[G.R. No. 113907.
April 20, 2001]
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA
M. GREENFIELD (MSMG-UWP), ITS PRESIDENT BEDA
MAGDALENA
VILLANUEVA,
MARIO
DAGANIO,
DONATO GUERRERO, BELLA P. SANCHEZ, ELENA
TOBIS, RHODA TAMAYO, LIWAYWAY MALLILIN,
ELOISA SANTOS, DOMINADOR REBULLO, JOSE
IRLAND, TEOFILA QUEJADA, VICENTE SAMONTINA,
FELICITAS DURIAN, ANTONIO POLDO, ANGELINA
TUGNA, SALVADOR PENALOSA, LUZVIMINDA TUBIG,
ILUMINADA RIVERA, ROMULO SUMILANG, NENITA
BARBELONIA, LEVI BASILIA, RICARDO PALAGA,
MERCY ROBLES, LEODEGARIO GARIN, DOMINGO
ECLARINAL, MELCHOR GALLARDO, MARCELO GARIN,
ROSALINA BAUTISTA, MARY ANN TALIGATOS,
ALEJANDRO SANTOS, ANTONIO FRAGA, LUZ
GAPULTOS, MAGDALENA URSUA, EUGENIO ORDAN,
LIGAYA MANALO, PEPITO DELA PAZ, PERLITA
DIMAQUIAT,
MYRNA
VASQUEZ,
FLORENTINA
SAMPAGA, ARACELI FRAGA, MAXIMINA FAUSTINO,
MARINA TAN, OLIGARIO LOMO, PRECILA EUSEBIO,
SUSAN ABOGANO, CAROLINA MANINANG, GINA
GLIFONIA, OSCAR SOTTO, CELEDONA MALIGAYA,
EFREN VELASQUEZ, DELIA ANOVER, JOSEPHINE
TALIMORO,
MAGDALENA
TABOR,
NARCISA
SARMIENTO, SUSAN MACASIEB, FELICIDAD SISON,
PRICELA CARTA, MILA MACAHILIG, CORAZON
NUNALA, VISITACION ELAMBRE, ELIZABETH INOFRE,
VIOLETA BARTE, LUZVIMINDA VILLOSA, NORMA
SALVADOR, ELIZABETH BOGATE, MERLYN BALBOA,
EUFRECINA
SARMIENTO,
SIMPLICIA
BORLEO,
MATERNIDAD DAVID, LAILA JOP, POTENCIANA
CULALA, LUCIVITA NAVARRO, ROLANDO BOTIN,
AMELITA
MAGALONA,
AGNES
CENA,
NOLI
BARTOLAY, DANTE AQUINO, HERMINIA RILLON,
CANDIDA APARIJADO, LYDIA JIMENEZ, ELIZABETH
ANOCHE, ALDA MURO, TERESA VILLANUEVA,
TERESITA RECUENCO, ELIZA SERRANO, ESTELLA
POLINAR, GERTRUDES NUNEZ, FELIPE BADIOLA,
ROSLYN FERNANDEZ, OSCAR PAGUTA, NATIVIDAD
BALIWAS,
ELIZABETH
BARCIBAL,
CYNTHIA
ESTELLER, TEODORA SANTOS, ALICIA PILAR, MILA
PATENO,
GLORIA
CATRIZ,
MILA
MACAHILIG,
ADELAIDA DE LEON, ROSENDO EDILO, ARSENIA
ESPIRITU, NUMERIANO CABRERA, CONCEPSION
ARRIOLA, PAULINA DIMAPASOK, ANGELA SANGCO,
PRESILA ARIAS, ZENAIDA NUNES, EDITHA IGNACIO,
ROSA GUIRON, TERESITA CANETA, ALICIA ARRO,
TEOFILO RUWETAS, CARLING AGCAOILI, ROSA
NOLASCO, GERLIE PALALON, CLAUDIO DIRAS,
LETICIA ALBOS, AURORA ALUBOG, LOLITA ACALEN,
GREGORIO ALIVIO, GUILLERMO ANICETA, ANGELIE
ANDRADA, SUSAN ANGELES, ISABELITA AURIN,
MANUELA AVELINA, CARLING AGCAOILI, TERESITA
ALANO, LOLITA AURIN, EMMABETH ARCIAGA,
CRESENCIA
ACUNA,
LUZVMINDA
ABINES,
FLORENCIA ADALID, OLIVIA AGUSTIN, EVANGELINE
ALCORAN, ROSALINA ALFERES, LORNA AMANTE,
FLORENTINA AMBITO, JULIETA AMANONCO, CARMEN
AMARILLO, JOSEFINA AMBAGAN, ZENAIDA ANAYA,
MARIA ANGLO, EDITHA ANTA ZO, MARY JANE ANTE,
1|Page
ANDREA AQUINO, ROWENA ARABIT, MARIETA
ARAGON, REBECCA ARCENA, LYDIA ARCIDO,
FERNANDO
ARENAS,
GREGORIO
ARGUELLES,
EDITHA ARRIOLA, EMMA ATIENZA, EMMA ATIENZA,
TEODY ATIENZA, ELIZABETH AUSTRIA, DIOSA
AZARES, SOLIDA AZAINA, MILAGROS BUAG, MARIA
BANADERA, EDNALYN BRAGA, OFELIA BITANGA,
FREDISMINDA BUGUIS, VIOLETA BALLESTEROS,
ROSARIO BALLADJAY, BETTY BORIO, ROMANA
BAUTISTA, SUSARA BRAVO, LILIA BAHINGTING,
ENIETA BALDOZA, DAMIANA BANGCORE, HERMINIA
BARIL, PETRONA BARRIOS, MILAGROS BARRAMEDA,
PERLA BAUTISTA, CLARITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINA
BAUTISTA, ADELINA BELGA, CONSOLACION BENAS,
MARIA BEREZO, MERCEDES BEREBER, VIOLETA
BISCOCHO, ERNESTO BRIONES, ALVINA BROSOTO,
AGUSTINA BUNYI, CARMEN BUGNOT, ERLINDA
BUENAFLOR, LITA BAQUIN, CONSEJO BABOL,
CRISANTA BACOLOD, CELIA DE BACTAT, MAZIMA
BAGA, ELENA BALADAD, ROSARIO BALADJAY,
AMALIA BALAGTAS, ANITA BALAGTAS, MARIA
BALAKIT, RUFINA BALATAN, REBECCA BALDERAMA,
AMELIA BALLESTER, BELEN BARQUIO, BERNANDITA
BASILIDES,
HELEN
BATO,
HELEN
BAUTISTA,
ROMANA BAUTISTA, ALMEDA BAYTA, AVELINA
BELAYON, NORMA DE BELEN, THELMA DE BELEN,
JOCELYN BELTRAN, ELENA BENITEZ, VIRGINIA
BERNARDINO, MERLINA BINUYAG, LINA BINUYA,
BLESILDA
BISNAR,
SHIRLEY
BOLIVAR,
CRESENTACION
MEDLO,
JOCELYN
BONIFACIO,
AMELIA BORBE, AMALIA BOROMEO, ZENAIDA
BRAVO, RODRIGO BEULDA, TERESITA MENDEZ,
ELENA CAMAN, LALIANE CANDELARIA, MARRY
CARUJANO,
REVELINA
CORANES,
MARITESS
CABRERA, JUSTINA CLAZADA, APOLONIA DELA
CRUZ, VICTORIA CRUZ, JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ,
MARITESS CATANGHAL, EDNA CRUZ, LUCIA DE
CASTRO, JOSIE CARIASO, OFELIA CERVANTES,
MEDITA CORTADO, AMALIA CASAJEROS, LUCINA
CASTILIO, EMMA CARPIO, ANACORITA CABALES,
YOLANDA CAMO, MILA CAMAZUELA, ANITA CANTO,
ESTELA CANCERAN, FEMENCIA CANCIO, CYNTHIA
CAPALAD, MERLE CASTILLO, JESUSA CASTRO,
CECILIA CASTILLO, SILVERITA CASTRODES, VIVIAN
CELLANO, NORMA CELINO, TERESITA
CELSO,
GLORIA
COLINA,
EFIPANIA
CONSTANTINO,
SALVACION CONSULTA, MEDITA CORTADO, AIDA
CRUZ, MARISSA DELA CRUZ, EDITO CORCILLES,
JELYNE CRUZ, ROSA CORPOS, ROSITA CUGONA,
ELSIE CABELLES, EMMA CADUT, VICTORIA CALANZA,
BARBARA CALATA, IMELDA CALDERON, CRISTINA
CALIDGUID,
EMMALINDA
CAMALON,
MARIA
CAMERINO, CARMENCITA CAMPO, CONNIE CANEZO,
LOURDES CAPANANG, MA. MILAGROS CAPILI,
MYRNA T. CAPIRAL, FLOR SAMPAGA, SUSAN B.
CARINO, ROSARIO CARIZON, VIRGINIA DEL CARMEN,
EMMA CARPIO, PRESCILA CARTA, FE CASERO, LUZ
DE CASTRO, ANNA CATARONGAN, JOSEFINA
CASTISIMO, JOY MANALO, EMMIE CAWALING, JOVITA
CARA, MARINA CERBITO, MARY CAREJANO, ESTELA
R. CHAVEZ, CONCEPCION PARAJA, GINA CLAUDIO,
FLORDELIZA CORALES, EDITO CORCIELER, ROSA C.
CORROS, AMELIA CRUZ, JELYNE CRUZ, WILFREDO
DELA CRUZ, REINA CUEVAS, MARILOU DEJECES,
JOSEPHINE DESACULA, EDITHA DEE, EDITHA DIAZ,
VIRGIE DOMONDON, CELSA DOROPAW, VIOLETA
DUMELINA,
MARIBEL
DIMATATAC,
ELBERTO
DAGANIO, LETECIA DAGOHOY, DINDO DALUZ,
ANGELITA DANTES, GLORIA DAYO, LUCIA DE
CASTRO, CARLITA DE GUZMAN, CARMEN DELA
CRUZ, MERCY DE LEON, MARY DELOS REYES,
MARIETA DEPILO, MATILDE DIBLAS, JULIETA
DIMAYUGA,
TEODORA
DIMAYUGA,
YOLANDA
DOMDOM, LUCITA DONATO, NELMA DORADO, RITA
DORADO, SUSAN DUNTON, HERMINIA SAN ESTEBAN,
AMALI
EUGENIO,
OLIVIA
EUSOYA,
ERNESTO
ESCOBIN, EVELYN ESCUREL, LYDIA ESCOBIN,
VICENTE E. ELOIDA, ELENA EGAR, GLORIA ERENO,
NORMA ESPIRIDION, ARSENIA ESPIRITU, AURORA
ESTACIO,
DEMETRIA
ESTONELO,
MILAGROS
FONSEGA, LYDIA FLORENTINO, JULIA FARABIER,
TRINIDAD FATALLA, IMELDA FLORES, JESSINA
FRANCO, MA. CRISTINA FRIJAS, ESPECTACION
FERRER, BERDENA FLORES, LEONILA FRANCISCO,
BERNARDA
FAUSTINO,
DOLORES
FACUNDO,
CRESTITA FAMILARAN, EMELITA FIGUERAS, MA.
VIRGINIA FLORENDO, AURORA FRANCISCO, MA.
JESUSA FRANCISCO, NENITA FUENTES, MARILOU
GOLINGAN, JUANITA GUERRERO, LYDIA GUEVARRA,
SOCORRO GONZAGA, PATRICIA GOMEO, ROSALINDA
GALAPIN, CARMELITA GALVEZ, TERESA GLE, SONIA
GONZALES, PRIMITA GOMEZ, THERESA GALUA,
JOSEFINA GELUA, BRENDA GONZAGA, FLORA
GALLARDO, LUCINDA GRACILLA, VICTORIA GOZUM,
NENITA GAMAO, EDNA GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA,
ROSARIO GIRAY, ARACELI GOMEZ, JOEMARIE
GONZAGA, NELIA GONZAGA, MARY GRANCE
GOZON, CARMEN GONZALES, MERLITA GREGORIO,
HERMINIA GONZALES, CARLITA DE GUZMAN,
MODESTA GABRENTINA, EDITHA GADDI, SALVACIO
GALIAS, MERLINDA GALIDO, MELINDA GAMIT,
JULIETA GARCIA, EMELITA GAVINO, CHARITO GILLIA,
GENERA GONEDA, CRESTITA GONZALES, HERMINIA
GONZALES,
FRANCISCA
GUILING,
JULIAN
HERNANDEZ, GLECERIA HERRADURA, SUSANA
HIPOLITO,
NERISSA
HAZ,
SUSAN
HERNAEZ,
APOLONIA ISON, SUSAN IBARRA, LUDIVINA IGNACIO,
CHOLITA INFANTE, JULIETA ITURRIOS, ANITA IBO,
MIRASOL INGALLA, JULIO JARDINIANO, MERLITA
JULAO, JULIETA JULIAN, MARIBETH DE JOSE,
JOSEPHINE JENER, IMELDA JATAP, JULIETA JAVIER,
SALOME JAVIER, VICTORIA JAVIER, SALVACION
JOMOLO, EDNA JARNE, LYDIA JIMENEZ, TERESITA DE
JUAN, MARILYN LUARCA, ROSITA LOSITO, ROSALINA
LUMAYAG, LORNA LARGA, CRESTETA DE LEON,
ZENAIDA LEGASPI, ADELAIDA LEON, IMELDA DE
LEON, MELITINA LUMABI, LYDIA LUMABI, ASUNCION
LUMACANG,
REGINA
LAPIADRIO,
MELANIA
LUBUGUAN, EVANGELINE LACAP, PELAGIA LACSI,
LORNA LAGUI, VIRGIE LAITAN, VIRGINIA LEE,
CRESTELITA DE LEON, FELICISIMA LEONERO, DIOSA
LOPE, ANGELITA LOPEZ, TERESITA LORICA, JUANITA
MENDIETA, JUANITA MARANQUEZ, JANET MALIFERO,
INAS MORADOS, MELANIE MANING, LUCENA
MABANGLO, CLARITA MEJIA, IRENE MENDOZA, LILIA
MORTA, VIGINIA MARAY, CHARITO MASINAHON,
2|Page
FILMA MALAYA, LILIA MORTA, VIRGINIA MARAY,
CHARITO MASINAHON, FILMA MALAYA, LILIA MORTA,
ROSITA MATIBAG, LORENZA MLINA, SABINA DEL
MUNDO, EDITHA MUYCO, NARCISA MABEZA, MA. FE
MACATANGAY, CONCEPCION MAGDARAOG, IMELDA
MAHIYA, ELSA MALLARI, LIGAYA MANAHAN, SOLEDA
MANLAPAS, VIRGINIA MAPA, JOSEI MARCOS,
LIBRADA MARQUEZ, VIRGINIA MAZA, JULIANITA
MENDIETA, EDILBERTA MENDOZA, IRENE MERCADO,
HELEN MEROY, CRISTINA MEJARES, CECILIA MILLET,
EMELITA MINON, JOSEPHINE MIRANA, PERLITA
MIRANO, EVANGELINE MISBAL, ELEANOR MORALES,
TERESITA MORILLA, LYDIA NUDO, MYRIAM NAVAL,
CAROLINA NOLIA, ALICIA NUNEZ, MAGDALENA
NAGUIDA, ELSA NICOL, LILIA NACIONALES, MA. LIZA
MABO, REMEDIOS NIEVES, MARGARITA NUYLAN,
TERESITA NIEVES, PORFERIA NARAG, RHODORA
NUCASA, CORAZON OCRAY, LILIA OLIMPO, VERONA
OVERENCIA, FERMIN OSENA, FLORENCIA OLIVAROS,
SOLEDAD OBEAS, NARISSA OLIVEROS, PELAGIA
ORTEGA, SUSAN ORTEGA, CRISTINA PRENCIPE,
PURITA PENGSON, REBECCA PACERAN, EDNA
PARINA, MARIETA PINAT, EPIFANIA PAJERLAN,
ROSALINA PASIBE, CECILIA DELA PAZ, LORETA
PENA, APOLONIA PALCONIT, FRANCISCO PAGUIO,
LYDIA PAMINTAHON, ELSIE PACALDO, TERESITA
PADILLA, MYRNA PINEDA, MERCEIDTA PEREZ,
NOVENA
PORLUCAS,
TERESITA
PODPOD,
ADORACION PORNOBI, ALICIA PERILLO, HELEN JOY
PENDAL, LOURDES PACHECO, LUZVIMINDA PAGALA,
LORETA PAGAPULAN, FRANCISCO PAGUIO, PRISCO
PALACA, FLORA PAMINTUAN, NOEMI PARISALES,
JOSEPHINE PATRICIO, CRISTINA PE BENITO, ANGELA
PECO, ANGELITA PENA, ESTER PENONES, NORMA
PEREZ, MAURA PERSEVERANCIA, MARINA PETILLA,
JOSIE PIA, ZULVILITA PIODO, REBECCA PACERAN,
CLARITA POLICARPIO, MAXIMO POTENTO, PORFIRIO
POTENTO, FLORDELIZA PUMARAS, FERNANDO
QUEVEDO, JULIANA QUINDOZA, CHARITO QUIROZ,
CARMELITA
ROSINO,
RODELIA
RAYONDOYON,
FLORENCIA RAGOS, REBECCA ROSALES, ROSALYN
RIVERO, FRANCISCO RUIZ, FRANCIA ROSERO, EMELY
RUBIO, EDILBERTO RUIO, JUANA RUBY, RAQUEL
REYES, MERCY ROBLES, ESTELA RELANO, ROSITA
REYES NIMFA RENDON, EPIFANIO RAMIRO, MURIEL
REALCO, BERNARDITA RED, LEONITA RODIL, BENITA
REBOLA, DELMA REGALARIO, LENY REDILLAS,
JULIETA DELA ROSA, FELICITAS DELA ROSA, SUSAN
RAFALLO, ELENA RONDINA, NORMA RACELIS,
JOSEPHINE
RAGEL,
ESPERANZA
RAMIREZ,
LUZVIMINDA
RANADA,
CRISTINA
RAPINSAN,
JOCELYN RED, ORLANDO REYES, TERESITA REYES,
ANGELITA ROBERTO, DELIA ROCHA, EDLTRUDES
ROMERO, MELECIA ROSALES, ZENAIDA ROTAO,
BELEN RUBIS, FE RUEDA, SYLVIA SONGCAYAWON,
CRISTINA SANANO, NERCISA SARMIENTO, HELEN
SIBAL, ESTELITA SANTOS, NORMA SILVESTRE,
DARLITA SINGSON, EUFROCINA SARMIENTO, MYRNA
SAMSON, EMERLINA SADIA, LORNA SALAZAR,
AVELINA SALVADOR, NACIFORA SALAZAR, TITA
SEUS, MARIFE SANTOS, GRACIA SARMIENTO,
ANGELITA SUMANGIL, ELIZABETH SICAT, MA.
VICTORIA SIDELA, ANALITA SALVADOR, MARITES
SANTOS, VIRGINIA SANTOS, THELMA SARONG,
NILDA SAYAT, FANCITA SEGUNDO, FYNAIDA SAGUI,
EDITHA
SALAZAR,
EDNA
SALZAR,
EMMA
SALENDARIO, SOLEDAD SAMSON, EDNA SAN DIEGO,
TERESITA SAN GABRIEL, GERTRUDES SAN JOSE,
EGLECERIA
OSANCHEZ,
ESTRELLA
SANCHEZ,
CECILIA DELOS SANTOS, LUISA SEGOVIA, JOCELYN
SENDING ELENA SONGALIA, FELICITAS SORIANO,
OFELIA TIBAYAN, AIDA TIRNIDA, MONICA TIBAYAN,
CRISTETA TAMBARAN, GLORIA TACDA, NENVINA,
FELINA TEVES, ANTONINA DELA TORRE, MAXIMA
TANILON, NENA TABAT, ZOSIMA TOLOSA, MARITA
TENOSO, IMELDA TANIO, LUZ TANIO, EVANGELINE
TAYO,
JOSEFINA
TINGTING,
ARSENIA
TISOY,
MAGDALENA TRAJANO, JOSEFINA UBALDE, GINA
UMALI, IRMA VALENZUELA, FELY VALDEZ, PAULINA
VALEZ, ROSELITA VALLENTE, LOURDES VELASCO,
AIDA VILLA, FRANCISCA VILLARITO, ZENAIDA
VISMONTE, DELIA VILLAMIEL, NENITA VASQUEZ,
JOCELYN VILLASIS, FERMARGARITA VARGAS, CELIA
VALLE, MILA CONCEPCION VIRAY, DOMINGA
VALDEZ, LUZVIMINDA VOCINA, MADELINE VIVERO,
RUFINA VELASCO, AUREA VIDALEON, GLORIA DEL
VALLE, THELMA VALLOYAS, CYNTHIA DELA VEGA,
ADELA VILLAGOMEZ, TERESITA VINLUAN, EUFEMIA
VITAN, GLORIA VILLAFLORES, EDORACION VALDEZ,
ANGELITA VALDEZ, ILUMINADA VALENCI, MYRNA
VASQUEZ,
EVELYN
VEJERAMO,
TEODORA
VELASQUEZ,
EDAN
VILLANUEVA,
PURITA
VILLASENOR, SALVADOR WILSON, EMELINA YU,
ADELFA YU, ANA ABRIGUE, VIRGINIA ADOBAS,
VICTORIA ANTIPUESTO, MERCEDITA CASTILLO,
JOCELYN
CASTRO,
CREMENIA
DELA
CRUZ,
JOSEPHINE IGNACIO, MELITA ILILANGOS, LIGAYA
LUMAYAT, DELIA LUMBES, ROSITA LIBRADO, DELIA
LAGRAMADA,
GEMMA
MAGPANTAY,
EMILY
MENDOZA, FIDELA PANGANIBAN, LEONOR RIZALDO,
ILUMINDA RIVERA, DIVINA SAMBAYAN, ELMERITA
SOLAYAO, NANCY SAMALA, JOSIE SUMARAN,
LUZVIMINDA ABINES, ALMA ACOL, ROBERTO
ADRIATICO, GLORIA AGUINALDO, ROSARIO ALEYO,
CRISTETA ALEJANDRO, LILIA ALMOGUERA, CARMEN
AMARILLO,
TRINIDAD
ARDANIEL,
CERINA
AVENTAJADO, ZENAIDA AVAYA, LOLITA ARABIS,
MARIA ARSENIA, SOFIA AGUINALDO, SALVE ABAD,
JOSEFINA AMBANGAN EMILIA AQUINO, JOSEFINA
AQUINO, JULIANA AUSAN, AMERCIANA ACOSTA,
CONCEPCION ALEROZA, DIANA ADOVOS, FELY
ADVINCULA, SEOMINTA ARIAS, JOSEPHINE ARCEDE,
NORMA AMISTOSO, PRESENTACION ALONOS, EMMA
ATIENZA, LEONIDA AQUINO, ANITA ARILLON,
ADELAIDA
ARELLANO,
NORMA
AMISTOSO,
JOSEPHINE ARCEDE, SEMIONITA ARIAS, JOSEFINA
BANTUG,
LOLITA
BARTE,
HERMINIA
BASCO,
MARGARITA BOTARDO, RUFINO BUGNOT, LOLITA
BUSTILLO, ISABEL BALAKIT, ROSARIO BARRERO,
TESSIE BALBOS, NORMA BENISANO, GUILLERMA
BRUGES,
BERNADETTE
BARTOLOME,
SHIRLEY
BELMONTE, MERONA BELZA, AZUCENA BERNALES,
JOSE BASCO, NIMPHA BANTOG, BENILDA BUBAN,
REGINA BUBAN, SALOME BARRAMEDA, IRENE
BISCO, FELICITAS BAUTISTA, VIOLETA BURA, LINA
BINUYA, BIBIANA BAARDE, ELSA BAES, ANASTACIA
3|Page
BELONZO, SONIA BENOYO, ELIZABETH BACUNGAN,
PATRICIA BARRAMEDA, ERLINDA BARCELONA, EMMA
BANICO, APOLONIA BUNAO, LUCITA BOLEA,
PACIFICA BARCELONA, EDITHA BASIJAN, RENITA
BADAMA, ELENA BALADAD, CRESENCIA BAJO,
BERNADITA BASILID, MELINDA BEATO, YOLANDA
BATANES, EDITHA BORILLA, ANITA BAS, ELSA
CALIPUNDAN,
MARIA
CAMERINO,
VIRGINIA
CAMPOSANO, MILAGROS CAPILI, CARINA CARINO,
EUFEMIA CASIHAN, NENITA CASTRO, FLORENCIA
CASUBUAN, GIRLIE CENTENO, MARIANITA CHIQUITO,
IMELDA DELA CRUZ, TEODOSIA CONG, TEOFILA
CARACOL, TERESITA CANTA, IRENEA CUNANAN,
JULITA CANDILOSAS, VIOLETA CIERES, MILAGROS
DELA CRUZ, FLOREPES CAPULONG, CARMENCITA
CAMPO, MARILYN CARILLO, RUTH DELA CRUZ, RITA
CIJAS, LYDIA CASTOR, VIRGIE CALUBAD, EMELITA
CABERA, CRISTETA CRUZ, ERLINDA COGADAS,
IMELDA CALDERON, SUSIE LUZ CEZAR, ESTELA
CHAVEZ, NORMA CABRERA, ELDA DAGATAN,
LEONISA DIMACUNA, ERNA DUGTONG, FLORDELISA
DIGMA, VIRGILIO DADIOS, LOLITA DAGTA, ADELAIDA
DORADO,
CELSA
DATUMANONG,
VIRGINIA
DOCTOLERO, EDNA SAN DIEGO, JULIETA DANG,
JULIETA DORANTINAO, LOLITA DAGANO, JUDITH
DIAZ, MARIA ENICANE, MARITA ESCARDE, ENRIMITA
ESMAYOR,
ROSARIO
EPIRITU,
REMEDIOS
EMBOLTORIO, IRENE ESTUITA, TERESITA ERESE,
ERMELINDA ELEZO, MARIA ESTAREJA, MERLITA
ESQUERRA, YOLANDA FELICITAS, FRUTO FRANCIA,
MARTHA
FRUTO,
LILIA
FLORES,
SALVACION
FORTALESA, JUDITH FAJARDO, SUSANA FERNANDO,
EDWIN FRANCISCO, NENITA GREGORY, ROSA
CAMILO,
MARIVIC
GERRARDO,
CHARITA
GOREMBALEM,
NORMA
GRANDE,
DOLORES
GUTIERREZ, CHARLIE GARCIA, LUZ GALVEZ,
ADELAIDA GAMILLA, LUZ GAPULTOS, ERLINDA
GARCIA,
HELEN
GARCIA,
ERLINDA
GAUDIA,
FRANCISCA GUILING, MINTA HERRERA, ASUNCION
HONOA, JUAN HERNANDEZ, LUCERIA ANNA MAE
HERNANDEZ,
JULIANA
HERNANDEZ,
EDITHA
IGNACIO, ANITA INOCENCIO, EULALIA INSORIO,
ESTELITA IRLANDA, MILAGROS IGNACIO, LINDA
JABONILLO, ADELIMA JAEL, ROWENA JARABJO,
ROBERT JAVILINAR, CLARITA JOSE, CARMENCITA
JUNDEZ, SOFIA LALUCIS, GLORIA LABITORIA,
ANGELITA LODES, ERLINDA LATOGA, EVELYN
LEGASPI, ROMEO LIMCHOCO, JESUS LARA, ESTRELLA
DE LUNA, LORETA LAREZA, JOSEPHINE ALSCO,
MERCY DE LEON, CONSOLACION LIBAO, MARILYN
LIWAG, TERESITA LIZAZO, LILIA MACAPAGAL,
SALVACION MACAREZA, AMALIA MADO, TERESITA
MADRIAGA, JOVITA MAGNAYE, JEAN MALABAD,
FRANCISCA MENDOZA, NELCITA MANGANTANG,
TERESITA NELLA, GENEROZA MERCADO, CRISTETA
MOJANA, BERNARDA MONGADO, LYDIA MIRANDA,
ELISA MADRILEJOS, LOIDA MAGSINO, AMELIA
MALTO, JULITA MAHIBA, MYRNA MAYORES, LUISA
MARAIG, FLORENCIA MARAIG, EMMA MONZON,
IMELDA MAGDANGAN, VICTORIA MARTIN, NOEMI
MANGUILLO,
BASILIZA
MEDINA,
VICTORIO
MERCADO, ESTELA MAYPA, EMILIA MENDOZA, LINA
MAGPANTAY,
FELICIANA
MANLOLO,
ELENA
MANACOP, WILMA MORENO, JUANA MENDOZA,
EVELYN DEL MUNDO, ROSIE MATUTINA, MATILDE
MANALO, TERESITA MENDEZ, FELIPINA MAGONCIA,
MARIA MANZANO, LIGAYA MANALO, LETICIA
MARCHA, MARINA MANDIGMA, LETICIA MANDASOC,
PRESCILLA MARTINEZ, JULIA MENDOZA, PACITA
MAGALLANES,
ANGELINA
MARJES,
SHIRLEY
MELIGRITO, IRENE MERCADO, ELISA MAATUBANG,
MARCELINA NICOLAS, AGUSTINA NICOLAS, ROSA
NOLASCO, WILMA NILAYE, VIOLETA ORACION,
ANGELA OSTAYA, JUANITA OSAYOS, MAGDALENA
OCAMPO, MARDIANA OCTA, ROSELA OPAO, LIBRADA
OCAMPO, YOLANDA OLIVER, MARCIA ORLANDA,
PAGDUNAN, RITA PABILONA, MYRA PALACA,
BETHLEHEM PALINES, GINA PALIGAR, NORMA
PALIGAR, DELMA PEREZ, CLAUDIA PRADO, JULIE
PUTONG,
LUDIVINA
PAGSALINGAN,
MERLYN
PANALIGAN, VIOLETA PANAMBITAN, NOREN PAR,
ERLINDA PARAGAS, MILA PARINO, REBECCA
PENAFLOR,
IMELDA
PENAMORA,
JERMICILLIN
PERALTA,
REBECCA
PIAPES,
EDITHA
PILAR,
MAROBETH
PILLADO,
DIOSCORO
PIMENTEL,
AURORA LAS PINAS, EVANGELINA PINON, MA. NITA
PONDOC, MA. MERCEDES PODPOD, ANGELITO
PANDEZ, LIGAYA PIGTAIN, LEONILA QUIAMBAO,
ELENA QUINO, MARITESS QUIJANO, CHOLITA
REBUENO, LOLITA REYES, JOCELYN RAMOS, ROSITA
RAMIREZ, ELINORA RAMOS, ISABEL RAMOS,
ANNABELLE RESURRECCION, EMMA REYES, ALILY
ROXAS, MARY GRACE DELOS REYES, JOCELYN DEL
ROSARIO, JOSEFINA RABUSA, ANGELITA ROTAIRO,
SAMCETA ROSETA, EDERLINA RUIZ, ZENAIDA
ROSARIO, BENITA REBOLA, ROSITA REVILLA, ROSITA
SANTOS, ROWENA SALAZAR, EMILYN SARMIENTO,
ANA SENIS, ELOISA SANTOS, NARCISA SONGLIAD,
ELMA SONGALIA, AMPARA SABIO, JESSIE SANCHEZ,
VIVIAN SAMILO, GLORIA SUMALINOG, ROSALINA
DELOS SANTOS, MARIETA SOMBRERO, HELEN
SERRETARIO, TEODORO SULIT, BELLA SONGUINES,
LINDA SARANTAN, ESTELLA SALABAR, MILAGROS
SISON, GLORIA TALIDAGA, CECILIA TEODORO,
ROMILLA TUAZON, AMELITA TABULAO, MACARIA
TORRES, LUTGARDA TUSI, ESTELLA TORREJOS,
VICTORIA TAN, MERLITA DELA VEGA, WEVINA
ORENCIA, REMEDIOS BALECHA, TERESITA TIBAR,
LACHICA LEONORA, JULITA YBUT, JOSEFINA ZABALA,
WINNIE
ZALDARIAGA,
BENHUR
ANTENERO,
MARCELINA ANTENERO, ANTONINA ALAPAN, EDITHA
ANTOZO, ROWENA ARABIT, ANDRA AQUINO,
TERESITA ANGULO, MARIA ANGLO, MYRNA ALBOS,
ELENITA AUSTRIA, ANNA ABRIGUE, VIRGINIA
ADOBAS,
VICTORIA
ANTIPUESTO,
REMEDIOS
BOLECHE, MACARIA BARRIOS, THELMA BELEN,
ESTELLA BARRETTO, JOCELYN CHAVEZ, VIRGINIA
CAPISTRANO, BENEDICTA CINCO, YOLLY CATPANG,
REINA CUEVAS, VICTORIA CALANZA, FE CASERO,
ROBERTA
CATALBAS,
LOURDES
CAPANANG,
CLEMENCIA CRUZ, JOCELYN COSTO, MERCEDITA
CASTILLO, EDITHA DEE, LUCITA DONATO, NORMA
ESPIRIDION,
LORETA
FERNANDEZ,
AURORA
FRANCISCO,
VILMA
FAJARDO,
MODESTA
GABRENTINA, TERESITA GABRIEL, SALVACION
GAMBOA, JOSEPHINE IGNACIO, SUSAN IBARRA,
4|Page
ESPERANZA JABSON, OSCAR JAMBARO, ROSANNA
JARDIN, CORAZON JALOCON, ZENAIDA LEGASPI,
DELLA LAGRAMADA, ROSITA LIBRANDO, LIGAYA
LUMAYOT, DELIA LUMBIS, LEONORA LANCHICA,
RELAGIA LACSI, JOSEFINA LUMBO, VIOLETA DE
LUNA, EVELYN MADRID, TERESITA MORILLA, GEMMA
MAGPANTAY, EMILY MENDOZA, IRENEA MEDINA,
NARCISA MABEZA, ROSANNA MEDINA, DELIA
MARTINEZ, ROSARIO MAG-ISA, EDITHA MENDOZA,
EDILBERTA MENDOZA, FIDELA PANGANIBAN, OFELIA
PANGANIBAN,
AZUCENA
POSTGO,
LOURDES
PACHECO,
LILIA
PADILLA,
MARISSA
PEREZ,
FLORDELIZA PUMARES, LUZ REYES, NORMA
RACELIS, LEONOR RIZALDO, JOSIE SUMASAR, NANCY
SAMALA,
EMERLITA
SOLAYAO,
MERCEDITA
SAMANIEGO,
BLANDINA
SIMBULAN,
JOCELYN
SENDING, LUISITA TABERRERO, TERESITA TIBAR,
ESTERLINA VALDEZ, GLORIA VEJERANO, ILUMINADA
VALENCIA, MERLITA DELA VEGA, VIRGIE LAITAN,
JULIET VILLARAMA, LUISISTA OCAMPO, NARIO
ANDRES, ANSELMA TULFO, GLORIA MATEO, FLANIA
MENDOZA, CONNIE CANGO, EDITHA SALAZAR,
MYRNA DELOS SANTOS, TERESITA SERGIO, CHARITO
GILLA,
FLORENTINA
HERNAEZ,
BERNARDINO
VIRGINIA, AMPO ANACORITA, SYLVIA POASADAS,
ESTRELLA ESPIRITU, CONCORDIA LUZURIAGA,
MARINA CERBITO, EMMA REYES, NOEMI PENISALES,
CLARITA POLICARPIO, BELEN BANGUIO, HERMINIA
ADVINCULA, LILIA MORTA, REGINA LAPIDARIO,
LORNA LARGA, TERESITA VINLUAN, MARITA
TENOSO, NILDS SAYAT, THELMA SARONG, DELMA
REGALIS, SUSAN RAFAULO, ELENA RONDINA,
MYRNA PIENDA, VIOLETA DUMELINA, FLORENCIA
ADALID, FILMA MELAYA, ERLINDA DE BAUTISTA,
MATILDE DE BLAS, DOLORES FACUNDO, REBECCA
LEDAMA, MA. FE MACATANGAY, EMELITA MINON,
NORMA
PAGUIO,
ELIZA
VASQUEZ,
GLORIA
VILLARINO, MA. JESUS FRANCISCO, TERESITA
GURPIDO, LIGAYA MANALO, FE PINEDA, MIRIAM
OCMAR, LUISA SEGOVIA, TEODY ATIENZA, SOLEDA
AZCURE, CARMEN DELA CRUZ, DMETRIA ESTONELO,
MA. FLORIDA LOAZNO, IMELDA MAHIYA, EDILBERTA
MENDOZA, SYLVIA POSADAS, SUSANA ORTEGA,
JOSEPHINE D. TALIMORO, TERESITA LORECA,
ARSENIA TISOY, LIGAYA MANALO, TERESITA GURPIO,
FE PINEDA, and MARIA JESUS FRANCISCO,
petitioners, vs. HON. CRESENCIO J. RAMOS,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, M.
GREENFIELD (B), INC., SAUL TAWIL, CARLOS T.
JAVELOSA, RENATO C. PUANGCO, WINCEL LIGOT,
MARCIANO HALOG, GODOFREDO PACENO, SR.,
GERVACIO CASILLANO, LORENZO ITAOC, ATTY.
GODOFREDO PACENO, JR., MARGARITO CABRERA,
GAUDENCIO RACHO, SANTIAGO IBANEZ, AND
RODRIGO AGUILING, respondents.
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is petitioners motion for partial
reconsideration of our decision dated February 28,
2000,i[1] the dispositive portion of which reads:ii[2]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission in Case
No. NCR-00-09-04199-89 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and the respondent company is hereby
ordered to immediately reinstate the petitioners to
their respective positions. Should reinstatement be
not feasible, respondent company shall pay
separation pay of one month salary for every year of
service. Since petitioners were terminated without
the requisite written notice at least 30 days prior to
their termination, following the recent ruling in the
case of Ruben Serrano vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Isetann Department Store, the
respondent company is hereby ordered to pay full
backwages to petitioner-employees while the
Federation is also ordered to pay full backwages to
petitioner-union officers who were dismissed upon
its instigation. Since the dismissal of petitioners
was without cause, backwages shall be computed
from the time the herein petitioner employees and
union officers were dismissed until their actual
reinstatement.
Should reinstatement be not
feasible, their backwages shall be computed from
the time petitioners were terminated until the
finality of this decision.
Costs against the
respondent company.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners allege that this Court committed patent
and palpable error in holding that the respondent
company officials cannot be held personally liable
for damages on account of employees dismissal
because the employer corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from its officers who merely
acted as its agents whereas the records clearly
established that respondent company officers Saul
Tawil, Carlos T. Javelosa and Renato C. Puangco
have caused the hasty, arbitrary and unlawful
dismissal of petitioners from work; that as top
officials of the respondent company who handed
down the decision dismissing the petitioners, they
are responsible for acts of unfair labor practice; that
these respondent corporate officers should not be
considered as mere agents of the company but the
wrongdoers. Petitioners further contend that while
the case was pending before the public
respondents, the respondent company, in the early
part of February 1990, began removing its
machineries and equipment from its plant located at
Merville Park, Paranaque and began diverting jobs
intended for the regular employees to its subcontractor/satellite
branches;iii[3]
that
the
respondent company officials are also the officers
and incorporators of these satellite companies as
shown in their articles of incorporation and the
general information sheet. They added that during
their ocular inspection of the plant site of the
5|Page
respondent company, they found that the same is
being used by other unnamed business entities also
engaged in the manufacture of garments.
Petitioners further claim that the respondent
company no longer operates its plant site as M.
Greenfield thus it will be very difficult for them to
fully enforce and implement the courts decision. In
their subsequent motion filed on the same day,
petitioners also pray for the (A) inclusion of the
names of employees listed in Annex D of the
petition which they inadvertently omitted in the
caption of the case, to wit: (1) Amores, Imelda (2)
Andres, Josefina (3)Aragon, Felicidad (4) Arias,
Genevive (5) Arroyo, Salvacion (6) Arceo, Elizabeth
(7) Anonuevo, Monica (8) Abellada, Josefina (9)
Advincula, Harmelina (10) Ajayo, Rosario (11) Alilay,
Marilyn (12) Almario, Anliza (13) Almario, Angelita
(14) Almazan, Marilou (15) Almonte, Rosalina (16)
Alvaran, Marites (17) Alvarez, Edna (18) Ampo,
Anacorita (19) Aquino, Leonisa (20) Bactat, Celia
(21) Carpio, Azucena G. (22) Cruz, Amelia (23)
Glifonia, Eugenia (24) Escurel, Evelyn F. (25) Hilario,
Bonifacio G. (26) Payuan, Adoracion (27) Perez,
Mercedita (28) Rempis, Zenaida (29) Rosario,
Margie deL (30) Salvador, Norma (31) Sambayanan,
Olivia (32) Tiaga, Aida (33) Torbela, Maria (34)
Trono, Nenevina (35) Varona, Asuncion (36)
Vasquez, Elisa M. (37) Villanueva, Milagros (38)
Villapondo, Eva C. (39) Villon, Adeliza T.; (B)
correction of their own typographical errors of the
names of employees appearing in the caption,
which should be as follows: Manuela Avelin, Belen
Barquio, Lita Buquid, Violeta C. Ciervo, Marilou
Dejocos, Maximina Faustino, Primitiva Gomez,
Myrna Palaca, Mercedita Perez, Rebecca Poceran,
Amorlita Rotairo, Emma Saludario, Tita Senis,
Salvacion Wilson,iv[4] Anita Ahillon, Gregoria
Arguelles, Tessie Balbis, Betty Borja, Rodrigo Buella,
Celsa Doropan, Maria Enicame, Josephine Lasco,
Julita Maniba, Juanita Osuyos, Juana Overencio,
Azucena Postigo, Cristina Rapinan, Roselyn Rivero,
Edeltrudes Romero, Rodelia Royandoyon, Fausta
Segundo, Teodora Sulit, Elena Tebis, Paulina
Valdez,v[5] Susan Abogona, Diana Adovas, Carmen
Rosimo Basco, Macaria Barrion, Maria Fe Berezo,
Matilde de Blas, Rufina Bugnot, Aurora Bravo, Jovita
Cera, Precila Carta, Amalia Eugenio, Milagros
Fonseca, Jose Irlanda, Rowena Jarabejo, Regina
Lapidario, Josie Marcos, Shirley Melegrito, Noemi
Menguillo, Teresita Nierves, Ricardo Paloga, Florenia
Ragos, Leonila Rodil, Emma Saludario, Narcisa
Songuad, Josie Sumarsar, Evangeline Tayco;vi[6] (C)
inclusion of other employees similarly situated
whose names were not included in Annex D or in
the caption of the case, to wit: (1) Dionisa Aban, (2)
Alicia Aragon, (3) Vicky Francia, (4) Nelita F.
Gelongos, (5) Erlinda San Juan, (6) Erlinda Baby
Patungan Manalo, (7) Jenette Patungan, vii[7] (8)
Blandina Simbahan,viii[8] (9) Asuncion Varona,ix[9]
(10) Josefina Andres, (11) Teresita Arales, (12) Alice
Artikulo, (13) Esther Cometa, (14) Eliza Cabiting,
(15) Erlinda Dalut, (16) Edna Fernandez, (17) Emily
Inocencio, (18) Esperanza Jalocon, (19) Imelda
Jarabe, (20) Mercedes Pabadora, (21) Venerado
Pastoral, (22) Cristina Perlas, (23) Margie del
Rosario.x[10]
In their Comment, the Solicitor General interposes
no objection to petitioners prayer for the inclusion
of omitted and similarly situated employees and the
correction of employees names in the caption of
the case.
On the other hand, private respondent company
officials Carlos Javelosa and Remedios Caoleng, in
their Comment, state that considering that
petitioners admitted having knowledge of the fact
that private respondent officers are also holding key
positions in the alleged satellite companies, they
should have presented the pertinent evidence with
the public respondents; thus it is too late for
petitioners to require this Court to admit and
evaluate evidence not presented during the trial;
that the supposed proof of satellite companies
hardly constitute newly discovered evidence.
Respondent officials interpose no objection to the
inclusion of employees inadvertently excluded in
the caption of the case but object to the inclusion of
employees who were allegedly similarly situated for
the reason that these employees had not been
parties to the case, hence should not be granted
any relief from the court. Respondent company
failed to file its comment.xi[11]
Petitioners contention that respondent company
officials should
be made personally liable for
damages on account of petitioners dismissal is not
impressed with merit. A corporation is a juridical
entity with legal personality separate and distinct
from those acting for and in its behalf and, in
general from the people comprising it.xii[12] The rule
is that obligations incurred by the corporation,
acting through its directors, officers and employees,
are its sole liabilities.xiii[13] True, solidary liabilities
may at times be incurred but only when exceptional
circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the
following cases:xiv[14]
1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate
cases, the officers of a corporation
(a) Vote for or assent to patently unlawful
acts of the corporation;
(b)
act in bad faith or with gross
negligence in directing the corporate
affairs;
(c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the
prejudice of the corporation, its
stockholders or members, and other
persons.xv[15]
6|Page
(2) When a director or officer has consented to the
issuance of watered stocks or who, having
knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the
corporate secretary his written objection thereto.xvi
[16]
(3) When a director, trustee or officer has
contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself
personally
and
solidarily
liable
with
the
Corporation.xvii[17]
(4) When a director, trustee or officer is made, by
specific provision of law, personally liable for his
corporate action.xviii[18]
In labor cases, particularly, the Court has held
corporate directors and officers solidarily liable with
the corporation for the termination of employment
of corporate employees done with malice or in bad
faith.xix[19] Bad faith or negligence is a question of
fact and is evidentiary.xx[20] It has been held that
bad faith does not connote bad judgement or
negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it
means breach of a known duty thru some motive or
interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud.xxi[21]
In the instant case, there is nothing substantial on
record to show that respondent officers acted in
patent bad faith or were guilty of gross negligence
in terminating the services of petitioners so as to
warrant personal liability. As held in Sunio vs.
NLRC,xxii[22]
We now come to the personal liability of petitioner,
Sunio, who was made jointly and severally
responsible with petitioner company and CIPI for the
payment of the backwages of private respondents.
This is reversible error. The Assistant Regional
Directors Decision failed to disclose the reason why
he was made personally liable.
Respondents,
however, alleged as grounds thereof, his being the
owner of one half (1/2) interest of said corporation,
and his alleged arbitrary dismissal of private
respondents.
Petitioner Sunio was impleaded in the Complaint in
his capacity as General Manager of petitioner
corporation. There appears to be no evidence on
record that he acted maliciously or in bad faith in
terminating the services of private respondents. His
act, therefore, was within the scope of his authority
and was a corporate act.
It is basic that a corporation is invested by law with
a personality separate and distinct from those of the
persons composing it as well as from that of any
other legal entity to which it may be related. Mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of
a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for
disregarding the separate corporate personality.
Petitioner Sunio, therefore, should nor have been
made personally answerable for the payment of
private respondents back salaries.
Petitioners claim that the jobs intended for the
respondent companys regular employees were
diverted to its satellite companies where the
respondent company officers are holding key
positions is not substantiated and was raised for the
first time in this motion for reconsideration. Even
assuming that the respondent company officials are
also officers and incorporators of the satellite
companies, such circumstance does not in itself
amount to fraud.
The documents attached to
petitioners motion for reconsideration show that
these satellite companiesxxiii[23] were established
prior to the filing of petitioners complaint against
private respondents with the Department of Labor
and Employment on September 6, 1989 and that
these
corporations
have
different
sets
of
incorporators aside from the respondent officers
and are holding their principal offices at different
locations.
Substantial identity of incorporators
between respondent company and these satellite
companies does not necessarily imply fraud.xxiv[24]
In such a case, respondent companys corporate
personality remains inviolable.xxv[25]
Although there were earlier decisions of this Court in
labor cases where corporate officers were held to be
personally liable for the payment of wages and
other money claims to its employees, we find those
rulings inapplicable to this case. In La Campana
Coffee Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa
La Campana (KKM),xxvi[26] La Campana Coffee
Factory, Inc. and La Campana Gaugau Packing were
substantially owned by the same person. They had
one office, one management, and a single payroll
for both businesses. The laborers of the gaugau
factory and the coffee factory were also
interchangeable, i.e., the workers in one factory
worked also in the other factory.
In Claparols vs. Court of Industrial Relations, xxvii[27]
the Claparol Steel and Nail Plant which was ordered
to pay its workers backwages, ceased operations on
June 30, 1957 and was succeeded on the next day,
July 1, 1957 by the Claparols Steel Corporation.
Both corporations were substantially owned and
controlled by the same person and there was no
break or cessation in operations. Moreover, all the
assets of the steel and nail plant were transferred to
the new corporation.
Notably, in the above-mentioned cases, a new
corporation was created, owned by the same family,
engaged in the same business and operating in the
same compound, a situation which is not obtaining
in the instant case.
7|Page
In AC Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC,xxviii[28]
the Court ruled that under the Minimum Wage Law,
the responsible officer of an employer corporation
can be held personally liable for non-payment of
backwages for if the policy of the law were
otherwise, the corporation employer would have
devious ways for evading of back wages. This Court
said:
In the instant case, it would appear that RANSOM,
in 1969, foreseeing the possibility or probability of
payment of backwages to the 22 strikers, organized
ROSARIO to replace RANSOM, with the latter to be
eventually phased out if the 22 strikers win their
case. RANSOM actually ceased operations on May
1, 1973, after the December 19, 1972 Decision of
the Court of Industrial Relations was promulgated
against RANSOM.
Clearly, the situation in AC Ransom does not obtain
in this case, where the alleged satellite companies
were established even prior to the filing of
petitioners complaint with the Department of Labor.
Petitioners prayer for the inclusion of employees
listed in Annex D whose names were admittedly
inadvertently excluded in the caption of the case
and for the correction of typographical errors of the
employees names appearing in the caption, is well
taken and is hereby granted. However, petitioners
prayer for the inclusion of other employees
allegedly similarly situated but whose names were
not included either in Annex D or in the caption of
the case must be denied. A judgment cannot bind
persons who are not parties to the action. xxix[29] It is
elementary that strangers to a case are not bound
by the judgment rendered by the court and such
judgment is not available as an adjudication either
against or in favor of such other person. xxx[30]
Petitioners failed to explain why these employees
allegedly similarly situated were not included in the
submitted list filed before us. Such inclusion would
be tantamount to a substantial amendment which
cannot be allowed at this late stage of the
proceedings as it will definitely work to the prejudice
and disadvantage of the private respondents.xxxi[31]
WHEREFORE,
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration is partially granted so as to include
the names of employees listed in Annex D which
petitioners inadvertently omitted in the caption of
this case, to wit: (1) Amores, Imelda (2) Andres,
Josefina (3) Aragon, Felicidad (4) Arias, Genevive (5)
Arroyo, Salvacion (6) Arceo, Elizabeth (7) Anonuevo,
Monica (8) Abellada, Josefina (9) Advincula,
Harmelina (10) Ajayo, Rosario (11) Alilay, Marilyn
(12) Almario, Anliza (13) Almario, Angelita (14)
Almazan, Marilou (15) Almonte, Rosalina (16)
Alvaran, Marites (17) Alvarez, Edna (18) Ampo,
Anacorita (19) Aquino, Leonisa (20) Bactat, Celia
(21) Carpio, Azucena G. (22) Cruz, Amelia (23)
Glifonia, Eugenia (24) Escurel, Evelyn F. (25) Hilario,
Bonifacio G. (26) Payuan, Adoracion (27) Perez,
Mercedita (28) Rempis, Zenaida (29) Rosario,
Margie del (30) Salvador, Norma (31) Sambayanan,
Olivia (32) Tiaga, Aida (33) Torbela, Maria (34)
Trono, Nenevina (35) Varona, Asuncion (36)
Vasquez, Elisa M. (37) Villanueva, Milagros (38)
Villapondo, Eva C. (39) Villon, Adeliza T.; and to
correct the typographical errors of the names of
employees appearing in the caption, as follows:
Manuela Avelin, Belen Barquio, Lita Buquid, Violeta
C. Ciervo, Marilou Dejocos, Maximina Faustino,
Primitiva Gomez, Myrna Palaca, Mercedita Perez,
Rebecca
Poceran,
Amorlita
Rotairo,
Emma
Saludario, Tita Senis, Salvacion Wilson, Anita
Ahillon, Gregoria Arguelles, Tessie Balbis, Betty
Borja, Rodrigo Buella, Celsa Doropan, Maria
Enicame, Josephine Lasco, Julita Maniba, Juanita
Osuyos, Juana Overencio, Azucena Postigo, Cristina
Rapinan, Roselyn Rivero, Edeltrudes Romero,
Rodelia Royandoyon, Fausta Segundo, Teodora
Sulit, Elena Tebis, Paulina Valdez, Susan Abogona,
Diana Adovas, Carmen Rosimo Basco, Macaria
Barrion, Maria Fe Berezo, Matilde de Blas, Rufina
Bugnot, Aurora Bravo, Jovita Cera, Precila Carta,
Amalia Eugenio, Milagros Fonseca, Jose Irlanda,
Rowena Jarabejo, Regina Lapidario, Josie Marcos,
Shirley Melegrito, Noemi Menguillo, Teresita
Nierves, Ricardo Paloga, Florenia Ragos, Leonila
Rodil, Emma Saludario, Narcisa Songuad, Josie
Sumarsar, Evangeline Tayco.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman),
concur.
and
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ.,
Vitug, J., reiterates his separate opinion in Serrano
v. NLRC (G.R. No. 117040, of Jan. 2000)
Panganiban, J., reiterates his separate opinion in
Serrano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117040, 27 Jan. 2000.
Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
M. Greenfield (MSMG-UWP) vs. Ramos
[GR 113907, 20 April 2001]
Facts: [28 February 2000 decision; Purisima]
Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M.
Greenfield, Inc., (B) (MSMG, the "local union"), is an
affiliate of United Lumber and General Workers of
the Philippines (ULGWP, the "federation"). On 12
September 1986, a local union election was held
under the auspices of the ULGWP wherein MSMGUWP, Beda Magdalena Villanueva, and the other
union officers were proclaimed as winners. Minutes
of said election were duly filed with the Bureau of
Labor Relations on 29 September 1986. On 21
March 1987, a Petition for Impeachment was filed
with the national federation ULGWP by the defeated
candidates in the aforementioned election. On 16
June 1987, the federation conducted an audit of the
8|Page
local union-funds. The investigation. did not yield
any unfavorable result and the local union. officers
were cleared of the charges of anomaly in the
custody, handling and disposition of the union
funds. The 14 defeated candidates filed a Petition
for Impeachment/Expulsion of the local union
officers with the DOLE NCR on 5 November 1987
(NCR-OD-M-11-780-87). However, the same was
dismissed on 2 March 1988, by Med-Arbiter Renato
Parungo for failure to substantiate the charges and
to present evidence in support of the allegations.
On 17 April 1988, the local union held a general
membership meeting at the Caruncho Complex in
Pasig. Several union members failed to attend the
meeting, prompting the Executive Board to create a
committee tasked to investigate the non-attendance
of several union members in the said assembly,
pursuant to Sections 4 and 5, Article V of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the union. On 27 June
1988, the local union wrote ULGWP a letter
requesting it to deduct the union fines from the
wages/salaries of those union members who failed
to attend the general membership meeting. In a
Memorandum dated 3 July 1988, the Secretary
General of the national federation, Godofredo
Paceo, Jr. disapproved the resolution of the local
union imposing the P50.00 fine. The union officers
protested such action by the Federation in a Reply
dated 4 July 1988. On 11 July 1988, the federation
wrote M. Greenfield (B) a letter advising the latter
not to deduct the fifty-peso fine from the salaries of
the union members. The following day, the company
sent a reply to MSMG's request in a letter, stating
that it cannot deduct fines from the employees'
salary without going against certain laws. The
company suggested that the union refer the matter
to the proper government office for resolution in
order to avoid placing the company in the middle of
the issue. The imposition of P50.00 fine became the
subject of bitter disagreement between the
Federation and the local union culminating in the
latter's declaration of general autonomy from the
former through Resolution 10 passed by the local
executive board and ratified by the general
membership on 16 July 1988. In retaliation, the
national federation asked the company to stop the
remittance of the local union's share in the
education funds effective August 1988. This was
objected to by the local union which demanded that
the education fund be remitted to it in full. The
company was thus constrained to file a Complaint
for Interpleader with a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with the Med-Arbitration Branch of the Department
of Labor and Employment (Case OD-M-8-435-88).
This was resolved on 28 October 1988, by MedArbiter Anastacio Bactin in an Order, ordering (1)
That the United Lumber and General Workers of the
Philippines (ULGWP) through its local union officers
shall
administer
the
collective
bargaining
agreement (CBA); (2) That the company shall remit
the P10,000.00 monthly labor education program
fund to the ULGWP subject to the condition that it
shall use the said amount for its intended purpose.
and (3) that the Treasurer of the MSMG shall be
authorized to collect from the 356 union members
the amount of P50.00 as penalty for their failure to
attend the general membership assembly on 17
April 1988. However, if the MSMG Officers could
present the individual written authorizations of the
356 union members, then the company is obliged to
deduct from the salaries of the 356 union members
the P50.00 fine." On appeal, Director Pura-Ferrer
Calleja issued a Resolution dated 7 February 1989,
which modified in part the earlier disposition, to the
extent that the company should remit the amount of
P5,000.00 of the P10,000.00 monthly labor
education program fund to ULGWP and the other
P5,000.00 to MSMG, both unions to use the same for
its intended purpose."
Meanwhile, on 2 September 1988, several local
unions (Top Form, M. Greenfield, Grosby, Triumph
International, General Milling, and Vander Hons
chapters) filed a Petition for Audit and Examination
of the federation and education funds of ULGWP
which was granted by Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah
on 25 December 1988 in an Order which directed
the audit and examination of the books of account
of ULGWP. On 30 September 1988, the officials of
ULGWP called a Special National Executive Board
Meeting at Nasipit, Agusan del Norte where a
Resolution was passed placing the MSMG under
trusteeship and appointing Cesar Clarete as
administrator. On 27 October 1988, the said
administrator wrote the company informing the
latter of its designation of a certain Alfredo
Kalingking
as
local
union
president
and
"disauthorizing" the incumbent union officers from
representing the employees. This action by the
national federation was protested by the MSMG in a
letter to the company dated 11 November 1988. On
13 November 1988, MSMG union officers received
identical letters from the administrator requiring
them to explain within 72 hours why they should not
be removed from their office and expelled from
union membership. On 26 November 1988, MSMG
replied, However, as early as 21 November 1988,
the officers were expelled from the ULGWP. On the
same day, the federation advised respondent
company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers
and demanded their separation from employment
pursuant to the Union Security Clause in their
collective bargaining agreement. This demand was
reiterated twice, through letters dated February 21
and March 4, 1989, respectively, to the company.
Thereafter, the Federation filed a Notice of Strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
to compel the company to effect the immediate
termination of the expelled union officers. On 7
March 1989, under the pressure of a threatened
strike, the company terminated the 30 union
officers from employment, serving them identical
copies of the termination letter, The expelled union
officers assigned in the first shift were physically or
bodily brought out of the company premises by the
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company's
security
guards.
Likewise,
those
assigned to the second shift were not allowed to
report for work. this provoked some of the members
of the local union to demonstrate their protest for
the dismissal of the said union officers. Some union
members left their work posts and walked out of the
company premises. On the other hand, the
Federation, having achieved its objective, withdrew
the Notice of Strike filed with the NCMB. On 8 March
1989, MSMG filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB,
DOLE,
Manila
(NCMB-NCR-NS03-216-89).
The
following day, a strike vote referendum was
conducted and out of 2,103 union members who
cast their votes, 2,086 members voted to declare a
strike. On 10 March 1989, the 30 dismissed union
officers filed an urgent petition (NCMB-NCR-NS-03216-89), with the Office of the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment praying for
the suspension of the effects of their termination
from employment. However, the petition was
dismissed by then Secretary Franklin Drilon on 11
April 1989. On March 13 and 14, 1989, a total of 78
union shop stewards were placed under preventive
suspension by the company. This prompted the
union members to again stage a walk-out and
resulted in the official declaration of strike at around
3:30 p.m. of 14 March 1989. The strike was
attended with violence, force and intimidation on
both sides resulting to physical injuries to several
employees, both striking and non-striking, and
damage to company properties. The employees who
participated in the strike and allegedly figured in the
violent incident were placed under preventive
suspension by the company. The company also sent
return to-work notices to the home addresses of the
striking employees thrice successively, on March 27,
April 8 and April 31, 1989, respectively. However,
only 261 employees were eventually accepted back
to work. Those who did not respond to the return-towork notice were sent termination letters dated 17
May 1989.
On 7 August 1989, MSMG filed a verified complaint
with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region,
DOLE, Manila, (NCR -00-09-04199-89), charging the
corporation, etc. of unfair labor practice which
consists of union busting, illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension
interference
in
union
activities,
discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion,
violence, and oppression. After the filing of the
complaint, the lease contracts on the company's
office and factory at Merville Subdivision, Paraaque
expired and were not renewed. Upon demand of the
owners of the premises, the company was
compelled to vacate its office and factory.
Thereafter,
the
company
transferred
its
administration
and
account/client
servicing
department at AFP-RSBS Industrial Park in Taguig,
Metro Manila. For failure to find a suitable place in
Metro Manila for relocation of its factory and
manufacturing operations, the company was
constrained to move the said departments to
Tacloban, Leyte. Hence, on 16 April 1990, the
company accordingly notified its employees of a
temporary shutdown. in operations. Employees who
were interested in relocating to Tacloban were
advised to enlist on or before 23 April 1990. On 15
December 1992, finding the termination to be valid
in compliance with the union security clause of the
collective bargaining agreement, Labor Arbiter
Cresencio Ramos dismissed the complaint. MSMG
then appealed to the NLRC. The First Division
affirmed the Labor Arbiter's disposition. With the
denial of their motion for reconsideration on 28
January 1994, MSMG elevated the case to the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court on 28 February 2000, ordered
M. Greenfield to immediately reinstate the affected
employees and officers to their respective positions;
that should reinstatement be not feasible, said
company shall pay separation pay of one month
salary for every year of service; that since the
affected employees and officers were terminated
without the requisite written notice at least 30 days
prior to their termination, the company was ordered
to pay full backwages to the affected employees
while the Federation was ordered to pay full
backwages to the affected union officers who were
dismissed upon its instigation; that since the
dismissal of the affected employees and officers
was without cause, backwages are to be computed
from the time the affected employees and union
officers
were
dismissed
until
their
actual
reinstatement, and that should reinstatement be not
feasible, their backwages shall be computed from
the time the affected employees and officers were
terminated until the finality of the Court's decision;
with costs against the company. In the decision, the
court held that the company officials cannot be held
personally liable for damages on account of the
employees' dismissal because the employer
corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from its officers who merely acted as its agents.
MSMG-UWG
filed
a
motion
for
partial
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the company officials cannot be
held personally liable for damages on account of
employees' dismissal because the employer
corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from its officers who merely acted as its agents.
Held: A corporation is a juridical entity with legal
personality separate and distinct from those acting
for and in its behalf and, in general from the people
comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred
by the corporation, acting through its directors,
officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. True,
solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but only
when exceptional circumstances warrant such as,
generally, in the following cases: (1) When directors
and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of
a corporation (a) Vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation; (b) act in bad faith
or with gross negligence in directing the corporate
10 | P a g e
affairs; (c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the
prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or
members, and other persons. (2) When a director or
officer has consented to the issuance of watered
stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not
forthwith file with the corporate secretary his
written objection thereto. (3) When a director,
trustee or officer has contractually agreed or
stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily
liable with the Corporation. (4) When a director,
trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of
law, personally liable for his corporate action. In
labor cases, particularly, the Court has held
corporate directors and officers solidarily liable with
the corporation for the termination of employment
of corporate employees done with malice or in bad
faith. Bad faith or negligence is a question of fact
and is evidentiary. It has been held that bad faith
does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means
breach of a known duty thru some motive or
interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
Herein, there is nothing substantial on record to
show that the corporate officers acted in patent bad
faith or were guilty of gross negligence in
terminating the services of the affected employees
and officers so as to warrant personal liability.
CHERRY
J.
PRICE,
STEPHANIE
G.
DOMINGO AND LOLITA
ARBILERA,
Petitioners,
- versus INNODATA PHILS. INC.,/
INNODATA CORPORATION,
LEO RABANG AND JANE
NAVARETTE,
Respondents.
September 30, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
G.R. No. 178505
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision1[1]
dated 25 September 2006 and Resolution 2[2] dated
15 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 72795, which affirmed the Decision dated 14
December 2001 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 30-0301274-2000 finding that petitioners were not
illegally dismissed by respondents.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent
Innodata
Philippines,
Inc./Innodata Corporation (INNODATA) was a
domestic corporation engaged in the data encoding
and data conversion business. It employed
encoders, indexers, formatters, programmers,
quality/quantity staff, and others, to maintain its
business and accomplish the job orders of its
clients. Respondent Leo Rabang was its Human
Resources and Development (HRAD) Manager, while
respondent Jane Navarette was its Project Manager.
INNODATA had since ceased operations due to
business losses in June 2002.
Petitioners Cherry J. Price, Stephanie G.
Domingo, and Lolita Arbilera were employed as
formatters by INNODATA. The parties executed an
employment contract denominated as a Contract
of Employment for a Fixed Period, stipulating that
the contract shall be for a period of one year, 3[3] to
wit:
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT FOR A
FIXED PERIOD
xxxx
WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE has
applied
for
the
position
of
FORMATTER and in the course
thereof
and
represented
himself/herself to be fully qualified
and skilled for the said position;
WHEREAS, the EMPLOYER, by
reason
of
the
aforesaid
representations,
is
desirous
of
engaging that the (sic) services of
the EMPLOYEE for a fixed period;
1
2
3
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NOW, THEREFORE, for and in
consideration
of
the
foregoing
premises, the parties have mutually
agreed as follows:
TERM/DURATION
The
EMPLOYER
hereby
employs, engages and hires the
EMPLOYEE and the EMPLOYEE hereby
accepts
such
appointment
as
FORMATTER effective FEB. 16, 1999
to FEB. 16, 2000 a period of ONE
YEAR.
xxxx
TERMINATION
6.1 In the event that EMPLOYER shall discontinue
operating its business, this CONTRACT shall also
ipso facto terminate on the last day of the month on
which the EMPLOYER ceases operations with the
same force and effect as is such last day of the
month were originally set as the termination date of
this Contract. Further should the Company have no
more need for the EMPLOYEEs services on account
of completion of the project, lack of work (sic)
business losses, introduction of new production
processes and techniques, which will negate the
need for personnel, and/or overstaffing, this
contract maybe pre-terminated by the EMPLOYER
upon giving of three (3) days notice to the
employee.
6.2 In the event period stipulated in
item 1.2 occurs first vis--vis the
completion of the project, this
contract
shall
automatically
terminate.
6.3 COMPANYs Policy on monthly
productivity shall also apply to the
EMPLOYEE.
6.4 The EMPLOYEE or the EMPLOYER
may pre-terminate this CONTRACT,
with or without cause, by giving at
least Fifteen (15) notice to that
effect. Provided, that such pretermination shall be effective only
upon issuance of the appropriate
clearance in favor of the said
EMPLOYEE.
6.5 Either of the parties may
terminate this Contract by reason of
the breach or violation of the terms
and conditions hereof by giving at
least Fifteen (15) days written notice.
Termination with cause under this
paragraph shall be effective without
need of judicial action or approval. 4
[4]
During their employment as formatters,
petitioners were assigned to handle jobs for various
clients of INNODATA, among which were CAS, Retro,
Meridian, Adobe, Netlib, PSM, and Earthweb. Once
they finished the job for one client, they were
immediately assigned to do a new job for another
client.
On 16 February 2000, the HRAD Manager of
INNODATA wrote petitioners informing them of their
last day of work. The letter reads:
RE:
Date:
End of Contract
February 16, 2000
Please be informed that your
employment ceases effective at the
end of the close of business hours on
February 16, 2000.5[5]
According to INNODATA, petitioners employment
already ceased due to the end of their contract.
On 22 May 2000, petitioners filed a
Complaint6[6] for illegal dismissal and damages
against respondents. Petitioners claimed that they
should be considered regular employees since their
positions as formatters were necessary and
desirable to the usual business of INNODATA as an
encoding, conversion and data processing company.
Petitioners also averred that the decisions in
Villanueva
v.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission7[7] and Servidad v. National Labor
Relations Commission,8[8] in which the Court
already purportedly ruled that the nature of
employment at Innodata Phils., Inc. is regular,9[9]
constituted stare decisis to the present case.
Petitioners finally argued that they could not be
considered project employees considering that their
employment was not coterminous with any project
or undertaking, the termination of which was
predetermined.
On the other hand, respondents explained
that INNODATA was engaged in the business of data
processing, typesetting, indexing, and abstracting
for its foreign clients. The bulk of the work was data
processing, which involved data encoding. Data
encoding, or the typing of data into the computer,
included pre-encoding, encoding 1 and 2, editing,
proofreading, and scanning. Almost half of the
employees of INNODATA did data encoding work,
while the other half monitored quality control. Due
to the wide range of services rendered to its clients,
INNODATA was constrained to hire new employees
for a fixed period of not more than one year.
Respondents asserted that petitioners were not
illegally dismissed, for their employment was
terminated due to the expiration of their terms of
employment. Petitioners contracts of employment
with INNODATA were for a limited period only,
commencing on 6 September 1999 and ending on
16 February 2000.10[10]
Respondents further
argued that petitioners were estopped from
asserting a position contrary to the contracts which
they had knowingly, voluntarily, and willfully agreed
to or entered into. There being no illegal dismissal,
respondents likewise maintained that petitioners
were not entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
On 17 October 2000, the Labor Arbiter 11[11]
issued its Decision12[12] finding petitioners
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages
meritorious.
The Labor Arbiter held that as
formatters, petitioners occupied jobs that were
necessary, desirable, and indispensable to the data
processing and encoding business of INNODATA. By
the very nature of their work as formatters,
petitioners should be considered regular employees
of INNODATA, who were entitled to security of
tenure.
Thus, their termination for no just or
authorized cause was illegal. In the end, the Labor
Arbiter decreed:
FOREGOING
PREMISES
CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring complainants
dismissal
illegal
and
ordering
respondent
INNODATA
PHILS.
INC./INNODATA CORPORATION to
reinstate them to their former or
equivalent position without loss of
seniority
rights
and
benefits.
Respondent company is further
ordered to pay complainants their
full backwages plus ten percent
(10%) of the totality thereof as
attorneys
fees.
The
monetary
awards due the complainants as of
4
5
6
7
10
11
12
12 | P a g e
the date of this decision are as
follows:
A.
Backwages
1.
Cherry J. Price
2/17/2000
223.50/day
illegal dismissal when it terminated petitioners
employment upon the expiration of their contracts
on 16 February 2000.
The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision
thus reads:
10/17/2000
at
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered
DISMISSING the instant complaint for
lack of merit.15[15]
P5,811.00/mo/ x 8 mos.
P46,488.00
2.
Stephanie Domingo
46,488.00
(same computation)
3.
Lolita Arbilera
46,488.00
The NLRC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 28 June
2002.16[16]
(same computation)
Total Backwages
B.
P139,464.00
Attorneys fees (10% of total award)
13,946.40
Total Award
P153,410.40
Respondent INNODATA appealed the Labor
Arbiters Decision to the NLRC. The NLRC, in its
Decision dated 14 December 2001, reversed the
Labor Arbiters Decision dated 17 October 2000, and
absolved INNODATA of the charge of illegal
dismissal.
The NLRC found that petitioners were not
regular employees, but were fixed-term employees
as stipulated in their respective contracts of
employment. The NLRC applied Brent School, Inc.
v. Zamora13[13] and St. Theresas School of
Novaliches Foundation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,14[14] in which this Court upheld the
validity of fixed-term contracts. The determining
factor of such contracts is not the duty of the
employee but the day certain agreed upon by the
parties for the commencement and termination of
the employment relationship. The NLRC observed
that the petitioners freely and voluntarily entered
into the fixed-term employment contracts with
INNODATA. Hence, INNODATA was not guilty of
In a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court filed before the Court of Appeals,
petitioners prayed for the annulment, reversal,
modification, or setting aside of the Decision dated
14 December 2001 and Resolution dated 28 June
2002 of the NLRC.
On 25 September 2006, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision sustaining the ruling of the
NLRC that petitioners were not illegally dismissed.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated that
although this Court declared in Villanueva and
Servidad that the employees of INNODATA working
as data encoders and abstractors were regular, and
not contractual, petitioners admitted entering into
contracts of employment with INNODATA for a term
of only one year and for a project called Earthweb.
According to the Court of Appeals, there was no
showing that petitioners entered into the fixed-term
contracts unknowingly and involuntarily, or because
INNODATA applied force, duress or improper
pressure on them.
The appellate court also
observed that INNODATA and petitioners dealt with
each other on more or less equal terms, with no
moral dominance exercised by the former on latter.
Petitioners were therefore bound by the stipulations
in their contracts terminating their employment
after the lapse of the fixed term.
13
15
14
16
13 | P a g e
The Court of Appeals further expounded that
in fixed-term contracts, the stipulated period of
employment is governing and not the nature
thereof.
Consequently, even though petitioners
were performing functions that are necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, petitioners did not become regular
employees because their employment was for a
fixed term, which began on 16 February 1999 and
was predetermined to end on 16 February 2000.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED
GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSIDER
THE
EVIDENCE
ON
RECORD SHOWING THAT THERE IS
CLEAR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE LAW
ON SECURITY OF TENURE THROUGH
CONTRACT MANIPULATION.18[18]
The appellate court concluded that the
periods in petitioners contracts of employment
were not imposed to preclude petitioners from
acquiring security of tenure; and, applying the ruling
of this Court in Brent, declared that petitioners
fixed-term employment contracts were valid.
INNODATA did not commit illegal dismissal for
terminating petitioners employment upon the
expiration of their contracts.
The issue of whether petitioners were
illegally dismissed by respondents is ultimately
dependent on the question of whether petitioners
were hired by INNODATA under valid fixed-term
employment contracts.
The Court of Appeals adjudged:
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition is hereby DENIED and the
Resolution dated December 14, 2001
of the National Labor Relations
Commission declaring petitioners
were not illegally dismissed is
AFFIRMED.17[17]
After a painstaking review of the arguments
and evidences of the parties, the Court finds merit
in the present Petition. There were no valid fixedterm contracts and petitioners were regular
employees of the INNODATA who could not be
dismissed except for just or authorized cause.
The
petitioners
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration of the afore-mentioned Decision of
the Court of Appeals, which was denied by the same
court in a Resolution dated 15 June 2007.
The employment status of a person is
defined and prescribed by law and not by what the
parties say it should be.19[19] Equally important to
consider is that a contract of employment is
impressed with public interest such that labor
contracts must yield to the common good.20[20]
Thus, provisions of applicable statutes are deemed
written into the contract, and the parties are not at
liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships
from the impact of labor laws and regulations by
simply contracting with each other.21[21]
Petitioners are now before this Court via the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari, based on
the following assignment of errors:
Regular employment has been defined by
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, which
reads:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual
Employment.
The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT APPLY THE SUPREME
COURT RULING IN THE CASE OF NATIVIDAD &
QUEJADA THAT THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT OF
RESPONDENTS IS REGULAR NOT FIXED, AND AS SO
RULED IN AT LEAST TWO OTHER CASES AGAINST
INNODATA PHILS. INC.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW
IN RULING THAT THE STIPULATION
OF CONTRACT IS GOVERNING AND
NOT THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT
AS DEFINED BY LAW.
17
14 | P a g e
18
19
20
21
completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of
engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and
employment is for the duration of the
season.
An employment shall be
deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph.
Provided, That, any employee who
has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall
continue while such activity exists.
(Underscoring ours).
Based on the afore-quoted provision, the
following employees are accorded regular status:
(1) those who are engaged to perform activities
which are necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, regardless of the
length of their employment; and (2) those who were
initially hired as casual employees, but have
rendered at least one year of service, whether
continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in
which they are employed.
Undoubtedly, petitioners belong to the first
type of regular employees.
Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, the
applicable
test
to
determine
whether
an
employment should be considered regular or nonregular is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual business or trade of the
employer.22[22]
employment under Article 280 of the Labor Code.23
[23] Under the Civil Code, fixed-term employment
contracts are not limited, as they are under the
present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or
for specific projects with predetermined dates of
completion; they also include those to which the
parties by free choice have assigned a specific date
of termination.24[24]
The
decisive
determinant
in
term
employment is the day certain agreed upon by the
parties for the commencement and termination of
their employment relationship, a day certain being
understood to be that which must necessarily come,
although it may not be known when. Seasonal
employment and employment for a particular
project are instances of employment in which a
period, where not expressly set down, is necessarily
implied.25[25]
Respondents maintain that the contracts of
employment entered into by petitioners with
INNDOATA were valid fixed-term employment
contracts which were automatically terminated at
the expiry of the period stipulated therein, i.e., 16
February 2000.
The Court disagrees.
While this Court has recognized the validity
of fixed-term employment contracts, it has
consistently held that this is the exception rather
than the general rule. More importantly, a fixedterm employment is valid only under certain
circumstances.
In Brent, the very same case
invoked by respondents, the Court identified several
circumstances wherein a fixed-term is an
essential and natural appurtenance, to wit:
Some familiar examples may
be cited of employment contracts
which may be neither for seasonal
work nor for specific projects, but to
which a fixed term is an essential
and natural appurtenance: overseas
employment contracts, for one, to
which, whatever the nature of the
engagement, the concept of regular
employment with all that it implies
does not appear ever to have been
applied, Article 280 of the Labor
Code
notwithstanding;
also
appointments to the positions of
dean,
assistant
dean,
college
In the case at bar, petitioners were
employed by INNODATA on 17 February 1999 as
formatters. The primary business of INNODATA is
data encoding, and the formatting of the data
entered into the computers is an essential part of
the process of data encoding. Formatting organizes
the data encoded, making it easier to understand
for the clients and/or the intended end users
thereof.
Undeniably, the work performed by
petitioners was necessary or desirable in the
business or trade of INNODATA.
However, it is also true that while certain
forms of employment require the performance of
usual or desirable functions and exceed one year,
these do not necessarily result in regular
23
22
25
15 | P a g e
24
secretary,
principal,
and
other
administrative offices in educational
institutions, which are by practice or
tradition rotated among the faculty
members, and where fixed terms are
a necessity without which no
reasonable
rotation
would
be
possible.
Similarly,
despite
the
provisions of Article 280, Policy
Instructions No. 8 of the Minister of
Labor
implicitly
recognize
that
certain company officials may be
elected for what would amount to
fixed periods, at the expiration of
which they would have to stand
down, in providing that these
officials, "x x may lose their jobs as
president, executive vice-president
or vice president, etc. because the
stockholders or the board of directors
for one reason or another did not
reelect them."26[26]
with this Court that petitioners were originally hired
on 16 February 1999 but the project for which they
were employed was completed before the expiration
of one year. Petitioners were merely rehired on 6
September 1999 for a new project.
While
respondents submitted employment contracts with
6 September 1999 as beginning date of effectivity,
it is obvious that in one of them, the original
beginning date of effectivity, 16 February 1999, was
merely crossed out and replaced with 6 September
1999. The copies of the employment contracts
submitted by petitioners bore similar alterations.
As a matter of fact, the Court, in its oftquoted decision in Brent, also issued a stern
admonition that where, from the circumstances, it is
apparent that the period was imposed to preclude
the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee,
then it should be struck down as being contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy.27[27]
Such modification and denial by respondents
as to the real beginning date of petitioners
employment contracts render the said contracts
ambiguous. The contracts themselves state that
they would be effective until 16 February 2000 for a
period of one year. If the contracts took effect only
on 6 September 1999, then its period of effectivity
would obviously be less than one year, or for a
period of only about five months.
After considering petitioners contracts in
their entirety, as well as the circumstances
surrounding petitioners employment at INNODATA,
the Court is convinced that the terms fixed therein
were meant only to circumvent petitioners right to
security of tenure and are, therefore, invalid.
The contracts of employment submitted by
respondents are highly suspect for not only being
ambiguous, but also for appearing to be tampered
with.
Petitioners alleged that their employment
contracts with INNODATA became effective 16
February 1999, and the first day they reported for
work was on 17 February 1999. The Certificate of
Employment issued by the HRAD Manager of
INNODATA also indicated that petitioners Price and
Domingo were employed by INNODATA on 17
February 1999.
However, respondents asserted before the
Labor
Arbiter
that
petitioners
employment
contracts were effective only on 6 September 1999.
They later on admitted in their Memorandum filed
26
27
16 | P a g e
The Court notes that the attempt to change
the beginning date of effectivity of petitioners
contracts was very crudely done. The alterations
are very obvious, and they have not been initialed
by the petitioners to indicate their assent to the
same.
If the contracts were truly fixed-term
contracts, then a change in the term or period
agreed upon is material and would already
constitute a novation of the original contract.
Obviously, respondents wanted to make it
appear that petitioners worked for INNODATA for a
period of less than one year. The only reason the
Court can discern from such a move on
respondents part is so that they can preclude
petitioners from acquiring regular status based on
their employment for one year. Nonetheless, the
Court emphasizes that it has already found that
petitioners should be considered regular employees
of INNODATA by the nature of the work they
performed as formatters, which was necessary in
the business or trade of INNODATA. Hence, the
total period of their employment becomes
irrelevant.
Even assuming that petitioners length of
employment is material, given respondents
muddled assertions, this Court adheres to its
pronouncement in Villanueva v. National Labor
Relations Commission,28[28] to the effect that where
a contract of employment, being a contract of
adhesion, is ambiguous, any ambiguity therein
should be construed strictly against the party who
prepared it.
The Court is, thus, compelled to
conclude that petitioners contracts of employment
became effective on 16 February 1999, and that
28
they were already
INNODATA for a year.
working
continuously
for
Further attempting to exonerate itself from
any liability for illegal dismissal, INNODATA
contends that petitioners were project employees
whose employment ceased at the end of a specific
project or undertaking. This contention is specious
and devoid of merit
In Philex Mining Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,29[29] the Court defined
project employees as those workers hired (1) for a
specific project or undertaking, and wherein (2) the
completion or termination of such project has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee.
Scrutinizing
petitioners
employment
contracts with INNODATA, however, failed to reveal
any mention therein of what specific project or
undertaking petitioners were hired for. Although the
contracts made general references to a project,
such project was neither named nor described at all
therein. The conclusion by the Court of Appeals that
petitioners were hired for the Earthweb project is
not supported by any evidence on record. The oneyear period for which petitioners were hired was
simply fixed in the employment contracts without
reference or connection to the period required for
the completion of a project. More importantly, there
is also a dearth of evidence that such project or
undertaking had already been completed or
terminated to justify the dismissal of petitioners. In
fact, petitioners alleged - and respondents failed to
dispute that petitioners did not work on just one
project, but continuously worked for a series of
projects for various clients of INNODATA.
In Magcalas v. National Labor Relations
Commission,30[30] the Court struck down a similar
claim by the employer therein that the dismissed
employees were fixed-term and project employees.
The Court here reiterates the rule that all doubts,
uncertainties, ambiguities and insufficiencies should
be resolved in favor of labor. It is a well-entrenched
doctrine that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer
has the burden of proof. This burden was not
discharged in the present case.
As a final observation, the Court also takes
note of several other provisions in petitioners
employment contracts that display utter disregard
for their security of tenure. Despite fixing a period
or term of employment, i.e., one year, INNODATA
reserved the right to pre-terminate petitioners
employment under the following circumstances:
29
30
17 | P a g e
6.1
x x x Further should the
Company have no more need for the
EMPLOYEEs services on account of
completion of the project, lack of
work
(sic)
business
losses,
introduction of new production
processes and techniques, which will
negate the need for personnel,
and/or overstaffing, this contract
maybe pre-terminated by the
EMPLOYER upon giving of three (3)
days notice to the employee.
xxxx
6.4 The EMPLOYEE or the EMPLOYER
may pre-terminate this CONTRACT,
with or without cause, by giving at
least Fifteen (15) [day] notice to
that effect. Provided, that such pretermination shall be effective only
upon issuance of the appropriate
clearance in favor of the said
EMPLOYEE. (Emphasis ours.)
Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions,
petitioners have no right at all to expect security of
tenure, even for the supposedly one-year period of
employment provided in their contracts, because
they can still be pre-terminated (1) upon the
completion of an unspecified project; or (2) with or
without cause, for as long as they are given a threeday notice. Such contract provisions are repugnant
to the basic tenet in labor law that no employee
may be terminated except for just or authorized
cause.
Under Section 3, Article XVI of the
Constitution, it is the policy of the State to assure
the workers of security of tenure and free them
from the bondage of uncertainty of tenure woven by
some employers into their contracts of employment.
This was exactly the purpose of the legislators in
drafting Article 280 of the Labor Code to prevent
the circumvention by unscrupulous employers of the
employees right to be secure in his tenure by
indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written
and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept
of regular employment.
In all, respondents insistence that it can
legally dismiss petitioners on the ground that their
term of employment has expired is untenable. To
reiterate, petitioners, being regular employees of
INNODATA, are entitled to security of tenure. In the
words of Article 279 of the Labor Code:
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. In
cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a
just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed
from
the
time
his
compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
By virtue of the foregoing, an illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges,
with full back wages computed from the time of
dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Considering that reinstatement is no longer
possible on the ground that INNODATA had ceased
its operations in June 2002 due to business losses,
the proper award is separation pay equivalent to
one month pay31[31] for every year of service, to be
computed from the commencement of their
employment up to the closure of INNODATA.
The amount of back wages awarded to
petitioners must be computed from the time
petitioners were illegally dismissed until the time
INNODATA ceased its operations in June 2002.32[32]
Petitioners are further entitled to attorneys
fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award
herein, for having been forced to litigate and incur
expenses to protect their rights and interests
herein.
Finally, unless they have exceeded their
authority, corporate officers are, as a general rule,
not personally liable for their official acts, because a
corporation, by legal fiction, has a personality
separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders
and members. Although as an exception, corporate
directors and officers are solidarily held liable with
the corporation, where terminations of employment
are done with malice or in bad faith, 33[33] in the
absence of evidence that they acted with malice or
bad faith herein, the Court exempts the individual
respondents, Leo Rabang and Jane Navarette, from
any personal liability for the illegal dismissal of
petitioners.
31
32
33
18 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated 25
September 2006 and Resolution dated 15 June 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72795 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Innodata Philippines, Inc./Innodata Corporation is
ORDERED to pay petitioners Cherry J. Price,
Stephanie G. Domingo, and Lolita Arbilera: (a)
separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, equivalent
to one month pay for every year of service, to be
computed from the commencement of their
employment up to the date respondent Innodata
Philippines,
Inc./Innodata
Corporation
ceased
operations; (b) full backwages, computed from the
time petitioners compensation was withheld from
them up to the time respondent Innodata
Philippines,
Inc./Innodata
Corporation
ceased
operations; and (3) 10% of the total monetary
award as attorneys fees. Costs against respondent
Innodata Philippines, Inc./Innodata Corporation
Fixed-Term Employment Contract
By attycortes
What is a fixed-term employment contract and
when is it considered valid? The Supreme Court had
occasion to tackle these questions in the case of
Cherry J. Price, et al. versus INNODATA Phils. Inc., et
al., (G.R. No. 178505), promulgated on September
30, 2008.
Cherry, Stephanie and Lolita were employed as
formatters by INNODATA a domestic corporation
engaged in the data encoding and data conversion
business. The parties executed an employment
contract denominated as a Contract of
Employment for a Fixed Period, stipulating that the
contract shall be for a period of one year.
The days passed by and soon Cherry and her
companions found themselves separated from work
due to the end of their contract. Cherry and her
companions decided to contest the validity of said
contract by filing a case for illegal dismissal. The
case eventually reached the Supreme Court.
In the course of deciding the case the Court cited
Art. 280 of the Labor Code which states, The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer According the Court:
The employment status of a person is defined and
prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it
should be. Equally important to consider is that a
contract of employment is impressed with public
interest such that labor contracts must yield to the
common good. Thus, provisions of applicable
statutes are deemed written into the contract, and
the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves
and their relationships from the impact of labor laws
and regulations by simply contracting with each
other.
It went on to say that, Under Article 280 of the
Labor Code the applicable test to determine
whether an employment should be considered
regular or non-regular is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual business or trade
of the employer.
However, the High Court also pointed out that
employment which requires performance of usual
and desirable functions, and does not exceed one
year, does not always result in regular employment.
This is where the concept of fixed-term employment
comes in:
Under the Civil Code, fixed-term employment
contracts are not limited, as they are under the
present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or
for specific projects with predetermined dates of
completion; they also include those to which the
parties by free choice have assigned a specific date
of termination.The decisive determinant in term
employment is the day certain agreed upon by the
parties for the commencement and termination of
their employment relationship, a day certain being
understood to be that which much necessarily
come, although it may not be known when.
Does this mean that fixed-term employment
contracts are always valid, provided they are
entered into knowingly and voluntarily? No. In the
case under consideration the Supreme Court
emphasized that fixed-term employment contracts
are the exception rather than the general rule, and
are valid only under certain circumstances. Citing its
earlier decision in Brent School v. Zamora (G.R. No.
48494, 5 February 1990, 181 SCRA 702) the Court
identified several circumstances wherein a fixedterm is an essential and natural
appurtenance:
Some familiar examples may be cited of
employment contracts which may be neither for
seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which
a fixed term is an essential and natural
appurtenance: overseas employment contracts, for
one, to which, whatever the nature of the
engagement, the concept of regular employment
with all that it implies does not appear ever to have
been applied, Article 280 of the Labor Code
notwithstanding; also appointments to the positions
of dean, assistant dean, college secretary, principal,
and other administrative offices in educational
19 | P a g e
institutions, which are by practice or tradition
rotated among the faculty members, and where
fixed terms are a necessity without which no
reasonable rotation would be possible. Similarly,
despite the provisions of Article 280, Policy
Instructions No. 8 of the Minister of Labor implicitly
recognize that certain company officials may be
elected for what would amount to fixed periods, at
the expiration of which they would have to stand
down, in providing that these officials, x x may lose
their jobs as president, executive vice-president or
vice president, etc. because the stockholders or the
board of directors for one reason or another did not
reelect them.
The Court also mentioned the fact that in the same
Brent case, it issued a stern admonition that
where, from the circumstances, it is apparent that
the period was imposed to preclude the acquisition
of tenurial security by the employee, then it should
be struck down as being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order and public policy.
To end the long story: Cherry and her companions
were considered by the Court as regular employees;
and as far as their fixed-term employment contract
was concerned, the Court had this to say:
After considering petitioners contracts in their
entirety, as well as the circumstances surrounding
petitioners employment at INNODATA, the Court is
convinced that the terms fixed therein were meant
only to circumvent petitioners right to security of
tenure and are, therefore, invalid.
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