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Pax Silica

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Pax Silica
Motto: "Securing the Silicon Supply Chain"
  Member States of Pax Silica
TypeInternational economic-security initiative
Membership
Leaders
Jacob Helberg
Establishment
• Pax Silica Declaration
December 12, 2025; 7 months ago (2025-12-12)
Website
www.state.gov/pax-silica

Pax Silica is a United States-led international initiative focused on securing supply chains for advanced technologies such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI) and rare earth elements. The initiative implicitly targets reducing reliance on China and countering its dominance in these fields.[1][2][3]

The initiative is coordinated by the U.S. Department of State and was launched in December 2025 alongside the signing of the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration by an initial group of partner countries.[4][5]

Launch and background

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During the 2020s, governments increasingly treated supply-chain resilience in semiconductors, critical minerals, and AI-related computing infrastructure as a national-security priority, amid export controls, industrial policy measures, and geopolitical competition over the technologies underpinning advanced manufacturing and AI. Pax Silica was presented by US officials as an economic-security framework aimed at aligning policies and investment among "trusted partners" that host major technology firms and key industrial capacity.[4][6] Pacific Forum's analyst Akhil Ramesh, writing for the National Interest magazine, described the initiative as understanding that: "economic security today is inseparable from control over energy, critical minerals, high-end manufacturing, and advanced models."[7]

On December 11, 2025, the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit and a planned signing of the Pax Silica Declaration, describing Pax Silica as the Department's flagship effort on AI and supply-chain security.[8] The initial summit was held in Washington, D.C. on December 12, 2025. The State Department fact sheet described cooperation areas including connectivity and data infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, logistics, mineral refining and processing, and energy.[4]

The initiative describes itself as a "positive-sum" partnership intended to reduce "coercive dependencies" and improve resilience across the full technology stack, from mineral extraction and processing through chip manufacturing and computing infrastructure.[4] US officials described Pax Silica as a framework for coordinating flagship projects and policy alignment across partner countries, including supply-chain mapping, investment and co-investment initiatives, and protection of critical infrastructure and sensitive technologies. Reuters reported discussions of projects linked to trade and logistics routes and an industrial park initiative in Israel.[9] Gulf countries, such as the UAE and Qatar, are betting on attracting AI companies with cheap energy.[10] Moreover, the UAE's potential to invest in Pax Silica's activities has been noted as a fundamental asset for the initiative.[11][12][13] In early 2026, the U.S. announced plans to contribute $250M toward an investmest consortium that's intended to strengthen energy and critical mineral supply chains. [14]

Membership

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During the inaguration, seven countries signed the Pax Silica Declaration, while Taiwan, the European Union, Canada, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development participated as guests.[15][16] In January 2026, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were publicly identified as prospective signatories, with their accessions expected later that month.[17]

Countries that signed the Pax Silica Declaration

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Seven countries signed the declaration at the December 12, 2025, summit in Washington, D.C.:[5]

Some countries who attended the initial conversations did not immediately sign, while additional countries were invited to join after the discussions concluded. The following are the later signatory members on the declaration:[5]

Countries invited / participating, but not yet signed

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At launch, US materials and contemporaneous reporting described additional invited participants and observers, including:

  • Canada – observer/participant in related discussions, per US briefing materials; not listed among signatories.[6]
  • Taiwan – participated in summit sessions according to a State Department briefing; not listed among signatories.[6]
  • Estonia – became an observer and signed the declaration on June 26, 2026[29]
  • Bangladesh - Invited to join the initiative by US special envoy Sergio Gor on August 1, 2026[30]

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union were also noted by US officials as present in an observer capacity, but are not countries.[6]

Reception and criticism

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Philippines

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Following the Philippines' accession to the initiative in April 2026, the Pax Silica initiative was criticized by several farmers' organizations, environmental groups, civil society organizations, and political groups over issues including land use, environmental impacts, sovereignty, and foreign participation in strategic industries.[31][32]

In April 2026, agricultural organizations including Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka (PKSM), and Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya ng Pilipinas (Pamalakaya) opposed the proposed conversion of agricultural and coastal land for industrial development. KMP described the proposed economic security zone within the Luzon Economic Corridor as a "massive sellout", stating that it could accelerate land conversion, resource extraction, environmental degradation, and the displacement of farming and fishing communities. The groups also expressed concern that the planned 4,000-acre (approximately 1,618-hectare) artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing hub in New Clark City, Tarlac, could affect surrounding communities, food security, and existing land-use patterns.[33][34]

In April 2026, the Scientists and Technologists Oppose the US War (STOP US War) coalition, a network of scientists, technologists, environmental advocates, and civil society organizations that includes AGHAM, the Computer Professionals' Union, and the Kalikasan People's Network for the Environment, opposed the initiative, stating that it could facilitate what the coalition described as "resource plunder" and environmentally harmful extractive activities. The coalition also expressed concern that the Philippines' deposits of nickel, copper, cobalt, chromite, and rare earth elements could become increasingly integrated into foreign-led supply chains supporting artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, and other advanced technologies. It further argued that the initiative could reinforce the country's role as a supplier of raw materials while higher-value manufacturing and technological development remained concentrated abroad.[35]

Some advocacy groups also cited proposed cooperation with Israel on critical minerals, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity as an additional concern. Their criticism followed remarks by Israeli Ambassador to the Philippines Dana Kursh, who said that the Philippines' abundant nickel and other critical minerals could complement Israel's expertise in artificial intelligence, chip design, cybersecurity, and other technological fields, describing the Philippines as a potential partner in the initiative.[36]

Environmental organizations also raised concerns about the environmental impacts of semiconductor and artificial intelligence infrastructure, citing high electricity and water consumption, increased demand for critical minerals, and industrial waste management challenges associated with advanced manufacturing facilities.[37]

Some activist groups also criticized the initiative's relationship with broader United States–Philippines economic and security cooperation. They argued that integrating critical-mineral extraction, semiconductor manufacturing, and artificial intelligence infrastructure with strategic economic corridors could increase the Philippines' exposure to geopolitical competition and make industrial facilities potential targets during regional conflicts.[33]

In May 2026, members of the left-wing Makabayan Bloc raised concerns regarding sovereignty and governance arrangements associated with the initiative, including reports of proposed special legal arrangements for foreign personnel. Makabayan representatives argued that such arrangements could raise constitutional and sovereignty issues, while government agencies and project proponents maintained that the development would remain subject to Philippine law and regulatory oversight.[32]

A dispute also emerged over the legal status of the proposed Pax Silica economic security zone in New Clark City. On 18 May 2026, during a site visit by U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg, Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) President Joshua Bingcang said that the United States had requested that the zone operate under U.S. law and that U.S. personnel be granted diplomatic immunity. According to Bingcang, the Philippine government rejected the proposal and maintained that the project would remain subject to Philippine law and jurisdiction.[38][39][32]

On 25 May 2026, Helberg denied reports that the United States had sought diplomatic immunity, stating in a post on X that his earlier remarks had been "taken out of context" and that the U.S. position was intended to provide legal certainty and predictability for investors rather than diplomatic immunity. A spokesperson for the United States Department of State later declined to directly address the discrepancy between Helberg's account and statements made by Philippine officials.[40]

European Union

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In May and June 2026, some policymakers and analysts in the European Union raised concerns regarding regulatory autonomy and the bloc's relationship with United States technology policies as discussions on accession progressed. Critics argued that participation could affect the EU's strategic autonomy in areas such as export controls and semiconductor policy, while supporters maintained that the initiative would strengthen supply-chain resilience among partner economies.[41]

Netherlands

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In June 2026, discussion surrounding the initiative in the Netherlands focused on export-control policies affecting the Dutch semiconductor industry, particularly ASML. Some officials and industry representatives expressed concern that additional restrictions on technology exports to China could affect commercial operations and competitiveness.[42]

India

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From late 2025 through early 2026, discussion in India centered on the country's absence from the initiative's original membership. Some commentators and opposition politicians questioned India's exclusion despite its growing semiconductor sector and participation in other technology partnerships.[43]

See also

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References

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  1. ↑ "Inside the State Department's 'Pax Silica' Initiative". WP Intelligence. January 9, 2026. Retrieved June 6, 2026.
  2. ↑ "Pax Silica Explained: The US-Led Initiative With 'Trusted Allies' to Counter China, Excluding India". TimesNow. December 13, 2025. Retrieved June 6, 2026.
  3. ↑ Cytera, Christopher (January 14, 2026). "Pax Silica — Can it Stop China?". CEPA. Retrieved June 6, 2026.
  4. 1 2 3 4 "Pax Silica Summit (Fact Sheet)". United States Department of State. December 11, 2025. Retrieved January 13, 2026.
  5. 1 2 3 "The Pax Silica Declaration by countries attending the Pax Silica Summit, 12 December 2025". Australian Government – Department of Industry, Science and Resources. December 13, 2025. Retrieved January 13, 2026.
  6. 1 2 3 4 "Outcomes of the Pax Silica Summit (Foreign Press Center briefing)". United States Department of State. December 2025. Retrieved January 13, 2026.
  7. ↑ Ramesh, Akhil (January 24, 2026). "Pax Silica and the Case for Bringing Industry Back into Foreign Policy". The National Interest. Retrieved January 25, 2026.
  8. ↑ "Under Secretary Helberg Will Kick Off Pax Silica Summit with Landmark Declaration Signing". United States Department of State. December 11, 2025. Retrieved January 13, 2026.
  9. ↑ "Qatar and UAE to join U.S.-led effort to bolster technology supply chain". Reuters. January 11, 2026. Retrieved January 13, 2026.
  10. ↑ "Qatar joins US 'Pax Silica' as it races to catch up with Gulf neighbours on AI". Middle East Eye. Retrieved January 25, 2026.
  11. ↑ "UAE signs Pax Silica declaration to advance AI-era security | Computer Weekly". ComputerWeekly.com. Retrieved January 25, 2026.
  12. ↑ Marias, Stephen Las (December 23, 2025). "Pax Silica Signals a New Era of Tech-Centric Geopolitics". EE Times Asia. Retrieved January 25, 2026.
  13. ↑ Varghese, Justin (January 19, 2026). "Pax Silica: What the new AI tech bloc means for the UAE, global economy". Gulf News: Latest UAE news, Dubai news, Business, travel news, Dubai Gold rate, prayer time, cinema. Retrieved January 25, 2026.
  14. ↑ Maggie, Eastland (March 23, 2026). "US to Put $250 Million Toward Supply Chain Investment Fund". Bloomberg.
  15. ↑ "The Pax Silica Declaration by countries attending the Pax Silica Summit, 12 December 2025". Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources. December 13, 2025. Retrieved July 23, 2026.
  16. ↑ "Pax Silica Summit". United States Department of State. December 11, 2025. Retrieved July 23, 2026.
  17. ↑ Renshaw, Jarrett (January 11, 2026). "Qatar and UAE to join U.S.-led effort to bolster technology supply chain". Reuters. Retrieved July 23, 2026.
  18. ↑ "The Netherlands joins US-led push to secure AI and chip supply chains - Bits&Chips". Bits&Chips. December 17, 2025. Retrieved January 13, 2026.
  19. ↑ "The US Peace Corps launches new Tech Corps to bring AI expertise abroad. Here's what to know | Euronews".
  20. ↑ "Qatar and the United States sign "Pax Silica" declaration to strengthen cooperation in advanced technology". The Peninsula (via Zawya). January 13, 2026. Retrieved January 13, 2026.
  21. ↑ "Statement by Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba on the United Arab Emirates joining Pax Silica". Reuters. January 14, 2026. Retrieved January 13, 2026.
  22. ↑ "India formally joins US-led coalition Pax Silica on AI, supply chain". upstox.com. Retrieved February 20, 2026.
  23. ↑ "Sweden joins Pax Silica initiative". government.se. Retrieved March 17, 2026.
  24. ↑ Finland to participate in Pax Silica initiative
  25. ↑ "PH joins US-led Pax Silica; plan for industrial hub in Luzon unveiled". pna.gov.ph. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
  26. ↑ "Norway Joins Pax Silica Initiative".
  27. 1 2 3 "Under Secretary Jacob Helberg on the Accession of the European Union, Germany, and Greece to Pax Silica". United States Department of State. Retrieved June 24, 2026.
  28. 1 2 3 4 5 6 "Outcomes of the Second Pax Silica Summit". United States Department of State. Retrieved June 28, 2026.
  29. ↑ "Estonia became an observer state in the US-led Pax Silica initiative and signed the Pax Silica Declaration on Artificial Intelligence".
  30. ↑ "Gor proposes Bangladesh join US-led Pax Silica initiative".
  31. ↑ Desiderio, Louella; Lee-Brago, Pia (May 20, 2026). "Philippines rejects US diplomatic immunity request for planned AI hub". The Philippine Star.
  32. 1 2 3 Sinaking, Erika Mae P. (May 19, 2026). "BCDA rejects US jurisdiction claims on AI hub". BusinessWorld.
  33. 1 2 "Farmers' Group Condemns "Pax Silica" as a "Massive Sellout"". The Manila Journal. April 20, 2026.
  34. ↑ "New Clark City to host AI hub under US-led Pax Silica". Philippine News Agency. April 20, 2026.
  35. ↑ Gonzales, Gelo (April 29, 2026). "Sci-tech coalition opposes Pax Silica over 'resource plunder,' env't harms". Rappler. Archived from the original on May 19, 2026.
  36. ↑ Dela Cruz, Raymond Carl (May 27, 2026). "Israel eyes PH as Pax Silica partner for AI, semiconductor push". Philippine News Agency.
  37. ↑ Rosete, Franck Dick (April 21, 2026). "Environmental concerns raised over AI and semiconductor industrial zones". Bulatlat.
  38. ↑ Chi, Cristina (May 19, 2026). "Philippines rejects US request for diplomatic immunity at planned AI hub". Philstar.com.
  39. ↑ Desiderio, Louella; Lee-Brago, Pia (May 20, 2026). "Philippines rejects US diplomatic immunity request for planned AI hub". The Philippine Star.
  40. ↑ Chi, Cristina (May 26, 2026). "US official says immunity for Pax Silica Clark hub 'taken out of context'". Philstar.com.
  41. ↑ Bertuzzi, Luca (June 1, 2026). "The EU is set to join US-led chip alliance 'Pax Silica' to counter China's AI race". Euronews.
  42. ↑ Sterling, Toby (June 23, 2026). "Netherlands to join US-led Pax Silica AI initiative despite ASML dispute". Reuters.
  43. ↑ "Congress takes swipe at PM over India not being part of US-led Pax Silica grouping". The Economic Times. December 13, 2025.
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