures of corruption, the rule of law, gov-
ernment effectiveness or the level of impartiality correlate at a surprisingly high level
(about .9). moreover, the expert based measures correlate to an equally surprisingly high
level with various measures constructed from surveys of representative selections of the
population indicating that experts and ordinary people give the same account of the prob-
lem in their country (rothstein 2011).
as argued above, neither the absence of corruption, nor representative democracy, nor
the size of government, nor the rule of law, nor administrative effectiveness capture what
should be counted as quality of government or good governance. searching for a defini-
tion, it is notable that the conceptual discussion has largely been detached from normative
political theories about social justice and the state. it should be obvious that when terms
like “good” or “quality” are placed in political concepts, it is impossible to refrain from
entering the normative issues that are raised in political philosophy. one can say that mod-
ern political philosophy has been engaged with the issue of “what the state ought to do”
but refrained from taking an interest in what the state “can do”. there are good reasons
for why it is meaningless (or dangerous) to discuss the one without the other (rothstein
1998). the quality of government and good governance agenda is a clear case where nor-
mative/ philosophical theory and positive/empirical approaches should merge. this issue
is certainly not confined to internal academic civilities. Without a foundation in ethical
standards, the risk is that when approaches like the good governance agenda translates into
practical policies, it may end up in mindless utilitarianism where basic human rights of
(often poor) people are sacrificed in the name of some overall utility. this is also why the
term “state capacity” is problematic since it usually only refers to brute administrative
strength which can be used in ways that are deeply unethical and that could seriously dam-
age the state’s legitimacy making it much harder to implement policies (cf. levi 1998,
rothstein 1998). the first requirement for definitions of concepts like quality of govern-
ment and good governance is thus that they are based in a normative theory that gives
some orientation for what should be regarded as “good” in this context. secondly, any def-
inition of these concepts must take into account that this approach clearly has shifted the
interest away from the “input” side to the “output” side of the political system.
19
in addition to standard requirements like precision and applicability for empirical
research, a third requirement would be universalism. one reason for this is that the qual-
ity of government approach is de facto applied on a global scale. this demand raises the
issue of how to deal with the huge variation in institutional configurations that exists
between countries that in most evaluations of quality of governance are ranked at the top.
countries like switzerland, finland and the United states are very different in their spe-
cific institutional configurations of representative democracy. there is for example, no
national-level equivalent to the swiss’ widespread use of referendums in the other two
countries and only the United states has a strong President and a politicized supreme
court. moreover, these three countries have very different electoral systems, party systems
and systems for regional and local government. However, despite these huge differences in
the institutional configuration of their (and all other democracies’) political systems, they
are all counted as being democracies. the same type of difference in specific institutions
can be shown if we compare countries that are generally ranked at the top when it comes
to measures like corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness. obviously, a defi-
nition of quality of government cannot relate to a specific set of institutional arrange-
ments. instead, it is necessary to look for some basic norm that characterizes their institu-
tional systems as whole. for representative democracy, that is, the access to power, leading
democratic theorist robert dahl has suggested such a norm, namely “political equality”.
the question is what the equivalent for good governance could be given that issues are
more related to the implementation side of the political system. Based on the type of
rights-based liberal political theory launched by philosophers such as Brian Barry and John
rawls, Jan teorell and i have suggested such a basic norm, namely impartiality in the exer-
cise of public power (rothstein & teorell 2008). this is defined in the following way:
“When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take anything about the
citizen or case into consideration that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law”
(strömberg 2000, 66). this definition is fairly precise and can be applied universally. it
makes clear what basic norm is being “abused” when corruption, clientelism, favouritism,
discrimination, patronage, nepotism or undue support to special interest groups occurs. it
excludes the content of policies since it is strictly procedural.
the connection to “good” or “quality” is motivated by the fact that impartiality is the
driving notion behind John rawls’ liberal right-based theory of justice. as goodin argues:
“certainly, the antithesis of justice is favouritism” (2004:100). in this context, impartiali-
ty is not a demand on actors on the input side of the political system, but first and fore-
most an attribute of the actions taken by civil servants, professional corpses in public serv-
ice, law enforcement personnel and the like.
equally important, however, are the things which the norm of impartiality does not
20
rule out. since Qog as impartiality is a procedural norm confined to the exercise of pub-
lic power, one important field that is not affected by this conception is the substance of
the content of policies. this builds on the idea that non-corruption implies that “a state
ought to treat equally those who deserve equally” (Kurer 2005:223). this is in line with
the argument that the content of public policies should not be included in the definition
of Qog. instead, it is impartiality in the exercise of power (the “ought to treat equally”
principle) that is the central component of Qog. to treat equal does of course not imply
that everyone should get the same. only people that are in need of a kidney transplanta-
tion should get one. instead, this follows the idea of “equal concern and respect” launched
by ronald dworkin (1977).
in political philosophy, this distinction between which norms should guide the con-
tent versus the procedural sides of the political system is readily seen in Brian Barry’s
important book Justice as Impartiality. Barry argues that impartiality should be a norma-
tive criterion in the exercise of political power: “like cases should be treated alike” (Barry
1995:126). His idea of “second order impartiality” implies that the input side of the polit-
ical system should be arranged so that it gives no special favor to any conception of “the
good”. However, as Barry readily admits, his theory “accepts that a demand of neutrality
cannot be imposed on the outcomes” (Barry 1998:238). accordingly, when it comes to
decisions about the content of the policies that governments should pursue, it is not neu-
trality or impartiality but “reasonableness” that is his main criterion (Barry 1998:238, cf.
Hardin 1998). By this he means that people engaged in the political process should give
sound arguments based on a secular understanding of knowledge for why they prefer cer-
tain policies over others. in Barry’s words: “What is required is as far as possible a polity
in which arguments are weighed and the best arguments win, rather than one in which all
that can be said is that votes are counted and the side with the most votes wins” (Barry
1995:103).
the implication is the one argued for here, namely that impartiality cannot be a moral
basis for the content of policies that individuals, interests groups and political parties pur-
sue on the input side of the political system since reasonableness is not the same as impar-
tiality. for example, in a given situation there may be good reasons for lowering pensions
and increasing support to families with children. this is, however, not the same as being
impartial between these two groups, because there is no such thing as an impartial way to
decide in a case like this (arneson 1998). this is particularly problematic when it comes
to conflicts over which public goods a state should provide since such goods can often not
be divided into minor parts (like money), something that often makes reasonable compro-
mises easier to reach. either the airport or dam is built or nothing is built (miller 2004).
it is important to note that, for many, increased justice implies policies that contain
21
more partiality (for example, extra resources to underprivileged groups). However, when
such partisan policies are to be implemented, their proponents usually do not want these
policies, once enacted, to be carried out in a partial way where bureaucrats are given total
discretion in each and every case (tebble 2002; young 1990). for example, it may be per-
fectly legitimate to argue for the government to establish academic positions that only
women (or some other disadvantaged group) could apply for given the gender inequality
that exists in higher academic positions. However, once such a position is announced and
a number of women apply, the impartiality norm takes overhand since those who have
argued for such a quota system usually wants the most qualified among the preferred
group to get the position. thus, impartiality is a norm to be followed when policies are to
be exercised, not when policies are decided in the democratic process. this conditionality
in the application of impartiality as a justice principle goes in fact all the way back to John
stuart mill:
if Qog, as stated above, is highly correlated to the possibility of establishing policies that
are “right” and “true” in the sense that they improve general human well-being, it is of
course important to find explanations for the huge differences that existing measures show
to exist. that this is not an easy task can be illustrated by a comment from noted econom-
ic historian avner greif who in the “Handbook of new institutional economics” states
that Qog type of institutions exist “in a few advanced contemporary countries and only
in recent times. We know surprisingly little, however, regarding the institutional develop-
ment that led to these modern successes” (greif 2005:737). attempts have been made to
find an explanation for this but so far we lack a well-established theory. the work of nobel
laureate elinor ostrom is certainly a case in point since she shows how groups can estab-
lish and maintain regulatory institutions that serve to avoid a “tragedy of the commons”
situation for common natural resourses (ostrom 1990). However, and as she readily
admits, her cases are relatively small local groups in which it has been possible to develop
high levels of social trust and social capital over a long period of time. for large nation-
states, high levels of social trust are an exception (Uslaner 2008).
22
Using a new cross-country dataset based on a web-survey with experts on public
administration that has been constructed to measure Qog as impartiality as above,
dahlström, lapuente and teorell (2011) have analyzed what type of structural features of
a country’s public administration that can explain the variation in levels of corruption and
with corruption related practices. contrary to what has often been taken for granted, they
show that the separation of the civil service career through special (privileged) employment
contracts or special exams do not have an effect on levels of corruption. they also show
that the comparative level of pay is not significant for the degree of corruption. However,
their results do show that meritocratic recruitment to the civil service have a significant
positive influence for minimizing corruption also when controlling for a large set of other
standard variables (see figure 1 and 2 in appendix). this result confirms an earlier study
by evans and rauch (2000) that demonstrated that meritocratic recruitment has a posi-
tive influence on a country’s level of corruption. these results are important because they
indicate that a procedural value, in this case the impartiality in the recruitment to the civil
service, results in a more efficient and effective public administration. secondly, these
results may also give us an idea of why it is that high levels of Qog as defined above have
much stronger positive effects on almost all measures of human well-being than has a
country’s level of democracy. simply put, meritocracy imputes knowledge into the politi-
cal system and thereby increases its epistemic orientation. if recruitment to, and promo-
tion within, the public administration is based on impartial evaluations of the candidates
skills and qualifications, this will increase the amount of “true” knowledge in the machin-
ery of government. thus, we arrive at the following conclusion. electoral-representative
democracy does not seem to ensure the necessary epistemic qualities in the political sys-
tem for creating policies that increase human well-being. However, quality of government
as defined (and measured) above does substantially increase the epistemic quality which
increases the likelihood that the political system will produce public policies that improve
human well-being. Quality of government is, inter alia, causally related to the existence of
impartial/ meritocratic recruitment of public employees. this implies that people with
high levels of skills and knowledge (instead of those with a certain family background, or
membership in certain clientelistic networks, etc.) fill the positions in the public adminis-
tration and positions as professionals in organizations implementing public policies. if the
political system is a democracy that is combined with meritocratic recruitment, this is very
likely to result in epistemic democracy as practice. We can speculate about how the causal
mechanisms may work. one possibility is that a Weberian type of merit-based civil serv-
ice functions as “cages of reason” (silberman 1983) imputing knowledge-based rationali-
ty into the policy-making process. another such mechanism may be that politicians that
only surround themselves with political cronies recruited through patronage will end up
23
with distorted views about reality. in contrast, merit-recruited civil servants may be “speak-
ing truth to power” (Wildavsky 1987). a third mechanism may be that public services that
are manned by merit-based professionals will use better (more true) knowledge in the
implementation process than will a system based on patronage and nepotism.
pared and analyzed the policy proposal cannot convince the elected politicians about the
merits of their suggestions, the politicians can and often do say no. they can, for exam-
ple, turn to other experts that have a better understanding of how to combine knowledge
with the politicians’ wishes. When the system works, and it has been shown to work by,
for example, Hermansson in his study of swedish politics between the 1910s and the
1980s, it can be seen as an realization of the idea of “politics based on the ideas of the
enlightenment” (Hermansson 1993 and 2003). studying a large number of policy process-
es that took place when the swedish welfare state was built, Hermansson’s study shows that
in a respectable number of cases, an “enlightened” deliberative process between elected
politicians, high level civil servants, experts and (often equally knowledgeable) representa-
tives from interest organizations took place when important public policies were con-
24
structed. this resulted in political processes in which the basic principle of political equal-
ity and the principle that politics should be based on what is “true” were combined, result-
ing in what lamont and Hall (2010) have defined as a “successful society”. a third advan-
tage is that this system for increasing knowledge in the political system has a proven
record. it has been tried and is used in quite a number of countries. in addition to com-
paratively good results when it comes to producing policies that are “true and right”, Qog
as impartiality implying merit-based recruitment also seems to achieve a high level of polit-
ical legitimacy. although impartial recruitment to positions in the civil service seems to be
a rare thing historically as well as today (see fukuyama 2011), we do have a number of
cases where it has been established in a sustainable manner. a fourth advantage is that the
Qog principles of how to organize the public administration are easily understood by
most citizens and not technically complicated to organize, not least when compared to
other systems for increasing the epistemic content in the political system that have been
suggested in this discussion. lastly, the principles of impartiality in the exercise of public
power resulting in meritocratic recruitment to positions in the public administration has
been shown to be universally understood as in line with principles of fairness, even in
deeply corrupt societies (Persson, rothstein & teorell 2010).
the discussion within epistemic democracy theory has to a large extent tried to solve
the problem of inserting more knowledge in the democratic process through changes of
the machinery of how the electorate’s preferences should be aggregated. among the most
well-known suggestions are systems for increasing deliberation among citizens (fishkin
2009) and forms of “experimentally based learning” (anderson 2006). What has been for-
gotten in this discussion is the possibility to solve the epistemic problem by increasing the
quality of the public administration that both prepares policy proposals and implements
them. the empirical analyses presented show that this can be done through a carefully
designed system of impartial merit-based recruitment to the state.
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Resumen 33
la situación de américa latina con respecto a la democracia y a las instituciones que se derivan de este sistema ofre-
ce un escenario que al mismo tiempo es alentador y retante. durante los últimos 25 años se han sucedido gobiernos
democráticos en la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos, sin embargo, la verdadera preocupación no reside en esta-
blecer elecciones libres y periódicas además del respeto por las leyes y por los derechos civiles, sino en la constitución
de estados que sean capaces de responder adecuadamente, aún a pesar de sus debilidades institucionales. existen, por
lo tanto, tres dimensiones básicas que debe contener la noción de una verdadera democracia. la competencia políti-
ca, la participación civil y una tercera dimensión definida por dahl como la democracia constitucional, que consiste
en asegurar el derecho de formar parte de la oposición y contar con mecanismos que impidan el uso indiscriminado
del poder adquirido por el gobierno para minimizar a la oposición legalmente constituida. así, la democracia debe
ser entendida como un sistema donde la vida política es controlada a través de la existencia de motivaciones que per-
mitan la libre expresión de las diversas comunidades componentes. este sistema también debe ofrecer al mismo tiem-
po paz y estabilidad social y civil, libertad para las personas y los grupos. las brechas sociales y las desigualdades en
latinoamérica han producido una crisis de legitimidad de la democracia en cada una de las dimensiones menciona-
das. el artículo analiza los factores componentes de esta crisis y ofrece algunas recomendaciones para asegurar la esta-
bilidad política y así construir una mejor democracia en los países latinoamericanos.
Abstract
latin-america situation towards democracy and its institutions offer a promising and challenging scenario. over
the last 25 years, democratic governments have succeeded in most of the latin-american countries, but the real
concern is not to establish free elections, respect for rights and other civilian warranties, but also to set up states
that can cope with their institutional weakness. therefore, there are three basic dimensions concerning a real
democracy: political concurrence, civil participation and third one defined by dahl as a constitutional demo-
cracy, which assures the right to oppose and the existence of mechanisms that avoid the indiscriminate use of
public power to minimize the legal opposition. democracy should be understood as a system where political life
is regulated through the motivation for each diverse community expression, but at the same time this system is
ought to assure social and civil peace and stability, freedom and peace for people and groups. social gap and
society inequalities in latin america have produced a crisis of democratic legitimacy in each dimension mentio-
ned above. the article analyses the components for these crises and at the end gives general recommendations to
assure at least political stability in order to construct a better democracy in latin-american countries.
* arturo valenzuela es Profesor titular de ciencias Políticas y director del centro de estudios latinoamericanos
de la edmund a. Walsh school of foreign service en georgetown University, Washington, dc, estados Unidos.
36
Representación y ciudadanía
bilidad la que le permite a la ciudadanía entregarle una cierta autonomía al poder público.
en últimas cuentas, sin embargo, el mecanismo más importante para asegurar la respon-
sabilidad de las autoridades y el ejercicio de la soberanía popular es el veredicto que den las
urnas, veredicto que a su vez requiere de partidos políticos coherentes con raíces en la
sociedad capaces de competir entre ellos para llenar los puestos de autoridad pública y
desde el poder estructurar los acuerdos necesarios para implementar políticas públicas que
permitan la convivencia, el progreso y la seguridad de las personas y de la nación.
Gobernabilidad y democracia
38
si hay una crisis en el sistema de representación latinoamericana, también la hay en la for-
mulación e implementación de políticas públicas por parte de la autoridad, especialmente
frente a desafíos tan importantes como la pobreza, la desigualdad y la falta de competiti-
vidad. todo gobierno tiene que tener capacidad de gestión, y esa capacidad de gestión
requiere en un sistema democrático un partido mayoritario coherente o una coalición
coherente de partidos que representen una mayoría de la ciudadanía. si para ser exitoso un
gobierno democrático tiene que basarse en la capacidad de generar consensos, cabe pre-
guntarse si esa voluntad se consigue con mayor facilidad en regímenes presidenciales o par-
lamentarios. en general los sistemas parlamentarios pueden configurar con mayor agilidad
gobiernos de mayoría, especialmente en sistemas multipartidistas o de fragmentación par-
tidaria. los sistemas presidenciales son menos aptos para generar consensos mayoritarios
en sistemas multipartidistas y por ende tienden con más facilidad a caer en parálisis polí-
tica. la mayoría de las democracias estables del mundo contemporáneo son regímenes par-
lamentarios. aun en países muy divididos, como india, italia, israel o algunos del caribe,
los regímenes parlamentarios experimentan crisis periódicas de gobierno, pero con menos
frecuencia crisis de régimen.
en estados Unidos, cuna del presidencialismo, ha sido el bipartidismo el que ha per-
mitido la creación de gobiernos de mayoría, o sea gobiernos donde el ejecutivo goza de
una mayoría de su propio partido en el congreso. es curioso que los constituyentes de
filadelfia no previeron la importancia de los partidos. es más, como lo revela el Federalista
No. 10, tenían un fuerte prejuicio contra ellos, considerándolos facciones mezquinas que
atentarían contra los intereses superiores de la nación. Pero al cabo de poco tiempo, el pro-
pio James madison, autor de aquel texto clásico, pasó a caracterizar a los partidos como la
“fuente natural de la libertad”, sin los cuales la democracia no podría subsistir.
existe un consenso en la ciencia política norteamericana en afirmar que el bipartidis-
mo es el factor más importante que permitió el funcionamiento exitoso del presidencialis-
mo. a principios del siglo XX, Woodrow Wilson comentaba que “las diversas partes del
gobierno están unificadas en un propósito común, porque están bajo una dirección común
y constituyen en sí maquinarias para el control de los partidos... Uno no puede obtener un
gobierno exitoso a partir de antagonismos”. Una de las eminencias de la ciencia política
norteamericana, v. o. Key, agrega: “Para que el gobierno funcione, las obstrucciones natu-
rales de la estructura gubernamental tienen que ser sobrepasadas, y es el partido, por expe-
dientes extra-constitucionales, el que cumple este fin”. según James sundquist, “el partido
político fue la institución que unificó los poderes separados del gobierno y trajo coheren-
cia al proceso de formulación de políticas públicas”.
ahora bien, para que el partido sirva de puente entre el ejecutivo y el congreso, facilitan-
do la creación de gobiernos eficientes, es necesario que el Presidente tenga mayoría en el
39
congreso. el dato fundamental para entender el éxito del régimen político estadounidense es
que a lo largo de su historia ha generado preferentemente gobiernos de mayoría, donde el par-
tido del Presidente ha podido conformar mayorías en ambas cámaras del poder legislativo.
si nos remontamos a la elección de andrew Jackson en 1828, cuando se crean los par-
tidos de masas en estados Unidos, vemos que todos los presidentes hasta eisenhower a
mediados del siglo pasado llegaron al poder con mayorías de su partido en el congreso,
con la excepción de Zachary taylor en 1848, rutherford Hayes en 1876, James garfield
en 1880 y grover cleveland en 1884. entre 1897 y 1954, o sea toda la primera mitad del
siglo XX, cuando estados Unidos pasa de ser una sociedad rural y provinciana a una
potencia industrial y mundial, el país tuvo gobiernos divididos sólo 8 años, y sólo en la
segunda mitad del período presidencial, cuando el presidente había asentado su autoridad.
este patrón de gobiernos mayoritarios cambia en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, cuan-
do miembros del Partido demócrata del sur del país persisten en votar por candidatos de
su partido para conformar el legislativo pero lo abandonan votando por republicanos para
la presidencia, en señal de un claro rechazo a la evolución del partido nacional a favor de
los derechos civiles de los afroamericanos. efectivamente, desde 1956, el gobierno dividi-
do pasa a ser la norma y, a juicio de muchos especialistas, habría contribuido a una crisis
institucional profunda. es el factor clave para entender la parálisis gubernamental en
estados Unidos desde Watergate hasta el juicio político del presidente clinton –sistema de
gobiernos divididos, donde la pugna por el poder se traduce en una lucha sin tregua entre
instituciones del estado en manos de adversarios políticos.
a pesar de estas dificultades, estados Unidos ha podido sobrevivir a gobiernos dividi-
dos. éstos tienen mayor capacidad de sobrevivencia en un sistema federal con gran auto-
nomía local, con una corte suprema como árbitro legítimo, con un sector privado pujan-
te y con partidos relativamente homogéneos que comparten en lo fundamental una misma
concepción de la sociedad.
tidos pronto caen en la cuenta de que la mejor forma de aumentar su participación en las
elecciones municipales y parlamentarias posteriores es desligándose de las dificultades que
encierra el gobernar una sociedad afligida por serios problemas socioeconómicos. las elec-
ciones posteriores se caracterizan por una política de mejor oferta, puesto que la suerte de
los gobiernos no depende de una votación perdida en el Parlamento. éste pasa a ser un
centro de crítica al ejecutivo, que, además, corre el riesgo de perder el apoyo de sus pro-
pios partidarios que se aprestaban al cálculo de la próxima elección presidencial.
la experiencia reciente de américa latina nos muestra a qué grado un país puede que-
dar paralizado cuando las mayorías políticas ya no están con un presidente, pero éste sigue
en el poder. tanto raúl alfonsín en argentina como Hernán siles suazo en Bolivia, y otros
doce presidentes entre 1985 y 2009, tuvieron que dejar el sillón presidencial antes del tér-
41
mino de sus períodos constitucionales por su incapacidad, a pesar de los enormes poderes
de la presidencia en el papel. desde que siles suazo dejó el poder en forma prematura en
el año 1985, 14 presidentes no han podido completar sus períodos constitucionales. sólo
uno, aristide en 1991, fue derrocado en un clásico golpe militar.
Paradójicamente, la reacción al atolladero del presidencialismo ha conllevado incre-
mentar los poderes del Presidente. Presidentes minoritarios se olvidan que son presidentes
con un apoyo real de menos de la mitad de los ciudadanos, y que llegaron al poder gracias
a votantes que no los apoyaron en la primera vuelta y que en el mejor de los casos lo con-
sideran sencillamente el mal menor. el peso simbólico del presidencialismo tiende a des-
lumbrar al político más modesto, dándole un carácter de representación casi plebiscitaria,
donde se cree el representante legítimo de la nación sobre los intereses particulares y mez-
quinos representados en el congreso. éstos llegan a pensar que pueden conseguir apoyo
político deslindándose de los partidos y el Parlamento –acusándolos de inútiles o corrup-
tos–. este esfuerzo agrava el problema, al debilitar los partidos y reducir las instancias de
negociación entre el Presidente y el Poder legislativo y los incentivos en el Parlamento para
crear coaliciones gobernantes. más aún, cuanto más se impone el mandatario, más se des-
incentiva la estructuración de un respaldo eficaz entre partidos y grupos celosos de su auto-
nomía y de sus perspectivas electorales futuras, agravando la tensión y dando la imagen de
una crisis permanente en el sistema político. con el correr del tiempo y frente a la incapa-
cidad de gobiernos de darle una respuesta real a las aspiraciones ciudadanas, el electorado
harto de la politiquería tiende a buscar a un salvador, un hombre fuerte dispuesto incluso
a usar medidas autoritarias para encarar los problemas de la nación.
se podría incluso sostener que en américa latina ha habido una correlación inversa
entre el poder del Presidente y el éxito del régimen presidencial. cuanto más fuerte ha sido
el Presidente apelando a un apoyo plebiscitario, más débil y confrontacional ha sido el régi-
men presidencial. américa latina será el continente de los caudillos, pero no en democra-
cia, ya que el sistema presidencial ha generado líderes débiles cuyos gobiernos se han
empantanado en una parálisis continua, producto de fuertes callejones sin salida entre los
que detentan la soberanía popular con la banda presidencial y los opositores en el
Parlamento igual de celosos de sus prerrogativas. y la salida a este punto muerto puede
generar líderes suprapartidarios que generan apoyo precisamente porque se desligan de los
partidos e incluso de las instituciones, creando una lógica perversa donde los líderes al sur-
gir de instituciones débiles las debilitan más al privilegiar el liderazgo personal sobre el lide-
razgo institucional. y, como bien lo señaló Weber, si hay una autoridad que es a la larga
débil es la autoridad carismática, ya que ésta descansa en la capacidad e imagen del líder y
no en las instituciones, las leyes y la constitución.
curiosamente no son sólo los presidentes en ejercicio los que a menudo contribuyen a
42
debilitar las instituciones. como la mayoría de las constituciones del continente permiten
la reelección presidencial aun si está vetada la reelección inmediata, en país tras país los ex
Presidentes mantienen un protagonismo político desmesurado buscando cómo regresar al
poder después de haber ocupado la primera magistratura de la nación.
ese protagonismo se basa en el fuerte reconocimiento popular que tiene cualquier
mandatario, aun aquellos que terminaron sus períodos desprestigiados. al tener una ven-
taja clara sobre otros presidenciables, los ex Presidentes con frecuencia tienden a sofocar los
procesos de renovación dentro de sus propias colectividades políticas complicando la
importantísima tarea de generar liderazgos nuevos para el futuro. es bien sabido que el ex
Presidente rafael caldera, fundador del Partido coPei en venezuela, provocó de forma
muy directa el colapso de su partido al no apoyar al candidato elegido por éste y buscar
volver a la presidencia como independiente –objetivo que logró para desmedro de su par-
tido y también de la democracia venezolana–. incluso en países con fuerte tradición demo-
crática como Uruguay, costa rica y chile el regreso al poder de ex Presidentes debilita los
partidos y frustra la renovación política. a pesar de la visibilidad de muchos primeros
ministros de posguerra, éstos rara vez han vuelto al poder después de terminar sus manda-
tos, y, cuando lo han logrado, ha sido gracias al continuo apoyo que tienen en las maqui-
narias de sus partidos y no a su popularidad en los sondeos de opinión pública.
La reforma necesaria
a controlar ambas cámaras del legislativo, es muy difícil. Hemos visto cómo gobiernos
militares tan diferentes como los del Uruguay y chile trataron de crear un sistema de par-
tidos políticos como el norteamericano, fracasando rotundamente en ese objetivo. la lite-
ratura académica en ciencias políticas ha llegado a la conclusión de que uno no puede cam-
biar la fisonomía básica de un sistema de partidos políticos fuertemente enraizados en una
sociedad con un simple cambio en las leyes de partidos y electorales. los partidos simple-
mente se adaptan a la ley hasta que tengan la oportunidad de cambiarla.
el problema entonces reside en cómo lograr una democracia estable a partir del reco-
nocimiento de la realidad política del hemisferio. lo lógico para sociedades con sistemas
de partidos fragmentados o multipartidistas, donde un Presidente no puede contar con la
posibilidad de crear mayorías estables para gobernar, es hacer ajustes al régimen político y
43
empezar a transitar hacia un sistema parlamentario. no de asamblea –como la iii o iv
república francesa– sino con las características de los sistemas parlamentarios del mundo
contemporáneo, con resguardos importantes como el voto de censura constructivo y un
sistema electoral que incentive la estructuración de partidos fuertes y coherentes con legi-
timidad popular.
simplificando, en Brasil y en la américa hispana el sistema parlamentario tendría tres
ventajas claras. en primer lugar, la generación de un gobierno parlamentario relajaría la
enorme presión que existe en un sistema presidencial por estructurar coaliciones amplias
en torno a una opción presidencial de suma cero, alternativa que estimula la polarización
y puede rigidizar e incluso radicalizar las opciones. el sistema de segunda vuelta, aunque
tiende a reducir la incertidumbre que proviene de la elección de un candidato con apoyo
minoritario, tiene el efecto de reducir aún más las fuerzas afines al Presidente en el
Parlamento y a exacerbar la polarización política al forzar la creación de coaliciones de
carácter temporal al calor de un conflicto electoral.
Un régimen parlamentario, elegido con un sistema electoral de carácter proporcional
o mixto con distritos relativamente pequeños, bajaría el perfil de las elecciones presiden-
ciales y le daría esperanzas a distintos sectores de poder tener injerencia en la generación
de coaliciones gubernamentales. también evitaría el fenómeno latinoamericano de candi-
daturas presidenciales relámpago basadas en popularidad personal generada por el acceso
a la televisión, candidaturas sin una base partidaria y organizativa lo suficientemente fuer-
te para permitir éxito como gobernador. incluso las cualidades personales que permiten la
elección de estos candidatos son cualidades que dificultan el gobierno posterior.
en segundo lugar, el funcionamiento de un sistema parlamentario contribuiría a
moderar la política. esto se ve claramente en el caso de chile. dadas las similitudes en las
posiciones de los partidos de izquierda y la democracia cristiana en 1970, es probable que
una coalición entre centro e izquierda hubiera subsistido si el régimen hubiera sido parla-
mentario. Hubiera perdurado, sabiendo allende y sus colaboradores que los cambios no
podían ser demasiado drásticos, so pena de provocar la caída del gobierno, no del régimen.
con un sistema parlamentario los gobiernos tendrían que estructurarse en el Parlamento,
privilegiando las opciones de centro y de coaliciones de partidos. en un régimen parlamen-
tario los incentivos para crear coaliciones de mayoría son altos, ya que la falta de consenso
mayoritario lleva a un nuevo proceso electoral con el riesgo para los partidos y parlamen-
tarios de perder sus escaños.
Un sistema parlamentario tendría el efecto de cambiar las correlaciones de fuerzas den-
tro de los partidos, dando más importancia a los parlamentarios elegidos y menos impor-
tancia a las cúpulas partidistas; también llevaría a una mayor disciplina de partido. el mero
hecho de que dirigentes de partido pasen a tener gestión de gobierno es importante. al
44
pasar los miembros prominentes del Parlamento a ocupar cargos ministeriales, éstos se
comprometerían con la gestión gubernamental. incluso desde un punto de vista político
es valioso tener un alto grado de rotativa ministerial. esto permite satisfacer ambiciones
políticas, al mismo tiempo que incorpora un grupo amplio de dirigentes a las tareas de
gobierno. el fenómeno, tan común en américa latina, de dirigentes importantes con esca-
ños en parlamentos débiles, sin capacidad de colaborar de forma inmediata en la estructu-
ración de gobiernos de coalición, constituye una barrera importante a la creación de las
mayorías políticas necesarias para tener un gobierno democrático exitoso.
no es lógico argumentar que un sistema parlamentario no funcionaría bien en un país
latinoamericano por la falta de madurez de los partidos. los partidos y dirigencias políti-
cas se ajustan a los incentivos que reciben del juego político. si el juego político tiene ten-
dencias centrípetas y no centrífugas, los elementos más favorables al diálogo van a conso-
lidarse dentro de las agrupaciones políticas. la disciplina partidaria es una variable depen-
diente, no independiente. la función es producto de la estructura.
tampoco es lógico argumentar que los problemas de américa latina son muchísimo
más agudos que los problemas de los países europeos, no permitiendo el establecimiento
de estructuras políticas que puedan funcionar en sistemas parlamentarios. acordémonos
que, en muchos países europeos, los conflictos religiosos, étnicos, linguísticos y de clase
han sido desgarradores. Países como Bélgica e incluso Holanda son países con divisiones
históricas mucho más profundas que las que tenemos en la mayoría de los países latinoa-
mericanos. sin embargo, con fórmulas parlamentarias para crear consenso han podido ela-
borar gobiernos exitosos de coalición.
aun en italia, que a menudo se menciona como un caso negativo del parlamentaris-
mo, las crisis políticas son crisis de gobierno, no de régimen. la rigidez del sistema presi-
dencial ha significado que en américa latina las crisis de gobierno pasan rápidamente a
ser crisis de régimen. américa latina requiere de un sistema institucional que se ajuste a la
idiosincrasia del continente, profundamente marcado por sus tradiciones políticas y lega-
les, pero también un sistema que aliente las tendencias centrípetas; así como instancias de
consenso y compromiso político que puedan generar mayorías para gobernar, dándole
garantías a las minorías de que no van a ser destruidas.
en tercer lugar, el funcionamiento de un régimen parlamentario eliminaría la parálisis
gubernamental y el enfrentamiento entre el ejecutivo y el legislativo, producto de la falta
de apoyo mayoritario al presidente en el Parlamento, entregando un gobierno más eficien-
te y ágil para solucionar los problemas del país. la nación no tendría que vivir con la rigi-
dez de un compromiso por un período presidencial de seis u ocho años que ya no cuenta
con mayoría operativa. el dramático caso de presidentes que en un comienzo gozaron de
enorme popularidad, pero perdieron poder real al perder su apoyo parlamentario y tuvie-
45
ron que dimitir antes de tiempo, demuestra el peligro de un mandato presidencial mino-
ritario que se prolonga sin reglas claras para completar el período constitucional. Por defi-
nición, un Primer ministro y su gabinete tiene más poder que un Presidente y el suyo
–hasta perder el apoyo mayoritario en el Parlamento–, generándose en breve tiempo una
solución para el punto muerto político.
sin embargo, es improbable que los países latinoamericanos busquen un cambio de
régimen político –han demostrado una menor capacidad de innovación institucional que
los países europeos que buscaron cómo ajustar sus instituciones luego del largo y amargo
colapso institucional de preguerra–. entonces, ¿qué reformas se podrían contemplar si se
mantiene el sistema presidencial? efectivamente hay ciertas reglas del juego que se pueden
introducir para hacer más ágil el sistema presidencial. entre ellas están las siguientes:
1. elaborar un sistema electoral que castigue a los partidos mayoritarios. el sistema uni-
nominal mayoritario es extremo; un sistema proporcional con distritos pequeños y lis-
tas cerradas para incentivar coherencia de los partidos ayuda a minimizar la fragmen-
tación política permitiendo un posible apoyo mayoritario al presidente. las opciones
electorales debieran permitirle al elector votar por el presidente y todos los parlamen-
tarios afines a su gestión con marcar una sola preferencia.
2. n o permitir la segunda vuelta que contribuye a la fragmentación política y exacerba
el conflicto con el Parlamento al sobredimensionar un Presidente débil. a falta de
mayoría en la elección presidencial, el congreso debería elegir al Presidente entre los
tres primeros, incentivando así coaliciones más estructuradas y coherentes. este siste-
ma ayuda a explicar la consolidación de la democracia chilena a principios del siglo
pasado en un contexto de multipartidismo altamente polarizado.
3. Permitir la reelección del Presidente por un período (de cuatro años) y la reelección sin
límites de los parlamentarios. esto permite que el Presidente no pierda poder al
Bibliografía
Resumen 49
Para poder tener una idea más clara de lo que significa el presidencialismo como forma de gobiernos,
existe una comparación constante con el parlamentarismo. estas dos formas de gobierno se han entremez-
clado para producir múltiples resultados y tendencias. de hecho, existen muchos países que han adopta-
do tanto el presidencialismo como el parlamentarismo acorde a sus necesidades y al contexto en el que
viven. sin embargo, la principal línea de atención de este artículo es la manera en que los países de
latinoamérica han adoptado el presidencialismo estadounidense junto con sus instituciones, y al mismo
tiempo han mantenido las tradiciones de gobierno europeas, heredadas por su cultura y su gente. Una
alternativa adoptada ha sido la de establecer una especie de semi-presidencialismo, según la cual el presi-
dente sigue teniendo los mismos atributos al ser el jefe del gobierno, pero el poder es de alguna manera
compartido y equilibrado con el congreso, precisamente para evitar un excesivo presidencialismo. sin
embargo, el deseo y la voluntad de mantener la figura del presidente como primera y principal cabeza del
gobierno ha llegado a influenciar en algunas de las crisis políticas ocurridas en los países de américa latina,
en las cuales la fragmentación política se ha manifestado a través de los partidos políticos favoreciendo la
figura de un caudillo en lugar de velar por los intereses del partido.
Abstract
in order to have a better picture of the presidentialism as a governmental form, there is a comparison with
the parliamentarism through the article that marks a clear tendency. these two forms of government have
been merged to produce not just once, but multiple results. there are many ways of how countries have
implemented the presidentialism and the parliamentarism according to their needs and also their specific
context. However, there is a main concern for this article and it is the way that latin american countries
have adopted the presidential form and institutions performed by the american constitution, but at the
same time, they have maintained the european traditions that are inherited to their culture and to their
people. an option to this mixed situation have appeared with the definition of semi-presidentialism, a
form in which the president still have the attributes to be the chief of the government, but the power is in
a certain way shared with congress to avoid excessive presidentialism. However, the persistent wish to
maintain and to keep the president as the main and principle head of the government has influenced in
some of the political crises suffered by the latin american countries, such as the fragmentation of politi-
cal parties favoring the figure of a caudillo instead of the party interests.
I. El prototipo estadounidense
empero, el presidencialismo ha tenido una extensión que va mucho más allá de los estados
Unidos. en américa latina, el presidencialismo es tradicionalmente el tipo de sistema
político preferido. en otras áreas, el presidencialismo no se ha podido difundir tanto como
el sistema parlamentario, por ejemplo en europa del este durante la transición a la demo-
cracia. en el transcurso de la redemocratización de los sistemas políticos de américa latina
en los años 1980, se volvieron a reactivar en todos lados sistemas presidenciales, aunque
en algunos países se han mostrado debilidades funcionales del presidencialismo en la época
preautoritaria, y se han discutido vivamente alternativas de reforma. se ha sostenido inclu-
so que el derrumbe de las democracias en los años 1960 y 70 tuvo su principal causa en el
presidencialismo. Por lo tanto se han recomendado urgentemente a los países latinoame-
ricanos tras la democratización sustituir el presidencialismo por el parlamentarismo (véase
la versión más acabada de esta cadena de argumentos en Juan J. Linz, 1994). en contras-
te con esta postura, se ha negado que el presidencialismo hubiera tenido tanta importan-
cia en el surgimiento de regímenes autoritarios. además, se destacó el papel del presiden-
cas y sociales, un tipo de sistema de gobierno con arraigo casi nulo en la cultura política
causaría riesgos incalculables. Para américa latina, me precía más conveniente buscar fór-
mulas de adecuación funcional del sistema dentro del molde presidencial (Nohlen, 1990),
en renovar el presidencialismo con la finalidad de flexibilizar las relaciones entre el presi-
dente y el parlamento y de mejorar por este medio la gobernabilidad (Nohlen/Fernández,
1991 y 1998). ya al iniciarse del debate, Rolando Franco (1990: 152) preveía que, citando
al autor de estas líneas, “la resistencia de la institución presidencial y lo arraigado que se
encuentra en la cultura política (Nohlen, 1990: 17), terminarán triunfando, siendo razo-
nable tal vez “trabajar sobre la realidad presidencial en cada contexto político e institucio-
nal y buscar fórmulas de adecuación funcional del sistema sin alterar su naturaleza presi-
dencial (ibidem)”. en términos generales, el debate institucional en américa latina ha
53
tomado este rumbo. iniciándose con la crítica al presidencialismo y la propuesta de su sus-
titución, ha pasado por la refutación de estos planteamientos para considerar sistemas de
gobierno supuestamente intermedios (véase Arias/Ramacciotti, 2005), por ejemplo el semi-
presidencialismo hasta llegar a pensar más a fondo en cómo hacer funcionar el presiden-
cialismo (véase Ellis/Orozco Henríquez/Zovatto, 2009).
no obstante este desarrollo muy acertado, en lo que sigue voy a enfocar algunas de las tesis
y sus trasfondos teóricos y metodológicos que marcan la crítica al presidencialismo latino-
americano. aunque las observaciones parecen hoy no tan necesario como en el momento
de la aparición de esta crítica los enfoques metodológicos de aquella literatura siguen muy
extendidos debido a la falta de diferenciación conceptual y de comparación empírica.
Una primera observación se refiere al tipo de análisis monocausal en el que se funda la
postura parlamentarista en el debate. como se recuerda bien, Juan J. Linz hizo responsa-
ble al presidencialismo por el pasado, el presente y el futuro de la democracia en américa
latina, lo que Bruce Ackerman (2000: 645) llegó a llamar el “linzian nightmare”. respecto
al pasado, su argumento se basó en un análisis contrafactual, suponiendo que los derrum-
bes de la democracia no se hubieran producido de existir el parlamentarismo en la región.
esta tesis era la más clara expresión de un monocausalismo que recordaba el instituciona-
lismo de viejo cuño que hizo todo dependiente de un solo factor institucional, que antes
no era tanto la forma de gobierno, sino el sistema electoral. el neo-institucionalismo está
consciente de que, en realidad, son múltiples los factores que intervienen en los procesos
históricos (véanse North, 1990; Steinmo et al., 1992; Scharpf, 1997). insiste, eso sí, en la
importancia de las instituciones, pero cuidándose de explicarlo todo a partir de un solo
factor. respecto a las cuestiones causales y el efecto que podría tener uno de ellos, sus res-
puestas favorecen la fórmula: “depende”. como decía Humberto Maturana (1980), la res-
ponsabilidad consiste en resistir la seducción de la certeza. sobre todo en la metodología
cualitativa, la certeza en el análisis y las consiguientes recetas en función de la consultoría
política tienen que ceder a mayor consideración y mesura.
la segunda observación se refiere, como los siguientes, a la práctica de la comparación
usada por parte de la escuela crítica al presidencialismo. se refiere al nivel abstracto de com-
paración entre presidencialismo y parlamentarismo. Para los protagonistas del parlamenta-
rismo, este examen termina con el resultado de que el sistema parlamentario es superior al
sistema presidencial. aunque esta tesis podría ser correcta, lo que conviene medir de verdad
es si esta u otra forma de gobierno es en la práctica más viable en función de objetivos de
54
gobernabilidad y eficacia, y si es más compatible con las condiciones económicas, sociales y
culturales del entorno concreto de un país. en la carrera de la “fórmula 1”, la victoria no es
sólo cuestión del mejor automóvil, sino que depende, en su caso, del circuito, del piloto, del
clima y de la adaptación del vehículo a estas condiciones. el examen de las formas de gobier-
no depende en última instancia también de las condiciones que se presenten. el mejor sis-
tema institucional es el que se adapte mejor a las condiciones prevalecientes y rinda mejor
en función de objetivos que también son regidos por espacio y tiempo.
la tercera observación enfoca el tipo de comparación empírica que se ejerce en la
dimensión espacio-temporal. los defensores del parlamentarismo comparan entre grupos
de países sin tomar en consideración las diferencias de sus respectivos entornos. se compa-
ra precisamente la época de las democracias parlamentaristas exitosas en la europa de la
postguerra con la época de los derrumbes de las democracias presidencialistas en américa
latina, en vez de tomar como objeto de comparación, por ejemplo, la época de los fraca-
sos del parlamentarismo en la europa de entreguerras, una época que se asemeja respecto
a varios fenómenos (por ejemplo crisis del desarrollo económico y social, inestabilidad
política) a la de américa latina hoy. no se respeta entonces una recomendación para el
análisis comparativo de comparar casos comparables, o sea, casos que compartan una cier-
ta cantidad de propiedades, incluso en relación a las variables en las que se centra el análi-
sis comparado. la estrategia más utilizada del método comparativo cualitativo es la de
escoger casos que tengan un contexto lo menos disímil. la comparación entre presidencia-
lismo y parlamentarismo hubiera tenido que extenderse hacia casos que comparten por
ejemplo el mismo desenlace: el derrumbe de la democracia.
la cuarta observación se refiere a la falacia de comparar una realidad, el presidencialis-
mo en américa latina, con una posibilidad, el parlamentarismo como alternativa. esta
falacia parece no percibirse tan fácilmente, como demuestra el título de una obra colecti-
va: “Presidencialismo y parlamentarismo en américa latina” (Arias/Ramacciotti, 2005).
(véase Lijphart, 1999). a nivel de modelos de toma de decisiones, al que alude también
lanzaro con su distinción entre “mayoritario” y “pluralista”, conviene considerar, en vez de
dos formas de hecho tres: el modelo jerárquico-decisionista, el competitivo-mayoritario y
el proporcional –“negocial”– acordado. no cabe duda que los primeros dos son muy per-
tinentes para diferenciar entre distintas prácticas que marcan los sistemas presidenciales en
américa latina, y el tercero, muy extendido en el parlamentarismo europeo, es (salvo
excepciones) una promesa para mejorar la gobernabilidad democrática en la región. las
propuestas de Carey y Shugart así como de Lanzaro tienen en común que derivan el orden
clasificatorio de la variedad de los sistemas presidenciales de ciertas lógicas abstractas.
el segundo proceder aborda el problema del orden conceptual en debate a partir de
ciertos componentes que en su variación en la realidad que se observa puedan conformar
57
diferentes tipos de sistemas presidenciales. estos sus elementos constitutivos pueden ser de
orden constitucional, cuando se refieren a la distribución de las facultades constituciona-
les entre el ejecutivo y el legislativo, de orden político-institucional, cuando enfocan los
partidos políticos y el sistema de partidos políticos, y de orden político-cultural, cuando se
refieren a los usos (abusos) y costumbres del ejercicio del poder. en el primer ámbito, con-
viene distinguir entre facultades presidenciales constitucionalmente fuertes, facultades
equilibradas entre ambos órganos conforme al concepto de checks and balances, y faculta-
des presidenciales más bien atenuadas o débiles, disposiciones del ejecutivo que siempre se
relacionan con el legislativo. además importa el respeto mutuo de los poderes en cuanto
a lo que prescribe la constitución como norma, o sea, el respeto a la ley (aspecto de lega-
lidad). sin embargo, las disposiciones constitucionales mismas no permiten “determinar si
este sistema es más apropiado que otro para construir una mejor asociación entre el
ejecutivo y la legislatura para la elaboración de políticas públicas” (Blondel, 2006: 16). Por
otra parte, no existe ningún modelo ideal de distribución de facultades, como ya he enfa-
tizado respecto a los diseños institucionales en general. y si existiera, no habría ninguna
seguridad de que pudiera implementarse. en el segundo ámbito, conviene distinguir entre
el tipo de apoyo que el presidente recibe en su elección (dependiente del sistema electoral
presidencial), entre el tipo de partidos (disciplinados o no) y el formato del sistema de par-
tidos, si es bien institucionalizado o no, concentrado o fragmentado en cuanto al número
de partidos. en este último caso, conviene distinguir entre sistemas fragmentados que
mantienen (dependiente del grado de polarización ideológica y competitividad estratégica
de los partidos) la capacidad de formar coaliciones de apoyo al presidente o no (aspecto de
legitimidad). en el tercer ámbito, conviene diferenciar entre una concepción “confronta-
cional” de los poderes del estado y una concepción de sus relaciones proclive a la coope-
ración entre ellos. conviene distinguir entre estilos históricamente muy arraigados de
cómo ejercer el poder de esta u otra forma, especialmente respecto al modelo de toma de
no basta, sin embargo, considerar los sistemas presidenciales sólo por sí mismos. Para valo-
rar el funcionamiento de las instituciones, conviene tomar en cuenta el entorno en el que
actúan como sistema y su interrelación con él. el contexto debe entenderse en sentido
múltiple. Hay que pensar primero en el estado, su tamaño (estado vs. mercado), su estruc-
tura (estado unitario o federal), su capacidad de implementación de los resultados del sis-
tema presidencial (estado fuerte o débil). Por ejemplo en argentina (véase Dalla Via,
2010) y hasta hace poco en venezuela (véase Brewer Carías, 1991 y 2010), la estructura
federal de ambos países ha tenido un fuerte impacto restrictivo en el ejercicio del poder
por parte del ejecutivo nacional. Hay que pensar, en segundo lugar, en la democracia
como concepto genérico por encima del sistema de gobierno, en su constitución como
democracia constitucional (véanse Salazar Ugarte, 2006) y su defensa (véanse García
VI. Semipresidencialismo
el semipresidencialismo parece ser una alternativa mucho más razonable para américa
latina. Por lo menos se observan entre los científicos y en la opinión pública en general
posturas mucho más proclives a una reforma del presidencialismo en tal sentido, indepen-
64
dientemente de su práctica concreta vigente en este u otro país. esta alternativa ha sido
adoptada también por defensores del parlamentarismo al ver que su opción predilecta no
tendría cabida en ninguna parte.
de una alternancia entre los dos tipos clásicos, dependiendo de la configuración de las
mayorías parlamentarias. en caso de una homogeneidad política entre presidente y mayo-
ría parlamentaria, el semipresidencialismo funcionaría a la manera de un sistema presiden-
cial y, en caso adverso, de uno parlamentario. de este modo disputó la autonomía tipoló-
gica del semipresidencialismo. John Carey y Matthew S. Shugart (1992) favorecieron, en
cambio, la idea de un continuum con dos polos, ocupados por el presidencialismo y el par-
lamentarismo, en el que el semipresidencialismo se sitúa en el medio, con dos tipos diferen-
ciados: el presidencial-parlamentario, más cerca del presidencialismo, y el parlamentario-
presidencial, más cerca del parlamentarismo. Giovanni Sartori (1994a y 1994b), por su
parte, salió en defensa de duverger y argumentó que un continuum sólo sería posible den-
tro de una sola categoría, pero no entre dos categorías. él prefirió el concepto de oscilación
65
para referirse a la dinámica del semipresidencialismo, siempre dentro de un molde o bien
presidencialista o bien parlamentario, dependiendo el tipo de semipresidencialismo de la
relación del presidente con el parlamento, de la configuración de las mayorías parlamenta-
rias y de la cultura política de un país.
esta pequeña reseña del debate conceptual y tipológico en torno al semipresidencialis-
mo subraya la centralidad que tiene la relación entre el ejecutivo y el legislativo para la defi-
nición y el mecanismo del sistema. el criterio decisivo es el de la distribución de compe-
tencias entre las figuras que componen el ejecutivo, el presidente y el jefe de gabinete (pri-
mer ministro), y la relación de confianza del primer ministro que se establece o con el pre-
sidente o con el parlamento, o bien con ambos a la vez. respecto a las reformas del presi-
dencialismo, es en el diseño de dichas relaciones en las que deberían centrarse las reflexio-
nes y sugerencias.
parecía haber culminado ya, se añadió el debate sobre el semipresidencialismo como alter-
nativa al presidencialismo (véase Arias/Ramacciotti, 2005).
en este nuevo debate y en la puesta en práctica de reformas institucionales en sentido
semipresidencialista se observan varios problemas, en parte aparecidos ya en la querella ante-
rior, y otros nuevos. entre los nuevos destaca el problema definitorio. mientras las caracte-
rísticas del presidencialismo y del parlamentarismo como formas de gobierno son más o
menos consentidas en el derecho público y en la ciencia política, no lo son los criterios del
semipresidencialismo. se añade la incertidumbre sobre su carácter de tipo de gobierno pro-
pio. Por otra parte, dado que el semipresidencialismo se reduce, de hecho, a la práctica polí-
tica francesa, se repite el problema de la transferencia de esta experiencia, por varios autores
valorada muy positivamente, al contexto latinoamericano. Por fin se pone encima de la
66
mesa el problema del difuso concepto de semipresidencialismo en el debate en américa
latina, añadido por el del diseño concreto para este u otro país de la región.
67
4. conviene recordar que la idea de sustituir el presidencialismo por el parlamentarismo
en su primer intento después de las transiciones a la democracia, en argentina, se fue incli-
nando hacia un sistema semipresidencial, como el francés o el portugués. “se preveía, así,
la existencia de un primer ministro o ministro coordinador que desligara al presidente de
la tarea administrativa y – en parte – también de la tarea de gobierno. al mismo tiempo,
el primer ministro podría actuar como “fusible” en situaciones de grave tensión política,
sin desgastar de ese modo la figura presidencial... se preveía también un juego de censura-
confianza entre el primer ministro y la cámara de diputados, que tendría la concentra-
ción de la función política, en tanto que el senado ... se concentraría en el fortalecimien-
to de la representación de las provincias” (Dalla Vía, 2008: 228). desde entonces, las refe-
rencias al semipresidencialismo en relación a cambios institucionales propuestos o realiza-
dos se han multiplicado, sin que se desprenda de ellas un concepto homogéneo. la ampli-
tud conceptual de la noción en américa latina es enorme. el semipresidencialismo englo-
ba estructuras institucionales vinculadas con hacer efectivo el equilibrio de poderes entre
el ejecutivo y el legislativo en el clásico sistema presidencial, cuando se sustenta “que el
presidente de la república tiene que rendir cuentas de su acciones a la asamblea nacional”
(Cuarezma Terán/Enríquez Cabistán, 2008: 710), hasta prácticas de un régimen parlamen-
tario, cuando se percibe como facultad del presidente en tal sistema el derecho de disolu-
ción de la(s) cámara(s). Por otra parte florecen nociones para reformas del presidencialis-
mo en dirección semipresidencial como gobierno de gabinete, por ejemplo (Valadés,
2003), que completan el cuadro conceptual muy difuso.
recordando el origen europeo del concepto, conviene diferenciar entre perspectivas
vinculadas con el semipresidencialismo que provienen del parlamentarismo y del presiden-
cialismo. en europa, el contenido “semipresidencial” se refiere a la tendencia de acercar el
sistema parlamentario al presidencial. en américa latina es al revés, la idea es la de acer-
car el presidencialismo al parlamentarismo. en otras palabras, se trata de atenuar las carac-
terísticas de cada una de las categorías originales. mientras que en europa “el semipresi-
dencialismo debe incluirse como parte de la democracia parlamentaria, acaso referido
como un régimen parlamentario con correctivo presidencial” (Colliard, 2009: 85), en
américa latina el semipresidencialismo debería concebirse como parte de la democracia
presidencial, con algún correctivo parlamentario; debería concebirse en términos de Diego
Valadés (2007: 5) como “la parlamentarización en el sentido de adoptar instituciones de
origen parlamentario, pero preservando la estructura básica del sistema receptor”. la cues-
tión que se propone se refiere a qué elementos parlamentarios pueden servir para diseñar
un presidencialismo “parlamentarizado” que resulte viable, acorde a las condiciones espe-
cíficas del caso concreto. el elemento central que se pone sobre la mesa es la responsabili-
dad del gobierno frente al parlamento, es decir la relación del jefe de gobierno con el pre-
68
sidente y con el parlamento, y cómo se debería hacer efectiva esta responsabilidad, por qué
tipo de relación de confianza. sin embargo, el debate no se restringe a este aspecto. ya en
relación a la propuesta argentina, a la que nos hemos referido antes, se observó hace quin-
ce años “que no existe equilibrio propio de los sistemas parlamentarios en el sentido de que
el Presidente pueda disolver el Parlamento, como contrapeso de la censura para permitir la
decisión del electorado en la formación de un nuevo gobierno” (Dalla Vía, 2008, citando
afirmativamente a Vanossi 1995). Para colombia recientemente, también se ha opinado
que el voto de desconfianza carece “de su correlato: la disolución del congreso por parte
del ejecutivo para conquistar en las urnas la confianza perdida en el Parlamento” (De la
Calle, 2008: 403). la gran tentación entre los constitucionalistas latinoamericanos consis-
te en pensar el semipresidencialismo en la perspectiva europea de su concepto, como siste-
ma parlamentario con correctivos presidencialistas, y no en la perspectiva de un sistema
presidencial con correctivos parlamentarios, que sería más oportuno para las reformas ins-
titucionales en américa latina.
5. el país en el que se ha producido últimamente el mayor debate sobre conceptos que caen
en el ámbito del semipresidencialismo –juntandose así a argentina y Perú que de haber
introducido la figura de un Jefe de gabinete cuentan con controvertidas experiencias de
tal variante institucional (véanse recién Sabsay, 2009, y Pease García/Peirano Torriani,
2011)– es seguramente méxico, donde el tripartidismo después de la transición a la demo-
cracia que difícilmente permite una mayoría absoluta de un solo partido en el parlamen-
to, ha dificultado seriamente la gobernabilidad del país. allí, la idea de renovar el presiden-
cialismo en la dirección parlamentaria ha tenido excelente atención. esto se desprende no
sólo del debate en el mundo académico (véase sobre todo Valadés, 2003, también Carpizo,
2007) sino también en el mundo político, por ejemplo del documento para la reforma del
estado del Prd de 2006, donde se propone “diseñar una nueva estructura constitucional
que provea mecanismos para la gobernabilidad, entre los cuales se propone la creación de
la figura del Jefe de gobierno que coordine las acciones del ejecutivo, las articule con el
legislativo e impulse la construcción de coaliciones parlamentarias y de gobierno estables”.
sin embargo, conviene advertir sobre algunos problemas que pueden originarse justamen-
te por salir del molde presidencialista del sistema político mexicano.
el debate que se desarrolló en torno al gobierno de gabinete tiene dos dimensiones. la pri-
mera se refiere a la fórmula de gobierno colegial que se inspira en el parlamentarismo bri-
tánico (Jennings, 1969) y se define, en sentido estricto, por el grado de responsabilidad
política colectiva de sus integrantes, los ministros (véanse Blondel, 1982; Helms, 2005).
este tipo de responsabilidad es ajeno al presidencialismo en su versión clásica (estadouni-
69
dense). el objetivo consiste en desconcentrar el poder del presidente y así mejorar la gober-
nabilidad democrática. el concepto ha sido difundido sobre todo por Diego Valadés
(2003). se percibe como una nueva forma de organización y funcionamiento del sistema
presidencial, en la que no sólo el presidente sino también el gabinete en su conjunto pose-
en funciones de gobierno. el propósito principal es el de superar la estructura individual
de la presidencia. se prevé la creación de un Jefe de gabinete, al que corresponde la coor-
dinación del gabinete y la conducción de las relaciones con el congreso.
la otra dimensión se refiere precisamente a la relación de esta figura con el parlamen-
to. si bien es designado y revocado por el presidente, se propone que el Jefe de gabinete
ha de ser ratificado por una de las cámaras del congreso. el diseño parece ser una moda-
lidad del presidencialismo renovado propuesto por Dieter Nohlen y Mario Fernández
(1998), que preserva la naturaleza presidencial del sistema. Diego Valadés incluso rechaza
la denominación de la figura como “primer ministro” para no dar lugar a la idea de una
sustitución del presidencialismo por el parlamentarismo. Uno de sus objetivos es el de
superar situaciones del gobierno dividido. Para lograr el apoyo parlamentario al presiden-
te se introduce la ratificación del gobierno por parte de una de las cámaras, una medida
pensada para incentivar la cooperación entre ambos poderes del estado. sin embargo, en
caso de que no se lograse formar tal mayoría, la norma puede tener el efecto no deseado
de dificultar la formación de un gabinete, entorpeciendo así el ejercicio del poder ejecuti-
vo. el modelo no contempla tales situaciones de competencia entre los partidos (que
siguen contendiendo por ocupar la presidencia), en las que el congreso no sea capaz de un
voto mayoritario de ratificación. Por lo tanto, el buen funcionamiento del gobierno de
gabinete, cuya formación se hace dependiente de la ratificación del congreso, depende a
su vez del sentido de cooperación del legislativo. Por un lado, el diseño institucional tiene
que incentivar la cooperación del congreso con el ejecutivo, pero por el otro, no debe
hacer depender la formación de un gobierno en funciones de la disponibilidad de coope-
ración del parlamento. Por otra parte, a través de la ratificación por parte del legislativo
del gobierno formado por un Jefe de gobierno, este puede adquirir una legitimidad pro-
pia e implicar el traslado del bloqueo tradicional entre poderes, el bloqueo que ocurre entre
el legislativo y el ejecutivo, al interior del ejecutivo, si no se entienden el Presidente y el
Jefe de gobierno, dado que ambos tendrían una propia legitimidad electoral, no obstante
que esta sea en un caso directa y en el otro indirecta. en este sentido, es cuestionable la
propuesta de hacer depender la más intensa vinculación del ejecutivo con el congreso de
la ratificación del Jefe de gabinete por parte del congreso.
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Abstract
Brazil has begun to position itself as the leading country in south america. many aspects have determined this 77
situation, for example the performance in administrative competence and effectiveness. there is a main idea
regarding this situation and it is about the concept of “state-crafting”, this means the consolidation of a network
among public policy agencies. However, it is important to remark the idea of state-crafting is a process not fin-
ished yet and if it is not handled carefully could be destabilized and incur in a situation similar as Brazil neigh-
bors, were rather than a consolidation of state agencies, there is a state shrinking. the principal arguments the
author use to talk about this improvement done by Brazil as a government relies on annual index done by inter-
national organizations as freedom House, or the Bertelsmann transformation index, where the position of Brazil
in comparison with other countries is really important. But, there is also some sources to measure the well being
perception right from the citizens, where they manifest to feel a promissory future for the country. in Brazil’s
positive performance there is also a important source that has influenced widely to construct a solid state agen-
cies network. Political traditions left by the time where the country was in formation process differ a lot from its
spanish regime neighbors, such as regional disputes and confrontations. to the end, the main conclusion and
recommendation is about giving this process the right tools to make it last and convert the Brazilian democracy
from a promissory situation to a concrete reality.
Resumen
Brasil ha empezado a constituirse como un país líder en sudamérica. varios aspectos han determinado que se pro-
duzca esta situación, entre ellos el desempeño y la efectividad en el manejo administrativo. acerca de esta afir-
mación existe una idea principal que está ligada con el concepto de “construcción del estado”, donde principal-
mente se trata de la consolidación de una red interconectada entre las agencias de política pública. sin embargo,
es importante señalar que esta noción de construcción es un proceso que todavía no está acabado ni completo y
que incluso si no es manejado adecuadamente puede ser desestabilizado e incurrir en una situación similar a la
de los países vecinos de Brasil, donde al contrario de la consolidación de las agencias estatales se ha producido
una reducción del estado. los argumentos principales que utiliza el autor para poder hablar de esta situación de
mejoría en el gobierno de Brasil están relacionados con los índices anuales realizados por organizaciones como
freedom House y el índice de transformación de Bertelsman, donde se destaca que la posición que ocupa Brasil
en relación con otros países es realmente importante. además, existen otras fuentes para medir la percepción del
bienestar directamente de los habitantes, donde ellos se expresan un futuro prometedor para el país. en este análi-
sis del desempeño del gobierno brasileño existe también un importante factor a tomar en cuenta y que ha influ-
ido ampliamente en la construcción de un red de agencias estatales sólidas. las tradiciones políticas heredadas
del tiempo en que el estado brasileño estaba en su proceso de construcción difieren de la situación de sus países
vecinos que con tradiciones españoles se destacan más bien disputas regionales y confrontaciones. Para finalizar,
la conclusión y recomendación principal es que es necesario dotar a este proceso de las herramientas adecuadas
para hacer que dure y convierta la democracia brasileña de una situación prometedora a una realidad concreta.
Palabras clave: Brasil, construcción del estado, democratización, red de agencias políticas.
razil’s international reputation is on the rise. much of the new enthusiasm con-
B cerns its enhanced economic prospects, with huge offshore hydrocarbon discover-
ies adding momentum to what was already a strong secular trend based on stable
single digit inflation; a diversified commodity base; increasingly competitive insertion into
a wide range of global markets (not just for primary products, but also for high-value
added manufactures like executive jets); an upgraded private business sector; and even the
beginnings of some progress in diminishing Brazil’s traditionally extreme levels of inequal-
ity and social exclusion.
on the institutional side, agencies such as itamaraty and the finance and education
78
ministries have developed strong and stable bureaucratic cultures that provide some assur-
ance of public policy rationality and continuity regardless of electoral outcomes. the
central Bank and the sophisticated financial system have also attracted plaudits, in partic-
ular by contrast with the mismanagement of credit cycles in the advanced market
economies. even congress and the party system, despite their evident flaws, display a
higher degree of stability and legislative capacity then anticipated by most commentators
of the 1990s. moreover, these institutional improvements also show up below the federal
level. in the vastness of continental Brazil there is, of course, still great variability, but the
state government of são Paulo and the city governments of curitiba and Porto alegre are
no longer such outliers. standards of administrative competence and effectiveness have
risen more generally.
lourdes sola and i have drawn attention to these ongoing long-term institutional
improvements by invoking the concept of “state-crafting”. over time institutions that
were once isolated “islands of probity” have knitted together into a denser and more pen-
etrating network of service delivery-oriented public policy agencies. this striking (if still
patchy and incomplete) modernisation of the state is a critical complement to the mod-
ernisation of the market brought about by controlled economic liberalization. it contrasts
with the indiscriminate “state shrinking” practices in some neighbouring latin american
countries, and it provides a foundation on which long-term social democratic, rather than
“savage capitalism” strategies of development can be advanced.
it is essential to stress that this is all still work in progress. considering the sorry state
of affairs at the start of this twenty-year cycle of democratic state-crafting it is hardly sur-
prising that many inherited failings persist. nor can all the deficiencies of the present be
entirely attributed to legacies from the past. in some areas wrong policies were not correct-
ed, and there are reforms that made things worse. the institutional progress signalled here
is an overall tendency, not a uniform or guaranteed fait accompli. it could be destabilized,
for example, if the huge tax revenues anticipated from the pré-sal finds encouraged a
revival of rentier-state type misallocations of resources. these are important caveats, but
they should not divert our attention from the big picture. if Brazil’s institutional progress
over the past twenty years as compared not against some ideal standard of theoretical per-
fection, but rather against the yardstick of comparative performance when measured
against such neighbours and competitors as argentina, mexico, or venezuela, the relative-
ly strong cumulative achievement becomes more obvious.
there is also a parallel tendency as regards Brazil’s influence and standing in the inter-
national economy and in the councils of world leaders. among the developments that
have raised Brazil’s international profile, and positioned it as a beacon of “progressive” pol-
itics attractive to many sympathisers outside the country, there was the anti-davos social
79
forum, the Un rio climate chance conference, the stand on Hiv generics, and most
recently Brazil’s activism in the g20. equally of course, a rising reputation and increased
leverage outside Brazil can add to the momentum of domestic restructuring and upgrad-
ing. some other countries have been tempted to commit excessive resources to the pursuit
of over-ambitious external objectives that may not be all that beneficial for the domestic
population. Brazil was for most of the twentieth century too inward-looking to secure the
international benefits for its people that could potentially be devised from its weight in the
world. my sense is that, at least in the present phase, an enhanced Brazilian presence in
international arenas would serve to correct this historic omission. it is still far from divert-
ing necessary attention and resources from the huge domestic tasks that remain.
Within this broad context, my presentation will focus on one major, but by no means
overwhelming component of Brazil’s re-rating. my expertise is in the comparative politics
of democratization, so in section two i trace how Brazil has progressed on this dimension
since the constitution of 1988, and how this political trajectory compares to those of its
major neighbours over the same period. in the conclusion i hazard some tentative sugges-
tions about future possibilities and trends.
some analysts of democratization make a very sharp contrast between “political” democ-
racy (the reliable and consistent application of a set of “rules of the game” governing the
distribution of public office and the obligations of such officeholders) and broader “social”
or “economic” changes that may also be loosely described as components of democratiza-
tion, but that concern the outcomes of public policy rather than the processes involved in
its production. in a similar vein, some make a categorical distinction between cases of
democratic “transition” and those that have attained the apparently irreversible status of
“consolidation”. for my purposes, these are only differences of degree, heuristically con-
venient categories, rather than cut-and-dried dichotomies.
those who limited their analysis to purely procedural questions were liable to find that
even when all the correct boxes have been ticked, according to their definition of a dem-
ocratic outcome, the citizens in question might remain deeply disaffected because their
expectations of democracy were not fulfilled. thus, for example, the venezuelan political
system of 1958-1998 looked pretty convincing from a procedural standpoint, but was
eventually rejected by the venezuelan people as a corrupt façade behind which rival par-
ties shared power at the expense of society (a “partidocracia”). similarly, venezuela provides
a convenient illustration of how an apparently “consolidated” democratic regime can turn
80
out to contain tensions and unresolved conflicts that render the political structure unsus-
tainable.
in view of these considerations my overview of Brazilian progress towards stronger
democratic politics can not entirely exclude substantive outcomes (the stabilization of the
currency in 1994 was an indispensable foundation for subsequent institutional advance).
nor does it seem productive to engage in a theological debate over whether Brazil’s democ-
racy is now finally “consolidated”. it has certainly persisted over time, vanquished succes-
sive sources of instability and is now quite routinised and entrenched. in my lexicon, the
progress of democratization in Brazil (as compared to most of its neighbours, with the
exception of Uruguay which is a case of re-democratization) has rested on its adaptive flex-
ibility, its “viability” in response to demands from Brazilian society, rather than its “con-
solidation” as an impregnable institutional edifice.
the scholarly literature rightly takes a somewhat sceptical view of the various ranking
and rating exercises by which new democracies are customarily graded. But due recogni-
tion of biases and over-simplifications notwithstanding, some of these tabulations do pro-
vide a useful first approximation to the underlying trends.
in contrast to some of my colleagues, i favour the freedom House annual survey of polit-
ical rights and civil liberties around the world, because it has been trying to answer a more
or less under-defined and stable set of questions, using expert surveys to apply track annu-
al performance since 1972. there are separate ratings for civil liberties and political rights,
and the most valuable feature of the procedure is that each numerical score is accompa-
nied by a reasoned textual commentary. so the reader can assess something of the subjec-
tivity involved in summing up the relative performance of a single country either over
time, of as compared to its neighbours. the broadest classification divides all sovereign
states into just three types; free; part-free; and not free.
according to this schema Brazil was not free in the 1970s, but gradually progressed
through different stages of the “part free” category in the 1980s. throughout the 1990s,
it was still rated “part free”, although very close to the top of that range. since 2002 it has
been consistently rated “free”, behind chile, costa rica, and Uruguay, but just ahead of
mexico and (also “free”) Peru, Bolivia, colombia, ecuador, Paraguay, and venezuela
remain in the “partly free” category. the closest comparatives to Brazil on this scale are
argentina and the dominican republic. in my view this is broadly correct.
the contested nature of such rankings can be demonstrated by comparing the
Heritage foundation’s parallel exercise on “freedom in the World”. this rates countries
81
according to their “free market” or “economic freedom” performance, and assumes that
low taxes and light regulation are the foundations of liberty (both economic and political).
that makes Hong Kong the “freest” country in the world (notwithstanding its lack of sov-
ereignty), and places chile at the top of the latin american rankings (ahead of canada
for example). Brazil, by contrast, is rated “mostly unfree”, (worse than moldova) above all
because of its high level of government intervention in the economy. of the immediate
neighbours only argentina and venezuela rate worse.
Whereas freedom House and the Heritage foundation both use expert surveys and anno-
tated annual commentaries to depict the degree of “freedom” provided by each political
regime each year, the Bertelsmann transformation index uses a similar procedure to assess
the relative performance of different regimes in managing the complex tasks of modern
government, and in implementing appropriate strategies of economic transformation.
Here the focus in on what isaiah Berlin referred as “freedom to” achieve collective desired
results, as opposed to “freedom from” oppressive intrusions.
By this third standard of evaluation contemporary Brazil performs particularly well. in
2008 it was ranked 15th out of 125 countries as regards “the management of political lead-
ership toward democracy and a market economy”, and 20th as concerns the “status of its
political and economic transformation”. only chile and Uruguay, of its south american
neighbours, were ranked higher. (argentina, for example, was 36th on management and 26th
on status; Peru 40th and 38th; colombia 58th and 436th; and ecuador was 103 and 64th).
Attitudinal Surveys
there is also a great deal of cross-national attitudinal survey research, some of which
shows a popular outlook that is favourable to democracy, some of which shows the oppo-
site. the interpretation of this kind of data is a highly specialised sub-field of academic
activity, which sometimes attributes more structural significant and explanatory power to
the data than such questions can bear. after all, it is not self-evident that an average citi-
zen in Brazil, answering a theoretical question drafted in english and then translated into
Portuguese, understands the terms and assumptions of the questioner in the same way as
a median voter operating in the quite different political and cultural context – say
venezuela or indeed the Usa. for what it is worth, however, i quote two recent survey
findings which locate Brazil as a regional outlier on attitudinal dimensions.
first, there is a gallop survey which tries to capture the collective sense of “well-being”
(broadly conceived) as reported by citizens in over 130 countries. Brazil scores very well
here. gallop finds that people in denmark, new Zealand, and canada report the highest
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well-being in the world. the United states, australia, venezuela, and Brazil are among the
countries that score nearly as high, but no country in mainland asia or africa makes the
top 10.
gallop’s Well-Being index reflects a broad view of the well-being concept and is made
up of six questions that ask respondents to evaluate their overall lives and to comment on
experiences during a specific time:
• Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. Support
we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of
the ladder represents the worst possible life for you.
• If the top set is 10 and the bottom sep is 0, on which step of the ladder do you feel you per-
sonally stand at the present time?
• Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand on the future, say 5 years
from now?
• Were you treated with respect all day yesterday?
• Did you smile or laugh a lot yesterday?
• Did you learn or do something interesting yesterday?
• Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? Enjoyment
answers to these experience and evaluative questions offer scholars a more representative
view of well-being than traditional economic and social indications such as gdP, poverty
rates, healthcare expenditures, and literacy rates. together, they provide a comprehensive
tool to measure and track the progress toward improving the well-being of citizens and
societies around the world.
at the other extreme, when the question asked was “in a few words, what is the mean-
ing of democracy for you?” no fewer than 37.5% of Brazilians were classified as “individ-
uals who could not assign a meaning to this term” – and the Barometro de las Américas
study concludes that those who cannot define democracy are less attached to it as a form
of response. (Brazil scored the lowest out of 19 latin american countries by this test,
whereas in Uruguay at the top only 9.7% could not define the term).
in summary, different cross-national indicators generate different conclusions about
the relative standing of Brazilian democracy as compared to its neighbours. if the crucial
test is considered to be the absence of state intervention in the economy, or a high level of
conceptual awareness of the meaning of democracy, then Brazil is still a laggard. But on
most of the more conventional indicators – political and civic freedom, and freedom of
expression; state capacity to promote economic reform and to manage the building of
democratic institutions; and social tolerance – Brazilian democracy emerges in a relative-
83
ly good light compared to its neighbours. indeed, Brazilian political elites are particularly
buoyant in their appraisal of what they have achieved since the 1988 constitution. By
2005 one survey of federal congressmen found that 88 percent believed Brazilian democ-
racy to be “consolidated”.
my view is that there has been sustained incremental progress on most of the relevant
dimensions over the past two decades, and that does differentiate Brazil from most of its
neighbours. at the same time, there are still substantial areas of risk and challenge, so that
the finality implied by the term “consolidation” should be resisted. if instead we think of
democratization as a long-term uneven, and potentially reversible process of social con-
struction, without a single “one-size fits all” end state that finally closes the issue, then we
can track the historical sequence and identify crucial areas of advance and of relatively high
comparative performance, while still paying due attention to the remaining authoritarian
legacies and areas of weakness and danger that will require further attention in the future
for democratization is to be sustained.
accordingly, the next section of this paper takes a more diachronic view and considers
not so much how closely Brazil’s current democracy corresponds to some de-contextu-
alised theoretical ideal, as how far it has cumulatively evolved in a direction that broadens
its national support base and embeds it as the appropriate framework for managing Brazil’s
ongoing and severe problems of social integration and national development.
there were elements of political opening and institutional-building in Brazil under the
empire (which, after all, had a two party system not unlike some nineteenth century
european monarchies). then there was a forty year period known as the “old republic”
cratic experience. the venezuelan transition of 1958 made almost as sharp a break with
the past. chile and Uruguay lived under fairly high quality and sustained constitutional
democracies for almost a century, apart from the violent interregnums of the 1970s, which
were then followed by clear-cut re-democratizations, involving the reinstatement of much
of the previous political class and its institutions. in all these cases, there was really only
one political model for the whole country, or sharply defined alternative.
By contrast, in Brazil political development and evolution was often far more jerky and
ambiguous. one regime type morphed into another, without explicit and agreed disjunc-
tures. the 1964 military coup, for example, was justified by its supporters as a brief inter-
lude to “save” democracy, rather than to suppress it. the 1985 transition to civilian rule
as negotiated on the basis that the “direitas já” campaign would not prevail. What col-
85
league tim Power has characterised as “implicit” cross-party and elite consensus guided
and stabilised the most important processes of political reform, without resorting to the
explicit device of “pacted” democratization (whereby party leaders in colombia, or chile
conspired to eliminate some of the most contentious questions from the political agenda).
it seems that much of Brazil’s political behaviour and discourse maybe based on internal
referents rather more than elsewhere. Brazilians are not such uncritical importers and
appliers of external models and their responses – be it democratic or authoritarian – maybe
more pragmatic then elsewhere.
this kind of flexible tacit, incremental, and ideologically opaque sequence of adjust-
ments to the rules of the political game often suited the sophisticated operators of the
major political hierarchies, but it may also at times deprived the mass of the citizenry of
any clear-cut sense of what overall alternatives were in play. in more recent elections, where
the programmatic alternatives were probably fairly clear to the electors, they were not
framed in the same zero-sum polarising terms as in neighbouring countries and in partic-
ular contenders did not accuse each other of subservience to foreign powers. it could be
seen as an appropriate reflection of the extreme heterogeneity of Brazilian regional inter-
ests and political outlooks (with far more modern democratic politics in são Paulo or
Porto alegre than in João Pessoa or rondânia). But it may also explain why so many
Brazilian citizens are unable to define “democracy” and why the “only game in town” test
of democratic consolidation may fail to encapsulate the national verstehen.
at the same time, if we judge contemporary Brazil by standard comparative criteria,
the end result of all this long process is remarkably democratic. civilian rule has been
unchallenged for the past quarter century (not a claim that can really be made about any
other south american republic other than Uruguay); and there is good reason to expect
this to continue into the indefinite future. in a similar manner, other potential “veto play-
ers” such as militant labour unions, or landless activists and propertied oligarchies no
longer threaten to subvert the democratic process. despite Brazil’s geographical diversity
there are no inclinations towards regional succession or confrontation with federal author-
ities (in contrast to the andean republics).
on Huntington’s “two turnover” test, Brazil’s federal elections have resulted in smooth
and peaceful transfers of power between rival parties, and can be expected to continue to
do so. the party system may have been inchoate in the 1980s, but it is now crystallising
into a fairly well-defined set of choices that offer programmatic alternatives while still gen-
erating an orderly menu of options. (contrast the lopsided offerings in argentina and
colombia; or the polarised alternatives in Bolivia, ecuador, Paraguay, and venezuela).
President collor was impeached in 1992, but not forced into exile (like de la rúa, sanchez
de lozada, and so many others in neighbouring countries). Hopefully, therefore, there will
86
be no further political exiles driven out of their home countries.
more generally, the persistence of this political regime is no longer a mere temporary
question of survival, but has now progressed to the point where it is strongly routinized. i
would prefer to say socially “embedded”, rather than institutionally “consolidated”. the
shock or assault now required to overturn it is vastly greater than in the 1980s – or than
in most other latin american democracies.
Both the comparative perspective and this long run historical view indicate that democra-
tization in Brazil is progressing well, and that the prospects are bright. in addition to the
various “procedural” criteria by which political scientists typically evaluate any democratic
regime, there are also some positive trends on the “output” side. in my opinion, citizens and
voters – who are not that caught up with the niceties of political dialogue and bargaining,
and who may have good reason to regard professional democratic politicians as a remote,
untrustworthy, and perhaps basically dishonest occupational category – are entitled to judge
their political system as much by what it delivers as by how it functions internally.
for a long time, many ordinary Brazilians may have recalled the high economic growth
and rapid modernisation of the years of military rule, and could therefore have judged neg-
atively hyper-inflation, economic stagnation, and intensified social inequalities of the first
decade of civilian rule. But since the mid-1990s not only has procedural democracy
become more embedded in Brazil, it has also started generating some highly desirable
“outputs”.
the first, and most indispensible of these was the stabilization of the price level under
the 1994 Plano real. this eliminated a hugely disruptive inflationary pattern that inflict-
ed quite disproportionate hardship on the poorest and most vulnerable, and distorted the
allocation of resources throughout both the public sector and the market economy. Price
stability legitimised the democratic system in Brazil as no constitutional convention
could have done. it was followed by the slow extension of other benefits that also cement
popular support for the current regime. conditional cash transfers (initially introduced
by the cardoso administration but then extended and systematized after 2002) now reach
11 million of the poorest families, or one quarter of the electorate. crucially these are
extended as rights, and no longer – as in the past so liable to be understood as clientelistic
benefits offered in exchange for political subservience.
almost as important, though less widely noted, is the rising level of the real minimum
wage – now 80 percent higher than in 1994, back to its pre-military regime peak. the
87
minimum wage affects the earnings not just of those at the bottom of the income scale,
but also those paid on multiples (twice or three times the minimum wage, etc.). the result
of stable prices, higher earnings, and the slow extension of (relatively) affordable credit is
that the mass of the population can now start accumulating assets such as white goods and
mobile phones, even cars and houses, which were previously outside their grasp.
this is not the place to discuss the broader socio-economic progress underway in con-
temporary Brazil. from my standpoint, we should emphasize the policy outputs that are
clearly attributable to the current political system. Price stability, the bolsa familia, and a
decent minimum wage are all understood as benefits associated with democratization. the
prospects for Brazilian democracy over the coming decade or generation will be enhanced to
the extent that these “outputs” remain secure and can be extended. of course, there are risks
here, but my judgement is that all these three highly desired public goods are more secure in
Brazil than in argentina, mexico, or the andean and central american republics – except
chile. if this is correct, then the relative future of Brazilian democracy is quite bright.
even so, it is vital to conclude with some caveats. these benefits are vital, but they are
not the only politically salient outputs of the current regime. on other crucial dimensions,
such as citizen security, the rule of law, and the control of corruption, Brazilian democra-
cy is still a severe underperformer. to take just one example, on the transparency
international corruption Perception index Brazil was ranked 45th in 2002, but 80th in
2008 (the least corrupt is ranked highest in this index). there is a clear risk that the antic-
ipated “oil rent” from offshore hydrocarbon wealth could end up as much of a political
“curse” in Brazil as it has proved to be for venezuelan democracy. this underscores the
risks that could arise if the past incremental progress in “state-crafting” neutral and effec-
tive public institutions were to be blocked or reversed. there is still widespread and well-
founded public distrust not only of politicians but of official agencies, and indeed of all
social partners beyond an immediate circle of family and friends.
the political elites that have united around their approval for the current democratic
regime can provide it with stability and further forward impetus, but only if they contin-
ue to realise that it is a work-in-progress, requiring much further effort and reform. if,
instead, they come to take it for granted, disregarding the need to improve its efficiency
and accountability, and instead just parcelling out its privileges, they are liable to exhaust
the patience of the population. not only does survey research indicate a high proportion
of Brazilian voters who cannot characterise democracy, it also uncovers a larger than nor-
mal sector of the electorate disposed to take an actively favourable view of authoritarian
rule when the “outputs” of democracy are judged unsatisfactory. this is hardly surprising,
considering that Brazil’s experience of military domination was not as brutal or traumatic
as that of most neighbours. But it does mean that the current democratic regime remains
88
to some degree on trial – subject to “performance legitimacy” rather than solidly support-
ed on principle.
Metodología
Truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit)
in the Deliberative
Model of Democracy1
Jürg Steiner
Abstract
91
in the Habermasian version of deliberative theory, truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit) is a key element. Habermas goes
back to Kant for whom to be wahrhaftig means to be true to one’s inner self, to find one’s human dignity.
Without human dignity, we become mere speech machines (sprachmaschinen). not to be wahrhaftig is a crime
for Kant. can we empirically measure in a reliable and valid way to what extent actors in a political discussion
are truthful? after many unsuccessful attempts, i have come to the conclusion that Wahrhaftigkeit in the Kantian
and Habermasian sense eludes empirical measurement. i assume that our most inner self is not something fixed
that we can discover if only we dig deep enough. i rather assume that the inner self is something malleable and
elusive that despite all our inner searching we can never quite know. such a view is compatible with deliberative
theory, which expects that political actors are open to change their preferences based on the force of the better
argument. such openness would not exist if we would be sure what our inner self is; in order to be wahrhaftig
we would simply do whatever our self tells us and not listen to arguments of others. although we cannot meas-
ure truthfulness, we can measure the perception of truthfulness by the participating actors. We have done so in
experiments in deeply divided societies such as colombia, where we discuss how colombia can get a future of
peace. i postulate that Wahrhaftigkeit should be kept as a regulative idea of the deliberative model.
Resumen
en la versión habermasiana de la teoría deliberativa, la veracidad es un elemento clave. Habermas retoma a Kant para
quien ser wahrhaftig significa ser sincere con nuestro yo interior, y en consecuencia encontrar nuestra dignidad
humana. sin dignidad humana, no seremos más que máquinas que hablan. el no ser wahrhaftig es un crimen para
Kant. ¿es posible medir empiricamente de forma válida y confiable hasta que punto los actores de un debate políti-
co están siendo sinceros? después de varios intentos fallidos para lograrlo, he llegado a una conclusión: el
Wahrhaftigkeit como es expresado en el sentido kantiano y habermasiano no toma en cuenta la dimensión empírica.
asumo, por lo tanto, que para muchos su yo interior no es algo fijo que puede ser descubierto únicamente a través
de ir hasta lo más profundo de nosotros. de hecho en realidad pienso que el yo interior es algo maleable y difuso que
a pesar de nuestra búsqueda interna, tal vez nunca lleguemos a descubrirlo. esta posición es compatible con la teoría
deliberativa, que espera que los actores políticos estén abiertos a cambiar sus preferencias según el planteamiento de
argumentos más sólidos. esta postura abierta no existiría si estuviéramos seguros de lo que establece nuestro yo inte-
rior; así que para ser wahrhaftig deberíamos simplemente hacer lo que nos dicta nuestro yo y no escuchar los argu-
mentos de los demás. a pesar de que no se puede medir la veracidad, si podemos medir la percepción de veracidad
entre los actores políticos involucrados. Hemos experimentado de esa manera en sociedades profundamente dividi-
das como colombia, en donde debatimos cómo colombia puede llegar a tener un futuro pacífico. Propongo que el
Wahrhaftigkeit debe ser considerada como un idea regulatoria de un modelo deliberativo.
1 an earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference on epistemic democracy in Practice, yale
University, 20-23 october 2011.
he deliberative model of democracy expects that actors, both politicians and ordi-
t nary citizens, justify their positions with reasons, refer to the public interest,
respect the position of other actors, and are willing to yield to the force of the bet-
ter argument. it could be, however, that such seemingly deliberative speech acts are not
sincere at all and are only used for strategic considerations. actors justify positions with
reasons that are not sincere but look good in a strategic game. references to the public
interest hide crude self-interest. respect is expressed to flatter the other side in order to
improve one’s own bargaining position. actors change strategically exaggerated position to
their real position as a clever moves and not because of the force of the better argument.
does this scenario cause great problems for the validity of the deliberative model? many
theorists think so
92
Jürgen Habermas is the foremost theorist who gives key importance to truthfulness
(Wahrhaftigkeit). in an early work, he postulates that “each person may only assert what he
2
believes himself.” He sticks with this assertion when in a more recent work he writes that
in deliberation participants must abstain from deceptive behavior (ohne Täuschung).3
Habermas claims that in most social situations it is routine praxis to assume that others are
truthful; otherwise one would not engage in any conversation at all. if this assumption is
violated, deliberation breaks down. for Habermas, without truthfulness no real delibera-
tion can take place. for him truthfulness is a necessary condition of deliberation in a con-
stitutive sense. Habermas explicitly bases his theory on the writing of immanuel Kant,4 so
that it is relevant to see what Kant means by truthfulness. like Habermas, Kant already
uses the concept of Wahrhaftigkeit, which for him has a much deeper connotation than the
english translation of truthfulness.5 the concept Wahrhaftigkeit for Kant certainly includes
not telling lies, but it is much broader in its meaning. to be wahrhaftig means to be true
to one’s inner self, to find one’s innermost identity. for Kant to be wahrhaftig is to find
one’s human dignity. He goes as far as to write that not to be wahrhaftig is a crime because
one destroys one’s human dignity.6 Without human dignity, we become mere speech
machines (Sprachmaschinen). for Kant it is a duty (Pflicht) to oneself and to others to be
wahrhaftig. if we are not wahrhaftig with others, we do not respect their human dignity,
and we do not act according to our own dignity.
2 Jürgen Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommuikatives Handeln (frankfurt a.m.: suhrkamp, 1983), s. 98.
‚Jeder sprecher darf nur behaupten, was er selber glaubt’.
3 Jürgen Habermas, Ach, Europa (frankfurt a.m.: suhrkamp, 2008), s. 148.
4 Jürgen Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handeln (frankfurt a.m.:
suhrkamp, 1984).
5 sincerity is another possible but also not quite satisfactory translation.
6 immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (Hamburg: f. meiner, 1986).
the argument against the Habermasian position with regard to truthfulness runs
about as follows: motives for deliberative behavior do not count for much. What really
counts is behavior itself. if a participant in a discussion expresses a high level of respect
towards another participant, only this utterance matters, whether it is meant truthfully or
not. dennis f. thompson presents this argument in a forceful way. in his view, the key is
that deliberators present all possible arguments in terms that are accessible to the relevant
audience, respond to reasonable arguments presented by opponents, and manifest an incli-
nation to change their views or cooperate with opponents when appropriate. this requires
no special window into the motives or inner life of actors. according to thompson,
“empirical researchers therefore should not worry, as some evidently do, about formulat-
ing an independent test for sincerity or truthfulness.”7 in the same vein, mark e. Warren
93
argues that “deliberative institutions should not depend upon, or be defined by, the delib-
erative intentions of participants.”8 let me illustrate this argument against the
Habermasian position with a speech act in the British House of commons. in a december
5, 1997 debate, conservative mP richard ottaway addressed mP estelle morris, labour
Undersecretary of state for education and employment, in the following way: “i am
pleased to hear that the minister’s commitment to special education needs is being devel-
oped through the green Paper. i am also pleased at the tone of her speech.”9 the argument
against Habermas would be that this utterance of respect may or may not have been truth-
ful, but that this would be irrelevant. the only relevant issue would be whether the utter-
ance of ottaway did contribute to a good outcome with regard to special education.
Warren does even go further in arguing that under certain conditions “white lies” are
justified. He stresses, however, that he is “not, of course, advocating insincerity” as a gen-
eral rule, but only under very specific circumstances, namely when there are “histories of
distrust, mutual ignorance, suspicion, and status inequality.” Under these conditions,
absolute sincerity would be detrimental to deliberation, since it “will cause injury, will be
a conversation stopper, and so amounts to a choice against deliberation.”10 in such situa-
tions, Warren calls for manners, and manners not in a conventional snobbish way, but as
deliberative diplomacy, “which may require expressive insincerity to be preferred when
issues are at their most sensitive, and conditions of discourse are less than ideal.”11
7 dennis f. thompson, ‘deliberative democratic theory and empirical Political science’, The Annual
Review of Political Science 11 (2008), 6.
8 mark e. Warren, ‘institutionalizing deliberative democracy’, in shawn W. rosenberg (ed.), Deliberation,
Participation and Democracy (london: Palgrave macmillan, 2007), p. 278.
9 Jürg steiner, andré Bächtiger, markus spörndli, and marco r. steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action.
Analysing Parliamentary Discourse (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 176-7.
10 mark e. Warren, ‘deliberation under nonideal conditions: a reply to lenard and adler’, Journal of Social
Philosophy .39 (2008), 658-60.
11 mark e. Warren, ‘What should and should not Be said: deliberating sensitive issues’, Journal of Social
“deliberative diplomats hold that in order to sustain a politics based on deliberation, some
things should not be said ….Within societies divided by race, ethnicity, or religion,
unbounded deliberation may reveal and strengthen latent prejudices in ways that cause
more damage than if they had gone unspoken.”12 for Warren, “well-mannered people self-
censor and tell little white lies”, if absolute sincerity and honesty would have unfavorable
consequences.13 He believes that sometimes “the civilizing hypocrisies of good manners”
may help deliberation.14 robert goodin is another prominent theorist who argues “that,
politically, some things are better left unsaid.”15 He agrees with Warren, that sometimes
“sensitivities are good grounds for taking certain topics off the agenda… merely raising the
topic can sometimes profoundly offend certain segments of the community.”16
the position of theorists like thompson, Warren and goodin is controversial in the
94
current philosophical literature. thus, Patti tamara lenard wrote a critical reply to
Warren, where she insists that Habermas has the right “intuition” when he postulates as a
criterion for good deliberation “mutual trust in subjective sincerity.”17 lenard postulates
that “we must believe that others do not intend to deceive us in some way and that they
are sincerely advocating the position they put forward, and that they are genuinely com-
mitted to the reasons with which they support their position. to a considerable extent, the
capacity for effective communication relies on our being able to take for granted that peo-
ple are telling the truth.”18 lenard addresses specifically sensitive situations that Warren
worries about and takes a counter-position:
in situations of intense vulnerability, such as the kind Warren describes, deliberators will
need to have confidence precisely in the sincerity of the views expressed by others. there is
considerable debate in the confidence-building literature about the mechanisms by which
deliberators should be protected from the insincerities of others; this debate is predicated on
the view that conflict resolution or transformation can emerge only under conditions in
which sincerity is the norm.19
lenard concludes that in situations of intense hostility, the advice of Warren “may be a
dangerous rather than a productive strategy for those involved in negotiations.”20 there are
many other theorists, besides lenard, who stick with the Habermasian position that truth-
fulness must be considered as a key element in the deliberative model. ian o’flynn, for
example, states: “truthfulness is important to the ethos of democracy. We would never
deliberate with others unless we thought that they were, in the main, truthful. We respect
people if and because we think that they are truthful.”21 in the same vein, James Bohman
and Henry s. richardson make the point that deliberation requires “a level of sincerity and
mutual recognition.”22 michael neblo goes in the same direction when he writes: “it is dif-
ficult to see how being coerced on the basis of polite lies shows any deep kind of respect
to those who come out in the minority. thus, without a sincerity constraint, deliberation
95
may lose much of both its epistemic values, and its respect expressing function.”23 for
simon niemeyer “truthfulness should be aspired to, even if it is ugly and even though we
know that it can’t be guaranteed,” and he defends this position with the argument “that as
soon as you admit untruthfulness you open the door back to strategic manipulation.”24
Jane mansbridge wants participants in deliberation to “speak truthfully.” for her “lying is
a form of coercive power.”25
We see that theorists differ widely on the role of truthfulness in the deliberative model.
Whatever weight is given to truthfulness, the focus is on truthfulness of motives. rudy
andeweg brings to my attention that there is another important aspect of truthfulness that
is neglected in the theoretical literature, namely whether facts are presented in a truthful
way. as an example he mentions “political leaders who knowingly overstated the intelli-
gence on weapons of mass destruction in iraq in order to convince others that military
intervention against saddam was justified. these leaders were truthful about their own
motives and goals, but they deceived others by presenting ‘untruthful’ factual informa-
tion.”26 this example shows, indeed, that truthfulness may refer both to motives and facts,
and that the two aspects may not necessarily go hand in hand. andré Bächtiger also puts
emphasis on the factual aspect of truthfulness.27 according to him, “it may be futile to get
hold of the inner motives of participants during a decision process.”28 He wants to “reverse
an intention-based approach to truthfulness by viewing truthfulness as an element that can
emerge out of a critical and thorough process of agonistic inquiry.”29 Bächtiger considers
critical questioning, disputing and insisting as core deliberative values. on this basis, delib-
eration should help to come closer to the factual truth in using methods “similar to cross-
examination in court” and “investigative news media.”30 in this way, it may be possible to
“unravel relevant information that otherwise would be withheld.”31 With this argument,
Bächtiger is in agreement with gary mucciaroni and Paul J. Quirk who argue that a deci-
sion process must be rational also in the sense that actors check the accuracy of informa-
tion in consulting the best available research evidence.32
the normative-philosophical controversies on truthfulness reveal hypotheses that cry
96
out for empirical testing. the big question is whether absolute and unconditional truth-
fulness helps or hurts deliberation. this raises the challenge for empirical scholars to meas-
ure in a reliable and valid way to what extent participants in a political discussion are truth-
ful. How can we investigate whether politicians, or, for that matter, ordinary citizens,
mean what they say when they discuss political issues? some rational choice theorists have
developed models where truthfulness and lying play a great role. these models, however,
remain at a theoretical level and are never empirically tested. let me give two examples of
papers that have both the concept of deliberation in the title and are therefore relevant in
the present context. david austin-smith and timothy J. feddersen ask in a mathematical
model whether in a jury lying or truthfulness are more likely under majority or unanimi-
ty rule.33 But they undertake no effort to empirically test their hypotheses, nor do they
show how such tests could look like. in a similar vein, dimitri landa and adam meirowitz
present game-theoretical ideas about institutional settings making lying least likely, but
again without any hints of how their ideas could empirically be tested.34
i, for my part, have come to the conclusion that Wahrhaftigkeit in the Habermasian
sense eludes direct empirical measurement. michael neblo points out well the problematic
of measuring truthfulness in the deliberative context: “sincerity is a notoriously difficult
concept to get a handle on empirically. the fear is that there is simply no scientifically serv-
iceable way to operationalize the concept for most purposes of deliberative research.” 35 let
me justify why in my view a direct measurement of Wahrhaftigkeit is impossible or at least
highly problematic. as stated earlier in the paper, to be wahrhaftig in the Kantian and
Habermasian sense means to be true to one’s inner self, which raises the question of how
we can know what our most inner self is. How do we know whether we are true to this self?
i assume that our most inner self is not something fixed that we can discover if only we dig
deep enough. i rather assume that the inner self is something malleable and elusive that
despite all our inner searching we can never quite know. such a view of the inner self is
compatible with deliberative theory, which –as we have seen above– expects that political
actors are open to change their preferences based on the force of better arguments. such
97
openness would not exist if we would be sure what exactly our inner self is, so that we would
have no reason to listen to others in order to be wahrhaftig. We would simply do whatever
our inner self tells us. according to deliberative theory, talking with others will help us in
the search of our inner self. thus, good deliberation can be instrumental to better under-
stand our own deeper identity, but we will never be quite sure what this identity really is.
this elusive and changing nature of our inner self means that we never quite know
whether we are wahrhaftig in a particular situation. if a politician or an ordinary citizen
supports a specific position, he or she can never be quite sure whether this position is fully
compatible with his or her inner self. outside observers will be all the more uncertain
about the Wahrhaftigkeit of the taken position. all this means that it seems impossible to
measure the level of Wahrhaftigkeit with a sufficient level of reliability and validity. this
does not mean, of course, that we are not able to detect crude lies in a political discussion,
especially when not motives but facts are involved. But it is a much more subtle issue
whether someone is truthful, for example, in referring to the common good or showing
respect to other actors. not being truthful in such situations is much more difficult to
detect than to discover crude lies about factual matters. the elusive character of one’s most
inner motives is also forcefully stressed by goodin:
the point is not just one about veracity in reporting one’s own motives. the fear is not so
much that the agent will lie, but that without any reality check neither he nor we will have
any way of telling what the truth of the matter really is. nor is the worry that he will nec-
essarily cook the books in his own favour, attributing to himself nobler motives than he in
fact harbours. He may do just the opposite, engaging in moral self-debasement and attribut-
ing to himself less noble motives than are really at work.36
overall, i feel that people expressed what was truly on their mind.
strongly agree 27%
agree 50%
neutral or do not know 17%
disagree 4%
strongly disagree 2%
i cannot escape the feeling that many participants were hiding their true beliefs from the
discussion.
strongly agree 10%
agree 32%
neutral or do not know 28%
disagree 21%
strongly disagree 9%
the answers depend on the formulation of the items, revealing the well known phenom-
enon that people have the tendency to answer in the positive. this tendency was probably
even stronger among ex-combatants because they were particularly cagey not to choose
99
wrong words. 77 percent agreed that the other participants were truthful when they spoke
up, which is an impressive figure for traumatized ex-combatants, although there was most
likely social pressure to answer in the positive. When in the second item, the question of
truthfulness was formulated in a negative way, there were still 30 percent who explicitly
said that they disagreed that the other participants were hiding their true beliefs. and with
42 percent it was not even a majority who expressed suspicion that the others were not
truthful. all in all, it seems that the perception of truthfulness was relatively high given the
background of participants. this would augur well for future progress in the discourse
quality. if one is not constantly worried that others are not telling the truth, one is more
likely to search for common solutions in the interest of all.
although empirical data on perceptions of truthfulness are useful, they are no substi-
tute for a measurement of truthfulness itself. the problematic of doing empirical research
about this particular element of deliberation does not mean, however, that we should elim-
inate truthfulness as a normative part of deliberative theory. as ian o’flynn puts it well,
“just because something is not objectively visible does not mean that that thing is moral-
ly or politically irrelevant.”40 What is the relevance of truthfulness in the deliberative model
of democracy? it is my position that truthfulness has a value per se. from a moral or deon-
tological perspective, truthfulness is an important value, although i would not go as far as
Kant disallowing any untruthfulness. i acknowledge that there are occasions, for example
a committee on national security, where it may sometimes be justified not to be altogeth-
er truthful in reporting the results to the outside world. i also agree with Warren that rules
of good manners may sometimes require telling “white lies,” for example not to say that a
meeting was boring when indeed this is what one felt.41 i also agree with christian f.
rostbøll that for reasons of privacy the deliberative model does not require that partici-
pants reveal all their innermost desires and interests in order to justify arguments.42 as a
general norm, however, participants in a political discussion should strive for truthfulness
when they use a deliberative vocabulary. With the argument that motives are relevant, i
get help from david Hume who writes: “We must look within to find the moral quality…
a virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous.”43 following Hume, i would
like to keep truthfulness as a normative regulative element of deliberation.
to keep truthfulness as a normative element in the deliberative model is particularly
important if we think of how we should teach our students about deliberation. Without
the element of truthfulness, it is easy to see deliberation as a shrewd tactic to further one’s
personal interests. even in good deliberation, strategic actions will never be completely
100
absent. it is only in the unreachable ideal type of deliberation where political actors would
consider only the common good and express respect without any ulterior motives. real life
discussions are always characterized by mixed motives. some actors will always be to some
extent untruthful in a political debate. But it seems to me desirable that we postulate as a
general regulative rule that truthfulness be a normative goal. in this way, deliberation has
a moral value in itself and is not only valuable because it may have good consequences.
this is what we should teach students. although much lying, cheating and corruption
may go on in the political arena, students should internalize the norm that this is not
inevitable and that the goal should be politics with more truthfulness and sincerity.
although i have no data for the level of truthfulness of political discussions, i could
present data on the perception of truthfulness. in colombia, ex-combatants did never call
each other liars during the experiments, but in the questionnaire filled out after the exper-
iments there were quite a few complaints that other participants were not truthful when
they spoke up. according to Kant and Habermas, in order to be truthful, ex-combatants
should have articulated these complaints during the discussion itself. But this is a situation
where i side with mark Warren that telling other participants face-to-face that they are
liars would have endangered any signs of emerging deliberation. after all, it was already an
accomplishment that a high number of ex-combatants were willing to meet with represen-
tatives from the other side. so it was a sign of appropriate prudence that complaints about
untruthfulness were expressed only in the questionnaire after the experiments.
42 christian f. rostbøoll, Deliberative Freedom. Deliberative Democracy as Critical Theory (albany: state
University of new york Press, 2008), pp. 178, 220.
43 david Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. a critical edition. edited by david fate norton and mary J.
norton, (oxford: clarendon Press, 2007), p. 307.
References
austin-smith david and feddersen timothy J., ‘deliberation, preference uncertainty, and
voting rules’, American Political Science Review 100 (2006),
Bächtiger andré, ‘on Perfecting the deliberative Process: Questioning, disputing, and
insisting as core deliberative values’, Paper Presented at annual meeting of the
american Political science association, Washington, d.c., september 2-5, 2010.
Bohman James and richardson Henry s., “liberalism, deliberative democracy, and
reasons that all can accept,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2009)
goodin robert e., Innovating Democracy (oxford University Press, 2009)
goodin robert e., ‘do motives matter?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1989)
101
Habermas Jürgen, Moralbewusstsein und kommuikatives Handeln (frankfurt a.m.:
suhrkamp, 1983),
goodin robert e., Ach, Europa (frankfurt a.m.: suhrkamp, 2008),
goodin robert e., Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handeln
(frankfurt a.m.: suhrkamp, 1984).
Hume david, A Treatise of Human Nature. a critical edition. edited by david fate
norton and mary J. norton, (oxford: clarendon Press, 2007)
Kant immanuel, Metaphysik der Sitten (Hamburg: f. meiner, 1986).
landa dimitri and meirowitz adam, ‘game theory, information, and deliberation’,
American Journal of Political Science, 53 (2009)
lenard Patti tamar, ‘deliberating sincerely: a reply to Warren’, Journal of Social
Philosophy .39(2008)
mansbridge Jane. ‘the Place of self-interest and the role of Power in deliberative
democracy’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010)
mucciaroni gary and Quirk Paul J., ‘rhetoric and reality: going Beyond discourse
ethics in assessing legislative deliberation’, Legisprudence. International Journal for the
Study of Legislation 4 (2010).
neblo michael a., ‘family disputes: diversity in defining and measuring deliberation’,
Swiss Political Science Review 13 (2007)
rostbøoll christian f., Deliberative Freedom. Deliberative Democracy as Critical Theory
(albany: state University of new york Press, 2008)
steiner Jürg, Bächtiger, andré, spörndli markus, and steenbergen marco r., Deliberative
Politics in Action. Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse (cambridge: cambridge
University Press, 2004),
steiner Jürg, The Foundation of Deliberative Democracy. Empirical Research and Normative
Implications(cambridge: cambridge University Press, 2012).
thompson dennis f., ‘deliberative democratic theory and empirical Political science’,
The Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008),
Ugarriza Juan, Potential for Deliberation Among Ex-Combatants in Colombia, PhD.
Dissertation, University of Bern, Switzerland, 2012.
Warren mark e., ‘institutionalizing deliberative democracy’, in shawn W. rosenberg
(ed.), Deliberation, Participation and Democracy (london: Palgrave macmillan, 2007),
Warren mark e., ‘deliberation under nonideal conditions: a reply to lenard and adler’,
Journal of Social Philosophy .39 (2008),
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Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (2008)
102
RESEÑAS BILIOGRÁFICAS
Sonia Alonso
Retos del Estado: Devolución y lucha por la credibilidad en los
Partidos. Una comparación entre Bélgica, Italia, España y el Reino Unido
Londres: Oxford University Press, 2012, 288 pp.
105
pesar de que los elementos de com- dentro de una coyuntura que se presenta
108
esde 1990 se enriqueció la biblio- antes de exponer el tema central se hace
explican además las razones por las cua- tipartidista. Pues sin éstos el uso de bienes o
les, posiblemente, este sistema no ha tenido currencies negociables para la formación de
el mismo éxito en el resto de países. a ma- coaliciones puede derivar en un proceso de
nera de conclusión sostienen que el ejecuti- corrupción sistémico que a su vez altere la
vo constitucionalmente débil frente a la estabilidad política.
función legislativa fragmentada obstaculiza es muy importante, entonces, la pre-
la correcta formulación de políticas públi- sencia de instituciones de check and balan-
cas y la resultante estabilidad política. se ce: cortes o tribunales, fiscalías, organismos
vuelve necesario entonces que el ejecutivo de rendición de cuentas y medios de comu-
cuente con currencies o bienes de coalición nicación autónomos. Para evitar que las
que garantice la cooperación de los legisla- condiciones anteriormente propuestas (pre-
110
dores o la formación de coaliciones y a su sidentes constitucionalmente fuertes, go-
vez una función legislativa fuerte que actúe bierno de coaliciones, función legislativa
como estabilizador para la formulación de fragmentada, etc.) sufran degeneraciones en
políticas públicas. el proceso y más bien generen gobernabili-
extienden importancia al papel de la dad y democracias sólidas.
prensa en la consolidación del modelo en en fin, a pesar de no contar con un
cuestión. es para ellos, el periodismo de análisis exhaustivo del presidencialismo
investigación una herramienta que facilita multipartidista, esta publicación arroja al-
el control de la ciudadanía sobre el actuar gunas conclusiones que invitan a la realiza-
de los actores políticos. tomando en cuen- ción de una investigación íntegra que per-
ta que es ésta la que denuncia las irregulari- mita la constitución de una teoría explica-
dades y actos de corrupción que pueden tiva. sumado a esto, es un trabajo que con-
surgir en el ejercicio político. tribuye al desarrollo de una nueva perspec-
finalmente concluyen que la falta de tiva teórica en relación a los modelos polí-
mecanismos de pesos y contrapesos impide ticos establecidos en la región.
la consolidación del presidencialismo mul-
una decisión electoral, existen otros factores a pesar que los partidos son ideológicamen-
que pueden tener igual o mayor peso que te más avanzados estos en la práctica han
dicha tendencia, en las democracias emer- dilatado el proceso negociador con Pales-
gentes la ideología es mínimamente tomada tina porque no hay un gobierno solido polí-
en cuenta para la creación de un partido ticamente.
político y casi sin peso en la decisión de un los partidos disfuncionales bajo el siste-
votante por el proceso histórico que han ma rP en la región mena producen un
vivido, lo imperante en estas democracias sentimiento de apatía y decepción hacia la
son factores sociales como la religión, pro- democracia debido a que al ser países con
cedencia étnica, cultura, idioma y más. es- extensiones muy grandes el adquirir bajo
tos partidos por lo general son cerrados y sus hombros necesidades generales y no
112 excluyentes si no se profesa la misma fe o domesticas los ciudadanos se ven desatendi-
característica distintiva. dos y critican el nuevo sistema de gobierno
la función de los líderes de los partidos que prometía progreso.
es mantener, defender y proteger los intere- en contra parte tenemos el sistema
ses del grupo, más no está dentro de sus mayoritario recomendado para estas demo-
prioridades atender solicitudes ciudadanas cracias que se basa en la postulación de ac-
que no otorguen beneficio específico para tores notables y locales; son las personas
su partido. la coalición se ve mermada por quienes los pueden elegir directamente. el
los fuertes orígenes del partido sea este reli- candidato que tiene mayor cantidad de vo-
giosos, político o social, así que el buscar tos es quien pasa a tomar las funciones y los
mayores adeptos en otras zonas o nichos poderes establecidos en un marco jurídico.
políticos no le es atractivo sino que se pre- dentro de este sistema tenemos una divi-
fieren afiliados leales y candidatos que no sión entre un único representante por dis-
traicionen los objetivos del partido y su trito la cual es la más común y la otra es de
líder. la mayoría son objetivos más genera- múltiples representante por distrito. la ren-
les de todo un país dejando sectores de lado dición de cuentas recae sobre estos repre-
que no ven los frutos de un competente sis- sentantes zonales lo que permite un control
tema democrático. en túnez por ejemplo el más amplio y menor corrupción dentro del
cambio de régimen y transición a la demo- sistema de gobierno o los problemas de las
cracia estimuló la proliferación de partidos localidades a las que representan son toma-
políticos de ex captadores de poder como el dos en cuenta por estos líderes y llevados a
caso de militares, grupos financieros y polí- la mesa de negociaciones con demás actores
ticos de muchos lugares pero sin ideología similares que necesariamente tendrán que
alguna que pretenden captar un poco del formar alianzas y coaliciones para cumplir
poder que tuvieron antes y que ahora está con su objetivo principal: cumplir con sus
fragmentado por las nuevas reglas del juego. mandantes. es allí en el debate necesaria-
en democracias estables como la de israel se mente donde se empezaran a formar los ini-
tiene el mismo problema de alianzas porque cios de partidos políticos sólidos y con pro-
Simón Pachano
Calidad de la democracia e instituciones políticas en
Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú
Quito, Edit. FLACSO, 2011
114
ara el autor, simón Pachano, los los sistemas de partidos y la distribución territo-
Cuadro 1
Capacidades del régimen según procesamiento y representación
Alta Baja
gran conjunto de países– debe incluir el sido el irrespeto a los procedimientos esta-
análisis de este tipo de variables interme- blecidos. “los derrocamientos de presiden-
dias. de manera especial debe preocuparse tes de la república en Bolivia (2003), en
de los aspectos institucionales (Pachano, ecuador (1997, 2000 y 2005) y en Perú
2011, 361)”. “allí se encuentran, sin duda, (1992) fueron las expresiones más claras,
las principales explicaciones acerca de los pero también deben sumarse a ellas las
cambios que se suceden en la calidad de la acciones de fuerza tomadas por los gobier-
democracia (Pachano, 2011, 361)”. nos cuando debieron enfrentar crisis econó-
las prácticas clientelares y la influencia micas (como ocurrió en Bolivia en 1985) o
de grupos poderosos también han influido. cuando intervinieron en los otros Poderes
con frecuencia ganó espacio la personaliza- del estado (como ocurrió en ecuador en
117
ción de la política. la “tónica predominan- 1984, 2004 y 2006, y en Bolivia en 2007)
te”, en los tres países, como se ha visto, ha (Pachano, 2011, 363)”.