Trumpism
Trumpism | |
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From left to right, top to bottom:
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| Leader | Donald Trump |
| Founder | Donald Trump |
| Founded | June 16, 2015 |
| Ideology |
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| Political position | Right-wing[23] to far-right[26] |
| National affiliation | Republican Party Freedom Caucus (factions) |
| Slogan | Make America Great Again |
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Life and business 45th and 47th President of the United States Tenure
Impeachments Prosecutions |
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| Part of a series on |
| Authoritarianism during the Trump presidencies |
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Trumpism is the political ideology behind Donald Trump, the 45th and 47th president of the United States, and his political base. It is often used in close conjunction with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) political movement. It comprises ideologies such as right-wing populism, right-wing antiglobalism, national conservatism, Christian nationalism, neo-nationalism and illiberalism,[27][28][29] and features significant authoritarian[1][2] and autocratic beliefs and practices.[b] Other ideologies include nativism,[6][7] economic nationalism,[8][9] anti-environmentalism,[30] interventionism, and anti-intellectualism.[11][12] Trumpists and Trumpians are terms that refer to individuals exhibiting its characteristics. There has been significant academic debate on-going over the prevalence of alt-right and neo-fascist elements of Trumpism.[a]
Trumpism has been characterized by scholars as having authoritarian leanings,[31][32] and has been associated with the belief that the president is above the rule of law.[c] It has been referred to as an American political variant of the populist, radical right[33][34] and the far-right,[35][18][36][37] as well as the national-populist and neo-nationalist sentiment seen in multiple nations starting in the mid–late 2010s.[38] Trump's political base has been compared to a cult of personality.[d]
Over the course of the late 2010s and early 2020s, Trump supporters became the largest faction of the Republican Party, with the remainder often characterized as "the elite", "the establishment", or "Republican in name only" (RINO) in contrast.[39] In response to these developments, many American conservatives opposed to Trumpism formed the Never Trump movement which opposes Trump and his political practices, often advocating to achieve a more traditional Republican Party.[40]
Background and context
Some political scientists have attempted to explain support for Trumpism from a societal perspective and in the broader context of a wave of right-wing populism that came to prominence in the 2010s, underpinning Brexit and Trump's 2016 election.[41][42] Theories cited by scholars include the "left behind" thesis that posits that the rise of right-wing populism in the West finds its roots in individuals or communities that feel that they have been neglected by the development of society and political decision-makers.[43][44][45] Trends of globalization and deindustrialization have been identified by scholars as having contributed to economic and social deprivation that underpins this theorized phenomenon.[46][45][e]
Some American scholars characterize the left behind thesis as a growing divergence between so-called "brain hubs" and "superstar cities" at one extreme and former manufacturing cities that have lost jobs and residents at the other.[48] Others characterize the problem as being a divergence between regions that have enjoyed the benefits of globalization and technological advance and those that have borne the brunt of disruptive impacts related to these phenomena.[48] A contested characterization of the left behind thesis is as a cultural backlash to long-term structural changes in gender equality, urban growth, education, immigration, economic instability, and terrorist attacks.[49][50] The left behind theory has been supported[44][51][52] and disputed[45][53] by scholars and empirical research.
Eric Kaufmann's Whiteshift[f] describes a Western societal trend in the 21st century that he says is perceived to be eroding white ethnic identity.[g] He argues that Whiteshift and a progressive trope celebrating the projected demise of white majorities have been responsible for much of the reactionary populism since 2015.[56] Kaufmann's thesis was criticised by Kenan Malik for omitting social context that Malik asserts is key to understanding politics.[57]
Themes
Trumpism emerged during Trump's 2016 presidential campaign. Trump's rhetoric has its roots in a populist political method that suggests nationalistic answers to political, economic, and social problems.[58][59][60] They are more specifically described as right-wing populist.[61][62] Policies include immigration restrictionism, trade protectionism, isolationism, and opposition to entitlement reform.[63]
Former national security advisor and close Trump advisor John Bolton disputes that Trumpism exists in any meaningful sense, adding that "[t]he man does not have a philosophy. And people can try [to] draw lines between the dots of his decisions. They will fail."[64] Writing for the Routledge Handbook of Global Populism (2019), Olivier Jutel notes, "What Donald Trump reveals is that the various iterations of right-wing American populism have less to do with a programmatic social conservatism or libertarian economics than with enjoyment."[65]
Trump has been described as a demagogue, and there exists a significant scholarly study on the use of demagogy and related themes within Trumpism.[66] Trump explicitly and routinely disparages racial, religious, and ethnic minorities,[67] and scholars consistently find that racial animus regarding blacks, immigrants, and Muslims are the best predictors of support for Trump.[68] Trumpist rhetoric heavily features anti-immigrant,[69] xenophobic,[70] and nativist[71] attacks against minority groups.[72][73] Other identified aspects include conspiracist,[74][75] isolationist,[71][76] Christian nationalist,[77] evangelical Christian,[78] protectionist,[79][80] anti-feminist,[81][page needed][82] and anti-LGBTQ[83] beliefs.
Grievance
Sociologist Michael Kimmel states that Trump's populism is "an emotion. And the emotion is righteous indignation that the government is screwing 'us.'"[84] Kimmel posits that Trump manifests "aggrieved entitlement",[85] a "sense that those benefits to which you believed yourself entitled have been snatched away from you by unseen forces larger and more powerful. You feel yourself to be the heir to a great promise, the American Dream, which has turned into an impossible fantasy ..."[86]
Retribution
Vagueness
Communications scholar Zizi Papacharissi explains the utility of being ideologically vague and using terms and slogans that can mean anything the supporter wants them to mean. "When these publics thrive in affective engagement it's because they've found an affective hook that's built around an open signifier that they get to use and reuse and re-employ ... MAGA; that's an open signifier ... it allows them all to assign different meanings to it. So MAGA works for connecting publics that are different, because it is open enough to permit people to ascribe their own meaning to it."[87][relevant?][note 1]
Exit polling data suggests the campaign was successful at mobilizing the "white disenfranchised",[88] the lower- to working-class European-Americans who are experiencing growing social inequality and who often have stated opposition to the American political establishment.[89][90]
Some prominent conservatives formed a Never Trump movement, seen as a rebellion of conservative elites against the base.[91][92][93][94]
Right-wing authoritarian populism
Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It's the only thing that can stop me. I don't need international law. I'm not looking to hurt people.
New York Times White House correspondents wrote that "Mr. Trump's assessment ... was the most blunt acknowledgment yet of his worldview. At its core is the concept that national strength, rather than laws, treaties and conventions, should be the deciding factor as powers collide."[95]

Trumpism has been described as right-wing authoritarian populist,[96] and is broadly seen among scholars as posing an existential threat to American democracy.[97] His presidency sparked renewed focus and research on restraining presidential power and the threats of a criminal presidency that had died down since the Nixon administration.[98] Trump advocated for an extreme position of unitary executive theory, arguing that Article II gave him the right to "do whatever I want".[99] The theory is a maximalist interpretation of presidential power formulated during the Reagan administration and pushed by the Federalist Society to undo post-Nixon reforms. Future presidents ran with "unitary-adjacent ideas" and aspects of theory held bipartisan support as part of the growing powers of the presidency.[100] In February 2025, Trump wrote and pinned a comment on Truth Social and X: "He who saves his Country does not violate any Law", which the White House later reposted on X that day. The phrase itself is a variation of one attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, and was noted to be in line with his administration's aggressive push for expanding presidential power under the theory.[101][102]
Yale sociologist Philip S. Gorski warned against the threat of Trumpism, writing that
"the election of Donald Trump constitutes perhaps the greatest threat to American democracy since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. There is a real and growing danger that representative government will be slowly but effectively supplanted by a populist form of authoritarian rule in the years to come. Media intimidation, mass propaganda, voter suppression, court packing, and even armed paramilitaries—many of the necessary and sufficient conditions for an authoritarian devolution are gradually falling into place."[103]
Some academics regard such authoritarian backlash as a feature of liberal democracies.[104] Disputing the view that the surge of support for Trumpism and Brexit is a new phenomenon, political scientist Karen Stenner and social psychologist Jonathan Haidt state that
the far-right populist wave ... did not in fact come out of nowhere. It is not a sudden madness, or virus, or tide, or even just a copycat phenomenon—the emboldening of bigots and despots by others' electoral successes. Rather, it is something that sits just beneath the surface of any human society—including in the advanced liberal democracies at the heart of the Western world—and can be activated by core elements of liberal democracy itself.
Stenner and Haidt regard authoritarian waves as a feature of liberal democracies, noting that the findings of their 2016 study of Trump and Brexit supporters was not unexpected. They wrote:
... normative threat tends either to leave non-authoritarians utterly unmoved by the things that catalyze authoritarians or to propel them toward being (what one might conceive as) their 'best selves.' In previous investigations, this has seen non-authoritarians move toward positions of greater tolerance and respect for diversity under the very conditions that seem to propel authoritarians toward increasing intolerance.[104]
Author and authoritarianism critic Masha Gessen contrasted the "democratic" strategy of the Republican establishment making policy arguments appealing to the public, with the "autocratic" strategy of appealing to an "audience of one" in Donald Trump.[105] Gessen noted the fear of Republicans that Trump would endorse a primary election opponent or otherwise use his political power to undermine any fellow party members that he felt had betrayed him.
The 2020 Republican Party platform simply endorsed "the President's America-first agenda", prompting comparisons to contemporary leader-focused party platforms in Russia and China.[106] In January 2025, a CNN-SSRS poll found that 53% of Republicans viewed loyalty to Trump as central to their political identity and very important to what being a Republican is, beating values such as "a less powerful federal government (46%), supporting congressional Republicans (42%) or opposing Democratic policies (32%)".[107]
Trumpism has been described as borrowing from the anti-parliamentarian political theory advocated by Carl Schmitt, and has received renewed attention as a historical reference.[108][109][110][111]
Gender and masculinity
According to Philip Gorski, in Trumpian nostalgia, "decline is brought about by docility and femininity and the return to greatness requires little more than a reassertion of dominance and masculinity. In this way, 'virtue' is reduced to its root etymology of manly bravado."[103] Michael Kimmel describes male Trump supporters who despaired "over whether or not anything could enable them to find a place with some dignity in this new, multicultural, and more egalitarian world. ... These men were angry, but they all looked back nostalgically to a time when their sense of masculine entitlement went unchallenged. They wanted to reclaim their country, restore their rightful place in it, and retrieve their manhood in the process."[116]
Social psychologists Theresa Vescio and Nathaniel Schermerhorn note that "In his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump embodied HM [hegemonic masculinity] while waxing nostalgic for a racially homogenous past that maintained an unequal gender order. Trump performed HM by repeatedly referencing his status as a successful businessman ("blue-collar businessman") and alluding to how tough he would be as president. ... Trump was openly hostile to gender-atypical women, objectified gender-typical women, and mocked the masculinity of male peers and opponents." In their studies involving 2,007 people, they found that endorsement of hegemonic masculinity better predicted support for Trump than other factors, such as support for anti-establishment, anti-elitist, nativist, racist, sexist, homophobic, or xenophobic perspectives.[117]
Kimmel was surprised at the sexual turn the 2016 election took and thinks that Trump is, for many men, a fantasy figure, an uber-male free to indulge every desire. "Many of these guys feel that the current order of things has emasculated them, by which I mean it has taken away their ability to support a family and have [a] great life. Here's a guy who says: 'I can build anything I want. I can do anything I want. I can have the women I want.' They're going, 'This guy is awesome!'"[118]
Gender role scholar Colleen Clemens describes toxic masculinity as "a narrow and repressive description of manhood, designating manhood as defined by violence, sex, status and aggression ... where strength is everything while emotions are a weakness; where sex and brutality are yardsticks by which men are measured, while supposedly 'feminine' traits—which can range from emotional vulnerability to simply not being hypersexual—are the means by which your status as "man" can be taken away."[119] Writing in the Journal of Human Rights, Kimberly Theidon notes the COVID-19 pandemic's irony of Trumpian toxic masculinity: "Being a tough guy means wearing the mask of masculinity: Being a tough guy means refusing to don a mask that might preserve one's life and the lives of others."[115]
Tough guy bravado appeared on the internet prior to the attack on Congress on January 6, 2021, with one poster writing, "Be ready to fight. Congress needs to hear glass breaking, doors being kicked in ... . Get violent. Stop calling this a march, or rally, or a protest. Go there ready for war. We get our President or we die."[120] Of the rioters arrested for the attack on the U.S. Capitol, 88% were men, and 67% were 35 years or older.[121][note 2]
Opposition to transgender rights is a theme of Trumpism.[123]
Christian Trumpism

Donald Trump has strong support among white evangelical Christians, particularly among those who do not attend church regularly.[124] Trump also maintains strong support with Christian nationalists,[125] and his rallies take on the symbols, rhetoric and agenda of Christian nationalism.[126] Trump described his 2024 presidential campaign as a "righteous crusade" against "atheists, globalists and the Marxists".[127]
Some Christian Trump supporters view him as divinely ordained and "chosen by God", and some compare him to Jesus, with opposition to him seen as spiritual warfare.[128][129] Trump shared and played a video entitled "God Made Trump" at several of his rallies explicitly comparing him to a messianic figure in religious terms.[130] Trump is frequently described among some of his Christian supporters as an Old Testament hero, with Cyrus the Great or David frequently mentioned. The New York Times describes his supporters seeing him as one of several "morally flawed figures handpicked by God to lead profound missions aimed at achieving overdue justice or resisting existential evil".[131] This framing has been described as "vessel theology" which allows for support of Trump and excuses his prior sexual misconduct and adultery.[132] Trump has strong support with members of the dominionist New Apostolic Reformation, and many Trump administration officials are aligned with the group.[133][16]
Methods of persuasion

Sociologist Arlie Hochschild writes that Trump's "speeches—evoking dominance, bravado, clarity, national pride, and personal uplift—inspire an emotional transformation" in followers, deeply resonating with their "emotional self-interest". Hochschild states that Trump is an "emotions candidate", appealing to the emotional self-interests of voters. To Hochschild, this explains the paradox raised by Thomas Frank's book What's the Matter with Kansas?, an anomaly which motivated her five-year immersive research into the emotional dynamics of the Tea Party movement which she believes has mutated into Trumpism.[134][135]
Her book Strangers in Their Own Land was named one of the "6 books to understand Trump's Win" by The New York Times.[136] Hochschild claims that voters were not persuaded by rhetoric to vote against their self-interest through appeals to the "bad angels" of their nature:[note 3] "their greed, selfishness, racial intolerance, homophobia, and desire to get out of paying taxes that go to the unfortunate." She grants that the appeal to bad angels is made by Trump, but states that it "obscures another—to the right wing's good angels—their patience in waiting in line in scary economic times, their capacity for loyalty, sacrifice, and endurance", qualities she describes as a part of a motivating narrative she calls their "deep story", a social contract narrative that appears to be widely shared in other countries as well.[137] She thinks Trump's approach towards his audience creates group cohesiveness by exploiting a crowd phenomenon Emile Durkheim called "collective effervescence", "a state of emotional excitation felt by those who join with others they take to be fellow members of a moral or biological tribe ... to affirm their unity and, united, they feel secure and respected."[138][note 4]
Trumpian rhetoric employs absolutist framings and threat narratives[140] rejecting the political establishment.[141] The absolutist rhetoric emphasizes non-negotiable boundaries and moral outrage at their supposed violation.[142][note 5]
Money-Kyrle pattern
you have nothing in common with
And if you don't stop people that you've never seen before, that you have nothing in common with, your country is going to fail. ... This double-tailed monster [of green energy and immigration] destroys everything in its wake, and they cannot let that happen any longer. You're doing it because you want to be nice, you want to be politically correct, and you're destroying your heritage.
A particular pattern is common for authoritarian movements. First, elicit a sense of depression, humiliation and victimhood. Second, separate the world into two opposing groups: a demonized set of others versus those who have the power and will to overcome them.[146] This involves identifying the enemy supposedly causing the current state of affairs and then promoting conspiracy theories and fearmongering to inflame fear and anger. After cycling these first two patterns through the populace, the final message aims to produce a cathartic release of pent-up ochlocracy and mob energy, with a promise that salvation is at hand because the leader will deliver the nation back to its former glory.[147] This three-part pattern was identified in 1932 by Roger Money-Kyrle who wrote Psychology of Propaganda.[148] Reporting on Trumpist rallies has documented expressions of the Money-Kyrle pattern and associated stagecraft.[149][150]
Trump rallies

Critical theory scholar Douglas Kellner compares the elaborate staging of Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will with that used in Trump rallies using the example of the preparation of photo op sequences and aggressive hyping of huge attendance expected for Trump's 2015 primary event in Mobile, Alabama, when the media coverage repeatedly cuts between the Trump jet circling the stadium, the rising excitement of rapturous admirers below, the motorcade and the final triumphal entrance of the individual Kellner claims is being presented as the "political savior to help them out with their problems and address their grievances".[151]
Connolly thinks the performance draws energy from the crowd's anger as it channels it, drawing it into a collage of anxieties, frustrations and resentments about malaise themes, such as deindustrialization, offshoring, racial tensions, political correctness, a more humble position for the United States in global security, economics and so on. Connolly observes that animated gestures, pantomiming, facial expressions, strutting and finger pointing are incorporated as part of the theater, transforming the anxiety into anger directed at particular targets, concluding that "each element in a Trump performance flows and folds into the others until an aggressive resonance machine is formed that is more intense than its parts."[152] Some compare the symbiotic dynamics of crowd pleasing to that of the professional wrestling style of events which Trump was involved with since the 1980s.[153][154]
Some academics point out that the narrative common in the popular press describing the psychology of such crowds is a repetition of a 19th-century theory by Gustave Le Bon when organized crowds were seen by political elites as potential threats to the social order. In his book The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (1895), Le Bon described a sort of collective contagion uniting a crowd into a near religious frenzy, reducing members to barbaric, if not subhuman levels of consciousness with mindless goals.[155] Since such a description depersonalizes supporters, this type of Le Bon analysis is criticized because the would-be defenders of liberal democracy simultaneously are dodging responsibility for investigating grievances while also unwittingly accepting the same us vs. them framing of illiberalism.[156][157] Connolly acknowledges the risks but considers it more risky to ignore that Trumpian persuasion is successful due to deliberate use of techniques evoking more mild forms of affective contagion.[158]

Rhetoric
A constant barrage of rhetoric rivets media attention while obscuring actions such as neoliberal deregulation. One study concluded that significant environmental deregulation occurred during the first year of the Trump administration but, due to its concurrent use of racist rhetoric, escaped much media attention. According to the authors, the rhetoric served political objectives of dehumanizing its targets, eroding democratic norms, and consolidating power by emotionally connecting with and inflaming resentments among the base of followers and distracted media attention from deregulatory policymaking by igniting media coverage of the distractions.[159]
According to civil rights lawyer Burt Neuborne and political theorist William E. Connolly, Trumpist rhetoric employs tropes similar to those used by fascists in Germany[162] to persuade citizens (at first a minority) to give up democracy, by using a barrage of falsehoods, half-truths, personal invective, threats, xenophobia, national-security scares, religious bigotry, white racism, exploitation of economic insecurity, and a never-ending search for scapegoats.[163] Neuborne found twenty parallel practices,[164] such as creating what amounts to an "alternate reality" in adherents' minds, through direct communications, by nurturing a fawning mass media and by deriding scientists to erode the notion of objective truth;[165] organizing carefully orchestrated mass rallies;[166] attacking judges when legal cases are lost;[167] using lies, half-truths, insults, vituperation and innuendo to marginalize, demonize and destroy opponents;[166] making jingoistic appeals to ultranationalist fervor;[166] and promising to stop the flow of "undesirable" ethnic groups who are made scapegoats for the nation's ills.[168]
Connolly presents a similar list in his book Aspirational Fascism (2017), adding comparisons of the integration of theatrics and crowd participation with rhetoric, involving grandiose bodily gestures, grimaces, hysterical charges, dramatic repetitions of alternate reality falsehoods, and totalistic assertions incorporated into signature phrases that audiences are encouraged to join in chanting.[169] Despite the similarities, Connolly stresses that Trump is no Nazi but is "an aspirational fascist who pursues crowd adulation, hyperaggressive nationalism, white triumphalism, and militarism, pursues a law-and-order regime giving unaccountable power to the police, and is a practitioner of a rhetorical style that regularly creates fake news and smears opponents to mobilize support for the Big Lies he advances."[162]
In his 2024 book Trump and Hitler: A Comparative Study in Lying, cultural theorist Henk de Berg points to a number of further parallels between Trump's and Hitler's rhetoric; namely, the use of jokes and personal insults; the deliberate creation of controversy; interpretative openness, allowing different groups to recognize themselves in the argument; and oratorical meandering in cases where a coherent narrative would draw attention to the argument's inconsistencies.[170] De Berg also points out that extremist language used by Trump's followers is often perceived as authentic, because in real life we also tend to overstate things (e.g., "My new boss is worse than Stalin").[171]
Branding
Trump used personal branding to market himself as an extraordinary leader by using his celebrity status and name recognition. As one of the communications directors for the MAGA super PAC put it in 2016, "Like Hercules, Donald Trump is a work of fiction."[172] Journalism professor Mark Danner explains that "week after week for a dozen years millions of Americans saw Donald J. Trump portraying the business magus [in The Apprentice], the grand vizier of capitalism, the wise man of the boardroom, a living confection whose every step and word bespoke gravitas and experience and power and authority and ... money. Endless amounts of money."[173]
Political science scholar Andrea Schneiker regards the branding strategy of the Trump public persona as that of a superhero who "uses his superpowers to save others, that is, his country. ... a superhero is needed to solve the problems of ordinary Americans ... Hence, the superhero per definition is an anti-politician. Due to his celebrity status and his identity as entertainer, Donald Trump can thereby be considered to be allowed to take extraordinary measures and even to break rules."[174][175]
Appeal to emotions
Historian Peter E. Gordon observes that "Trump, far from being a violation of the norm, actually signifies an emergent norm of the social order" where the categories of the psychological and political have dissolved.[176][note 6] In accounting for Trump's election and ability to sustain high approval ratings among voters, Erika Tucker writes in the book Trump and Political Philosophy that though all presidential campaigns have strong emotions associated with them, Trump was able to recognize, and then to gain the trust and loyalty of those who felt strong emotions about perceived changes in the United States. She notes, "Political psychologist Drew Westen has argued that Democrats are less successful at gauging and responding to affective politics—issues that arouse strong emotional states."[178]
Examining the populist appeal of Trump, Hidalgo-Tenorio and Benítez-Castro draw on the theories of Ernesto Laclau, writing, "The emotional appeal of populist discourse is key to its polarising effects, this being so much so that populism 'would be unintelligible without the affective component.' (Laclau 2005, 11)"[179][180]
Trump uses rhetoric that political scientists have deemed to be both dehumanizing and connected to physical violence by Trump's followers.[181]
Emotion, trust, and media
Scholar Michael Carpini states that "Trumpism is a culmination of trends that have been occurring for...decades...we are witnessing...a fundamental shift in the relationships between journalism, politics, and democracy." Carpini identifies "the collapsing of the prior [media] regime's presumed and enforced distinctions between news and entertainment."[182] Examining Trump's use of media in Language in the Trump Era, professor Marco Jacquemet writes that this approach "assumes (correctly, it appears) that his audiences care more about shock and entertainment value in their media consumption than almost anything else."[183]
Plasser and Ulram describe a media logic which emphasizes "personalization ... a political star system ... [and] sports based dramatization."[184] Olivier Jutel notes that "Trump's celebrity status and reality-TV rhetoric of 'winning' and 'losing' corresponds perfectly to these values", asserting that "Fox News and conservative personalities from Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck and Alex Jones do not simply represent a new political and media voice but embody the convergence of politics and media in which affect and enjoyment are the central values of media production."[185]
Studying paranoia in media, Jessica Johnson writes, "Rather than finding accurate news meaningful, Facebook users find the affective pleasure of connectivity addictive, whether or not the information they share is factual, and that is how communicative capitalism captivates subjects as it holds them captive."[186] Looking back prior to social media, researcher Brian L. Ott writes: "I'm nostalgic for the world of television that [Neil] Postman (1985) argued, produced the 'least well-informed people in the Western world' by packaging news as entertainment.[187] Twitter is producing the most self-involved people in history by treating everything one does or thinks as newsworthy. Television may have assaulted journalism, but Twitter killed it."[188] Commenting on Trump's support among Fox News viewers, Mark Lukasiewicz has a similar perspective, writing, "Tristan Harris famously said that social networks are about 'affirmation, not information'—and the same can be said about cable news, especially in prime time."[189]
Arlie Russell Hochschild holds that Trump supporters trust their preferred sources of information due to the affective bond they have with them. As Daniel Kreiss summarizes Hochschild, "Trump, along with Fox News, gave these strangers in their own land the hope that they would be restored to their rightful place at the center of the nation, and provided a very real emotional release from the fetters of political correctness that dictated they respect people of color, lesbians and gays, and those of other faiths ... that the network's personalities share the same 'deep story' of political and social life, and therefore they learn from them 'what to feel afraid, angry, and anxious about.'"[190]
From Kreiss' account of conservative personalities and media, information became less important than providing a sense of familial bonding, where "family provides a sense of identity, place, and belonging; emotional, social, and cultural support and security; and gives rise to political and social affiliations and beliefs."[191] Hochschild gives the example of a woman who states, "Bill O'Reilly is like a steady, reliable dad. Sean Hannity is like a difficult uncle who rises to anger too quickly. Megyn Kelly[note 7] is like a smart sister. Then there's Greta Van Susteren. And Juan Williams, who came over from NPR, which was too left for him, the adoptee. They're all different, just like in a family."[192]
Olivier Jutel notes that, "Affect is central to the strategy of Fox which imagined its journalism not in terms of servicing the rational citizen in the public sphere but in 'craft[ing] intensive relationships with their viewers' in order to sustain audience share across platforms."[note 8] In this segmented market, Trump "offers himself as an ego-ideal to an individuated public of enjoyment that coalesce around his media brand as part of their own performance of identity." Jutel states that news media companies benefit from offering spectacle and drama. "Trump is a definitive product of mediatized politics providing the spectacle that drives ratings and affective media consumption, either as part of his populist movement or as the liberal resistance."[193]
Researchers give differing emphasis to which emotions are important to followers. Michael Richardson argues that "affirmation, amplification and circulation of disgust is one of the primary affective drivers of Trump's political success." Richardson agrees with Ott about the "entanglement of Trumpian affect and social media crowds" who seek "affective affirmation, confirmation and amplification. Social media postings of crowd experiences accumulate as 'archives of feelings' that are both dynamic in nature and affirmative of social values."[194][195]
Social trust expert Karen Jones follows philosopher Annette Baier in explaining that the masters of the art of creating trust and distrust are populist politicians and criminals, who "show a masterful appreciation of the ways in which certain emotional states drive out trust and replace it with distrust."[196] Jones sees Trump as an exemplar of this who recognize that fear and contempt are tools that can reorient networks of trust and distrust in social networks to alter how a potential supporter "interprets the words, deeds, and motives of the other."[note 9] She holds that "A core strategy of Donald Trump...has been to manufacture fear and contempt towards some undocumented migrants (among other groups)", a strategy which "has gone global ... in Australia, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Italy and the United Kingdom."[196]